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SYNOPSIS
A review of critical opinion past and present demonstrates the degree to which 
Stendhal is perceived as the exponent of a clearly defined philosophical tradition. 
Generations of scholars have lent support to the assumption that Stendhal made his 
own the mechanistic materialism of Hobbes and the hedonistic utilitarianism of 
Helvetius, whilst rallying to the sensationalist Ideology of Destutt de Tracy. The 
contention of this study is that such a view has been too uncritically endorsed, and that 
the definition of Stendhal as a ’philosopher’ calls for substantial revision. Stendhal is 
not a philosopher properly so called, namely one engaged in sustained argument; 
rather he is a philosopher in the popular sense of an intellectual, who brings 
philosophical concepts to bear upon a range of human, social and moral issues, and 
who addresses these concepts more from committed standpoints than detached 
reflection. The revision which the thesis attempts is, similarly, not a philosophical 
argument; it proceeds by documenting the concepts in question and by examining 
afresh the treatment which they receive in Stendhal’s writings and in the accounts of 
his commentators.
Placing Stendhal broadly within the intellectual context of his age, the thesis 
examines his reaction to contemporary philosophers and his perception of his own role 
as an expounder of ideas (Chapter I). Stendhal's conception of Philosophy as a 
discipline is considered in relation to his literary ambitions; for there is early evident in 
his writings a dichotomy between the philosopher and the artist which would 
re-emerge much later in the composition of his novels (Chapter II). Among the first 
and most compelling questions which Stendhal calls upon philosophy to resolve is the 
perennial problem of free will and determinism. While affinities with 
eighteenth-century radical philosophy are identified, these are shown to be confounded 
by a quite orthodox conception of human motivation and moral responsibility (Chapter 
III).
The thesis forsakes the common tendency among scholars to accept at face value 
Stendhal's professions of philosophical allegiance, and seeks instead to measure these 
against the notes, diaries, letters, and later published writings which attest to his 
philosophical development. Hobbes, Helvetius and Tracy provide instructive case 
studies, demonstrating the gulf that exists at times between the philosophy which 
Stendhal reads and his reading of it. The difficulty which Stendhal encounters in 
adhering faithfully to the most fundamental precepts of these thinkers calls into 
question the depth of his intellectual commitment to them, while it reveals an 
ineradicable attachment to the conventional definition of man with which such 
philosophers took issue. The thesis provides the first critical analysis of Stendhal's 
reading of Hobbes and of the philosophical treatise which he drafted thereafter in 1804 
(Chapter IV). This abortive treatise evidences both a serious misunderstanding of 
Hobbes's philosophy and a failure by Stendhal to break free of traditional dualist 
categories in his reasoning on human nature — a problem which will be apparent 
again in his reading of Tracy, and which has been overlooked by those many critics 
who readily annexe Stendhal to the latter's school of thought.
A very different case is presented by Stendhal's reading of the physiologist 
P.-J.-G. Cabanis. Here he would discover a whole new perspective on man as a 
living, organic entity. Through the reading of Cabanis, first in 1805, then, more 
notably, in 1811, Stendhal's conception of human nature undergoes a critical 
development. The thesis seeks to provide the first detailed account of this much 
neglected philosophical influence, exploring in particular Stendhal's debt to the notion 
of indwelling physiological determinants such as temperament. Stendhal’s earlier 
writings, with their abstract representation of human nature and their mechanistic 
overtones, are heavily indebted to eighteenth-century rationalism. Through the 
influence of Cabanis, he comes to embrace a much more concrete definition of man in 
which the role of the body is preponderant and in which human nature is held to be
indissociable from Nature in its widest sense (Chapters V and VI). The physiological 
determinism of Cabanis furnishes Stendhal with a new means of understanding 
himself and those around him. It legitimates the notion that human beings do not 
share, as Helvetius had claimed, a common fund of potentiality, but that they are 
intrinsically different in their characters and aptitudes. The effect of this idea upon 
Stendhal's philosophical, moral, aesthetic and political outlook would be far-reaching.
It is no misnomer to describe what Stendhal derives from Cabanis as a 
'naturalistic' philosophy of man. Yet the term sits ill with a novelist so unconcerned to 
portray the 'natural', material world in any detail. Stendhal is considered, therefore, in 
relation to the aims and methods of the later Naturalist movement and in the light of 
Zola’s critical assessment in particular (Chapter VII). The problem of integrating 
philosophy into the novel as Stendhal conceived of it is examined, and distinctions are 
drawn between the fictional art in which his 'naturalism' is muted and the range of 
other writings in which it is given full expression.
Nowhere is this aspect of Stendhal's thought more in evidence than in his studies 
of Italy. Here Stendhal's determinism — racial, geographical, social, historical — is 
most vividly articulated. Yet the Italy which he rediscovers in 1811, and from which 
he subsequently fashions his Italian ideal, is as much the fruit of invention as of 
observation. Stendhal's Italian is a persona who owes much to the reading of Cabanis 
and of whom some striking adumbrations are to be found in the Rapports du physique 
et du moral de Vhomme. Inescapable in this context are the notions of human 
sensibility and energy. More than the 'moral' qualities for which they have been taken 
almost without exception by critics, these are shown to have firm roots in the 
physiological conception of man derived by Stendhal from Cabanis (Chapter VIII).
Dissenting from what has become an established critical tendency, the thesis 
insists not upon the permanence of Stendhal's thought, but upon its signal evolution. 
A broad consideration of Stendhal's philosophical development invites the conclusion 
that his thought progressed far beyond the philosophy which is articulated in his early 
writings (Chapters IX and X). Stendhal's definition of man is indebted at the outset to 
the optimistic philosophy of the Enlightenment and Revolution; from this he would 
graduate to a much more pessimistic view of the human condition. The transition from 
a generic conception of Humanity to a cult of the individual 'self, while it is essential 
to the relativism of Stendhal's later aesthetic and moral outlook, betokens a 
fundamental revision of his earliest philosophical principles. The fatalistic perspective 
in which Stendhal comes to view human nature testifies to no apostolic succession in 
the line of Helvetius, Tracy and Cabanis, but to a definitive break with the whole 
reformist ethic of the philosophes and Ideologues.
REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS
Where the titles of Stendhal's works have not been given in full, they are abbreviated as 
follows:
Corr, I, II, III: Correspondence (Pleiade, 3 vols.)
/L, I, n, HI: Journal litteraire (3 vols.)
H dePt I, II: Histoire de la p,einture en Italie (2 vols.)
CA, I, II, III, IV, V: Courrier anglais (Le Divan, 5 vols.)
Chron., I, II, III, IV, V: Chroniques pour VAngleterre (Grenoble, 5 vols.)
Rossini, I, II: Vie de Rossini (2 vols.)
Mem surNap.: Memoires sur Napoleon
Vie de Nap.: Vie de Napoleon
VHMM: Vies de Haydn, de Mozart et de Metastase
Mel.journ.: Melanges: journalisme
Mel. peint.: Melanges: peinture
Mel. litt.: Melanges: litterature
Mel. pol/hist.: Melanges: politique/histoire
M de T, I, n, El: Memoires d'un touriste (3 vols.)
R et S: Racine et Shakespeare
S d'E: Souvenirs d'egotisme
HB, I, II: Vie de Henry Brulard (2 vols.)
01, 1, II: CEuvres intimes (Pleiade, 2 vols.)
Unless otherwise specified, the above relate to the Cercle du Bibliophile edition of 
Stendhal's works. The novels and short stories are cited not under their respective 
titles, but as part of the two-volume Pleiade edition, Romans et Nouvelles (abbreviated 
Romans); likewise the Italian travelogues, which are cited in the Pleiade edition, 
Voyages en Italie (abbreviated Italie).
INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about Stendhal's thought. Few indeed are those commentators 
who do not have some occasion to rehearse the classic definitions of Stendhal as a 'man 
of the eighteenth century', a votary of Ideology, a defiant materialist and exponent of 
hedonistic utilitarianism, a faithful advocate of Helvetius and Destutt de Tracy. The 
most cursory review of Stendhal scholarship would throw into relief a number of 
recurrent terms, among which 'rationalism', 'sensationalism', 'Ideology', 
'materialism', 'determinism', 'utilitarianism', would have a privileged place. While 
critics may not agree upon Stendhal's merits as a thinker, the above terms mark out 
clearly the ground upon which the question has long come to be addressed.
The reason is not far to seek. As Stendhal's notebooks, diaries and letters attest, he 
early declared allegiance to a philosophy which he is held to have espoused with 
unfailing conviction throughout his life. It is one thing, however, to assume a 
philosophical posture; quite another philosophically to sustain it. We are concerned in 
this study to examine a number of the definitions that have been commonly applied to 
Stendhal's thought, and to seek out some of the reasoning which informed his 
philosophical orientation. By what means, and to what extent, did he rationalise the 
principles which underpinned his philosophy? Did he always observe the logic of what 
those principles implied? How did he perceive the role of the philosopher, and to what 
degree does he keep faith with those thinkers whose influence he underwent?
The problems posed by such questions are many. Stendhal's thought is ambivalent 
and resistant to easy categorisation. 'Of all the great French writers,' affirms F.C. 
Green, 'Stendhal is least amenable to synthetic treatment.'1 The purpose of this thesis 
is to attempt no such treatment of Stendhal's thought; nor is it to endeavour to bridge 
the distance between divergent critical readings of it. Our objective is rather to 
concentrate upon a number of important questions which are central to any 
consideration of Stendhal's philosophy and which, we submit, stand in need of 
reassessment.
We begin by considering Stendhal within the intellectual context of his age, and by 
reviewing the critical opinion upon which his reputation as a thinker rests. Our intention 
is to demonstrate that, whatever the diversity of opinion over Stendhal's achievement as 
a 'philosopher', there is unanimity in placing him squarely within a well defined 
philosophical tradition. To acknowledge as much, however, is to come at once against 
a difficulty; For Stendhal's thought is often taxed with being unsystematic and with 
lacking a rigorous consistency. While there may be evidence aplenty in Stendhal's 
writings to support such a charge, the question must be considered in its wider context.
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If Stendhal grew to manhood in an age when the esprit de systeme had fallen from 
grace, he took up his pen at a time when synthetic and idealistic rationalism was not 
only creeping back into vogue, but was finding new and potent allies in a revived 
marriage of convenience between Church and Crown. Between the observation-based 
empiricism of the sensationalist tradition and the contemplative rationalism of a new 
generation of 'systematists', Stendhal saw a choice of near-Manichaean proportions. It 
is our contention that, in signalling the unsystematic nature of Stendhal's thought, 
critics have taken insufficient account of what he himself understood by systematic 
reasoning, and of the extent to which his writings reveal a quite conscious effort to 
avoid being deemed 'systematic' in the presentation of his ideas.
This is not to resolve, however, the problem which is thereby posed for 
assimilating Stendhal to a particular 'school' of philosophy. Central to this question is 
the time-honoured definition of Stendhal as heir to the radical materialist philosophy of 
thinkers such as Helvetius and d'Holbach, and acolyte of that group of intellectuals 
who have become known as the 'Ideologues' and who are adjudged to have provided a 
conduit from the eighteenth-century philosophes to later nineteenth-century positivism. 
From the earliest, critics have affirmed the importance — for good or for ill — of such 
influences upon Stendhal's intellectual development. From acknowledging Stendhal's 
affinities with the Ideologues to reserving a place for him in the history of French 
philosophy, moreover, has been but a short step for many of his commentators. The 
appraisals of Hippolyte Taine and Paul Bourget in the latter half of the 
nineteenth-century set the tone for succeeding generations of critics, who identified in 
Stendhal the exponent of a sensationalist philosophy running from Condillac to the 
Ideologues and their later nineteenth-century successors. Frangois Picavet's classic 
study of the Ideologues, to cite but one example among many, provides a striking 
demonstration of this readiness to annexe Stendhal to the philosophy in question. All of 
Stendhal's writings, from the novels through to De VAmour and the Vie de Henry 
Brulard, declares Picavet, 'nous montrent un disciple, meme un successeur et un 
defenseur, mutatis mutandis, des ideologues.'2
The qualification notwithstanding, to claim as much is to invite consideration of 
Stendhal as a vehicle for the aims, precepts and methods of a whole philosophical 
tradition. The antecedents of Ideology, while they may be 'as old as Epicurus',3 find 
their most influential expression for the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in 
the sensationalist epistemology pioneered by Locke and Condillac. Going further than 
either of the latter, the Ideologues sought to develop a thoroughgoing sensationalism 
predicated upon a monistic definition of man as a being determined solely by his 
physiological organism and its interaction, through sense-experience, with the 
environment. The annexation of Stendhal to this school of thought and all it implies has
2
not only gained widespread and enduring currency: it has assumed the status of a 
self-evident truth. 'The connection between Stendhal and Ideologie has so often been 
pointed out,' asserts Gilbert Chinard, 'that it would be superfluous to call attention to 
it.’4
Such a statement bears witness to what has become a very real problem in the 
approach to Stendhal's thought. For it is all too easy for definitions to petrify, 
discouraging scholars from going over ground which, it is assumed, has been amply 
covered already. Acknowledging Stendhal's association with Ideology in his scholarly 
study of the later French Enlightenment, Sergio Moravia cuts short his discussion of 
the question with the remark: 'Ma il rapporto di Stendhal con gli ideologues e cosa 
troppo nota perche occorra insistervi ancora.'5 Yesterday's inquiry thus becomes 
today's presupposition. The problem is not new. Nor is it restricted to Stendhal's 
rapports with the Ideologues specifically. In the Avant-propos of his early study, Les 
Idees de Stendhal, Jean Melia had no hesitation in concluding that, given the range of 
influences at work upon his thought from the earliest, Stendhal 'ne pouvait etre que 
materialiste.'6
However apparently conclusive the evidence for such an assertion, it articulates a 
view of Stendhal which has never been subjected to critical scrutiny. Instead, it has 
proved something of a locus classicus amid a body of scholarly opinion which holds 
the nature of Stendhal's philosophical allegiance to be, in its fundamental principles at 
least, beyond question. Even those many commentators who, after the fashion of Leon 
Blum, insist upon a 'romantic' counter-tendency to the philosopher in Stendhal, cast no 
doubt upon his intellectual adherence to the precepts of the Ideologues and their 
eighteenth-century predecessors.7 For them, as for Jean Theodorides, Stendhal remains 
a confirmed disciple of Ideology, 'un materialiste convaincu, dans la lignee des 
"philosophes" du siecle des Lumieres.'8
Burnished by succeeding' generations of critics, such definitions, then, have 
become the common coinage of Stendhal scholarship. Yet we may ask: what is the 
precise nature of the debt which Stendhal contracted to the mechanistic materialism and 
sensationalist psychology that are so commonly held to have been his philosophical 
stock-in-trade? The question, far from being otiose, is one which becomes all the more 
apposite in view of the now established tendency among critics to take Stendhal's 
philosophical orientation for granted. For it is only when one proceeds from easy 
generalities to a more detailed consideration of Stendhal's thought that the problem 
which we have intimated above becomes fully apparent. We may cite as a single 
illustration of this problem Sergio Moravia when he writes of Stendhal: 'Appassionato 
di Hobbes, devoto ammiratore di Helvetius e di d'Holbach, leggera e rileggera piu volte
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i testi degli ideologues.'9 Though it finds endorsement in much of the scholarship 
which devotes consideration to Stendhal’s thought, such a description of the latter as a 
devotee of Hobbes and d'Holbach is highly misleading. For Stendhal's ’passion' for 
Hobbes, inspired as it was by an erroneous reading of the latter's philosophy, was 
assuredly a thing of the past by 1806. And if his admiration for d'Holbach may be 
assumed, it is certainly not bome out by the textual evidence available. Across the 
whole range of Stendhal's writings, there is barely a reference to the author of the 
Syst&me de la nature, and, surprising though this may be, there is no clear indication 
that Stendhal ever undertook even the most perfunctory reading of this philosopher.
Upon such grounds alone, the case for some reappraisal of Stendhal's thought can 
be made. It becomes the more compelling, however, when one considers those thinkers 
whom Stendhal did read and for whom he does reserve his sustained admiration. If 
there is much in Helvetius and Destutt de Tracy which explains their appeal for 
Stendhal, there is much, too, which must make us question the range and depth of that 
appeal. There can be litde doubt that Stendhal is indebted to these thinkers for a number 
of strong and enduring philosophical principles that he would make his own. Yet, taken 
as a whole, the concept of man propounded by Helvetius or Tracy bears decidedly little 
resemblance to the concept of man which awaits us in the pages of Stendhal. Nothing, 
it seems, could be further removed from the vital, dynamic, energetic self that is so 
much an object of admiration for Stendhal than the mechanistic-materialist man posited 
by Helvetius. What meaning might be assigned to the notions of 'energy', 'genius’, 
'generosity', even 'character' itself, within the definition of man as an inert product of 
his environment, a tabula rasa with no inherent dispositions, activated solely by 
external stimuli and incapable of seeking anything but his own material gratification? 
How might the intrinsic qualities and predispositions that define the human being of 
extraordinary cast, the exceptional individual, be accounted for within Helvetius's 
conception of a humanity cut from a common cloth to a common standard?
Nor could anything be less suited to accommodate Stendhal's concepts of 
'passion', 'reason' or 'will' than the simple 'faculte de sentir' postulated by Tracy. One 
could not embrace in all their scope the subtle hues and rich complexities of human 
consciousness while subscribing to the crude, reductionist equation between thought 
and sensation upon which the whole edifice of Ideology was founded. The distinction 
between reason and passion itself, a distinction much present in Stendhal's construction 
of human nature, is conjured away by a doctrine which admits of no substantive 
discrimination between the cognitive and affective realms in man. The more such a 
distinction could be effaced, the more the traditional concept of a rational faculty 
presiding over’the thoughts and wishes of the individual would be undermined, as 
would any obscurely conceived realm of 'heart' — or, a fortiori, 'soul' — invested
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with functions arising neither from the body nor from the intellect. If the mind is but a 
blank slate upon which sense-experience leaves its impressions, if it has no active 
principle by which to galvanise itself into thinking or willing, then this has radical 
implications for the character psychology and moral accountability of human beings. 
Man could be seen at last for what he is: a determined material being in whom the 
notions of moral conscience and free will, no less than those of divine revelation and an 
immortal soul, would be exposed as so much illusion.
Such considerations, while they may appear prima facie  to echo some of 
Stendhal’s most cherished principles, in fact suffice to call into question the very 
foundations of his debt to the environmentalism of Helvetius or the sensationalism of 
Tracy. While Stendhal lends his endorsement in principle to the rationale which they 
expound, he will prove recalcitrant in his adherence to just those concepts which it was 
the intention of Helvetius and Tracy to abolish. Stendhal, it is true, sets out resolutely 
down the path traced by these philosophers, finding in the sensationalist basis of mind, 
the pleasure-pain calculus, the self-interest theory, and the utilitarian ethic, important 
keys to moral and social man. But he could not be satisfied for long with the essential 
passivity upon which such concepts were predicated. The ’will’, for Helvetius as for 
Tracy, is a process, not an initiative faculty: a result, not a cause in itself How could 
this passive, mechanistic conception of human determination be squared with 
Stendhal’s, insistence upon a self-motive faculte de vouloirl This is but one of the 
questions which impresses itself upon the reader who passes from the Elemens 
d'ideologie and De VEsprit to what is often, in Stendhal, a quite radically different 
conception of human nature. For as with the 'will', so with the 'mind' in general. The 
shift from the definition of all mental operations — cognitive, affective and volitional 
alike — as mere modified sense-impressions, to a view of the mind as an independently 
defined, self-directing set of faculties, opens up at times an unbridgeable gulf between 
Stendhal and his 'mentors'. Through a fundamental change in emphasis — from 
passivity to activity, from determinism to spontaneity, from a self bereft of autonomy to 
a self with power to arbitrate over its thoughts and desires, from a monistic definition 
of man to a quasi-dualistic view of mind and matter, head and heart — Stendhal will 
visit distortions upon the most fundamental of the precepts which he holds from 
Helvetius and Tracy both. It would be a peculiar reader of the Vie de Henry Brulard 
who would come away with the impression of a vacant human nature, an indefinitely 
malleable 'self determined in its every least thought, desire and mode of being by 
influences from without. Yet this denial of a permanent, substantial 'self was the very 
starting-point for Helvetius. It would require a no less peculiar reading of Le Rouge et 
le Noir or Lamiel to discover therein a faithful restatement of the theory that the will is 
no prime mover but a purposeless receptacle of determined stimuli, an essentially 
passive instrument awaiting activation by forces beyond itself. Yet such is the principle
5
upon which Tracy rests his refutation of volition as a free moral agency in man.
These brief preliminary observations, in arguing the need to bring a critical eye to 
bear upon Stendhal’s reading of the philosophy with which he is associated, anticipate 
a number of the questions which it is our purpose to address in this study. To what 
extent does Stendhal’s thought square with the definitions that have been affixed by 
posterity to his name? What is the precise nature of the materialist philosophy that has 
been so readily ascribed to him by succeeding generations of critics? To what degree do 
his writings provide a faithful articulation of the precepts — sensationalist, 
deterministic, utilitarian — that are central to the philosophy of the Ideologues and of 
their eighteenth-century predecessors? Such questions, though necessarily broad in 
their purview, are only part of what must be considered in any study of Stendhal's 
thought For there is a Stendhal who predates the reader of the Ideologues, just as there 
is a Stendhal who will go beyond the bounds of what is endorsed by Destutt de Tracy 
and his compeers. We propose not to study Stendhal as an idiologue, but to consider 
Ideology as part of the broader philosophical development which he underwent. In so 
doing, we wish to challenge the widely held view that Stendhal early forged a 
philosophy to which he would owe unfaltering allegiance throughout his writing life. It 
is our contention that Stendhal's philosophical education stretches far beyond the point 
at which it is customarily halted by critics who contrive to discover in the young Henri 
Beyle all the essential elements of his later philosophy.
Detailed attention will be given to. Stendhal's earliest philosophical ideas as he 
records them in his notebooks, diaries and letters. We shall examine in this context the 
philosophical treatise which he undertook to write in 1804. Though it has been largely 
consigned to obscurity by Stendhal scholars, the Filosofia Nova furnishes a valuable 
insight into his mind during this early period. The most significant point about this 
ill-conceived philosophical venture, we shall argue, is its failure; for it demonstrates 
some of the difficulties which Stendhal encountered in handling the precepts of a 
philosophy that he is generally held to have espoused with ease. In this respect, we 
contend, Stendhal's reading of the English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, provides a 
compelling corrective to his reputation as a philosophical 'materialist'.
By considering in detail Stendhal’s early philosophical endeavours, we are better 
placed to measure the substantial development which his thought was to undergo. 
Whatever Stendhal's reputation as a disciple of Hobbes, Helvetius and Tracy, it is clear 
that he became alive to the shortcomings of each in turn. For they did not provide a 
complete account of human nature in all its range and diversity. On this question, the 
importance of a quite different philosophical preceptor will emerge. The influence of the 
physiologist P.-J.-G. Cabanis upon Stendhal has been seriously neglected by scholars.
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Yet Cabanis, as we shall seek to demonstrate, furnishes some of the most crucial 
ingredients in Stendhal's conception of human nature. At its most primitive, Stendhal's 
philosophy rests upon a highly abstractive and somewhat archaic notion of man, as a 
being actuated by the lofty forces of passion and reason, and able, through a judicious 
exercise of the latter, to exert control over his character and conduct. In the writings of 
Cabanis, by contrast, Stendhal would discover a whole new definition of man as a 
physical organism subject to the determining influences of temperament and of the 
wider natural environment. Though he would hold throughout to his division of man 
into heart and head — a factor which bedevils from the earliest his concepts of 
materialism and determinism alike — the implications of his reading of Cabanis were to 
be far-reaching. In the Rapports du physique et du moral de I'homme, Stendhal 
discovers what Hobbes, Helvetius and Tracy had failed to provide: a means of 
accounting for man as a concrete, living entity.
In this sense, it will be important to draw a distinction between the metaphysical, 
mechanistic materialism of Hobbes and the physiological 'materialism' of Cabanis. 
Such a distinction is called forth by the fact that so many assessments of Stendhal's 
thought appear to rest on the assumption that the thinkers whose influence he 
underwent merely retail versions of the same philosophy, and that to align Stendhal 
with one is to align him with all. This is far from being the case. The distinctions that 
obtain between such thinkers as Hobbes, Helvetius, Destutt de Tracy and Cabanis shed 
important light upon Stendhal's philosophical predispositions and evolution. To define 
Stendhal as a 'materialist' is insufficient, where it is not misleading. To describe him as 
a disciple of Hobbes is quite erroneous. Stendhal is best defined, we shall argue, when 
we abandon the attempt to make him fit the mechanistic mould of earlier materialist 
philosophy and recognise in his thought a combination of influences, not least among 
them the psycho-physiological naturalism of Cabanis and the conception of Nature 
advanced by the developing physical sciences in the early nineteenth century.
Yet the term 'naturalism', with all its connotative accretions, appears fraught with 
contradiction when applied to a writer so unconcerned to portray the 'natural', material 
world in any detail. We consider, therefore, the disparity that exists between the 
naturalistic philosophy to which Stendhal holds in principle and his conception of the 
novel. The refusal to translate his materialist and determinist leanings unambiguously 
into the novel raises questions which invite us to consider Zola's ambivalent 
appreciation of Stendhal. Despite what the latter might hold in principle to be the 
influence of race, milieu and moment, his conception of the novel, we argue, militated 
against the obtrusive presence of 'philosophy'. We attempt to take some account of the 
conscious choices which Stendhal confronted on this question, and we consider a 
number of ways in which determinism may be seen to be at work, through suggestion,
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in his novels.
. If Stendhal's 'naturalism' is muted in his novels, it finds unhindered expression 
across the range of his other writings. The influence of Cabanis is to the fore not only 
in I'Histoire de la peinture en Italie, but in other works, from Rome, Naples et Florence 
through De VAmour to the Promenades dans Rome and the Memoires d'un touriste. 
Stendhal's private diaries and letters, his biographical and autobiographical writings, 
too, are infused with the physiological notions derived from Cabanis. We draw 
attention, in this respect, to the importance of the year 1811, which saw the coincidence 
of Stendhal's reading of Cabanis with his real discovery of Italy — a 'discovery' in 
which there is a substantial element of invention. Central to our interest here, the 
questions of energy and sensibility are considered from a physiological point of view, 
an aspect which has been neglected by scholars, who have tended to define such 
concepts in purely moral terms. The energetic, passionate, natural Italian is, in part at 
least, we contend, a construct of Stendhal's imagination who owes much to Cabanis 
and of whom we find some clear prefigurations in the Rapports du physique et du 
moral de Vhomme.
The final chapters of the thesis seek to provide a broad overview of Stendhal's 
philosophical development. From the optimism of his early years, an optimism resting 
upon the notion of a common humanity susceptible of improvement through education 
and legislation, he gravitates towards a much bleaker and more fatalistic view of the 
human condition. The relativism and individualism that bulk so large in Stendhal's 
aesthetic and moral outlook owe much, we argue, to his diminished faith in the 
possibility of any real community of interest or experience among men. From the ideal 
of a universal humanity to a cult of the exceptional individual, from an endeavour to 
mathematise the study of man to a celebration of the irrational, imponderable, 'anarchic' 
element in human nature, the transition can be traced through Stendhal’s private and 
published writings. The effect of such a transition upon his social and political 
philosophy is measured against the buoyant civism of his early years. Stendhal's loss 
of faith in the moral and political reformism of thinkers such as Helvetius and Cabanis, 
far from attesting his place within the tradition which Ideology sustains, foreshadows 
his effective renunciation of the ideologue ethic, with all its considerable debt to the 
notions of human perfectibility and social regeneration.
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CHAPTER I
STENDHAL AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HIS AGE
Perceptions of Stendhal as Philosopher
i. Early Criticism: The Polarisation of Opinion.
The question of Stendhal as a thinker has long exercised the minds of his 
commentators. In the first major study of Stendhal's thought, published in 1868, Albert 
Collignon presented his subject as nothing less than a 'pionnier philosophique', forging 
across the range of his writings 'le vaste ensemble d'une philosophic'. Proclaiming 
Stendhal the forerunner of a new intellectual generation, Collignon defined him 
unstintingly as 'un penseur profond, un observateur penetrant, philosophe fort instruit, • 
logicien rigoureux et original.'1 While it contrasted with the tenor of much of the 
criticism which had greeted Stendhal's writings during his lifetime and in the years 
immediately following his death, Collignon's encomium found a resonance in others of 
his generation. Foremost among these was Hippolyte Taine, who, in the Introduction 
to VHistoire de la litterature anglaise, hails Stendhal as a philosopher ahead of his 
time.2 Emile Zola, too, discerned in Stendhal a thinker of some stature, at once a man 
of the eighteenth century and a precursor of the later nineteenth. Reserving for him a 
place in the van of the Naturalist movement, Zola deemed Stendhal the link between 'la 
conception metaphysique du XVHIe siecle et la conception scientifique du notre.'3 As 
the apologist of the roman experimental put it, 'Stendhal appliquait en philosophe des 
theories que nous tachons aujourd'hui d'appliquer en savants.'4
Zola's assessment, like that of Taine before him, provides something of a 
landmark in the appraisal of Stendhal as a philosopher-novelist, much as Balzac's 
review of La Chartreuse de Parrne serves as an early landmark in the appreciation of 
Stendhal as a literary technician.5 What distinguishes Zola from Taine in his praise of 
Stendhal is the point at which he chooses to rest his case’ For he stops some way short 
of Taine's eulogistic appraisal of Stendhal as the 'naturaliste' and 'physicien' who had 
opened the way towards an understanding of 'les causes fondamentales' — 'les 
nationalites, les climats, les temperaments.'6 Zola's criticism, indeed, was that Stendhal 
had been too philosophical, too rationalistic, taking insufficient account of race, milieu 
and moment as determining factors in man's character and destiny. Stendhal's was 'une 
etude purement philosophique et morale de l'homme considere simplement dans ses 
facultes intellectuelles et passionnelles, et pris a part dans la nature.'7 The world 
according to Stendhal, Zola concluded, was incomplete as a result; it was, he judged, 
'de l'humanite quintessenciee par un procede philosophique.'8
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Despite their different emphases and quite divergent conclusions, Taine and Zola 
rested their respective assessments, like Collignon, upon a genuine regard for Stendhal 
as a thinker. It is as a thinker, too, that the latter would appeal to Paul Bourget, who, in 
his Essais de psychologie contemporaine, gives due praise to the literary artist in 
Stendhal, adding:
Mais sous l'artiste il y a un philosophe, et meme le philosophe domine sans cesse.
La faculte souveraine de cette pensee en mouvement reside dans l'invention d'idees
generates.9
'C’est un philosophe et c'est un ideologue,' insists Bourget, for whom Stendhal is both 
a philosopher in his own right and the legatee of an established philosophical 
tradition.10 Though such favourable appraisals were penned at a time of renascent 
interest in Stendhal, he had early been recognised as an insightful and original thinker. 
In a fine obituary article published in January 1843, Auguste Bussiere had put the case 
with cogency, presenting Stendhal as a thinker who, the critic claimed, 'a eu plus 
d'idees enfin qu'il n'en faut pour planter une banniere a soi dans le champ de 
l'invention et tenir etat de chef d'ecole.'11 The point is echoed in an article of 1846 by 
Hippolyte Babou, who, for all his mandatory recognition of Stendhal’s 'asperites 
blessantes’, ascribes an incisive rationalism — 'un esprit froid, etendu, sense, 
raisonneur' — to this 'terrible logicien’.12
Such a perception of Stendhal was to gain widespread and enduring currency 
among future generations of commentators.13 It is one thing, however, to acclaim 
Stendhal as a thinker; quite another to define with precision what we are to understand 
by this. The point is not an idle one. We argued in our Introduction that a consensus 
has crystallised around the question of Stendhal’s philosophical orientation. Yet if we 
confront a number of the passages in which his thought is discussed, we are presented 
with some apparently radical discrepancies. While M.E. Carcassonne rehearses the 
classic definition of Stendhal as 'un heritier du XVIIIe siecle rationaliste, plein de 
confiance dans l'efficacite des idees claires et des theories bien ordonnees', Robert 
Adams can point with equal conviction to the same Stendhal's mockery of intellectual 
systems in general, his debunking of 'rationality itself.14 In view of Stendhal's 
long-established reputation as a philosopher and ideologue, we may be surprised in 
turn to find Alain Girard contending that Tabsence de toute preoccupation 
philosophique ou religieuse apparait comme un des traits marquants de son oeuvre.’15 
While J.-C. Alciatore argues that Stendhal, from the earliest, 'se revele metaphysicien', 
H.-F. Imbert ascribes to him 'le plus beau mepris voltairien pour tout ce qu'il est 
commode de ranger sous la rubrique "metaphysique".'16 What, then, are we to make of 
George Brandes when he grandly proclaims Stendhal 'the metaphysician among the
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French authors of his day, as Leonardo was the metaphysician among the great painters 
of the Renaissance’?17
At issue here, as a fuller reading of the critical appraisals in question attests, is not 
any fundamental divergence in the interpretation of Stendhal’s thought, but rather a 
simple failure in each case to clarify the sense of the terms by which it is designated. 
We are confronted at the outset, therefore, with the problem of defining, in broad terms 
at least, the philosophy to which Stendhal held in the first decades of the nineteenth 
century. While we shall have occasion to consider in some detail Stendhal’s 
understanding of the term philosophie itself, the terms 'metaphysics' and 'rationalism' 
owe much of their sense — and much of their ambiguity in the instances cited — to a 
long association with aprioristic, speculative philosophy and deductive-rationalist (as 
opposed to inductive-experimentalist) thought.18 In the case of a mind so ill-disposed 
as Stendhal’s to the subtleties of philosophising in vacuo,19 the terms must be handled 
with care. Stendhal himself defines la metaphysique, in a letter of 1806, as 'la 
connaissance des moyens que nous avons pour connaitre ce qui nous environne, et de 
Vaction de ces moyens.'20 It is this epistemological sense which Alciatore and Brandes 
clearly have in mind when declaring Stendhal a 'metaphysician' after the fashion of 
Helvetius and Condillac.21 Though the term would retain this respectable sense for 
Stendhal,22 it harbours a much more incriminating connotation when applied to that 
philosophy for which he would never tire of arraigning German thinkers, and none 
moreso than Immanuel Kant: 'cette metaphysique reveuse et brumeuse,' as he puts it, 
'qui passe chez nos bons voisins pour de la philosophie.'23 This, broadly, is the sense 
in which Girard, Imbert and Adams employ their terms when they affirm Stendhal's 
sweeping disregard for 'philosophy', 'metaphysics' and even 'rationalism' itself.24
Whatever the ambiguities and apparent contradictions that are thrown up by the 
foregoing, Stendhal's thought must be recognised to have little in common with 
philosophy in any contemplative or strictly rationalistic sense. Nowhere is he concerned 
with the first principles or final causes which take the philosopher into the realms of 
abstruse speculation: his 'metaphysic' is this-wordly; it begins and ends, as J.-C. 
Alciatore observes, with 'la connaissance de l'homme'.25 If by 'philosophy' we 
understand the wrestling with such traditional metaphysical problems as the existence 
of God or the immortality of the Soul, then we shall find little that is philosophical in 
Stendhal. Denied outright as a foregone conclusion, such concepts have a place in his 
reasoning only insofar as they provide strongholds against which to deploy a 
philosophical militancy that draws its impetus as much from what it denies as from 
what it affirms. To posit a world free of supernatural causation is, of course, to make 
an enormous statement from the outset. In sweeping aside so much of the traditional
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stuff of philosophical inquiry, Stendhal might be accused of as much presumption and 
prejudice as he denounces in those 'metaphysicians' whom he is tireless in berating.26 
But one could not, he held, gain any sure knowledge of man and man's world without 
first dispensing with that whole body of presuppositions and gratuitous hypotheses — 
rationalistic, supernatural, theological —  that had for so long bedevilled the 
philosopher.27 Stendhal may, in keeping with the age from which he issues, make of 
Reason the summum bonum, the ultimate guarantor of truth and moral well-being alike. 
His whole intellectual animus is, however, directed against a particular tradition of 
rationalism which, ascribing to the mind a place and function apart within the human 
economy, constitutes the very antithesis of the sensationalist school to which he early 
professes allegiance. Paul Bourget, in endeavouring to define the contours of 
Stendhal's thought, takes account of this essential consideration. 'Beyle n'est pas 
seulement un philosophe,' insists Bourget,
c'est un philosophe de l'ecole de Condillac, d'Helvetius et de leur continuateur, 
Destutt de Tracy. II a subi, jusque dans les moelles, l'influence du sensualisme 
ideologue, qui est celui de ces theoriciens. Avec eux, il attribue a la sensation 
l'origine de toute notre pensee. Avec eux, il resout dans le plaisir tous nos mobiles 
d'action et tous nos motifs. Poussant ces premiers principes jusqu'a leur extreme 
consequence, il considere que le temperament et le milieu font tout l'homme. Sa 
metaphysique sommaire le rend implacable pour les subtiles inventions de 
l'idealisme allemand, comme elle le rend feroce sur l'article de la religion.28
Writing in 1914, Leon Blum echoes much of Bourget's assessment. 'Comme 
Helvetius et comme Condillac,' affirms Blum, Stendhal 'est empiriste, sensualiste et 
rationaliste; comme eux, il met la sensation a la base de toute connaissance; comme eux, 
il forme l'idee de sensations controlees et generalises; comme eux, tout en limitant le 
role de la raison au classement logique de l’experience, il croit a sa toute-puissance sur 
la nature.'29 In Blum's wake, W.H. Fineshriber makes a similar judgment. Drawing 
'the principles of his rationalism' from Condillac, Helvetius, Cabanis, Montesquieu 
and Destutt de Tracy, Stendhal is, according to Fineshriber, 'an empiricist and a 
sensualist' who despises 'the vague uncertainty of all metaphysics.'30 The same notion 
is pushed further still by F.C. Green, according to whom Stendhal represents 'the 
extreme limit attained by the anti-Cartesian revolt inspired by Locke early in the 
eighteenth century and pursued by two generations of sensualistes.'31
Such recognition of Stendhal's status as a thinker and of his place within a broader 
philosophical tradition is not restricted to the claims oi a faithful few. In his Essai sur 
Vhistoire de la philosophie en France au XIXe sidcle, J.-P. Damiron wrote of the 
Ideologue movement that it had found its physiologist in Cabanis, its metaphysician in 
Tracy and its moralist in Volney.32 To this distinguished group, a number of scholars 
would come in turn to annexe the name of Stendhal. Francis Picavet, in his classic
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study of the Ideologues, devotes serious consideration to Stendhal as a porte-parole of 
the movement. Schooled in Cabanis, Tracy, Helvetius and Hobbes, Stendhal is, 
according to Picavet, a full-fledged disciple and a continuator of the Ideologues.33 A 
distinguished professor of philosophy like Picavet, Henri Delacroix, too, reserves a 
place for Stendhal in the annals of the discipline. Delacroix goes so far indeed as to 
express the hope that his study, La Psychologie de Stendhal, if it has little to offer the 
Stendhalian, might prove of benefit 'aux historiens de la philosophie.'34 Admitted thus 
to the ranks of philosophical respectability, Stendhal has found his place reserved in 
studies of the school of thought with which his name is associated. C.H. Van Duzer, in 
his Contribution of the Ideologues to French Revolutionary Thought, rehearses the 
view of Stendhal as a mind 'shaped' and 'moulded' by 'Ideologic influences'. 
Borrowing the earlier formula of Paul Arbelet, Van Duzer considers Stendhal to be 'the 
"novelist, psychologist and critic" of the Ideologic doctrines.'35 No less does Emile 
Cailliet, in La Tradition litteraire des ideologues, acknowledge the ideologue in 
Stendhal and credit him as one of the leading lights of the movement. 'De meme que 
Condorcet devient l'historien de l'ldeologie,' contends Cailliet, 'Stendhal va s'instituer 
son romancier, son essayiste et son critique.'36 In his French Philosophies o f the 
Romantic Period, George Boas, while likewise ascribing Stendhal's turn of mind to the 
influence of Ideology, goes further still. Though he might be said to 'belong to the 
ideological tradition,' argues Boas, Stendhal is, in his psychological analysis and his 
admiration for energy, 'more than an Ideologue.'37
As such endorsements clearly demonstrate, Stendhal is seen and respected by a 
substantial body of informed opinion as a thinker and as a continuator of the 
philosophical tradition to which he has been assimilated. It is largely, indeed, through 
the ministrations of Stendhal that Ideology has acquired what limited place history has 
seen fit to accord it.38 The thought would have been a curious one for that group of 
intellectuals who, meeting in the salon of Destutt de Tracy in the 1820s, observed the 
portly figure of this dilettante author on their fringes.39 It would, in fact, be a number 
of years before the world of philosophy itself was to pay any kind of tribute to Stendhal 
as a thinker — and then the compliment was to come not from Hippolyte Taine alone, 
but from another and more redoubtable, if not altogether unlikely, source.
Friedrich Nietzsche, whose enthusiastic appreciation of Stendhal is well 
documented, was to find something of the fellow philosopher in him.40 'Wer hat 
recht?', writes Nietzsche in Zur Genealogie der Moral, 'Kant oder Stendhal?'41 The 
question relates to Stendhal's definition of beauty as 'une promesse de bonheur' and 
provides Nietzsche with a means of assailing the notion, not only in Karit but in 
Schopenhauer too, that beauty affords disinterested pleasure 42 The point is a 
significant one, for it underlines Nietzsche's readiness to accord Stendhal a meaningful
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if polemically expedient — place within Philosophy. 'That he should play off 
Stendhal here not only against Kant, whom he has always despised, but also against 
Schopenhauer,' observes W.D. Williams, 'shows the magnitude of the impression 
made on him.'43
The magnitude of the impression made upon Nietzsche by Stendhal is manifest in a 
number of similar instances. In Ecce Homo, it is as a thinker of great insight and 
perception that Nietzsche upholds Stendhal, 'mit seinem vorwegnehmenden 
Psychologen-Auge, mit seinem Tatsachen-Griff.' Here, he claims, was an 'ehrlicher 
Atheist’, one of a rare breed among the French 44 Though the German philosopher 
happened late upon Stendhal, the latter would remain, as W.D. Williams notes, one of 
'the happiest discoveries of Nietzsche's life’, cherished to the end as 'a defiant 
philosopher of energy.'45 In Jenseits von Gut und Bose, it is, significantly, to Stendhal 
that Nietzsche looks in order to substantiate his contention that the term 'philosopher' 
should not be reserved for bookish writers of philosophical treatises. The definition of 
the philosopher, Nietzsche argues, should be extended to accommodate those 
'free-spirited' thinkers of whom he cites Stendhal as exemplar 46
Appreciations of Stendhal the 'philosopher', however, were not always to be so 
generous. Writing at the turn of the century, Rene Doumic would declare Stendhal's to 
be 'une philosophie fort courte. C'est celle qu'on pouvait attendre d’un homme qui 
tenait Helvetius pour le plus grand des philosophes.'47 In similar vein, Edouard Rod 
contends that the 'ensemble de croyances, d'idees et d'opinions’ which make up 
Stendhal's thought 'est assez peu logique, et constitue une pauvre "philosophie".'48 
Stendhal's misfortune, Rod asserts, 'fut de prendre cette "philosophie" au serieux', 
consigning himself thus to 'le cercle etroit de ses certitudes negatives et steriles.'49 
Writing half a century before Doumic and Rod, Elme Caro had gone further than both 
in denouncing the exiguity of Stendhal's philosophy. 'Toute sa philosophie,' as Caro 
has it, 'se reduit a cet axiome fondamental: le plaisir pendant la vie, le neant apres.'50 
Such assessments are curios of a particular type of literary criticism which throve in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Stendhal criticism in this early period was 
often too polemical in its intent, too concerned with moral sanction to provide any 
objective appraisal of the author’s thought. Bernard Weinberg stresses the degree to 
which early critical assessments of Stendhal were non-literary in character, taken up as 
they were 'with the philosophy and, still more definitely, with the moral attitude of the 
author.'51 Thus, for Caro, Stendhal is a 'fanfaron de vices', whose philosophy is 
nothing short of 'la corruption redigee en axiomes, formulee en dogmes.'52 Among the 
most unsparing of Stendhal’s early critics, Caro was a tireless opponent of the atheistic 
materialism with which the latter was associated and a champion of thfe idealistic
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philosophy in whose name Emile Faguet would in turn engage the impious author of Le 
Rouge et le Noir,53 Faguet, indeed, echoes Caro's charge against Stendhal, 
denouncing the same 'fanfaron de vices' as 'un sceptique, puis un contempteur et un 
ennemi de toute morale.'54
These broadsides of moral censure were part of an intellectual, religious and 
political reaction against an Enlightenment and Revolutionary philosophy which was 
seen to have passed on much of its charge to the positivism of the mid-nineteenth 
century.55 A number of critics insist upon Stendhal's role as a conduit from the 
philosophes through to the later Positivist and Naturalist movements. 'Stendhal, qui 
regut a son arrivee a Paris le coup de foudre de M. de Tracy,' writes Albert Thibaudet, 
'reste le feal des ideologues, et c'est de sa main que Taine prend non pas a vrai dire le 
flambeau philosophique, mais le bougeoir d'argent du XVIIIe siecle.'56 Others are less 
parsimonious in their assessment of Stendhal's contribution in this respect. '[Des] 
Philosophes et des Encyclopedistes aux Ideologues, et de ceux-ci, par l'intermediaire 
des Stendhal et des Taine, aux Positivistes de 1860 et aux Naturalistes de 1880, la 
chaine reste tendue,' writes Emile Cailliet, echoing the earlier judgment of Pierre 
Martino.57 Matthew Josephson likewise attributes to Stendhal the merit of having 
handed on 'the torch of the Enlightenment at a time when the rationalistic tradition was 
in danger of dying out.’58
Not all of Stendhal’s commentators, however, saw this achievement as being quite 
so creditable. Though it has long been commonplace to refer to Stendhal as a 'man of 
the eighteenth century', the designation had decidedly disparaging connotations in the 
hands of some of his earliest critics. Rene Doumic is characteristic of this tendency 
when he defines Stendhal as '[un] sensualiste, un athee, un epicurien a la mode du 
XVIIIe siecle finissant, mais chez qui l'imagination a regu l'ebranlement de la gloire 
napoleonienne.'59 A more censorious note still is struck by Barbey d'Aurevilly, who, 
in his essay of 1856, had launched a spirited assault against what he deemed 'un esprit 
si particulier," souille par une detestable philosophic au plus profond de sa source.’60 
For the mordant polemicist of the Revue du monde catholique, Stendhal is
ce dernier venu du XVH[e siecle, qui en avait la negation, l'impiete, l'analyse 
meurtriere et orgueilleuse, qui portait enfin dans tout son etre le venin concentre, 
froidi et presque solidifie de cette epoque empoisonnee et empoisonneuse a la 
fois...61
Such attacks ad hominem were long to be a feature of Stendhal criticism.62 In 1876, the 
inauspiciously named Charles Bigot published a less than sympathetic portrait of 
Stendhal as 'une conscience malade’, a self-proclaimed reprobate liable to deprave the 
morals of a younger generation.63 Eugene-Melchior de Vogue, in breaking his lance
16
against the new Realist school in 1886, deplores in turn the ’influence desastreuse’ of a 
Stendhal who, he declares, 'ignore volontairement le mystere qui subsiste par-dela les 
explications rationnelles, la quantite possible du divin.'64 The publication of Stendhal's 
Journal by Casimir Stryienski and Francois de Nion in 1888 was the occasion for a 
tirade of acerbic criticism which saw Stendhal dubbed variously a 'materialiste a 
outrance', a 'sceptique endurci', a 'vilain monsieur', an 'ecrivain malsain' and 'un 
mechant homme, d'une mechancete systematique'.65
Nor was it necessary for Nietzsche to insist upon the esteem in which he held his 
'defunct friend'66 in order for parallels to be drawn between the two. The early 
twentieth century saw a marked tendency among Stendhal's critics to seize upon the 
alleged affinities between the creator of Julien Sorel and Nietzsche. 'Toute la 
philosophic de Nietzsche est dans Stendhal,' declares Jean Melia, according to whom 
the same 'culture du moi' passes intact from Stendhal to the German philosopher.67 
Writing in 1911, Melia echoes Emile Faguet, who had earlier remarked: 'On pourrait 
considerer Stendhal comme le premier des Nietzscheens, si le premier des Nietzscheens 
n'etait pas Voltaire.'68 Ernest Seilliere, James Huneker, Horace B. Samuel, Lytton 
Strachey,69 all retail in turn the same view of Stendhal as 'a prophet of that spirit of 
revolt in modem thought which first reached a complete expression in the pages of 
Nietzsche.'70 Even Leon Blum, in his highly sympathetic study, feels constrained to 
give expression to the same idea:
En depit de toutes les differences, le beylisme repose sur une vue analogue a celle 
de Nietzsche. Certaines idees sont nourriture de maitres et les autres pature 
d'esclaves.71
It is against this background that Pierre Sabatier, in his Esquisse de la morale de 
Stendhal published in 1920, would recognise in Nietzsche 'un disciple de Stendhal, 
avec sa theorie du surhomme et de l'amoralisme.'72 Sabatier goes considerably further 
than a number of his fellow-critics, placing Stendhal at the fountain-head of 'une 
ethique nouvelle’ and discerning a 'communion d'idees’ between his thought and that 
of 'nombre d'ecrivains, comme Schopenhauer et Nietzsche, des moralistes de l'histoire 
comme Taine, des romanciers, comme Merimee, Zola ou Wilde.'73 Thus it is, writes 
Sabatier, that, 'ardemment oppose au principe chretien,' Stendhal's guiding principle of 
the self surrendered to its primitive impulses 'va devenir la loi de toute une generation 
de philosophes et de moralistes.' ■/4 . * .
Heady criticism indeed. Yet such was the gravamen of the charge brought against 
Stendhal by a number of critics in the first decades of the twentieth century. Le 
' beylisme became now a term redolent of unbridled individualism and social 
domination. Here, it was held, was a philosophy forged from Helvetius and the
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Ideologues, and turned to the service of a practical ethic which threatened to subvert the 
moral order. Stendhal's philosophy had been denounced from the first as an intellectual 
posture; never had it been presented quite so insistently as a danger to the social fabric. 
The new hysteria with which critics sought to combat Stendhal was in direct proportion 
to his growing popularity among the reading public and to the increased critical 
currency which his works were enjoying both in France and abroad. While Sabatier 
went so far as to descry 'une si dangereuse fermentation' of beylisme among the 
masses, Jean Carrere, reserving for Stendhal a place of honour in his 'index' of 
reprehensible thinkers, Les Mauvais Maitres, found an object of acute concern in the 
'fanatiques admirations' which the latter's writings had spawned.75 Even the faithful 
Pierre Jourda, in his Etat present des itudes stendhaliennes of 1930, feels constrained 
to insist upon the 'tendances dangereuses de sa morale',76 while endeavouring to 
'absolve' Stendhal, as he puts it, of a predisposition towards theories which seem at 
best 'demoralisantes', at worst 'anarchiques'.77
ii. Later Criticism: The 'Systematic' Criterion
This brief review of early criticism serves as a useful introduction to the study of 
Stendhal's thought. For it demonstrates that, whatever the diversity of opinion over his 
merits as a thinker, and whatever the polemical tones in which his name was invoked, 
there was broad agreement from the earliest in according Stendhal his place within a 
well defined philosophical tradition. All of the foregoing assessments attest clearly to 
one thing: the store which was set — from Taine, Zola, Collignon, Bourget and 
Nietzsche, through to Caro, Barbey d'Aurevilly, Faguet, Rod and others — by the 
philosophy that was held to underpin Stendhal's writing.78 This philosophy was 
construed in different ways and to different ends, leaving Stendhal scholarship in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries divided, broadly speaking, into two 
irreconcilable camps: those who were in sympathy with the aims and methods of the 
philosophes and Ideologues, and those who championed the reaction of a new age 
against them.79 Though it is perhaps comprehensible in this light, it is nonetheless 
remarkable that, almost a century after Stendhal's death, so little had been done to 
provide any full and objective account of his thought. While devotees were selective in 
what they praised, detractors made virtually no attempt to go beyond the most 
superficial condemnation. The charge that Stendhal was an atheistic materialist of 
eighteenth-century persuasion, that he was, in the words of Rene Doumic, 'un eleve 
docile de Condillac, d’Helvetius, du baron d’Holbach, de Cabanis et de Tracy,’80 
precluded the need, it was clearly felt, for any detailed consideration of his thought.
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The middle and later decades of the twentieth century have witnessed a more 
objective response to the question of Stendhal’s philosophy. Less concern with the 
ethical implications of 'Beylism' as a practical code of conduct has permitted a more 
balanced appreciation of Stendhal's capacities as a thinker. For when one strips away 
the moral and political considerations which so determined the response of 
commentators in his own century, one is able to turn to the more essential question of 
how Stendhal's thought hangs together as an intellectual whole. On this question, the 
verdict has not always been a favourable one. As early as 1919, Paul Arbelet, while 
being far from unsympathetic towards his subject, divined in Stendhal an 'esprit 
simpliste' and a dearth of ideas.81 Stendhal's thought, Arbelet suggests, 'est, comme 
un theoreme de geometrie, satisfaisante seulement dans ses bomes etroites.'82 Arbelet, 
curiously, feels no need to square this with the contention, advanced elsewhere in the 
same study, that Stendhal is both a 'philosophe' and an 'ideologue'.83 Robert Adams, 
in his Stendhal: Notes on a Novelist, supports the apparent contradiction in Arbelet's 
view, describing Stendhal as a 'philosophical novelist' whose 'abstract ideas were few 
and almost spectacularly limited.'84 Emile Cailliet, too, echoes Arbelet's remarks, 
adding the qualification (as Arbelet himself had done) that, if Stendhal’s store of ideas 
was strictly limited, he held nonetheless with tenacity to those few 'points fixes' which 
afforded him his intellectual bearings.85
While in each of these cases the recognised limitations of Stendhal's philosophy do 
nothing to diminish its perceived coherence, other commentators have been less 
restrained in acknowledging the disjointed character of Stendhal's reasoning. What 
emerges most clearly, in fact, from the assessments of those who have sought to arrive 
at some synthesis of Stendhal's philosophy, and who have been served in this by the 
publication of a substantial body of private writings, is the extent to which his ideas are 
deemed to lack a rigorous internal consistency, to be, as Erich Auerbach puts it, 
'erratic, arbitrarily advanced, and, despite all their show of boldness, lacking in inward 
certainty and continuity.'86 On this point, admirers and detractors alike have found 
common cause. ’Peu philosophe,’ wrote Emile Faguet, Stendhal ’n’a pas su ramener 
ses tendances a un systeme.'87 Stendhal was 'anything but a systematic writer,' argues 
in turn Michael Wood. 'He loved the metaphor of the system, the image of a clean, 
ordered, properly explicable world. But it was only the metaphor he loved.'88 Manuel 
Brussaly goes further, deeming Stendhal 'incapable of maintaining a thesis',89 while 
for Victor del Litto the latter remains throughout 'refractaire aux idees generates.'90 As 
Del Litto puts it, Stendhal 'n'a jamais eu du philosophe ni la penetration ni la puissance 
de raisonnement ni l'esprit de systeme.’91 A similar interpretation is advanced by 
Georges Blin, who finds Stendhal 'inapte a toute gestion methodique de sa pensee.’ 
For all the acuity of the latter's philosophical insights, argues Blin, 'il manquait a un
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rare degre du genie dialectique et du sens des ensembles.'92
It would be difficult, certainly, to exonerate Stendhal from the charge that his 
thought is unsystematic, that he was, as Lytton Strachey put it, 'too capricious, too 
unmethodical, in spite of his lo-gique, ever to have framed a coherent philosophy.'93 It 
is a point that is pithily, if somewhat savagely, expressed by the Spanish philosopher, 
Jose Ortega y Gasset, when he opens his essay 'Amor en Stendhal' with the assertion: 
'Stendhal terna la cabeza llena de teorfas; pero no tema las dotes de teorizador.'94 Such 
estimable opinions notwithstanding, however, we must be cautious in selecting the 
criteria by which Stendhal's thought is to be judged. For a love of paradox and 
mystification, a penchant for the ironic sally and the arresting turn of thought or phrase, 
a readiness to play defence and prosecution alike in the setting forth of argument,95 do 
not conduce to the sustained dialectic of the consummate philosopher. It has been said 
of Friedrich Nietzsche that his thought does not readily lend itself to generalisation, that 
his 'entire output is characterized by what may be called, at best, flashes of 
consistency.'96 Without going quite so far, the same might well be argued of Stendhal, 
whose aphoristic turn of mind and strong sententious reasoning so appealed to the 
German philosopher.97
Such a superficial comparison, while open to serious objection, does beg the 
question of the relationship between philosophy and systematic reasoning. The problem 
is one which Geoffrey Strickland acknowledges when he argues that Stendhal 'was not 
himself a systematic thinker or rather did not have a system to offer — which is 
different from saying that his thought was lacking in coherence, depth or 
consistency.'98 Though it is not our intention here to consider the full implications of 
this judgment as it relates to Stendhal, the qualification which it introduces is apposite. 
For the assessments cited above depend for their validity upon what we understand by 
'systematic' reasoning; they depend, too, and not least, upon what Stendhal himself 
understood by such. The fact is that, of all the questions which give rise to the 
introspection of the self-conscious author in Stendhal, none exercises him more than 
the nature of his philosophical convictions and the manner in which these should be 
expressed through his writings. In this sense, it is important to recognise that the 
critical assessments which we have considered make a common point with which 
Stendhal himself would not have taken issue. For he would have been the first to 
acknowledge the strict limitations of his thought as a 'philosophical' enterprise. 'Par 
instinct', he reflects in the Vie de Henry Brulard, 'ma vie morale s'est passee a 
considerer attentivement cinq ou six idees principales, et a tacher de voir la verite sur 
elles.'99 This reduction of his whole intellectual life to a handful of 'idees principales' 
is highly significant. For Stendhal makes no claim to range in his thought. His concern 
is, by his own avowal, nowhere that of the synthesist. 'Comme j'ai toujours creuse les
memes idees depuis,' he notes, reflecting on his youth again in the Vie de Henry 
Brulard,
comment savoir ou j'en etais alors? Le puits avait dix pieds de profondeur, chaque 
annee j'ai ajoute cinq pieds, maintenant a cent quatre-vingt-dix pieds comment 
avoir l'image de ce qu'il etait, en fevrier 1800, quand il n'avait que dix pieds?100
The charge by Stendhal's critics that his reasoning is 'unsystematic' stands to be 
balanced against remarks such as these. The evidence is that Stendhal, far from 
considering it ungenerous, would quite have assented to the suggestion that his thought 
escapes the constraints of any rigorous dialectic. In his latter years as in his youth, 
Stendhal considered that too many questions remained unanswered, too many doubts 
undispelled, for him to be able to subscribe to any neatly ordered, 'systematised' view 
of the world. In a letter written to his sister Pauline in August 1804, Stendhal makes a 
telling point:
Voila, ma chere Pauline, quatre pages de philosophic que je viens d'ecrire sur du 
papier a lettres, au lieu de les mettre sur mon cahier. J'avais besoin de trouver une 
verite nouvelle, et voila le chemin pour y parvenir: beaucoup d'exemples. Des 
qu'on s'en ecarte, on tombe dans les systemes, on reve, et ceux qui vous ecoutent 
se moque [j/c] de vous.101
This is the triumph of the self-proclaimed empiricist over the rationalist. For Stendhal, 
there was something distinctly im-philosophical, something intellectually fraudulent 
about 'systematic' reasoning. Truth could not be bent to accommodate any rationalistic 
model of reality, but could be founded only on the bedrock of experience and 
observation. 'La philosophic de Condillac invoque sans cesse l'experience,' Stendhal 
would write in the New Monthly Magazine of May 1825.102 Those thinkers, by 
contrast, who — 'sous le nom de syst&mes de philosophie' — banish experience in 
favour of a priori hypotheses, are fit at best to produce 'des romans'103 Stendhal’s 
scornful dismissal of Schlegel in the margin of the latter's Cours de litterature 
dramatique is typical of such judgments: 'L'auteur admet une philosophie independante 
de la raison ou de Vexperience. C'est tout dire.'104
Throughout his life, Stendhal retained the same deep-rooted suspicion of 
'systematic' reasoning as a preserve of charlatans and an instrument of dogmatism and 
sophistry. His especial disdain was reserved for what he labelled the Germanic and 
Greek traditions, with their 'systemes pretendus philosophiques qui ne sont qu'une 
poesie obscure et mal ecrite.'105 In this, Stendhal echoed the sentiment of philosophes 
and Ideologues alike. For his allegiance lies from the earliest with those currents of 
empirical philosophy which denounced 'systematic' reasoning as sterile and 
retrogressive.106 Hostility to systems had been, as F.L. Baumer observes, 'a hallmark 
of eighteenth-century philosophy.'107 Destutt de Tracy, in founding the new 'science
21
of ideas', was no more sparing than his forebears in denouncing the 'gens de I'ecole' 
and 'sectateurs de certains systemes philosophiques.'108 The latter were in turn to find 
an implacable opponent in Stendhal.109
Though Ideology might be accused of having abolished one type of system only to 
erect another in its place,110 it found its guiding spirit in a relentless opposition to the 
esprit de syst&me and a cult of observation and 'fact' that was to have realigned 
philosophy and science on a new path towards truth.111 Nowhere, as Sergio Moravia 
argues, were the new ideals more in evidence than in the medical sciences as they 
developed from the mid-eighteenth century onwards, and in particular under the 
impetus of such philosopher-practitioners as P.-J.-G. Cabanis and Philippe Pinel.112 
The rediscovery of Hippocrates provided a rallying point for the developing science of 
physiology and an icon around which the new spirit of empiricism crystallised its 
ideal.113 As Aram Vartanian observes, the 'ideal philosopher— whom La Mettrie and 
Cabanis alike strove to personify for their contemporaries — became the 
medecin-philosophe.'114 The point is an important one. For in a footnote to one of the 
chapters on temperament which appear in VHistoire de lapeinture en Italie, Stendhal in 
turn gives a glimpse of what he considers to be the sole enduring model of 
philosophical integrity:115
C'est aux medecins ideologues, et par consequent vdritables admirateurs 
d'Hippocrate et de sa maniere severe de ne chercher la science que dans l'examen 
des faits, qu'il faut demander justice de tous ces jugements temeraires sur lesquels 
Paris voit batir, tous les vingt ans, quelque science nouvelle. Facta, facta, nihil 
praeter facta, sera un jour l'epigraphe de tout ce qu'on ecrira sur l'homme.
To this, he adds the further note:
On jugera de tous ces poemes en langue algebrique, qu'en Allemagne un 
pedantisme sentimental decore du nom de systemes de philosophie, par un mot: ils 
ne s'accordent qu'en un point, le profond mepris pour Vempirisme. Or, 
l'empirisme n'est autre chose que l'experience.116
This call for a knowledge founded on fact rather than on speculation is one of the 
pillars of Stendhal's intellectual world. 'La vraie science,' he writes to his sister 
Pauline in 1811, 'en tout depuis l'art de faire couver une poule d'Inde jusqu'a celui de 
faire le tableau d'Atala, de Girodet, consiste a examiner, avec la plus grande exactitude 
possible, les circonstances des faits.'11? The remark is significant; for it displays the 
same faith in a universal method which informed the whole Ideological enterprise and 
acted as a unifying principle across the disciplines of philosophy, science and medicine 
in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It is clear from VHistoire de la 
peinture en Italie that, for Stendhal, the whole of modem science and philosophy find 
their common model in the empirical method pioneered by Francis Bacon.118 For all
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the superficiality of Stendhal's remarks on Bacon, the latter wins his respect as 'un vrai 
philosophe', 'l'un des plus grands hommes des temps modernes',119 who rescued 
philosophy from centuries of obscurantism by making experience — or facts — rather 
than a priori hypotheses — or systems — the basis of knowledge.120
Francis Bacon, if he was in reality little more than a name to Stendhal, embodied 
an empiricism which, by the eighteenth century, had become enthroned as a 
philosophical ideal.121 The primacy of fact and observational data, for which 
'experiment' became both a method and a short-hand term, was to be, as Paul Hazard 
puts it, 'la puissance bienfaisante qui fera s'ecrouler les temples du faux.'122 The ideal 
was a lofty one, and the use to which Stendhal put it was, as we shall see, fitful. What 
matters for our purpose here, however, is that Stendhal should have leapt with such a 
will to the support of the empiricists’ cause. For, from the outset, he sought — in 
principle at least — to draw the whole of his rational sustenance from the same elixir, 
what he would come to describe colourfully as 'le jus des faits.'123 In this clearly 
defined philosophical rationale, it can be argued, lies the source of his abiding 
predilection for le petit fait vrai.124 'Fatti,fatti: des faits, des faits!', he exclaims to his 
sister Pauline in a letter of August 1804, enjoining her to furnish him with insights into 
the female world. 'J'ai besoin d'exemples, de beaucoup, de beaucoup de faits.'125 To 
the same Pauline he had observed as early as January 1803: 'Hors la geometrie, il n'y a 
qu'une seule maniere de raisonner, celle des faits.'126 This latter remark recalls a 
journal entry of 16 December 1802, in which Stendhal had noted quite simply: 'Le 
raisonnement par les faits est, ce me semble, le meilleur de tous.'127
Nor would the criterion of philosophical rectitude vary with time. It is by the same 
standard precisely that Stendhal will praise Napoleon in 1818 for having been 
'philosophical', not in any 'metaphysical' sense of the term, but because '[il] jugeait 
par les faits.'128 Such, too, will be the yardstick applied to that model of empiricism, 
Hippocrates, who, in the margin of Montesquieu's De VEsprit des lois, is lauded by 
Stendhal for having recognised that 'toute vue generale, qui n’est pas un resultat precis 
des faits, n'est qu'une pure hypothese.’129 In 1831 still, in a letter to Adolphe de 
Mareste, we find an insistence on the primacy of fact that echoes closely the letters 
despatched some three decades earlier to Pauline Beyle. 'Ecrivez-moi toutes les nuances 
des faits,' Stendhal urges his friend:
II est important [...] de connaitre les nuances des faits. [...] Ne negligez aucune
nuance. Tout est dans les nuances.130
What is interesting in this latter example is that 'fact', once held by Stendhal to be the 
atom of truth, has itself been atomised. Facts are, it is now suggested, too crude in
23
themselves to yield any meaningful truth; for that, one must descend further into the 
details — or, in Richard Coe's fine expression, the 'momentous minutiae'131 — of 
experience. As truth, ever elusive, takes refuge in smaller particulars and more arcane 
circumstance, this 'sectaire du "petit fait" isole', as Georges Blin dubs him, would have 
recourse to 'l'epluchement progressif des nuances.'132 Thus, as Lucien Leuwen 
recounts the tale of his electoral mission to Blois and Caen, we will be reminded, 
through the mouthpiece of his father, of Stendhal's diminished faith in bait fact as a 
means to truth:
Plus de details, plus de details, disait-il a son fils, il n'y a d'originalite et de verite
que dans les details...133
Empirical Doubt and Rational 'Faith1: Philosophies in Conflict
Whatever the practical difficulties of achieving truth in detail, Stendhal never wavered 
in his contention that observation and experience alone could serve as a basis for sure 
knowledge. Indissociable from this empirical insistence on fact was the advocation of a 
'methodical doubt' which should evacuate the mind of all preconception and prejudice, 
leaving it ready to assimilate only those truths that were ratified by experience. 
Stendhal's writings from the earliest ring with a quasi-Cartesian injunction to doubt:
Faire l'inventaire de son savoir de temps en temps, et se reprouver tout ce qu’on 
croit.
Ne se determiner jamais quia magister dixit, mais voir les raisons qui 
convainquaient le maitre.
Ne croire que ce que j'aurai vu moi-meme.134
His letters to Pauline read at times like a sceptic's handbook:
Ce que je te recommande, c'est [...] de ne rien croire sans examen.
N'ayez aucun prejuge, c'est-a-dire ne croyez jamais rien parce qu'un autre vous l'a 
dit, mais parce qu'on vous l'a prouve.
Tout homme qui croit, parce que son voisin lui dit: Croyez! est un butor.135
Though in Stendhal’s case this methodical doubt — this 'doute philosophique, etat 
habituel du sage'136 — is, as we shall argue, little more than a posture, a rhetorical 
imperative, it serves as an essential principle in his division of philosophy into the 
warring camps of sound reason and charlatanism. In Stendhal's conception of
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philosophy, the place of doubt is always reserved.137 Thus, in the Promenades dans 
Rome, he will remark upon Camuccini's Incredulity of Saint Thomas: 'je suis toujours 
surpris que ce grand acte de philosophie soit represente dans les eglises.'138 Stendhal's 
judgment of Descartes is especially interesting in this regard. For he upholds the value 
of Descartes's method, while throwing out the whole philosophy in whose service it 
was deployed.139 'On a vu Descartes,' he writes in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, 
'deserter une methode sublime, et, des le second pas, raisonner comme un moine.'140
Such a judgment was, of course, as caricatural as it was banal, the common 
coinage of philosophes and Ideologues bent on abolishing the Cartesian division of 
man into material and mental realms, as part of a broader assault on innate ideas and the 
incorporeal soul.141 Yet contained here, too, is the substance of Stendhal's charge 
against 'system-builders' in general. For the problem inherent in philosophical systems 
is, according to Stendhal, that they come to rely more upon faith than upon reason; as 
such, they are seen as an impediment to, rather than an instrument of, intellectual 
progress. 'La philosophie allemande a toujours une petite chose qu’elle vous prie de 
croire,' he notes in a copy of the Promenades dans Rome. 'Quand vous lui aurez 
accorde cette grace, elle expliquera tout'142 In a footnote of Rome, Naples et Florence, 
Stendhal provides one of the best illustrations of his views on this whole question, 
together with an illuminating glimpse of what he recognised as the source of his own 
much vaunted empiricism:
J'ai honte de donner si peu de profondeur a certains examens; le pedantisme a la 
mode fait applaudir les phrases vagues sur ce qu'on appelle la philosophie; mais 
l'on est moins indulgent pour l'analyse des faits particuliers. Je supprime, par 
respect pour l'opinion, un parallele entre le caractere des Bolonais et celui des bons 
habitants de Milan. Deux cents de ces petits examens partiels mettraient a meme 
quelque grand philosophe tel qu’Aristote de comparer le caractere des peuples du 
Midi et celui des peuples du Nord. Diderot appelait cela commencer par le 
commencement. Ce n'est que par des monographies de chaque passion du cceur 
humain que l'on pourra parvenir a connaitre l'homme; mais alors tout le monde rira 
des phrases louches de Kant et autres grands philosophes spiritualistes. La 
metaphysique est si peu avancee parmi nous, que l'on en est encore a l'ere des 
syst&mes: voyez les progres de la physique et de la chimie, depuis que l'on a laisse 
les systemes a MM. Azais et Bemardin de Saint-Pierre. En fait de logique, les 
jeunes Fran9ais arrives dans les salons depuis la Restauration sont bien moins 
avances que la generation formee dans les Ecoles centrales. II faudra revenir a ces 
Ecoles des que nous serons delivres des jesuites.143
Instructive in a number of particulars, this passage serves as a profession of faith, 
offering a glimpse of the conflict as Stendhal perceived it in the mid-1820s between the 
progressive, enlightened, analytical philosophy of the empiricists and the rationalistic 
revival ushered in by Kant and taken up in France by such figures as Pierre-Paul 
Royer-Collard and Victor Cousin.144 Stendhal's own articulation of the analytic 
principle, with the two hundred 'petits examens paitiels' which he advocates here as an
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exemplary philosophical method, raises, however, a number of questions. For one 
might legitimately ask at what point, and indeed how, individual facts which are 
themselves subject to caution — 'II ne faut jamais generaliser le fait dont on tire une 
consequence'145 — become fused into a compound basis for valid general conclusions. 
The problem is adumbrated in an amusingly paradoxical maxim which Stendhal coins 
— unwittingly, one suspects — in an early notebook that is replete with like sentential 
'Toute maxime generale ayant du faux, c'est un mauvais genre d'ecrire que les 
maximes.’146
Stendhal nowhere addresses the question in a manner which resolves — or even, 
indeed, fully rationalises — the problematic transition from the particular to the general; 
but it is clear here, as it is elsewhere, that he viewed the accession to truth as a process 
of accretion, 'l’examen patient des details' serving as the first stage in 'la lente 
acquisition des verites generates.'147 Stendhal's declared approach is everywhere that 
of the observer, nowhere, as we have noted, that of the synthesist. In this sense, he 
embraces what Charles Frankel and Owsei Temkin identify as the guiding spirit of the 
philosophes and Ideologues alike.148 Knowledge begins with particular facts, not with 
general laws and principles. In 1804, Stendhal had defined knowledge quite simply as 
a 'grand nombre d'experiences.'149 Some twenty years later, in an article for the 
London Magazine, we find precisely the same notion advanced — in praise of the 
newly founded Academie de Medecine in Paris — by a Stendhal for whom the science 
of physiology had by then assumed an essential place in the study of man:
Cette Academie a ete fondee pour verifier le principe suivant: la plus haute 
philosophie, la logique la plus impeccable sont souvent impropres a decouvrir la 
cause d'un phenomene physique constate chez un ou meme chez dix individus. 
Observez le meme phenomene dans dix mille individus et la verite devient 
immediatement evidente.150
It is against this scrupulously empirical principle that Stendhal sets his philosophic 
betes noires. While ironic sallies against 'Kant et autres grands philosophes 
spiritualistes' are a common enough feature of his repertoire, German philosophy was a 
province of which Stendhal appears to have had little first hand knowledge and which 
he was content to view — and to dismiss — from afar.151 Much, if not all, of his 
criticism of thinkers such as Spinoza, Leibniz and Kant is founded on a predisposition 
against what he perceives as a certain type of rationalistic philosophy that is inimical to 
his own broadly held principles. Hence the near-Manichaean terms in which, as a 
reviewer for the British liberal press in the 1820s, he judges the current state of 
philosophy in Europe.152 If Bacon and Locke stand as symbols of what is most 
commendable in philosophy, respect for individual fact and the gradual accumulation of 
experiential knowledge, they find a worthy foe for Stendhal in Immanuel Kant. It is not
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just, as Geoffrey Strickland suggests, that Stendhal found the German philosopher 
'unreadable';153 it is that the whole tradition of rationalism for which Kant's name 
stands is anathema from the outset to this advocate of Helvetius, Tracy and Cabanis.154 
The incriminating features of Kant's philosophy as Stendhal perceives it are many: his 
obscurity, his idealism, his admission of innate ideas, his defence of intuitive, a priori 
perceptions, his style.155 There is also — and this should not be undervalued — a very 
important political dimension to Stendhal's judgments in this context. 'On sait assez 
que toutes les reveries de Kant, Steding et Cie sont a la lettre renouvelees des Grecs,' 
he writes in 1818:
Toute cette philosophie est dans Platon et est fondee sur une sainte horreur pour
Y experience. Le parti ultra protege beaucoup cette philosophie...156
Such a remark, for all its brevity, affords a glimpse into what might be considered 
the substratum of Stendhal's philosophical world. His relentless denigration of German 
philosophy — 'la risee de l'Europe'157 — and of Kant as its prime exponent, reflecting 
as it does the spirit of the Ideologues, is in large part a rearguard action against an 
idealism which had in fact gained considerable ground under the increasingly 
favourable conditions of the Empire and Restoration.158 In his study of Destutt de 
Tracy, Emmet Kennedy emphasises the important link between politics, philosophy 
and morality during the early years of the nineteenth century. 'The religious revival, 
which accompanied the emergence of the Napoleonic Empire,1 he writes, 'found its 
philosophical counterpart in the nascent philosophical spiritualism, which stressed 
nonmaterial cognitive faculties, irreducible to simple sensation.’159 Napoleon's 
Concordat with Rome had, already in 1802, done much to smooth the path of a 
rehabilitated Catholicism which had the 'secular millenarianism' of the Ideologues in 
retreat some time before Stendhal rallied to the latters' cause.160
The point is an important one. Stendhal's ready espousal of the anti-systematic, 
anti-idealistic philosophy of the eighteenth-century sensationalists and Ideologues not 
only defines his philosophical stance from the first: it also dates i t  For if the nineteenth 
century was to be anything, it was, as D.G. Charlton observes, to be an 'age of 
systems', and one in which the climate of opinion would lean heavily towards a revived 
religious sensibility.161 Metaphysical and theological systems might, as Owsei Temkin 
argues, have been 'denounced as loudly during the 1790s as was the political tyranny 
of the kings';162 but between the last years of the eighteenth century and the first years 
of the nineteenth stretches a gulf that belies the short span of time by .which it is 
marked. Defining the 'spirit' of any age is a notoriously hazardous business; it is safe 
to say, however, that Stendhal’s boyhood and manhood were lived out in periods of a 
vastly different philosophical temper. If one had to await the Restoration for the stirring
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eloquence of a Victor Cousin, one did not have to look beyond 1802 for Le Genie du 
christianisme, or 1803 for the suppression by Napoleon of the Classe des sciences 
morales et politiques, the bastion of Ideology at the heart of the Institut National.163 
Though Robert Adams's description of Stendhal as a 'philosophical anachronism' 
admits of some qualification,164 it underlines clearly the outdated nature of the latter's 
allegiance to a tradition of thought which was condemned to increasing disfavour in a 
climate of secular and religious reaction. The early decades of the nineteenth century are 
described by William Coleman as 'an era of acute spiritualism in religious belief and 
systematic idealism in metaphysics.'165 In his philosophical leanings, Stendhal cannot 
be divorced from the historical and intellectual context of his age — not because he 
articulates what we might define as the spirit of that age, but because he evinces, from 
the earliest, a concern, as Philippe Berthier puts it, to 'se definir contre le contexte 
ambiant':
C'est precisement dans les toutes premieres annees de l'Empire que l'on releve 
cette attitude resolument anti-obscurantiste et philosophiquement militante: il est 
patent qu'il s'agit pour lui de se fortifier interieurement contre un deferlement de 
religiosite dont l'origine est trop claire et porte un nom, celui de Chateaubriand.166
The passage from Rome, Naples et Florence which we cited earlier is particularly 
significant in this respect. For it furnishes one of the rare occasions when Stendhal 
invokes his schooling quite so explicitly as the major formative influence on his intellect 
and as the abandoned model to which French education should return.167 While 
denouncing the current climate of philosophical degeneracy as he saw it, Stendhal 
would hold doggedly still, in the 1820s, to his hope of a new age of enlightenment 
founded on the demonstrable truths of the developing sciences. The progress that had 
been marked in physics and chemistry — since 'systems' were abandoned in favour of 
observation and experiment — was only the beginning, he argued, of a scientific and 
philosophical revolution which would re-establish man's knowledge on a new and 
unshakeable base:
La vraie philosophie frangaise, celle qui est claire, celle qui est fondee sur 
l'experience, celle qui fut enseignee par Condillac, Cabanis, de Tracy; celle dont 
les pauvres Allemands se plaignent qu'elle les blesse jusqu d Vdrne, parce qu'elle 
les ridiculise; celle qui, avant trente ans, sera physiologiquement prouvee par les 
travaux anatomiques de MM. Magendie, Gall et Flourens; cette vraie philosophie 
triomphera des obscurites boursouflees de Kant, de Steding, de Proclus, et meme 
des niaiseries que l'illustre poite Platon et son traducteur, M. Victor Cousin, ont 
habillees d'un si beau langage.168
The equation that is established here between physiology and 'true philosophy' is in 
line with Stendhal's ultimate conviction that the study of human nature had to take as its 
starting-point the study of man as a physica l entity.169 The refusal of the 
'Kanto-Platoniciens' and 'Cousinistes'170 to take account of this most fundamental
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consideration lent weight to the criticisms tirelessly levelled against them by Stendhal. 
Advance in the moral sphere, he held, was intimately linked to advances in the physical 
and natural sciences. Long in advance of Ernest Renan, Stendhal would proclaim 
science to be the ’religion’ of the nineteenth century.171 It can be clearly observed, he 
writes scoffingly in the New Monthly Magazine of September 1824, that
a la suite des decouvertes electriques de Franklin et de l'usage des paratonnerres, 
aucun habitant un peu eclaire de Paris ou de Londres, quand il entend le tonnerre 
ou voit un eclair, n’eprouve plus cette "peur melee de respect" que M. Constant 
nomme sentiment religiewc.
Clarity: The Cardinal Virtue
There was a further, and closely related, reason why Stendhal took up arms against the 
'systematists'. The eighteenth century had done much to demystify philosophy, to 
make it a function of reason and good sense — and, increasingly, of science — rather 
than an impenetrable province of arcane speculation. It is towards this conception of 
philosophy that Stendhal leans in the first decades of a century which, he saw too 
clearly, was witnessing the return of the philosophical fashion towards realms from 
which the philosophes and Ideologues had sought to wrench it.173 Stendhal's 
journalistic writings of the 1820s provide in this sense a valuable, if highly partisan, 
commentary on the changing philosophical trends in Restoration France, and in 
particular on the conflict between what Emmet Kennedy describes as 'the two most 
important philosophical schools in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century',
between Anglo-French sensationalism and German idealism, between 
over-confident eighteenth-century French rationalism and the doubting critique of 
reason, between nineteenth-century physiological psychology and a pure 
psychology, between an "ideological" or unitary conception of the moral and 
political sciences and Kantian dualism of pure and practical reason.174
Such, in essence, was the philosophical conflict in which Stendhal found himself an 
observer and occasional, if peripheral, participant. In the latter capacity, he provides an 
interesting example of what Kennedy describes as the 'use made of Kant in France.'175 
For Kant's name alone provided the ground upon which battle could be joined between 
the apostles of the new metaphysics and their philosophical opponents, the dwindling 
circle of Ideologues under the aegis of Destutt de Tracy.176 That it was a battle, 
Stendhal leaves us in no doubt when, in 1827, he defines philosophy as a Republic at 
war with itself, 'divisee en deux factions, la faction materialiste et la faction 
spiritualiste.'177
29
What Stendhal condemns above all in philosophical 'systems' like that of Kant is 
the studied obscurity which, he claims, is required to sustain their credit. The 
contributions to journals such as the London Magazine and New Monthly Magazine 
constitute a relentless tirade of abuse against a type of philosophising for which 
Stendhal's synonyms are far from generous: 'mysteres', 'doctrines chimeriques', 
'sottes boutades', 'reveries', 'speculations ideales', 'vagues fantaisies', 'obscurites 
boursouflees', 'niaiseries', 'un tas enorme d'absurdites'.178 Stendhal's objective 
throughout is to explode a mystique which has no place in philosophical reasoning and 
to reduce the latter to its simplest, most readily apprehensible expression. Clarity is the 
cardinal virtue of the philosopher. 'Rien ne soutient un philosophe comme une langue 
forcement claire,' he writes, in a damning appreciation of Kant for the British press in 
1822.179 'Celui qui n'est pas capable de se faire entendre,' he insists elsewhere, in an 
article on Helvetius, 'ne vaut pas d'etre cru.'180 Of the darling of the French spiritualist 
revival, Victor Cousin, Stendhal writes disparagingly in the New Monthly Magazine of 
January 1823: 'son systeme manque d'une des qualites foncieres de la philosophie: a 
savoir le sens commun.'181
For Stendhal, philosophy should be capable of being framed within simple terms. 
Logical reasoning, he wrote to his sister Pauline in 1802, if conducted in a spirit free of 
prejudice, 'serait la chose du monde la plus facile.' For the science of logic, he goes 
on, 'n'est autre chose que l'art de raisonner.'182 What is significant here is less the 
terms of the rather meaningless equation 'logic = reason' than the expression around 
which the equation is constructed. For the repeated use of the formula 'ne ... que' in 
this context — 'la philosophie, qui n'est que le bien-raisonne'; Tempirisme n'est autre 
chose que l’experience'; 'toute science ne consiste qu'a voir les circonstances des faits'; 
'le genie n'est qu'une plus grande dose de bon sens' — is evidence of Stendhal's 
desire to reduce the most apparently exacting mental activity to a straightforward 
exercise conducted by way of simple rules accessible to all.183 His enthusiasm for 
Ideology is due in no small measure to the fact that the reasoning which sustains it is 
deemed by Stendhal to be comprehensible. 'Je lis avec la plus grande satisfaction les 
cent douze premieres pages de Tracy aussi facilement qu'un roman,' he notes in his 
diary on 1 January 1805.184 'La science qui nous occupe', he writes in an 'Ideology 
lesson' to Pauline on the same day, 'cet epouvantail si terrible aux tyrans, cette science 
si detestee des charlatans de toutes les especes, est la chose du monde la plus enfantine, 
la plus simple.'185 What was true, moreover, of Tracy's Ideologie would hold good 
for his Logique, a work which Stendhal, in a letter of 19 November 1805, records he is 
reading 'avec autant de plaisir, et autant de facilite que jadis Roland lefurieux,'186 Nor, 
he thought, would this 'science of ideas' be more difficult to implement than it was to 
comprehend. 'Les regies que Tracy prescrit,' he notes in his diary of 12 December
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1805,'[...] sont si simples que je puis fort bien tacher de les mettre en pratique.'187
The distinction between clarity and obfuscation remains fundamental throughout to 
Stendhal’s appreciation of thinkers and of the theories which they expound. In the New 
Monthly Magazine of May 1826, he divides philosophy into two broad schools, the 
intelligible and the unintelligible:
M. Victor Cousin a l’honneur d'avoir introduit en France la philosophie mystique 
et visionnaire du sentiment. Cette philosophie etant obscure par definition plait 
mieux au gouvemement et au clerge que la philosophie de Condillac que tout le 
monde comprend.188
In a subsequent article for the same review, Destutt de Tracy is praised in like terms for 
having expounded — ’d’une fagon on ne peut plus claire’ — the thought of Locke and 
Condillac.189 Nor is clarity in such matters to be equated with simplicity. Tracy's 
works, Stendhal elsewhere contends, ’sont les ouvrages les plus profonds et les plus 
clairs de la langue frangaise sur la formation des idees, l’art de les exprimer et la fagon 
de conduire le raisonnement.’ 190
Philosophy which was not transparent in its basic tenets, which was not 
susceptible of easy illustration, was not worthy of the name. In his diary of December 
1805, Stendhal enters a curious remark which raises questions about the criteria on 
which were based his early philosophical convictions. 'Maintenant,' he reflects, 'il faut 
que j'approfondisse un ancien jugement qui n'est, je crois, qu'une idee de Condillac 
admise comme vraie sur la recommandation de mon orgueil, uniquement parce que je la 
comprenais...'191 Though the 'uniquement' is disconcerting, the remark serves to 
underline the premium which Stendhal placed from the outset on clarity and simplicity 
in the expression of ideas. This emerges again from a diary entry of June 1807, in 
which we find Helvetius’s De VHomme lauded in the following terms: 'Je trouve plus 
dans un de ses chapitres que dans des volumes des autres, et enonce plus clairement, et 
mieux prouve.'192 In the Vie de Henry Brulard, it is precisely these qualities which will 
prompt Stendhal to recall of a notable passage from Helvetius's other major work, De 
VEsprit: 'moi, je comprenais parfaitement la fagon dont Helvetius explique Regulus, je 
faisais tout seul un grand nombre d'applications de ce genre...'193 The clarity with 
which Helvetius expounds his philosophy is a point upon which we find Stendhal 
insisting once more in the draft of an article entitled De VEtat de la philosophie a Paris 
en 1827:
Helvetius perfectionne par Jeremie Bentham a fort bien explique ce qui se passe 
dans le cceur de l'homme passionne, ou simplement agite par des desirs; ce qui se 
passe dans le coeur de Regulus lorsqu'il quitte Rome pour retourner a 
Carthage...194
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These latter examples are significant not only for the model of philosophical clarity 
which they represent. The legendary tale of Regulus — with its insistence on 
self-interest as the motivating force even in the most apparently altruistic of actions — 
is of central importance to Stendhal's view of human nature.195 With this in mind, we 
find the essential qualities of the true philosopher nowhere better defined by Stendhal 
than in the response which he drafted (but never published) in 1829 to some unsparing 
criticisms that had appeared in Duvergier de Hauranne's review of the Promenades 
dans Rome. In the review, published in Le Globe of 24 October 1829, Stendhal had 
been taken to task as an outmoded disciple of Helvetius, 'un ecrivain mauvaise tete qui 
ne menage personne et qui ne respecte rien.'196 Stung by the suggestion that he is 'un 
suranne partisan d'Helvetius’,197 Stendhal's response is to draft several pages under 
the ironic title'Philosophie transcendentale',198 in which he recounts the anecdote of a 
certain Lieutenant Louaut in an endeavour to demonstrate the simple axiom that all 
human actions are motivated by an irresistible impulsion towards pleasure and away 
from pain. Stendhal defies the 'Eclectic' school of philosophy to provide an 
explanation, other than the enlightened self-interest upheld by Helvetius and Jeremy 
Bentham,199 which would account for Louaut's heroism in diving into the Seine to 
rescue a drowning boatman. He then goes on to make a telling point in defence of the 
hard-nosed cynicism of which he might be accused in attributing thus the noblest of 
human actions to self-interest:
[...] la philosophie allemande cherche toujours a emouvoir le coeur et a eblouir 
{'imagination par des images d'une beaute celeste. Pour etre bon philosophe, il faut 
etre sec, clair, sans illusion. Un banquier qui a fait fortune a une partie du caractere 
requis pour faire des decouvertes en philosophie, c'est-a-dire voir clair dans ce qui 
est, ce qui est un peu different de parler eloquemment de brillantes chimeres 200
It is a fitting irony that the one philosopher to have appreciated this definition 
should have been Friedrich Nietzsche, who cites it admiringly in Jenseits von Gut und 
Bose.201 Sec, clair, sans illusion. Such are the qualities demanded of the philosopher, 
qualities which Stendhal had early recognised as a corollary of the 'esprit de commerce, 
qui compte tout et ne s'enthousiasme de rien,'202 and which he would later incarnate in 
the figure of that disabused republican and accomplished Epicurean, Leuwen pere.203 
Such qualities would find a ready model for Stendhal in the 'geometric spirit' of the 
Abbe de Condillac — 'le sec Condillac',204 as Stendhal dubs him — and in the 
Ideologue movement of which he was a forerunner.205 'Je ne doute aucunement,' 
writes Stendhal in the London Magazine of March 1825, 'que d'ici vingt ans, gi ace aux 
preuves physiologiques des verites exposees par Condillac et son ecole, la France ne 
donne au monde le systeme philosophique le moins alourdi d'erreurs qui ait jamais 
encore ete expose.’206
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The least encumbered by error: the wording is significant. For it brings us back 
squarely to Stendhal's view of 'systematic' thought. No philosophical theory should be 
considered proof against falsehood; the best one can hope for is to minimise the errors 
that may find their way into even the soundest reasoning. 'Souvent il se glisse un peu 
de faux dans les meilleurs preceptes...' Thus Stendhal in a notebook entry dating from 
September 1803.207 The whole history of human thought and the course of man's 
intellectual advancement — together with that of his future progress — were founded 
for Stendhal on the gradual, painstaking and often piecemeal eradication of falsehood. 
Stendhal's scepticism nowhere becomes the self-defeating 'Ne pas conclure' of a 
Flaubert; but one must, he urged, be ever on the watch against complacency, ready at 
every moment to call into question and, where necessary, to revise one's convictions.
From Theory to Practice: The Authorial Posture
The foregoing pages provide a very general introductory review of the context within 
which Stendhal defined his philosophical direction. It was one thing, however, to 
cherish a theory; quite another to put it into practice. As a would-be 
philosopher-playwright, Stendhal required from the outset some method for ordering 
and making sense of the world around him, for imposing meaning upon the disparate 
data of observation and experience.208 C.W. Thompson points rightly to the 'tour tout 
systematique' which is evident in the mind of the young Stendhal, and which finds 
early expression iii his love of mathematics and quest for a rigorous philosophical 
method of inquiry.209 'Je suis dans le plus haut de la philosophie', writes Stendhal in 
August 1804, 'profiter du moment pour me faire un systeme.'210 If his writings were 
to be readily comprehensible for a future audience, he recognised the need to present 
and develop his thoughts in a systematic order, 'pour plaire au vulgaire dont l'esprit 
faible est soulag£ par la. Que tout soit dispose par ce systeme qui, comme 
classification, est bon etemellement.'211 Stendhal, however, remains fully alive to the 
connotations of the term in question, as is evidenced by the following journal entry 
from August 1803: 'Toute espece de systeme annoncee rend mefiant le lecteur 
judicieux, il craint qu'on ne plie les faits au systeme.'212 Thus, amid the notes for his 
planned philosophical treatise in 1804, he resolves: 'Donner tout ce que je pense de 
bien, non point comme une suite ou une preuve de mon systeme, mais comme une 
chose qui m'est prouvee par le sentiment.'213 Nor is there any contradiction between 
his search for some 'systematic' means of interpreting and representing reality, on the 
one hand, and the denigration of 'systematists' which he sustains with such a will, on 
the other. For even the most cherished of his theories were to be no more than
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provisional guides, means of ordering and classifying his view of the world, which 
would remain open to doubt and to contrary evidence. If the esprit de systdme was 
always to be shunned, the esprit systematique did have its place.214
Such was the principle from which Stendhal early derived a sense of intellectual 
probity that was to remain with him. The ambivalence expressed in these instances, 
between the need for rational method and the limits within which such method should 
be contained, was to be a feature of his later writings. In no work does Stendhal come 
closer to framing a 'systematic' argument than in De VAmour. 'II est difficile,' writes 
Leon Blum, 'de pousser plus loin la presomption systematique.'215 Yet in no work — 
and this is the point which Blum wholly overlooks — does Stendhal do more to 
undermine the very ideas which he sets forth. A striking illustration of this is to be 
found in Chapter XXVm, where Stendhal depicts a certain feminine grace as the fruit 
of a monarchical regime. The intimate relationship between the government of a society 
and the sensibility of its members was a notion close to Stendhal's heart and one which 
he never tired of expounding, both in his private and in his published writings. In the 
case in question, however, he is willing to place his whole theory at risk in order to 
take account of what appears to be anomalous evidence. Having evoked that 
'delicatesse feminine' which, it is suggested, is a preserve of monarchical society, 
Stendhal goes on:
Cependant, meme dans les republiques du moyen age, je trouve un admirable 
exemple de cette delicatesse, qui semble detmire mon systeme de l'influence des 
gouvemements sur les passions, et que je rapporterai avec candeur.216
Stendhal cannot reconcile his theory with the possible objection to it that is raised here; 
but he is at pains to demonstrate that intellectual scruple forbids him to duck the issue or 
pretend that it poses no problem.
Again in De IAmour, we find rehearsed another of Stendhal's favoured themes, 
that of the sharply contrasting influence on the human character of the temperate climes 
of the south (the home of love, energy and passion) and the harsher climates of the 
north (the home of cant, vanity and emotional sclerosis). Yet, as he now observes, 
more women kill themselves for love in Paris than in all the towns of Italy. He 
concedes:
Ce fait m'embarrasse beaucoup; je ne sais qu'y repondre pour le moment, mais il 
ne change pas mon opinion 212
Unchanged Stendhal's opinion may be; but he is only too aware of the apparent 
objection to his theory that has been thrown up. On yet another occasion, in a fragment 
dealing with the poet Robert Bums, Stendhal cites an example which, as he
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acknowledges, appears to be at odds with his general principle. While classifying the 
Scots poet as 'un genie romain1, he concedes that 'Edimbourg est a la meme latitude 
que Moskou, ce qui pourrait deranger un peu mon systeme des climats.'218 Even in 
outlining one of the fundamental principles of De VAmour — the existence of four 
distinct types of love — Stendhal is anxious to avoid distorting a complex reality 
through over-adherence to his theory. No sooner, therefore, has he established his four 
recognisable categories of love than he goes on to undermine the whole basis of his 
contention. The figure of four, he suggests, is arbitrary and provisional; one might as 
readily speak in terms of eight, or even ten, types of love. One might, in fact, go much 
further still. 'II y a peut-etre autant de fagons de sentir parmi les hommes,' he ventures, 
'que de fagons de voir...'219
De VAmour, though it provides a number of telling examples, is far from 
exceptional in this respect. Across the range of his writings, one finds the same refusal 
by Stendhal to force his ideas irretrievably into a single mould. So it is, for example, 
with the celebrated definition of Romanticism which he would erect, in Racine et 
Shakespeare, into a first principle of aesthetic good sense. Here again we find a 
Stendhal who, for all his posture of theorist and his clarion defence of the nascent 
French Romantic movement against the tyranny of the Classical aesthetic, is careful to 
avoid replacing one yoke with another. Le romanticisme may, as he contends, be 
defined for all as Tart de presenter aux peuples les oeuvres litteraires qui, dans l'etat 
actuel de leurs habitudes et de leurs croyances, sont susceptibles de leur donner le plus 
de plaisir possible';220 but there operates even here an ultimate principle against which 
no movement, school or theory has redress. 'Le bon gout,' in the final analysis, 'c'est 
mon gout.'221 The point is brought home with emphasis in VHistoire de la peinture en 
Italie:
Mais Racine ne plut-il qu'a un seul homme, tout le reste de l'univers fut-il pour le 
peintre d'Othello, l'univers entier serait ridicule s’il venait dire a cet homme, par la 
voix d'un petit pedant vaniteux: "Prenez garde, mon ami, vous vous trompez, 
vous donnez dans le mauvais gout: vous aimez mieux les petits pois que les 
asperges, tandis que moi j'aime mieux les asperges que les petits pois."
To which Stendhal adds the peremptory conclusion:
La preference degagee de tout jugement accessoire, et reduite a la pure sensation, 
est inattaquable.222
The latter example may appear to be at some remove from our original point. It 
demonstrates clearly, however, that theories must capitulate for Stendhal before the 
reality of human experience. In none of the cases cited does he presume to provide an 
answer for the objections and attenuations which can be brought against his theories. 
On the contrary, such apparent contradictions are sought out, embraced, flaunted even,
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as though they served as some ultimate guarantor of the author's integrity. 'Quelquefois 
j'entre en doute de mes idees les plus fondamentales,' avows the author of Rome, 
Naples et Ftorence en 1817.223 In the later edition of the same work, Stendhal evokes 
the happy disposition of the Milanese, but prefaces his explanation of this with a caveat 
to his reader: 'Ce qui precede est evident, l'explication qui suit n'est que probable.'224 
Nor would the suspicion of 'theories' that is paraded by such remarks diminish over 
time. As the author of the Memoires d'un touriste will put it, 'l'experience seule repond 
a tout; la theorie n'est qu'un reve.’225
This ostentatious scom for hermetically sealed certitudes is a defining feature of 
Stendhal's writing which, in his more flippant moments, is carried to the point of 
parody. 'Comme je ne suis pas ici pour faire l'education des niais,' we read in his notes 
for a second edition of Rome, Naples et Florence, 'je saute mille consequences qui 
pourraient servir de preuves...'226 Elsewhere among the same notes, he declares more 
flatly still: 'je ne chercherai pas a prouver cette singuliere assertion.'227 The attitude to 
which such remarks give expression in 1818 will be evident in the second published 
edition of the work some years later. There, for example, we find it asserted that the 
Roman is superior to the other peoples of Italy, and, potentially, to all the peoples of 
Europe. 'C'est ce que je prouverais facilement,' Stendhal concludes, 's'il me restait 
assez de place. Si cette brochure a une autre edition, je donnerai dix anecdotes prouvant 
l'assertion qui precede.'228
This recurrent undermining of authorial convention, for all its irreverent humour, 
has a serious underside. For it demonstrates Stendhal's refusal to push his ideas 
beyond a certain point, to forge the critical link between observation and 'proof. In a 
letter to Adolphe de Mareste dated 1 December 1817, the author of the recently 
published Rome, Naples et Florence en 1817 writes revealingly of that work: 'j'ai 
toujours rempli mon but, qui etait de ne pas parler comme auteur,'229 This remark, 
with its measured emphasis, reveals something of Stendhal's perception of himself 
vis-a-vis his subject and his reader both. For, in renouncing the prerogative of the 
scient author, Stendhal demonstrates the self-consciousness with which he views his 
role as a purveyor of ideas. The letter to Mareste is in tune with those many occasions 
when he appeals to his reader's scepticism, or indulgence, in the face of the arguments 
which he sets forth. In the chapters on temperament which are adapted from Cabanis 
for VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, the same attitude is clearly displayed. Invoking the 
authority of medical science, Stendhal describes the moral characteristics which attend 
upon a given physiological make-up. Here again his conclusions arise from what has 
all the appearance of a systematic argument; yet he is careful to stop short of promoting 
this to the status of a proven 'theory'. 'Tout ce que j'avance,' he protests, 'c'est qu'on 
trouvera souvent ces circonstances physiques a cote de ces dispositions morales.'230
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The authorial posture that is struck here finds parallels throughout Stendhal's 
writings. The distinction between what might be called 'contingent' truth and 
'necessary' truth, between observed fact and reasoned principle, remains an important 
one. On a visit to Saint Peter's in the Promenades dans Rome, Stendhal takes the 
opportunity to air his views on art and architecture, and to discourse on the wider social 
context of which these are an expression. Here again, however, he is at pains to parry 
in advance any charge of theorising:
Je prie le lecteur de se souvenir que je ne fais que l'office d'avocat general; je 
propose des motifs de conviction. J'invite a se mefier de tout le monde et meme de 
moi. L'essentiel est de n'admirer que ce qui a fait reellement plaisir, et de croire 
toujours que le voisin qui admire est paye pour vous tromper. 1
A similar spirit is in evidence on those occasions when Stendhal strikes an interrogative 
rather than an affirmative posture. 'La constitution des Anglais peut expliquer leur 
energie,' he observes in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie; 'mais comment expliquer la 
vivacite des cochers russes (moujiks) que nous primes a Moscou?'232 The penchant of 
the Italian for religion, he muses in the Promenades dans Rome, 'tient-il a la race 
d'hommes ou a la frequence des tremblements de terre et des orages qui, en ete, sont 
vraiment faits pour inspirer la terreur?'233 The answer in these instances, as in others, 
is conspicuous by its absence. Far from being embarrassed by inconsistencies and 
unanswered questions, Stendhal delights in drawing the reader's attention to them. 
Considering the lack of stable judgment which he takes to be a feature of the female 
mind, the author of De VAmour readily concedes: 'II faut qu'il y ait la quelque loi 
generate que j'ignore.'234 In the Vie de Rossini, he writes in similar vein:
I l y a  done quelque circonstance inconnue et pourtant necessaire dans l'ensemble 
des mceurs de la belle Italie et de l'Allemagne. II fait moins ffoid dans la rue Le 
Peletier qu'a Dresde ou a Darmstadt. Pourquoi y est-on plus barbare? Pourquoi 
l'orchestre de Dresde ou de Reggio execute-t-il divinement un crescendo de 
Rossini, chose impossible a Paris? Pourquoi surtout ces orchestres savent-ils 
accompagner?235
The emphatic repetition of the interrogative form here gives evidence of what seems a 
conscious effort to undermine the role of the author as the expounder of clearly 
formulated 'truths'. For all Stendhal's ostensibly well defined notions about man and 
society, for all his long-held beliefs about the conditions that give rise to the flowering 
of genius and artistic creativity, he admits to being quite at a loss when it comes to 
accounting for the proliferation of talent which flourished in that brief historical moment 
known as the Renaissance. 'Pourquoi la nature, si feconde pendant ce petit espace de 
quarante-deux ans, depuis 1452 jusqu'en 1494, que naquirent ces grands hommes, 
a-t-elle ete depuis d'une sterilite si cruelle?' asks the historian of Italian painting. 'C'est 
ce qu'apparemment ni vous ni moi ne saurons jamais.'236
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As in Montaigne, so in Stendhal, concludes Geoffrey Strickland, 'the interrogative 
cast of mind proves to be incompatible with systematic thought — that is, thought 
which seeks to demonstrate its consistency by defending itself against all possible 
objections...'237 The greatest objection to Stendhal's thought, it might be added in the 
light of the foregoing, is Stendhal himself. For there is an advocatus diaboli, or, as he 
puts it in the Vie de Henry Brulard, a 'parti contraire', which stands ever ready (or so, 
at least, he would have us believe) to challenge his received ideas.238 Auguste 
Bussiere, as early as 1843, recognised here an essential feature of Stendhal's 
philosophical outlook:
Ce serait etre infidele envers les idees de l'auteur que de vouloir les reduire a une 
rigoureuse deduction logique, et donner a cette philosophie legere des allures 
d'ecole que l'auteur a eu surtout a cceur de lui epargner.239
It is in this sense, one might argue, that Robert Adams's description of Stendhal 
(though it rings too categorical still) finds some endorsement. 'He was,' asserts 
Adams, 'totally uncommitted; absolutely unfinal; responsive to experience in a way 
more fluid than logical categories can ever quite grasp.'240 While such an assessment 
takes no account of the degree to which Stendhal, for all his show of open-mindedness, 
remains entrenched in a number of idees fixes, it does recognise his concern to eschew 
any suggestion of authorial omniscience in favour of a much vaunted philosophical 
doubt.
The net effect of all of this is to reaffirm the primacy of observation over theory, 
and to suggest that truth itself is protean, defined as much at times by exception as by 
rule, and always perceived from a particular point of view.241 'Je ne pretends pas dire 
ce que sont les choses, je raconte la sensation qu'elles me firent,' insists the author of 
Rome, Naples et Florence 242 Nor is he loath to draw attention to the possible 
consequences of such subjectivism: 'L'auteur a besoin de toute l'indulgence du lecteur; 
souvent on trouvera des contradictions apparentes, [...] et meme des fautes plus 
graves.'243 'Truth', it is suggested in such instances, is not an objective criterion, 
ratified by all: it is for each of us to forge his own truth from the raw materials of 
observation and reason. There is evident in Stendhal, as Michel Crouzet notes, 'un 
souci applique de nier les limites entre les verites de chaque bord', to place himself at a 
crossroads where various 'truths', or partial truths, may commend themselves to his — 
inescapably subjective — eye 244 Thus, he protests, he does not purport to represent 
views in which his reader can readily acquiesce; 'mais je me manquerais a moi-meme, 
si je ne disais pas ce qui me semble vrai.'245 In the Vie de Henry Brulard this important 
qualification comes again to the fore, in a manner which brings home clearly Stendhal's 
readiness to belittle his own contribution to any objectively defined vision of 'reality':
Je supplie le lecteur, si jamais j ’en trouve, de se souvenir que je n'ai de pretention
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a la veracite qu’en ce qui touche mes sentiments', quant aux faits, j'ai toujours eu 
peu de memoire.246
This distinction between subjective and objective fact is highly significant. All 
truth, it is clear, is not susceptible of definition by the same means. As Stendhal would 
write in the Promenades dans Rome, ’chaque science a un degre de certitude 
different'247 — and the 'science of man', of all sciences, is the least subject to precise 
verification. 'Moral' truth is, as we read in a letter from Stendhal to Francis Arago 
dated 3 April 1836, 'difficile a mettre en equation.'248 In an entry penned in his diary 
some thirty years earlier, Stendhal had in fact sketched out what he considered to be a 
fundamental distinction within the nature of truth itself. 'Ne jamais oublier', he had 
noted, 'que les verites morales ne sont point susceptibles de demonstrations comme 
celles qui regardent des proprietes appreciates en nombre exactement.'249
Any means of looking at the world which took consistency as its ultimate 
guarantor was, it is repeatedly suggested by Stendhal, destined to founder in falsehood. 
Theories, doctrines, 'systems' exist not because of, but in spite of, the reality they 
purport to represent. That Stendhal held unswervingly, obdurately even, to a number of 
ideas formulated in his*youth, that he showed himself less than open at times to the 
arguments that could be levelled against these, we shall have ample occasion to 
confirm. Yet he never relinquished in principle the 'methodical doubt' which we have 
sought to illustrate. On the contrary, as Stendhal advanced in years, he became 
increasingly convinced that even the finest methods were too crude to establish any 
reliable hold on truth. 'J'ai ecrit dans ma jeunesse des biographies (Mozart., 
Michel-Ange) qui sont une espece d'histoire,' he would reflect in 1834. 'Je m'en 
repens. Le vrai sur les plus grandes comme sur les plus petites choses me semble 
presque impossible a atteindre, du moins un vrai un peu detaille.'250 This remark, 
penned on a copy of Le Rouge et le Noir, bespeaks the scepticism of a Stendhal who, 
having tried his hand at a whole gamut of literary genres, had turned to the novel as the 
sole remaining means whereby an author might 'atteindre au vrai'. 'Je vois tous les 
jours davantage,' he reflects in the same marginal note, 'que partout ailleurs c'est une 
pretention.' Read in conjunction with these remarks, a passage from the Promenades 
dans Rome takes on a somewhat fuller significance. On a tour of the Castel San 
Angelo, Stendhal describes the magnificent fireworks display which marks the 
feast-days of Saints Peter and Paul and which, he informs us, dates back in its 
conception to Michaelangelo. Here, however, he stops short, adding the brief but 
telling paragraph:
Je me garderais d'en jurer. On fremit quand on songe a ce qu'il faut de recherches 
pour arriver a la verite sur le detail le plus futile.251
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In a letter of 24 November 1805, Fran?ois Bigillion had reproached his young 
friend Henri Beyle for an intellectual capriciousness which, he claimed, prevented the 
latter from attaining any firm grip upon reality. 'Toi, Henri, tu as beaucoup vu, 
reflechi, mais d'apres les autres, car a chaque nouvelle lecture, tu changes de fa$on de 
penser.'252 The remark must have struck home in a young man only too aware of the 
contradictions in his reasoning and of his inability consistently to view the world within 
the same perspective.253 In a notebook entry of August 1803, the same Henri had gone 
so far as to declare himself beset by 'un pyrrhonisme inquietant'.254 Some three 
decades later, we find a Stendhal who, by his own avowal, is no less susceptible to the 
vagaries of his reason. While it does little justice to what consistency there is in 
Stendhal's thought, a remark made in the Souvenirs d'egotisme, prefaced by all of the 
foregoing, might be read as a final denial of any 'systematic' basis to his reasoning, the 
ultimate statement in empirical agnosticism. As a rule, declares this self-styled 
Pyrrhonist, 'ma philosophie est du jour ou j'ecris.'255
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CHAPTER II
THE FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY 
Setting the Parameters
The preceding chapter, while it anticipates questions which will be developed in the 
course of this study, serves a number of functions. Placing Stendhal broadly within the 
intellectual context of his age, it establishes the grounds upon which his reputation as a 
thinker rests and examines an aspect of his writing which has largely escaped the 
attentions of his critics. Not only does Stendhal make no pretence of setting forth a 
systematic philosophy: he is tireless in his endeavour to fight shy of all that might 
betoken an esprit de syst&me. Both Arthur Chuquet and Michael Wood have the merit 
of recognising Stendhal's readiness to call into question theories which he holds dear.1 
They are, however, notable exceptions amid a body of critical opinion which has 
tended to measure Stendhal by the very standards of ’consistency’ which he himself so 
ostentatiously calls into question as a means of apprehending truth in all its diversity.2
That critics should deny Stendhal this consistency whilst at the same time 
proclaiming him a philosophe in the mould of Helvetius, or an ideologue after the 
fashion of Tracy, raises the question, it might be argued, of their own consistency. For 
if the Ideologues sought to achieve anything, it was, for all their arraigning of the term 
itself, to systematise the study of human nature and codify a new ethic for man and 
•society3 — in Tracy's case, to encapsulate all philosophy, a whole education, in several 
volumes.4 'Au moyen de trois volumes de Tracy, qu'on pourrait facilement reduire a 
un,' writes Stendhal excitedly to his sister Pauline on 22 March 1806, 'tu es dispensee 
a jamais de lire Aristote, Locke, Condillac, etc., etc., Port-Royal, le Pere Buffier, etc., 
etc., etc.'5 While the terms of such a recommendation may seem the more extravagant 
when measured against Tracy's ultimate achievement, they do articulate one of the 
central aspirations of a philosophical programme that was truly encyclopaedic in its 
scope. 'II ne s’agit de rien de moins,’ as Bernard Plongeron observes, 'que de 
promouvoir une civilisation republicaine regroupant la philosophic, la politique, 
l'economie, l'education, les arts et meme les sciences exactes.'6 We need scarcely insist 
upon the extent to which the range and embraciveness of such pretensions contrast with 
what we have seen to be the self-avowed limitations of Stendhal's own philosophical 
enterprise.
These are not, however, the only problems that are raised by the preceding 
chapter. The perception of Stendhal as an acolyte of Ideology and heir to an
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eighteenth-century philosophical tradition has, as we have said, become one of the 
undisputed commonplaces of Stendhal scholarship.7 To consign Stendhal thus to a 
specific niche, however, to make of him the exponent — disciple, successeur, 
defenseur, inspirateur, precurseur8 — of a particular current or movement, is to neglect 
a more general but no less important area of inquiry. Ever since the studies of Leon 
Blum and Henri Delacroix, it has been customary to discern in Stendhal the uneasy 
coexistence of a rationalist and a romantic.9 What these and subsequent studies of a 
similar nature10 fail to account for, however, is a deep and enduring ambivalence to 
philosophy itself which confounds any such facile schematisation. For, as our 
discussion in Chapter I suggests, there is no single definition of Reason or of the 
Philosopher that may be set against the Romantic in Stendhal. La philosophie had many 
avatars: it could be 'haute', 'grande', 'sublime', 'bonne', 'veritable', 'vraie'; it could 
equally be 'mauvaise', 'fausse', 'abominable', 'rude', 'vaine', 'pretendue', 'aride', 
'miserable', 'ridicule', 'saugrenue', 'reveuse', 'melancolique', 'mauvaise et 
grossiere'.11 Philosophy can be considered as the guarantor of truth and intellectual 
integrity, just as it can be 'folle a mourir de rire.'12 There is a philosophy that is a 
branch of mathematics, another that partakes of science and medicine, yet another that 
is amenable to art. There is a philosophy, too, that is vivifying, part of the very 
definition of human happiness, of that much vaunted 'art de marcher au bonheur' — 
another that is, as the hapless protagonist of Le Rouge et le Noir will discover, 'de 
nature a faire desirer la mort.'13
All of this raises questions which have been addressed only tangentially by 
scholars who devote consideration to Stendhal's philosophical development.14 Yet they 
are the starting-point for any appreciation of his abiding concerns in this most important 
domain. What value did Philosophy itself, as a discipline, hold for Stendhal? How did 
he perceive the role of the Philosopher? Where do the boundaries between Philosophy 
and Art occur, and to what degree, if at all, may the two be coalesced? Why did 
Stendhal turn to philosophy in the first place? There is a widely held assumption that 
Stendhal took to reading philosophy as a means of offsetting his excessive sensibility 
and undoing the sentimentalism which he had imbibed through Rousseau as an 
adolescent. Yet his earliest notebooks and letters reveal a quite different motivation 
underlying his recourse to the philosophers. What informed Stendhal's judgment of the 
philosophy which he read, and how did his conceptions evolve over time? The view 
prevails that, by the time he reached adulthood, Stendhal had forged a definitive 
philosophy upon which he rested his conception of man and society, and from which 
he would never thereafter deviate. Nothing, however, could be more misleading than 
this image of a Stendhal who, from his eighteenth year, as Georges Blin puts it, 'est un 
homme dont le siege est fait.'15
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It is to such questions that we shall turn our attention in the pages that follow. Let 
us begin, however, by attempting to establish what Stendhal understood by the term 
philosophie itself. According to J.-C. Augendre, Stendhal first defines philosophy in a 
letter to Pauline Beyle dated 9 March 1800.16 In recommending that his sister observe a 
judicious diet of reading, Stendhal makes the following remark:
Tes lectures, si elles sont choisies, t'interesseront bientot jusqu'a l'adoration et 
elles t’introduiront' a la vraie philosophie, source inepuisable de jouissance 
supremes, c'est elle qui nous donne la force de l'ame et la capacite necessaire pour 
sentir et adorer le genie. Avec elle tout s'aplanit, les difficultes disparaissent, l'ame 
est etendue, elle congoit et aime davantage.17
Though this passage contains much that is instructive about the benefits of philosophy 
as Stendhal conceived of them at this early stage, it provides no definition, as Augendre 
claims, of the concept itself. The first definition proper — the first answer to the 
question: what is philosophy? — appears rather in a letter written almost two years 
later, in which we find Stendhal once more counselling his sister Pauline:
Tu vois, ma chere, que nous sommes toujours contraries par quelque chose, aussi, 
le meilleur parti que nous ayons a prendre est-il de tacher de nous accommoder de 
notre situation et d'en tirer la plus grande masse de bonheur possible. C'est la la 
seule vraie philosophie.18
Here, in 1801, is a clear adumbration of that 'philosophy' which would issue 
under the name of beylisme from a number of Stendhal's letters and diary entries of 
1811 and 1812.19 The eudaemonic principle that is central to the above passage, and 
which early informs Stendhal's understanding of the proper function and end of 
philosophy, is present again in the more concise definition which we read in a letter 
dated 7 June 1804: 'La philosophie est l'art de rendre heureux: pour cela, plaisantons 
de tout; rions sur chaque chose.’20 Writing once more to Pauline Beyle on 26 January 
1806, Stendhal recounts how he has succeeded in coaxing a friend back from the brink 
of suicide. By showing the friend in question an alternative route to happiness and 
self-fulfilment (the cultivation of his intellect through a sustained programme of study 
in which feature philosophers such as Tracy, Hobbes and Cabanis), Stendhal takes 
credit for having administered '[une] grande cure morale aussi difficile au moins qu'une 
cure physique.' His tale, however, has a moral which goes beyond the particular case 
in question. 'Voila l'avantage de la philosophie’, he concludes: 'elle apprend a se guerir 
des plus grands chagrins.'21
In each of these three instances, we find evoked the same sagesse which Stendhal 
holds to be the essence of a sane personal philosophy. 'Voila de quoi se compose la 
sagesse,' he writes in his letter of 26 January 1806, 'il faut ou prendre le parti de se 
bruler la cervelle tout de suite ou se mettre a se corriger.'22 This notion of sagesse is
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one which is closely related to Stendhal's earliest thoughts on philosophy. It can be 
defined as the practical business of seeking happiness, of bringing one's desires into 
line with what felicity is adjudged to be attainable. As such, it implies both 
self-knowledge and self-mastery.23 It is this notion precisely that is articulated in 
another letter, written to Pauline on 22 March 1806, in which Stendhal attempts to 
codify what he terms 'la veritable philosophie'; in so doing, he prescribes something 
akin to the treatment which has 'cured' his suicidal friend:
Songe a trois maximes:
1° S’accoutumer aux chagrins, tout hom[me] en a sept ou huit par jour.
2° Ne pas trop s'exagerer le bonheur que l'on n'a pas.
3° Savoir tirer parti des moments de froideur pour travailler a perfectionner notre 
art de connaitre, ou esprit.
Le bonheur est presque dans l'observation de ces trois maximes...24
Between this passage and the principles which Stendhal will outline to his friend Felix 
Faure in 1812, the thread is unbroken.25 In his enduring concern with the notion of 
happiness, Stendhal echoes what Robert Mauzi and L.G. Crocker characterise as the 
distinguishing feature — the 'obsession' and 'highest value', as Crocker puts it — of 
the eighteenth century 26 To this extent, H.-F. Imbert makes an important qualification 
when charging that Stendhal comes to philosophy with too much parti pris and too little 
specialised competence. 'Et pourtant,' notes Imbert, 'cette incompetence est limitee par 
le fait que Stendhal n’a jamais varie sur ce qu’il attendait de la philosophie: la recherche 
des principes les plus efficaces pour atteindre, en cette vie meme, le bonheur.'27
Happiness is a destination, a state that is to be reached by negotiating the obstacles 
which lie in one's path. Stendhal's writings are replete with geometrical images which 
suggest a course to be plotted or a path to be followed — 'la route du bonheur', 'seul 
chemin du bonheur’, ’Yunique chemin du bonheur'28 — in order to attain happiness. 
In a letter to his sister dated 1 January 1805, he develops the metaphor:
Pour arriver a leur but, les hommes ont une conduite a tenir, c'est le raisonnement 
qui chez tous trace cette conduite; il est tout simple que, quand le raisonnement est 
mauvais, nous n'arrivions pas au but desire, comme nous n’arriverions pas a 
Voreppe, si nous nous avancions par le chemin du Cours, vers le pont de Claix.
[...] De meme, dans la vie, l'homme qui raisonne bien arrivera a son but; celui qui 
raisonne mal restera en route.29
Such strong, simple reasoning is a feature of Stendhal's earliest endeavour to define, in 
the most readily apprehensible terms, the indispensable place of reason in human 
affairs. Yet, if the plotting of one's route to happiness is in some sense the geometry of 
philosophy, the latter also has its algebra. For it must be precise, clinical, unadorned by 
sentiment. Sec, clair, sans illusion, to recall the terms of Stendhal's own definition. 
Stendhal himself makes just such a suggestion when, in 1818, he writes of 'la
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philosophie, laquelle est une espece d'algebre et ne cherche que la verite sans s'adresser 
aux passions.’30 It is to this ’philosophy' precisely that Stendhal will have recourse 
when recalling the women he has loved in the Vie de Henry Brulard, where he writes:
Pour les considerer le plus philosophiquement possible et tacher ainsi de les 
depouiller de l’aureole qui me fait aller les yeux, qui m’eblouit et m'ote la faculte 
de voir distinctement, j 'ordonnerai ces dames (langage mathematique) selon leurs 
diverses qualites.31
Would it be pushing the point too far to suggest that there is equally an 'arithmetic' of 
philosophy? Perhaps not, if we recall that 'esprit de commerce, qui compte tout et ne 
s'enthousiasme de rien,’ which Stendhal considers so conducive to sound reason in his 
diary entry of 12 September 1805 32 Or if we reiterate his remark to Pauline, in a letter 
of July 1804, concerning the variable proportions in which flattery and effrontery may 
be combined in conversation without a breach of the proprieties. 'II faut t'accoutumer a 
raisonner ainsi mathematiquement,' he insists on that occasion; 'voila le veritable usage 
des math[ematiques].’33
It is evident from such remarks that mathematics early provided Stendhal with a 
ready paradigm for his philosophical enterprise. However one cares to categorise them
— and the mathematical model is one which exercises a strong appeal for Stendhal34 — 
it is evident that there exist, in fact, various 'orders' of philosophy within Stendhal's 
overall conception. There is a philosophy that is conducive — more than that, essential
— to happiness; another which operates outside the realm of sentiment altogether. It 
would be crude, but not altogether erroneous perhaps, to divide these into the broad 
categories of 'theory' and 'application'. For Stendhal held that philosophical wisdom 
and the felicity which should attend it could be founded only upon an accurate 
understanding of ourselves and of the world around us. '[Je] vois chaque jour', he 
urges Pauline in July 1804, 'qu'il n'y a point de bonheur sans connaissance de la 
verite. Crois cela, et agis en consequence.'35 Again, on 23 October 1805, he reminds 
his sister that happiness can be attained only through a knowledge of oneself and of 
one's place in a wider scheme of things.36
The exercise of philosophical wisdom — or, in Stendhal's parlance, la sagesse — 
must therefore be preceded by and founded upon a more intellectualised apprehension 
of man and the nature of the world. In one of his earliest extant letters, dated 18 
November 1801, Stendhal inquires of Pauline: 'T'occupes-tu de l'histoire, non pas de 
cette histoire qui consiste a apprendre par cceur M. Le Ragois, mais de cette histoire 
philosophique qui montre dans tous les evenements la suite des passions des 
hommes....?'37 Clearly in evidence here is that 'spirit of classic ethical psychology' 
which, as Erich Auerbach observes, informs Stendhal's world-perspective.38 The
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study of men and events as they are revealed through history — 'cette base de toute 
connaissance de l'homme', as Stendhal elsewhere defines the study of the past39 — 
should serve as a means of acquiring philosophical wisdom in the present. 'La science 
de l’histoire a-t-elle d'autre but que la construction de la philosophie?' writes Stendhal 
in a notebook entry dating from January 1803.40 Enumerating the benefits of studying 
history in a letter from the same period, he is unequivocal on this same point:
La premiere est de faire connaitre les hommes: cette connaissance se nomme 
philosophie, mot tire du grec et qui signifie amour de la sagesse.41
As a concise definition of philosophy, this is clear enough. Stendhal sees fit elsewhere, 
however, to define with greater precision still the 'philosopher' to whom such a title 
should be applied. 'Je n'appelle point philosophes,' he specifies, 'les inventeurs dans 
les sciences exactes.'42 Newton, Euler, Lagrange, if they are to be considered 
'philosophers', should be so not through their knowledge of the sciences but through 
their knowledge of man.43 On discovering the English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, 
in June 1804, Stendhal is unstinting in his appreciation. The terms in which he couches 
his praise are worthy of note:
II y a plus de connaissance du vrai sur l'homme ou de philosophie dans ce parag. 
14 du chap. V de Hobbes que dans tout J[ean]-J[acques] 44
It is evident, as we have suggested, that two quite distinct definitions of 
philosophy are at work in all of this. On the one hand, a eudaemonic and strictly 
pragmatic conception which makes the procurement of happiness both the function of 
philosophy and the measure of its value. On the other, a more abstractive notion which 
holds the ’science of man’ to be the basis of all true philosophy. These two conceptions 
are not in contradiction, but rather form part of the same ideal. Their interdependence 
is, in fact, made explicit in a note which Stendhal consigns to his diary as early as 
December 1801:
Presque tous les malheurs de la vie viennent des fausses idees que nous avons sur 
ce qui nous arrive. Connaitre a fond les hommes, juger sainement des evenements, 
est done un grand pas vers le bonheur 45
In electing to live 'en philosophe' in Paris in 1802, Stendhal would make no 
distinction, therefore, between a science of Reason and an art of seeking Happiness 46 
Both were to be subsumed under the 'connaissance de l'homme' which he set himself 
as the most pressing challenge. 'Quelle est la meilleure marche a suivre pour faire les 
progres les plus grands et les plus rapides dans la connaissance de l'homme?' he asks 
amid his notes for April 1804.47 As ever, he engages his sister Pauline in the 
enterprise, concluding his letter of 25 September 1804 with the injunction: 'reflechis 
sur l'homme, voila la seule bonne science, et tu verras combien elle te servira dans le
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monde.'48
The poete-philosophe
It was more, however, than an abstract equation between knowledge and happiness that 
impelled Stendhal towards this 'plus belle science qui existe, celle de l'homme.'49 He 
had a purpose, and one which was clearly defined from the outset. Amid the many 
critical appreciations of Stendhal's thought, sight is often lost of the single factor 
which, more than any other, determined his early intellectual orientation. For there is, 
as we have intimated, a tendency to perceive Stendhal's excursions into philosophy as a 
necessary counterweight to his sensibility. Thus, for Jean Prevost, the journal in which 
Stendhal set down the rudiments of his incipient philosophy was undertaken not — as 
Stendhal himself might have protested — 'pour developper son esprit', but, the critic 
asserts, 'pour lutter contre sa sensibilite.'50 This view is echoed and amplified by 
Robert Alter, according to whom Stendhal's early cultivation of philosophy can be seen 
as an 'instinctive attempt to counterbalance his passionate emotionality with an 
intellectual apparatus adopted from thinkers who were hard-headed rationalists, 
utilitarians, materialists, mechanists.'51 In similar vein, Robert Adams argues that 
Stendhal 'needed a philosopher, if only as a trace to direct and a snaffle to curb his 
sensibility.'52 No different are the assessments offered by Gita May and Francine 
Marill Alberes. While May divines in Stendhal 'un besoin profond d'etudier la nature 
humaine afin d'affermir son jugement et de maitriser son imagination et sa 
sensibilite',53 Alberes suggests that his recourse to philosophy is explicable as 'le 
meilleur remede contre ses chagrins d'amour et le manque de succes mondains.'54
Though Stendhal would indeed assign such a counterbalancing value to his 
philosophical endeavours, he embarked upon these — as he explicitly states — with a 
quite different purpose in mind.55 In May 1803, he resumes thus his ambitions:
Quel est mon but? D'etre le plus grand poete possible. Pour cela connaitre
parfaitement l'homme. Le style n’est que la seconde partie du poete.56
It is clear from this statement, and we know from the body of his writings which date 
from this period, that his overriding ambition was to become a successful playwright, a 
second and more accomplished Moliere.57 Philosophy was useful to him insofar as it 
would advance his theatrical ambitions, for on his success as a dramatist was staked his 
future happiness as he conceived of it. This strictly functional value is brought out with
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a singular clarity of purpose in an entry which Stendhal makes to his journal in July 
1804, envisaging the philosophical treatise which he is planning to write under the tide 
Filosofia Nova and in which he proposes to lay bare the workings of human nature:
J'ai besoin de cet ouvrage pour faire des poemes excellents. II faut observer les 
passions dans l'homme qui existe pour pouvoir les mettre dans mes etres plus 
beaux que nature. Pour observer les passions il faut savoir ce qu'est la verite. Mais 
nous voyons les choses telles que notre tete nous les peint. II faut done connaitre 
cette tete.58
Convoluted the chain of reasoning may be; but it leaves us in no doubt about the 
hierarchy of the young Stendhal's priorities. Philosophy is conceived here not as a 
means of 'curbing' or 'curing' sensibility, but as a means of giving dramatic expression 
to the very passions which, according to those critics cited above, it was Stendhal’s 
objective to counteract. Once embarked upon the drafting of the treatise in question, 
moreover, the aspiring poite-philosophe maintains the same sense of purpose in his 
attitude toward the task in hand. 'Ce mois-ci,' he records in his diary on 11 August 
1804, 's'est passe a l'etude de la grande philosophic pour trouver les bases des 
meilleures comedies, et, en general, des meilleurs poemes, et celles de la meilleure 
route que j'ai a suivre pour trouver dans la societe tout le bonheur qu'elle peut me 
donner.'59 A week before penning this note, Stendhal had resumed the two years of 
self-administered study in which he had been engaged since resigning his commission 
in summer 1802:
De tout ce que j'ai lu, de tout ce que j'ai vu jusqu'aujourd’hui, je n'ai retenu que ce 
qui m'a semble utile au talent que je veux acquerir de grand peintre de caractere.60
Philosophy, then, was a means to an end for Stendhal, a first necessary step on the 
road to success as a dramatist. Early in 1803, he had posed the question: 'Quels sont 
les avantages de la philosophic pour un poete?'61 Though he does not, on that 
occasion, provide any answer, his subsequent writings are peppered with reminders of 
the utility of the philosophy upon which he has embarked:
Je lis De la verite par Brissot-Warville [...]. Cet ouvrage va m’etre tres utile.
Ce livre [Descartes's Les Passions de Lame] [...] pourra m’etre tres utile.
Voilh ou l'etude de l'ideologie (Tracy et Biran) m'est utile.
Voila la grande utilite pour moi de l'ideologie. ..
Voila comme il est utile aux poetes d'etudier l'ideologie.
Je relis la Logique de Tracy, j'ai commence cet auteur le 31 decembre 1804. II 
m’aura ete de la plus grande utilite...62
Where, however, was all this relentlessly pursued 'utility' tending?63 Stendhal
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provides a clear answer in his diary of February 1805, when he explains the essential 
but subsidiary role which he assigns to the philosopher's task:
En general, le talent des philosophes n'est que l'echafaudage de celui des poetes.
Us font connaitre les affections que le poete peint ensuite pour emouvoir.64
The remark is worthy of note. For, in keeping with this distinction, Stendhal forges yet 
a further definition of 'philosophy', one which resumes with concision all of his 
intellectual and artistic aspirations as they are invested in his early»literary endeavours:
Philosophic, ou art de connaitre et de peindre les passions des hommes.65
The simplicity of this definition masks a serious problem for Stendhal. It is a 
problem, moreover, which harks back to the earlier distinction between philosophy as 
an intellectual discipline and philosophy as a practical means to happiness. How can the 
talent of the philosopher and that of the poet be fused? Can one, as Maurice Bardeche 
puts it, 'devenir poete comme on devient ingenieur?'66 For such indeed is Stendhal's 
intent. We have noted already how the qualities required of the philosopher are the very 
antithesis of those required in the reader of De VAmour & Yet Michael Wood is correct 
when he suggests that Stendhal harbours the 'double desire to be both Lamartine and an 
eighteenth-century ideologue', that he 'wants to feel like Shelley and to measure like 
D'Alembert.'68 From the outset, however, it becomes clear to Stendhal that the 
philosopher and the poet are not of the same stuff, that they are not only fundamentally 
different but are, essentially, in conflict one with the other. By endeavouring to 
become, in the language of Saint-Lambert, a 'podte philosophe',69 Stendhal is in fact 
attempting to realise what he soon comes to fear is a contradiction in terms. 'Voila 
peut-etre Rousseau oppose a Helvetius,' he reflects amid his notes of July 1804, 'ou 
l'on voit que le philosophe ne peut pas plus etre bon poete que le poete bon 
philosophe.'70 Whereas he had seemed to find confirmation in Alfieri 'qu'un homme 
plein d'Helvetius peut etre poete sublime',71 his subsequent reading of Brissot de 
Warville inclines him towards the opposite point of view. 'Brissot me fait penser,' he 
concedes in his diary of 7 July 1804, 'que les qualites du philosophe, c'est-a-dire de 
celui qui cherche a connaitre les passions, et du poete, ou de celui qui cherche a les 
peindre pour produire tel effet, sont incompatibles.'72
Reflections such as these among Stendhal's early private writings betoken more 
than the self-conscious anxieties of the struggling litterateur. For through his 
deliberations on the respective talents of the philosopher and the poet, Stendhal declares 
a very personal stake in a well established philosophical debate. If it was the case, as 
John Locke (and, more forcibly in his wake, Helvetius) had argued, that men were 
what they were through education, if talents were not prevenient but acquired, then this
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seemed to open up limitless horizons of achievement for those to whom the appropriate 
instruction was administered. 'I think I may say,' Locke had written in Some Thoughts 
Concerning Education, 'that of all the Men we meet with, Nine parts of Ten are what 
they are, Good or Evil, useful or not, by their Education.'73 With Helvetius, the 'nine 
parts of ten' become all 'normally constituted' individuals without exception.74 
Stendhal, it is clear from his journals and letters, early adheres under the latter's 
influence to the view that men are made, not born, to be what they are. His writings 
from the period exude a boundless faith in the power of education. If the conception of 
human nature which this implied placed an uncomfortable onus on a neophyte impatient 
for success in more than one domain, it held out the reassuring promise that genuine 
ambition and judicious application would reap a plentiful reward. 'Les grandes 
passions viennent a bout de tout,' writes the student of Helvetius to his sister in 
January 1803: 'de la, on peut dire que, quand un homme veut vivem ent et 
constamment, il parvient a son but.'75
As Jean-Pierre Richard has ably shown, Stendhal would never resolve the problem 
of reconciling the cold edge of the philosopher with the ardent sensibility of the poet76 
Even at the height of his attempt to marry the two, the language which he employs 
remains conflictual, betraying his continued doubts about the feasibility of his 
undertaking:
Voila comment le poete bat le philosophe dans les details, il n'y a que lui qui les ait 
sentis, il est done le seul qui puisse les peindre.
Mais le philosophe [...] le bat dans les grands principes, dans les bases de 
systeme.77
In a notebook entry dated 6 June 1804, Stendhal writes: 'Je crois que pour bien faire la 
comedie il faut se depassionner.'78 On the following day, he transcribes this idea in a 
letter to his friend Louis Crozet: 'Je cherche a me depassionner pour redevenir froid 
philosophe et faire mon plan.'79 The sharp distinction that is evoked here between 
reason and sentiment was to bedevil Stendhal's enterprise from its inception. In a letter 
to Pauline Beyle dated 29 August 1804, he gives graphic expression to his desire to 
seal off his reason from the incursions of his sensibility: 'II ne faut pas exalter ton ame, 
je voudrais pouvoir te parler aussi froidement qu'un geometre en demontrant la maniere 
d'avoir la valeur de x  dans - px + 9 = O.'80 The sense of this remark is more fully 
appreciated if it is read in conjunction with a series of definitions which Stendhal had 
entered in his notebook a year earlier, in an attempt to codify the difference between 'le 
poete, le philosophe et le geometre':
le poete = le maximum des passions, 
le geometre = le minimum, 
le philosophe est entre deux.
J.-J. Rousseau etait plus pres du poete que du philosophe.
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Helvetius peut-etre dans le milieu desirable pour un philosophe. Duclos trop pres 
du geometre.81
Yet if the conception of the geometer as it is here defined appears to bring the poet 
and philosopher closer, the rapprochement is relative and fragile. In a note which 
Stendhal consigns to his diary of February 1805, the gulf between the two seems wider 
than ever: 'Les poetes ne sont loues que par des hommes.passionnes, les philosophes 
que par des hommes froids. Quelle difference de gloire en quantite!'82 If Helvetius, 
moreover, benefits momentarily from being seen as the desirable 'middle path', he is 
quickly relegated to a realm of insensitivity that is much closer to the geometer than to 
the poet: 'Helvetius a peint vrai pour les cceurs froids, et tres faux pour les ames 
ardentes.'83 In a letter to Pauline Beyle of 22 March 1806, Stendhal goes so far as to 
castigate Rousseau for not having recognised that the qualities of the thinker are the 
very antithesis of those of the artist:
[...] malheureusement le manque de chaleur lui faisant mepriser les auteurs froids, 
comme Duclos, Helvetius, d'Holbach, il ne voit pas que leur froideur, qui les rend 
tres peu poetes, ne les rend que meilleurs raisonneurs.84
To this criticism of Rousseau, Stendhal adds a brief but revealing fragment of 
self-analysis: 'Moi-meme, tu t'en souviens, je suis tombe dans ce defaut. Tracy a 
acheve de m’en guerir.'85 The reference to Destutt de Tracy is instructive in this regard; 
for it is clear that the ambition to embody the talents of the philosopher and those of the 
poet is seen here at least by Stendhal as an example of precisely those 'vceux 
contradictoires' against which Tracy had put him on his guard.86
For all its internal contradictions, however, Stendhal's cherished ideal remains 
clear. Rousseau, he insists, 's'il faut faire une analyse du cceur humain, [...] est poete 
la ou il faudrait raisonner, et avance mille sophismes.'87 Mme de Stael's Delphine, on 
the other hand, 'fait trop sur l'ame (sur mon ame) l'effet d'un cours de philosophic.'88 
The success of his own endeavour, Stendhal was convinced, would stand or fall by his 
ability to combine the virtues and avoid the excesses of both. 'Cette union de 
philosophic sublime et de beaux vers,' he permits himself to predict, ’doit 
l'emporter.'89 Stendhal's use of the epithet 'sublime' here, despite its rhetorical 
overtones, introduces an important consideration. For it suggests once more that there 
are different orders of philosophy, and that all may not be deserving of the same 
approbation. Stendhal was, in fact, during this early period, working out further 
distinctions within the notion of philosophy itself, distinctions which might allow him 
still to reconcile the apparently irreconcilable. Thus, in his journal of 19 June 1804, we 
find the brief but significant reflection: 'II n'y a (je crois) de contraire a la poesie qu'une 
certaine philosophic.'90
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Though the tentative nature of this remark is underlined by the parenthetic 'je 
crois', it does open up the concept of philosophy — as it relates to 'la poesie' 
specifically — to new considerations. One of the problems inherent in Stendhal's 
attempt to combine the two lay in the fundamental dichotomy which seemed to him to 
exist between the poet as a purveyor of pleasure and the philosopher as a purveyor of 
unpalatable truths, an inveterate iconoclast whose function was to destroy the most 
cherished of illusions. The dramatist, Stendhal believed from the outset, 'doit plaire 
d'abord et ensuite instruire.'91 On the philosopher, however, no such constraint 
impinged. Quite the contrary. If the first task of the poet is to please, that of the 
philosopher is to disabuse: 'avant d'instruire il faut commencer par detromper.'92 
Within such a perspective, the role of the philosopher was indissociable from a 
disregard for pleasure, whether it be his own or that of others. The philosopher gives 
no quarter and asks for none in his mission to expose the truth. In a journal entry of 31 
July 1804, Stendhal portrays philosophy as a form of intellectual masochism:
J'ai une sensation agreable; celle de mes cheveux divises en deux masses sur les
deux tempes. Je m'arrete a en jouir, a en gouter les nuances; le philosophe l'eut
detruite pour voir si elle etait bien vraie, si c'etait bien de la que venait le plaisir.93
There is much here that is suggestive of those philosophers whom Stendhal early 
designates as 'froids',94 those insensitive or desensitised individuals who, espousing 
reason to the exclusion of sentiment, measure up unfavourably against his own 
projected undertaking to combine the two. From such philosophers, Stendhal reasons, 
dramatic art could never emanate: 'ils pourraient bien parvenir a faire un beau plan de 
tragedie [...], mais, ne pouvant accoucher d!un sentiment, ils n'en pourront jamais faire 
une scene.'95 Here precisely was the type of philosopher for whom Stendhal’s 
aversion would never be far from the surface, the exponent of that 'certaine 
philosophic' which he perceived as implacably opposed to all things 'poetic'.96
The semantic fields in which Stendhal places his evocations of such philosophy — 
coldness, aridity, sadness, destructiveness97 — are highly significant. For they reflect 
a tendency on Stendhal's part, and on the part of a substantial body of intellectual 
opinion in the post-Revolutionary years, to perceive philosophy as a cruel mistress who 
delighted not only in the unmasking of vicious falsehood but in the destruction of even 
the fondest illusions. This backlash against the withering character of philosophy is 
evident in some of the contemporary responses to the Ideologues and in a 
post-Revolutionary reaction to the perceived excesses of the Enlightenment. The spirit 
of Ideology, 'si constructeur au fond', as Henri Delacroix writes, 'devait apparaitre 
d'abord comme destructeur, comme une philosophic sceptique et revolutionnaire, et les 
evenements politiques, issus de la revolution, devaient favoriser un autre systeme.'98
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Thus, as early as 1794, we find Robespierre, in an address to the Convention, defying 
the 'philosophers' in a ringing exaltation of Rousseau and his defence of 'ces dogmes 
consolateurs que la raison donne pour appui au cceur humain.'99 In like spirit, Maine 
de Biran warned, in 1802, against any assault on those consoling beliefs which 
bolstered the fragile happiness of life, those 'sentiments consolateurs de l'existence' 
which Mme de Stael would uphold and which would be championed by others such as 
Maistre and Chateaubriand.100 The conviction expressed was that the atheistic 
materialism of the philosophes and their successors robbed man of cherished beliefs 
and, as some argued, posed a threat to the moral and social order. Napoleon was not 
slow to seize upon this pretext in his opposition to Ideology as a hotbed of 'dangerous 
dreamers' intent upon the destruction of illusions and, by implication, of happiness 
itself.101 Thus it was that Degerando, in the Rapport historique sur les progris de la 
philosophie depuis 1789 which he produced for Napoleon in 1808, denounced the 
'abus commis au nom de la philosophie sous les rapports de la morale, de la religion et 
des institutions politiques’, and defined his objective as being to 'reconcilier la 
philosophie avec les verites qui fondent le bonheur de l'homme et la tranquillite des 
Etats.' The philosophy that must be embraced, Degerando goes on, in terms whose 
significance is to be weighed against the language of the Enlightenment, is
cette philosophie qui appelle la raison non a proscrire, mais a fonder les idees
religieuses, qui s'allie au christianisme, qui reconnait une morale naturelle, qui
respecte les institutions etablies...102
Though Stendhal was far from sharing the moral, religious or political animus 
which informed such judgments, he harboured a similar view of philosophy as a sad 
and disillusioning business, an exercise in 'cette logique inexorable, dure, et se 
complaisant dans sa durete’103 which seemed the very antithesis of a happy state of 
mind and which was later to find its most uncompromising exponent in Nietzsche. 
Reason, far from guaranteeing felicity, becomes 'une ecole de deception, de 
defloration', a domain into which the philosopher ventures at his peril.104 'Pour fuir la 
desagreable cuisine interieure de la croyance,' writes Michel Crouzet, 'il faut recourir a 
une sorte de cruaute du savoir; est vrai ce qui degoit, ou accable, en tout cas contraint le 
moi.'105 This is a perception of the philosopher which Stendhal would never manage to 
dispel, and which requires to be set against his image as an unflinching disciple of the 
philosophes and Ideologues. 'Voila pourquoi les peintures du monde sont si tristes 
chez les philosophes,' he writes in a letter of November 1804 to his sister Pauline: 'ils 
ont peint ce qu'ils sentaient et qui, en effet, etait fort triste.'106 Writing again to Pauline 
in June 1810, Stendhal returns to this theme: 'Tous les savants en connaissances de 
l'homme sont moroses et meurent de tristesse.'107 In Rome, Naples et Florence, the 
view will be more jaundiced still: 'Le philosophe qui a le malheur de connaitre les 
hommes meprise toujours davantage le pays ou il a appris a les connaitre.'108
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Consoling illusions there are aplenty, argues the author of the Promenades dans Rome, 
in the philosophy of Kant and Victor Cousin. 'La triste raison,' on the other hand, 'a 
laquelle il faut bien en revenir quand il s'agit de raisonner, nous offfe, pour nous guider 
dans la recherche si difficile du vrai, les ouvrages de Bayle, de Cabanis, de MM. de 
Tracy et Bentham.'109 Happiness, it seems, must be the first victim when one 
determines, as Stendhal would put it in the Memoires d'un touriste, to 'voir les choses 
du cote philosophique, c'est-a-dire triste.'110
It is clear from our discussion thus far that in Stendhal there is a fusion — or, 
more properly, an uneasy coexistence — between two quite distinct and opposed 
currents of thought on the question of truth and falsehood.111 Though the utility of 
truth and the pemiciousness of falsehood are major themes underlying the whole edifice 
of his philosophical beliefs, they are unstable and liable to shift quite dramatically in 
relation to the overriding criterion of personal happiness. The equation between reason 
and imhappiness that informs each of the foregoing examples is never more graphically 
expressed by Stendhal than in a note which he enters in his diary as early as 29 March 
1805, and in which the problem of truth and illusion is cast in sharp relief:
Voila encore du genie philosophique. J'ai le diable au corps pour montrer l'ecorche 
a tout le monde. C'est un peintre qui voudrait s'illustrer dans le genre de l'Albane, 
qui aurait judicieusement commence par l'etude de l’anatomie, et pour qui, comme. 
objet utile, elle serait devenue tellement agreable, qu'au lieu de peindre un joli sein, 
voulant enchanter les hommes, il peindrait a decouvert et sanglants tous les 
muscles qui forment la poitrine d'une jolie femme, d'autant plus horrible, en leur 
sotte manie, qu'on s'attendait a une chose plus agreable. Ils procurent un nouveau 
degout par la verite des objets qu'ils presentent. On ne ferait que les mepriser s'ils 
etaient faux, mais ils sont vrais, ils poursuivent l'imagination.112
Stendhal’s 'Age of Reason1
The above passage (with its striking adumbration of the criticisms that would be 
levelled against the later author of Le Rouge et le Noir)113 expresses in sum the 
dilemma by which the young Stendhal found himself confronted at the outset of his 
literary career. Philosophy was, at one and the same time, essential and inimical to the 
art in which his ambition was to excel, essential and inimical to the happiness that it 
was his overriding preoccupation to attain.114 His resolve to 'derousseauise' 
himself,115 together with his sustained denunciation of the froideur of a philosopher 
such as Helvetius, constitute the horns of the dilemma on which he found himself 
caught. The solution, he reasoned, lay in the formulation of a 'new' philosophy, which 
would be used not to suppress but to give free expression to sensibility. The intellect
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should elucidate, not devitalise, the emotions. This ideal was what Stendhal proposed 
to realise in the Filosofia Nova, a treatise on human nature which he determined to 
write 'avec le langage propre de [la] passion et non point avec les phrases si froides des 
philosophes du XVffle siecle.’116 Through the medium of his treatise, he resolved, he 
would codify a number of 'new truths' — 'plusieurs verites morales que j'ai 
decouvertes et que je crois neuves' — before proceeding to cast these in dramatic form 
'et les faire applaudir sur la scene.'117
In the event, the exercise was to prove a fiasco; but if it was fruitless in what it 
achieved, the drafting of the Filosofia Nova remains arguably the most instructive 
episode of Stendhal's early intellectual life. Before considering this ill-fated project in 
detail, it is useful to reflect upon the stage in his intellectual development at which 
Stendhal undertook thus to resolve the problems of the poite-philosophe. It has become 
something of a truism among critics to assert that Stendhal's intellect matured at an 
early age and that his mind deviated little subsequently from the mould into which it had 
been cast in his youth. This interpretation dates, essentially, from the essay by Paul 
Bourget, who writes of Stendhal: 'On peut meme affirmer, apres avoir lu Henri 
Brulard, que, depuis sa dix-huitieme annee, il n'a rien acquis, sinon plus d'ampleur de 
ses tendances premieres.'118 Leon Blum gives further impetus to this image of 
Stendhal, acknowledging and elaborating upon Bourget's remark: 'II n'a rien acquis, et 
surtout, fait plus rare et plus significatif, il n'a rien perdu.'119 Paul Arbelet in turn cites 
Bourget's observation as the very justification for his extensive study, La Jeunesse de 
Stendhal, though he differs marginally from Bourget over the year in which he places 
Stendhal's definitive 'formation': 'a vingt ans, le mode de sa pensee est deja fixe, on 
voit poindre ou se preciser ses theories familieres; Stendhal n'aura desormais rien de 
tout a fait nouveau a nous dire.’ Everything thereafter, according to Arbelet, is but an 
'etemel rabachage' of the same.120
The currency which this view of Stendhal has gained is indeed remarkable. By 
1803, declares Henri Delacroix, 'les idees capitales de Beyle sont arretees et elles se 
declarent des le premier contact avec Helvetius.'121 Pierre Martino opts likewise for 
Stendhal's twentieth year as the point beyond which 'il n'avait qu'a etayer sa jeune 
science et a exalter ses sentiments.’122 From this moment onwards, Martino is ready to 
conclude, 'il n'a point evolue.'123 Henri Martineau and Matthew Josephson subscribe 
in turn to the view of a Stendhal whose philosophy had been forged by the age of 
twenty,124 while W.H. Fineshriber endorses the earlier claim by Bourget and Blum 
that Stendhal had acquired the full store of his ideas by the age of eighteen.125 Though 
Victor del Litto sets no date upon Stendhal's intellectual maturation, he lends his 
support to the view expressed by all of the above:
73
Stendhal est ainsi fait: c'est dans sa jeunesse qu'il decouvre ses idees-cles; par la
suite, il se bome a les developper, les completer, sans changer de cap.126
Stendhal himself, it must be said, does much to accredit this view of an intellect 
which, in Del Litto's words, follows from the earliest the same 'allure 
monolithique.'127 As for the point at which he himself believes he acquired his 
definitive cast of mind, Stendhal offers a number of suggestions: 1793 ('en 1793, il y a 
quarante deux ans, [...] mon caractere etait absolument le meme qu'aujourd'hui'); 1794 
(7 am encore in 1835 the man of 1794'); 1799 ('Tel encore j'etais en 1799, tel je suis 
encore en 1836...').128 Though it may be the case, as Georges Blin argues, that 
Stendhal never dates his 'calcification' at any point later than his twentieth birthday,129 
research has demonstrated that his recollections on the matter are subject to more than a 
little caution. Maurice Bardeche's argument that, where Stendhal's recollections of his 
youth are concerned, it is 'la deformation qui compte et non la realite'130 depends, for 
its validity, on what one is seeking to establish. While Stendhal may, to cite but one 
such example, claim in the Souvenirs d'egotisme that the Rapports du physique et du 
moral de l'homme was his 'bible a seize ans',131 all evidence indicates that he first 
became acquainted with the work of Cabanis in his early twenties, and that his 
admiration for the physiologist did not fully dawn until a number of years later.132 The 
point, as we shall see, is an important one for any chronology of Stendhal's intellectual 
development
While it is unquestionable that 'la precocite et la permanence' — to borrow the 
expression of Leon Blum and Paul Arbelet both133 — are the outstanding features of 
Stendhal's thought, it is surely misleading to isolate his eighteenth or twentieth year as 
the point beyond which he would, as Pierre Martino puts it, no longer evolve. There 
are, of course, numerous aspects of Stendhal's thinking which appear to pass intact 
from later childhood and adolescence into adulthood and later middle age.134 To assert, 
however, that his development was halted at his majority or shortly thereafter is to 
condemn Stendhal to an intellectual stagnation which is quite at odds with the evidence 
provided by his notebooks, letters and diaries.135 The choice of his eighteenth year is 
indefensible, we submit, in that it excludes the whole period from 1802 until 1806, 
when Stendhal worked assiduously to forge a philosophy which would allow him 
better to define himself and the world around him. Yet even a critic as distinguished and 
discerning as Georges Blin insists upon the 'immutabilite', the 'esprit definitif of a 
Stendhal who, he suggests with Jean Prevost, remains from the earliest'insoluble', 
'impermeable.'136 In the domain of ideas, Blin contends, 'ce serait l'adolescent, voire 
l'enfant qui aurait precocement donne reponse d'homme a toutes les questions.'137
The fault in this interpretation is, we submit, twofold. Firstly, it leaves no room
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whatever for the revision, or indeed renunciation, by Stendhal of ideas to which he held 
in his youth. Yet such revision and renunciation there most decidedly was. Secondly, it 
leaves out of consideration a seminal period during which a number of Stendhal's most 
important ideas took shape or underwent significant modification, a period which, as 
Maurice Bardeche and Michel Crouzet rightly remind us, constitutes Stendhal’s 
'seconde education', his 'deuxieme scolarite'.138 The conviction that man was 
motivated in all cases by self-interest may have sat well with the precocious scepticism 
of the adolescent Beyle, but it cannot, surely, be seen in isolation from the major 
influence which Helvetius brings to bear from 1803 onwards.139 The interplay of 
reason and passion, and their respective roles in the determination of human conduct, 
crystallised fully as a major question for Stendhal only in 1804, prompting him to 
undertake his treatise, the Filosofia Nova, and furnishing a subject with which he was 
to grapple, in one form or another, throughout his entire writing life. Not before 1805 
would Stendhal, in formulating his notions of ideation and epistemology, enjoy the 
'mille germes de pensees nouvelles' that were to be the fruit of Tracy's Id eo lo g ies  or 
experience the ’bien heureuse revolution dans mes idees* that was to be wrought by the 
same author's Logique.141
Stendhal's thoughts on the importance of physiology to the study of man, with the 
new emphasis which it placed on instinct, temperament and the physical basis of human 
character, find their genesis in this period too, most notably in the influence brought to 
bear by Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis. The latter Stendhal read cursorily in 1805; but he 
would come to appreciate Cabanis increasingly with the passage of time, recognising 
fully the importance of this medecin-ideologue only after 1811. If the relativity of 
government and climate, culture and taste was already clear to Stendhal from his 
reading of Du Bos, Montesquieu, Buffon and Helvetius,142 the relativity of human 
nature itself would be brought home to him by a reading of Cabanis which was to have 
profound implications for his conception of man and for the moral, social and political 
principles that were consequent upon it.
Other ideas, to which it is assumed Stendhal held unerringly from the outset, 
encounter serious difficulty when put to the test during the period in question. While 
Stendhal is credited with a materialism redolent of Hobbes and d'Holbach, his 
notebooks and diaries — from 1804 in particular, when he was engaged in the drafting 
of his Filosofia Nova — provide evidence that he was far from comfortable in handling 
the precepts of philosophical materialism or in subscribing to their implications. His 
perception of philosophy and of his own role as a thinker was to undergo significant 
development during those years spent in Paris, between 1802 and 1805, endeavouring 
to master the medium of the philosopher-dramatist. If Stendhal held tenaciously to his 
dramatic aspirations until well into adult life, he would emerge from the experience of
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these early years, and from the Filosofia Nova in particular, with his philosophical 
ambitions substantially tempered.
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CHAPTER HI
PASSION AND REASON: DEFINING THE BOUNDS 
OF HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY
'Experimental Philosophy'
Whether or not one shares F.C. Green's reluctance to apply the epithet 'critical' to any 
specific period of Stendhal's life, one must surely concur in regarding 'the years from 
1802 until 1805 as really formative.'1 It makes little sense, certainly, to describe 
Stendhal as a 'philosopher' of any sort, if one fails to take account of his one sustained 
endeavour to study — and indeed to write — 'philosophy' in the strictest sense of the 
term. Yet this is precisely what Pierre Martino does when he acknowledges the 
importance of the philosopher in Stendhal,2 yet dismisses as inconsequential the very 
process through which the latter first defined his philosophical orientation. As Martino 
has it, the unpublished writings and abortive projects of these early years are to be 
written off as the product of some dark age which retains a curiosity value at best for 
scholars.3 Stendhal's much vaunted intellectual precocity notwithstanding, Martino can 
thus conclude: 'il n'est pas utile de s'arreter longtemps a cette periode malheureuse et 
infeconde.'4
Such a judgment may indeed be tenable, if one is seeking in Stendhal's writings 
the hand of an accomplished author only. Yet it hardly seems consistent, for any 
assessment of Stendhal's thought, with the claim that his mind was cast in its definitive 
mould from the earliest.5 For it should be remembered that, whatever the literary 
failings of Stendhal's initial projects, they were to have provided the vehicle for a 
particular view of man and society. It is in this sense that the Filosofia Nova takes on 
an importance all of its own; for it was to have been, as Jean Prevost recognises, 
Stendhal’s 'discours de la methode’, serving at once as a forum for the development of 
philosophical truths and as a manual for their dramatic expression.6 'Purposes,' writes 
Stendhal in a notebook entry of 10 May 1804: 'Mettre dans ma Philosophie nouvelle 
toutes mes decouvertes sur l'homme.'7
In order to appreciate what Stendhal was attempting to achieve in this ambitious 
treatise, it is essential to know something of what preceded it. For this reason, it is 
important to note that Stendhal's whole philosophical enterprise rests at the outset on 
the premise that man is knowable, that his innermost, least conscious impulses are 
susceptible of rational explanation and codification. The method whereby Stendhal 
proposes to plumb the bedrock of human character is that same empirical reasoning
based on observation and analysis which he advocates as the only viable method of 
philosophical inquiry and for which, we recall, the Ecoles Centrales provided the 
model. One must never conclude from the particular to the general, Stendhal cautions 
first himself, then his sister Pauline, in June 1804.8 On the contrary, the most complex 
just as the most simple phenomenon could be understood only through analysis, 
through the breaking down of the whole into its constituent parts and the painstaking 
observation of the subsidiary facts relating to them.9
It is this approach — what Diderot had termed ’la philosophie experimentale' as 
opposed to 'la philosophie rationnelle'10 — which Stendhal seeks to adopt as a means 
of gaining purchase on human nature. To this end, he recognised that he must acquire 
an aptitude for analytical reasoning. 'Chercher a me donner le pouvoir d'analyse,' he 
writes, at the height of his philosophical ambitions in June 1804:
Ce sera un grand pas qu'aura fait mon esprit. J'aurai le pouvoir d'analyse lorsque 
me faisant des questions: qu’est-ce que l'homme? qu'est-ce qu'un nom? qu'est-ce 
que le rire? qu'est-ce que la faim? qu'est-ce que le remords? je pourrai repondre 
exactement11
There are a number of instances in Stendhal's early writings when he rehearses thus a 
catechetic drill which formed a standard part of the pedagogical apparatus in the Ecoles 
Centrales.12 Frangois Picavet cites the case of the Ecole Centrale d'Auxerre, where, as 
part of a formal public examination, students had to provide answers to such questions 
as: Qu'est-ce que l'homme? Qu'est-ce que le raisonnement? Qu'est-ce que la grammaire 
generate?13 In Stendhal's method, there is a strong suggestion, too, of Saint-Lambert 
and Volney, whose respective catechismes purported to provide manuals of enlightened 
ethics for the new generation of post-Revolutionary children. The format in which the 
latter couch their principles illustrates well the method prevalent in the philosophic 
instruction which Stendhal early adopts as his model:
D: Qu'est-ce que l'homme?
R: Un etre sensible et raisonnable.
[...]
D: Qu'est-ce que la raison?
R: La connaissance des verites utiles a notre bonheur.
[...]
D: Quels sont ceux qui s'aiment bien?
R: Ceux qui cherchent a se connaitre et qui ne separent pas leur bonheur de celui 
des autres...14
If Stendhal entertained any doubts about his own competence, to respond 
adequately to such questions, he had no doubt whatever about the didactic method of 
which they were a function. 'L'ouvrage le plus utile qu'un bon citoyen put faire,' we 
read in a notebook entry of July 1804, 'serait un petit catechisme de cent pages au plus
qui ferait comprendre au peuple les verites qui lui sont le plus utiles.'15 To his sister 
Pauline he writes in August of the same year: 'Envoie-moi vite trois ou quatre 
caracteres peints par les faits; raconte-les exactement, ensuite tire les consequences. 
Cette methode se nomme analyse, c'est la bonne.'16 Time and again in his notebooks, 
Stendhal exhorts himself to apply this same method in his study of man.17 The human 
being becomes a compound resolvable into so many constituent parts. 'Chercher a 
decomposer toutes les forces qui font agir les hom[mes] en desirs ou forces 
particulieres,' we read in an entry of June 1804.18 'M’occuper tout de suite de l’analyse 
de chaque passion,' he will similarly urge himself on undertaking his Filosofia Nova.19 
Such exhortations give some insight into the object of the young Stendhal's concerns 
and the extravagance of his ambition alike. This philosopher, it is clear, was seeking no 
mean return on his intellectual investment.
While the much vaunted analytical method was to have provided a key to unlock 
the secrets of human nature, this 'decomposition' of man into his constituent parts 
signified more than a mere method. It implied a whole conception of the human being 
as an object of inquiry, an entity which could be apprehended in all its various elements 
and states. The notion of man that emerges from Stendhal's early notebooks and letters 
is that of a machine-like being responding to given stimuli. Alter the balance of the 
forces at work upon man, believed Stendhal, and one alters the character and the 
conduct which ensue.
In principle at least, there is little to distinguish such a conception from the 
rationale that would inform the writings of Zola and the Naturalist movement more than 
half a century later. Stendhal's earliest notebooks read at times, indeed, like a prototype 
for'experimental'literature:
[...] essayer successivement a chaque personnage tous les vices et toutes les
vertus. Voir ceux qui leur conviennent.
Quelles sont les circonstances propres a porter chaque passion a son maximum?
Chercher une methode d'analyse par laquelle je puisse tirer d'un caractere, ou
d'une intrigue, tout ce qu'il peut donner d'utile aux homme s...20
Human nature can be explored by placing characters in given situations and observing 
how they react. Siich was the 'scientific' method from which the young Stendhal, no 
less than the later Zola, sought to draw the directing principles of his art.21 Yet if the 
former appears more readily a man of eighteenth-century metaphysics than a forerunner 
of Naturalism, it is because of the highly abstract and rarefied vision of human nature in 
which he persists. 'Chercher dans les recueils d'anecdotes,' he exhorts himself in June 
1804, 'les actions propres a eprouver le cceur et la tete, alors je verrai si tel caractere y
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passe bien.'22 In a subsequent note, the same problem is framed in more concise, but 
no less abstractive, terms: ’Quelles sont les circonstances ou il faut mettre [...] un 
homme pour juger de son cceur? pour juger de sa tete?'23
Some years before taking up his pen in defence of the Romantic aesthetic, Stendhal 
in fact espouses a thoroughly classical notion of human nature and its representation 
through art. For there is an assumption underlying his earliest literary endeavours that 
human nature, with its essential elements of passion and reason, is a universal datum, 
an absolute value transcending the variegations of time and space 24 That there was 
such a thing as a human 'nature' shared by all — 'le cceur humain', 'la raison humaine' 
— is nowhere called into question in his early writings. Instead, Stendhal sets about 
discovering the common denominators of human experience as a means of providing 
for his audiences a mimetic representation of man's inner self, a self which, in keeping 
with a time-honoured tradition not yet challenged by Romantic individualism, he seeks 
to define not by its distinctiveness but by its universality. Thus and only thus, he 
reasoned, could the requisite bond be established and sustained between the inner states 
of his protagonists and the sensibility of his potential audience.25
Of all the stimuli that operate upon the generic Man envisaged by Stendhal in this 
early period, it is the passions which first excite his mind. If one is to isolate what is 
irreducible in human nature, he held, one must start with those unreasoned motive 
forces by which men are impelled.26 The passions had occupied, of course, a 
privileged place in the ethical psychology of philosophers and moralists through the 
ages.27 That Stendhal should seek to understand man through an analyse du cceur 
humain was wholly consonant with the spirit of the eighteenth-century philosophy 
upon which he drew. Stendhal's repeated use of the formula 'la science de l'homme'28 
to describe his undertaking is no misnomer; for it is indeed as a self-styled 'scientist' 
that this 'alchimiste de l'ame humaine', as Maurice Bardeche dubs him 29 conceives of 
his task. Yet the highly abstractive language of Stendhal's earliest writing points up the 
gulf which separates his literary enterprise at its inception from what the nineteenth 
century — and Stendhal himself — would come to regard as 'scientific':
Les passions sont des forces qui peuvent etre melangees d’une infinite de fagons 
dans l'homme.
A chaque instant je combine ces forces dans des proportions differentes; elles 
produisent des actions. Je regarde si ces actions sont de nature a plaire au public.
Je ne suis encore que le hasard dans ces combinaisons. II faut inventer une 
methode qui les range dans un ordre commode a suivre, et qui n'en laisse echapper 
aucune.30
The language of experimentation that is so prevalent here — 'melangees', 
'proportions', 'combinaisons', 'methode' — and the stated concern for rigour and
90
comprehensiveness, while they suggest the analogy between writer and scientist which 
was to culminate in the 'experimental' novel more than half a century later, are 
superficial and, to a large extent, rhetorical. In this Stendhal, Maurice Bardeche 
discerns le chimiste devant ses eprouvettes.'31 It would be more fitting perhaps to find 
in him the philosopher-mathematician who had undertaken to apply 'les mathematiques 
au cceur humain', and who, as we have seen, wished to be able to articulate his 
thoughts 'aussi froidement qu'un geometre.'32 For Stendhal's earliest literary 
enterprise is reducible, in Georges Blin's expression, to 'le projet d'un viol des Lettres 
par les mathematiques.’33 The notebooks in which Stendhal compiles the material for 
his study of the 'human heart' are strewn with a mathematical jargon which, in its 
endeavour to reduce man to the dimensions of a theorem, points up jarringly at times 
the discordance between Stendhal's subject and his method:
le poete = le maximum des passions, 
le geometre = le minimum, 
le philosophe est entre les deux.
une passion = a, 
un climat = c, 
une legislation = 1.
Chaque passion pour etre exprimee exactement devra etre ecrite acl...
Lois + x climat = mceurs.34
The fact is that there is no room for the unquantifiable in Stendhal's view of human 
nature at this stage. Man, if subjected to the cutting edge of analysis, will be laid bare in 
his most recondite desires and impulses:
Qu'est-ce qu'un grand peintre de passions?
C'est un homme qui connait exactement, et dans leur ordre, toutes les teintes 
successives et differentes que prend dans un homme passionne un desir vif, et les 
diverses actions que ces divers etats du desir lui font faire.35
The final three words here are of particular significance, for they translate the 
essentially deterministic terms in which Stendhal early appears to conceive of the 
human condition. We have noted already how the passions, in their various 
proportions, 'produisent des actions.'36 Stendhal's choice of the verb 'produire', while 
it reflects a quasi-scientific concern with cause and effect, throws open to question the 
degree to which individuals may be held to account for their actions. In a notebook 
entry of August 1803, we find him reflecting upon what happens when 'une passion 
subite fait changer de conduite a un homme...'37 Here again man is portrayed not as the 
agent of his own destiny, but as the object of his passions. 'Le corps d'un homme,' 
notes Stendhal in June 1804, 'est mu par les passions de cet homme suivant les 
habitudes qu'elles lui ont fait contracted'38 The passions are thus seen to play a crucial 
role in the mobilisation and sustainment of human activity. Exclusive in the demands
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which they place upon the individual, they are capable of prevailing, in certain cases, 
over the desire for life itself.39
Stendhal does, of course, recognise other constituent forces within man; but the 
role of the passions as the driving force in the human economy remains always to the 
fore. The passions, he writes in a letter to Pauline Beyle dated 29 January 1803, 'sont 
le seul mobile des hommes; elles font tout le bien et tout le mal que nous voyons sur la * 
terre.'40 In arguing as much, Stendhal establishes an important causal relationship 
between passion and morality, a relationship that is echoed in a brief but significant 
remark which appears among his notes of 30 June 1804: 'Les passions produisent des 
actions utiles ou nuisibles, vertueuses ou vicieuses.'41 Nor is there any limit — in good 
as in evil — to what these forces, once unleashed, may achieve. 'Les passions,' the 
student of Helvetius baldly declares, 'peuvent tout.'42
Man as Abstraction: 'The Heart' and 'The Head'
i. Passion
In thus exalting the passions, Stendhal was not only echoing a current of 
eighteenth-century philosophical opinion that found exponents in such thinkers as 
Helvetius, Vauvenargues, d'Holbach and Diderot43 He was posing a question that had 
long exercised philosophers and moralists.44 If morality is reducible to the effects of 
passion, and if passion operates beyond the ambit of reason and, consequently, beyond 
the control of the individual, where does man’s accountability for his behaviour begin 
and end? For to suppose that human beings are responsible agents, morally accountable 
for what they do or omit to do, one must suppose that they are indeed free to determine 
their course of action. To this crucial question, Stendhal offers no answer. In 
emphasising the involuntary nature of passion, however, he does appear to subscribe to 
a view of man as powerless in the face of his own inscrutable impulses. It should be 
clear to any discerning eye, affirms Stendhal in his notes of July 1804, that 'une 
passion n'est pas volontaire,' that, consequently, 'on n'est point maitre, du moins 
communement, de se donner des passions.'45 Elsewhere he is more emphatic still: 
'Une passion est une maladie involontaire de l'ame, comme la fievre est une maladie du 
corps.'46 It is clear that, in order to know man, one must first learn to identify and to 
understand the passions in all their manifestations. One must also, and more 
significantly, be able to establish what room there is — if room indeed there is — 
within human nature for the notions of responsibility and freedom of choice. 'La seule
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science que j'aie a apprendre,' Stendhal had noted, fresh from his reading of Helvetius 
in February 1803, 'est la connaissance des passions.'47
It is important in this context to note that Stendhal shared the deep preoccupation of 
the eighteenth century and the immediate post-Revolutionary era with the need to 
establish a new secular morality based on the inescapable relationship between human 
nature and ethics.48 Any realistic morality, he was convinced, had to come to terms 
with the passions and find means not of negating them but of exploiting them to 
desirable ends. Passions in themselves are <z-moral; it is only when translated into 
action — and this is the crucial point for Stendhal — that passion can he qualified as 
virtuous or vicious:
Les passions prennent le nom de:
vices lorsqu'elles sont nuisibles a l'individu et a la societe;
vertus lorsqu'elles sont utiles a l'un et a l'autre ou a l'un des deux seulement sans
nuire a l'autre 49
In this definition, so redolent of the eighteenth-century secular moralism of an 
Helvetius or a d'Holbach,50 passion assumes a place that is central to the notion of 
virtue and vice, just as it is held by Stendhal to be central to the notion of personal 
happiness. 'Qu'est-ce que le bonheur?' he asks in a note from August 1803. 'C'est 
l'evenement qui donne la plus grande jouissance possible a la passion ou aux passions 
qui dominent l'individu.'51
The coincidence is a problematic one. For if passion stands at the junction of 
happiness and virtue alike, this assumes an identity, firstly, between self-interest and 
passion, and, secondly, between the interests of the one and the good of the many — 
an identity which, it must be concluded, is not bome out in fact. Passions are evidently 
not, in their social manifestations, virtuous at best, innocuous at worst. The passions, 
we recall, 'font tout le bien et tout le mal que nous voyons sur la terre.'52 Nor is 
passion always congruent with the interests of the individual. Prompted by 
Vauvenargues's claim that 'Nos passions se reglent ordinairement sur nos besoins,' 
Stendhal scribbles in the margin the riposte: 'Nos passions, au contraire, sont presque 
nuisibles a nos besoins et a nos interets.'53
The remark warrants some consideration. Stendhal's early concern with passion is 
nowhere the reckless and unfettered celebration of this force which had found a voice in 
the eighteenth century. Thus, in June 1804, he copies into his notebook a 'verite 
morale' to which he clearly lends his endorsement: 'La libre disposition de suivre les 
premiers mouvements de sa volonte est le plus grand de tous les esclavages.'54 In the 
letters to his sister Pauline, Stendhal is more explicit still in equating happiness with
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self-control rather than with the reckless venting of the passions. In order to be happy, 
he urges her in a letter of 30 April 1807, 'il faut d'abord acquerir la tranquillite.'55 The 
more powerful the passion, the more injurious its potential effects on the human 
constitution. 'Toutes ces jouissances vives que les romans font desirer se fanent en 
quelques jours,’ we read in a letter written from Marseille to Pauline in March 1806. 
'Ce qui ne se fane pas, c'est un etat heureux, une sagesse qui apprenne a eviter les 
peines.'56 On a reading in the same year of Mme de S tael's De Vinfluence des 
passions, Stendhal notes: 'La base du bonheur des caracteres qui ne sont point 
passionnes est toujours la meme, elle est la certitude de n'etre jamais domine par un 
sentiment plus fort que soi.'57
This recognition of a 'self which precedes the onset of passion and which may act 
as a moderating influence upon the latter is quite at odds with a number of Stendhal’s 
more deterministic pronouncements on the passions. It marks him off in particular from 
those eighteenth-century thinkers who had been bent on exposing self-control, 
conventionally understood, as a chimera. In his discussion of d’Holbach's 
determinism, L.G. Crocker makes the point in the following terms:
When the will is determined by a passion, we cannot even will to use the reason. 
The process is automatic. There is no self which transcends motives, which 
decides between passion and reason.58
Clearly, for Stendhal, there is a self which may transcend, and arbitrate between, 
motives. Though his writings reflect at times the sweeping denial of free will which had 
been central to eighteenth-century detemiinist philosophy, there is a countervailing 
tendency in his thinking which installs reason as a sentinel over the other components 
of man. It is the role of reason thus conceived to co-ordinate the interplay of the 
passions and to determine the value that is to be placed upon each impulse or endeavour 
in turn. In this Stendhal, certainly, there is no trace of the 'apologiste de l'instinct' 
denounced by Pierre Sabatier,59 or of that cult of a spontaneous ego which, according 
to Eugene Goodheart, has its source in Stendhal and 'issues finally in supermen and 
nihilists and immoralists.'60 On the contrary, one discerns at times in Stendhal a 
deep-seated moral and philosophical orthodoxy which has never been fully measured 
by his critics. A note consigned to his journal of July 1804 tells us much about 
Stendhal's struggle even as an adult to emancipate himself from influences which, it is 
commonly assumed, he had repudiated — and that with the utmost ease — in his 
boyhood:
J'ai une bien triste obligation a mes parents, c'est de prendre toujours dans mon 
premier mouvement les noms de passion: orgueil, vanite, amour-propre, en 
mauvaise part. Tactier de me guerir de ce prejuge qui nuit infiniment a mes plus 
doux plaisirs, jetant pour un instant un vemis d'odieux sur les personnel que 
j'aime le mieux quand je discerne ces passions si naturelles dans elles. Je n'aurais
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pas ce malheur si mes parents avaient lu Helvetius.61
'Maladie morale a guerir en moi,' adds Stendhal, by way of a judgment on this 
revealing fragment of self-analysis. For the passions, he clearly believes, are raw 
material only. They are not to be condemned outright, but should, through some 
judicious process of education and legislation, be regulated, sanitised, rendered 
beneficial — or, at the very least, harmless — to individual and society alike. Thus, in 
a remark entered among his notes of June 1804, Stendhal compares the Christian 
dogmatists, with all their impossible strictures, to 'les philosophes dont les lois sont 
moins parfaites, mais executables.' Men, he charges, in falling short of the laws of 
religion, 'ne suivent plus que celles de leurs passions et sont beaucoup plus malheureux 
que s'ils etaient guides par les philosophes.'62
There is in all of this both a problem of logic and a problem of ethics. Logic in the 
sense that passion is equated expressly with happiness and unhappiness alike; ethics in 
that, while the need to offset the adverse effects of passion is recognised, the means of 
achieving such an objective are nowhere adequately defined. The moral definition of 
passion, we have noted, requires the translation of this force into action. It was here, 
Stendhal believed, that man could exert some degree of control, although he is neither 
clear nor consistent in his definition of what the nature or boundaries of that control 
might be. If we can neither determine nor dispel the passions which take root within us, 
then our sole recourse lies in being able to direct those passions in ways which conduce 
to personal happiness and do not impinge upon the well-being of others.
It is to this already well-worn notion that Stendhal subscribes in his attempt to 
define the nature and limits of passion. In addressing thus the time-honoured problem 
of human responsibility, Stendhal sets about identifying the constituent factors of 
human nature that might act in some sense as a counterbalance to the dominion of the 
passions. The eighteenth century had, of course, deliberated long and hard on this same 
question; and among the various answers with which it had come up was the notion, as 
L.G. Crocker puts it, 'of a harmony, balance or counterpoise among the passions',63 
the argument being that the latter themselves, if properly synchronised, could provide a 
means of control against the excesses of a single passion. While he recognises the 'naif 
optimisme* implicit in this view, Robert Mauzi provides a good account of its essential 
rationale in his discussion of d’Holbach’s philosophy of the passions:
On ne dit pas: il faut temperer les passions par la raison; cela rappellerait trop la 
morale conventionnelle et plate du rationalisme chretien. On dit: il faut equilibrer 
les passions entre elles. Les passions restent ainsi leur propre arbitre, sans que le 
bonheur et la morale courent aucun danger. [...] et la raison se borne a controler 
l'equilibre du systeme.64
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Some echo of this idea can be found in an entry which Stendhal makes in his diary 
on 28 January 1806. Tai observe hier soir les orages des passions,' he notes, 'que les 
grandes passions ne peuvent se guerir que par les moyens qu'indique Ph[ilippe] Pinel 
dans La Manie... '65 The remark, as J.-C. Alciatore suggests, is a probable reference to 
the chapter of Pinel's work entitled 'Art de contrebalancer les passions humaines les 
unes par les autres, partie importante de la medecine.'66 What Pinel in fact argues is 
that the cure for mental infirmity in individuals provides a model for the government of 
society at large: both should be informed by a concern not to stifle but to harmonise the 
passions:
Le principe de la philosophic morale qui apprend non a detruire des passions 
humaines, mais a les opposer l'une a l'autre, s'applique egalement a la medecine 
comme a la politique, et ce n'est point la le seul exemple de gouvemer les hommes 
et de les guerir de leurs infirmites...67
Though Stendhal would record a genuine and enduring admiration for the author of 
these lines, he was not to espouse this rationale with any real conviction. For the 
argument advanced by Pinel and echoed in Stendhal's diary raises questions which 
remain conspicuously unanswered in the latter's writings. Nowhere is there any 
indication, for example, of which passions should be mobilised to offset others in 
given circumstances, nor indeed of how such compensating passions are themselves to 
be stimulated. Instead, Stendhal returns time and again to the notion of a single 
dominant passion which admits of neither rivalry nor compromise in its ascendancy 
over the individual. 'Ce n'est que par une passion que l'on peut triompher d'une autre 
passion,' he had declared in July 1803.68 Though this appears prima facie to echo the 
above notion of a counterpoise between passions, the choice of the verb 'triompher' 
makes it much more akin to a definition which Stendhal consigns to his notebook some 
weeks later, where he classifies 'passion' as 'le despotisme d’un desir sur tous les 
autres et une continuite de sentiments de meme espece.'69
It is this notion of passion as an exclusive, overriding force which best 
characterises Stendhal's early thoughts on the question. The human character is seen 
not as a convenient balancing act between and among the passions, but rather as the 
theatre for a relentless struggle waged by the different elements within it. Stendhal's 
frequent recourse to a military vocabulary, with all its connotations of conflict and 
subjugation, while it once more carries strong eighteenth-century echoes, spells out 
clearly his conviction that human resolution and endeavour are invariably the result of a 
violent internal struggle:
A certaines sensations certaines passions se reveillent, et les unes ont coutume de 
• vaincre les autres.
[Les hommes] sont presque toujours domines par leurs passions...
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[Une] passion est a son plus haut point lorsqu'elle l'emporte sur tout meme sur 
l'amour de la vie.
Une passion sera la plus grande possible lorsqu'elle se fera sacrifier toutes les 
autres passions de l'individu.
La bonne tete alors, esclave de la passion, raisonne juste sur tout excepte sur 
l'objet de la passion, car tel est l'interet de cette passion.
On prouve qu'on a une passion, en sacrifiant a cette passion la passion 
immediatement inferieure ou le lien naturel.70
As an apprentice playwright, Stendhal could conceive of no more compelling 
enterprise than to dramatise this struggle within man, exposing thus to the glare of the 
footlights the workings of the 'human heart'. For him, the very essence of the 
dramatist's art lay in the apprehension and faithful depiction of this inner conflict. 'II 
me semble,' he reflects in 1805, 'qu'on ne peut point exposer un grand caractere 
comique sans mettre deux passions qui se combattent.'71 Such inner conflict had an 
external dimension, too, in the ties which bound the individual to those around him. 
The ever problematic relationship between passion on the one hand and social 
obligation op the other was to provide the very foundation upon which Stendhal's 
characters would rest. 'II n'y a de vrai caractere que celui qui est fonde sur l'opposition 
d'un lien et d'une passion,' he concludes from the earliest.72 'Plusieurs liens opposes a 
une passion peuvent donner un caractere touchant,' he reasons, in drawing up a list of 
social ties and passions in January 1803.73 Nothing, however, could rival the 
out-and-out struggle of passion against reason: there, for Stendhal, lay the most 
powerful focus of inner human conflict and dramatic interest alike. 'Rien de si fort,' he 
notes in his journal for October 1803, 'que de peindre un homme aussi philosophe que 
possible et malgre cela toujours entraine par ses passions.'74
There is nothing new, of course, in this most classical of notions. In Stendhal, 
however, it takes the form not of a mere theatrical contrivance but of a crucial 
philosophical issue which the theatre might, in some innovative way, help to resolve. 
Nor need we await the decisive encounter between Julien Sorel and Mme de Renal in 
the garden at Vergy to appreciate that the secret of character for Stendhal lies more in 
the inner struggle which gives rise to action than in that action itself. As we read in a 
notebook entry dated 7 August 1804, 'une action isolee ne nous decouvre que tres peu 
le caractere de celui qui la fait':
Cinquante traits sur un homme ne nous apprennent pas grand-chose, tandis que 
seulement deux exposes avec les motifs qui l'ont fait agir, ses indecisions, ses 
combats nous le font connaitre 75
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ii. Reason
Much of what Stendhal consigned to his early notebooks and letters about the passions 
was conceived under the influence of Helvetius and Vauvenargues.76 Both of these 
thinkers held that man, though he may be the theatre for a number of different passions, 
was necessarily actuated by a single passion dominante which prevailed over all 
others 77 The language of Stendhal's notes in turn reflects this same belief. ’La passion 
regnante,' he concludes in June 1804, ’n'a pas besoin d'etre reveillee par une 
sensation.'78 Again, in July of the same year, he muses upon the changes that occur in 
heart and head when 'la passion regnante' itself is modified.79 Where such passion 
exists, there can be no balance, no harmony in any meaningful sense. It was inevitable, 
therefore, that Stendhal should bring his attentions to bear upon that other major 
component of human nature, reason. On a reading of Lancelin's Introduction d 
Vanalyse des sciences in autumn 1803, he had been struck by the author's claim that 
morality, far from being the result of some aleatory interplay of passions, was to be 
seen as a function of human reason. 'Dans le systeme de Lancelin,' he notes,
c’est la raison humaine formee qui engendre toutes les vertus. En la formant il faut
donner d'avance l'habitude des vertus par une experience menagee.80
The suggestion that reason might thus act as a guiding force for the passions was not 
lost on Stendhal. In a letter of 12 July 1804, he outlines the relationship between 'heart' 
and 'head' to his sister Pauline: 'D'apres eela, tu vois que le meilleur cceur (celui ou 
regne le plus fortement l’amour de ce qu’il appelle la verite) ne peut faire que peu de 
bien, quand il ne sera pas joint a une bonne tete qui lui aura dit ce que c'est que la vertu 
veritable.'81 Some months later, the same point is made with a greater insistence on the 
crucial role of education. 'Je t'ai explique,' Stendhal writes once more to his sister, 'ce 
que c'etait que la tete et le cceur,; comme quoi, avec la meme dose d'impulsion, on 
pouvait ne faire rien qui vaille. Voila la veritable raison de la necessite de 
l'instruction...'82
Here was a principle which, by summer 1804, was echoing through every part of 
Stendhal's writings — letters, diaries, notebooks and project drafts alike.83 Reason is 
more than ratiocination: it has what Anthony Levi terms an 'ethically normative 
function' too.84 'Le meilleur cceur, lorsqu'il n'est pas joint a une bonne tete, peut ne 
faire que peu de bien,' Stendhal insists in a notebook entry dated 13 July 1804, before 
proceeding thus to define his terms:
J’appelle le meilleur cceur celui qui est pret a faire les plus grands sacrifices a ce
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qu'il appelle vertu, mais si sa tete ne lui a pas appris ce que c'est que la veritable 
vertu (il giovare ai pin, produire la plus grande masse de bonheur possible) il 
risque de faire de tres grands sacrifices sans etre tres utile au bonheur des hommes. 
Louis XII, par exemple, n'avait pas ce me semble une tete digne de son cceur. Car, 
sans rien changer a son cceur, il pouvait faire beaucoup plus d'heureux. S'il avait 
un cceur excellent, ce qui est possible, il n'avait qu'a, avec une excellente tete, 
donner a la France une constitution republicaine et lui rendre la liberte. Tous les 
malheurs de Francois Ier, de la Ligue, de Louis XIV, ne seraient probablement pas 
arrives.85
Though this passage invites commentary on a number of levels — not least for the 
ethical import of Stendhal's remarks, and his interpretation of history as a process 
reducible to the virtues, or vices, of powerful individuals86 — it is of significance to 
note here that Stendhal identifies the relationship between heart and head as the key to 
interpreting man on a moral level and to defining his role within society. From his notes 
on dramatic characterisation, it is clear, moreover, that the theatre was to have provided 
a testing-ground for this principle. In planning the character of Chamoucy for his play 
Les Deux Hommes, Stendhal applies the logic of the above passage. An ambitious 
character may always have 'le meme cceur'; but, Stendhal argues, 'un leger changement 
dans la tete en fait un grand poete, un grand guerrier, un grand geometre, etc.' The 
reason is simple: 'II cherche a primer dans ce qu'il croit le plus grand.'87
This view of passion as a blind force requiring the sight of reason — 'une force 
qu'il ne s'agit plus que de diriger'88 — had, in fact, been prefigured as early as 
December 1802, when Stendhal transcribed into his notebook some thoughts inspired 
. by Vauvenargues:
L'esprit est l'oeil de l'ame, non sa force. Sa force est dans le cceur, c'est-a-dire 
dans les passions. La raison la plus eclairee ne donne pas d’agir et de vouloir. 
Suffit-il d'avoir la vue bonne pour marcher, ne faut-il pas encore avoir des pieds, 
et la volonte avec la puissance de les remuer?89
By 1804, this essential relationship between passion and reason had become one of the 
pillars on which Stendhal rested his conception of man. 'Une tete plus ou moins bonne 
change les effets des passions,' he writes in July 1804, 'mais ne change rien a leur 
force.'90 In its implications, such a view of human nature constituted a departure from 
those eighteenth-century thinkers who had advocated setting one passion, or one group 
of passions, against another. 'Quand la tete est pleine de verites,' declares Stendhal, 
'les passions ont bien moins de combats avec le desir d'etre honnete homme, et 
peut-etre entr’elles.'91 It also meant — and here the human equation was to become 
decidedly more complex — that passion was in a very real sense rivalled as the measure 
of man. 'C’est-a-dire,' writes Stendhal in a notebook entry dated 26 August 1804, 
'que deux hommes a egale force de passion [...] sont entre eux comme leurs tetes; a 
egale bonte de tete, entre eux comme leurs passions.'92
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As his early writings testify, then, Stendhal became increasingly convinced that 
any possibility of exerting control over man's irrational impulses had to lie with the 
judicious exercise of reason. In July 1804, it is once again to Lancelin that he turns, 
this time for a definition of education which he commits to his notebook as follows:
'Education: Art de former la tete et le cceur de l'homme, en donnant a l'un et a l’autre le 
meilleur developpement possible.'93 This altogether bland definition would command 
little interest if it were not clear, from a letter penned some weeks before, that it had 
been exercising Stendhal's mind. For, writing to his sister Pauline on 11 May 1804, he 
prises open what is recognisably the same definition and proceeds to define each of its 
elements in turn:
Le mot education, art de former la tete (ou l'esprit) de l'homme et son ame (ou le
centre de ses volontes), en donnant a l'un et a l'autre le meilleur (le plus utile au
plus grand nombre) developpement possible.94
Here we find a prime example of that analytical method which the young Stendhal so 
aspired to perfect and to inculcate in his young sister. Yet his remarks to Pauline on this 
occasion raise many more questions than they answer. Where and how could 
'education' apply leverage to what is elsewhere seen as an irresistible driving force 
within the individual? Did reason have power not only to direct but to forge the 
passions at their very source? These questions were knotty, and they were to preoccupy 
Stendhal intensely. For it was imperative that some means be divined whereby reason 
might cut across what he had established as a clear divide between heart and head. In 
seeking such a bridge between the intellect and the passions, Stendhal was to have 
recourse to a notion that had found currency among the preceding generation of 
philosophers and moralists. There were, he argued, certain 'habitudes de l'ame', or 
'habitudes morales',95 which could be cultivated and which could conduce to virtue or 
vice. One could, he believed, so redefine the contours of one's character by this means 
that it became predisposed towards certain types of passion, ill-disposed to others. The 
observation of such 'habits' as justice, clemency, probity, generosity,96 Stendhal held, 
might serve to promote desirable passions and to stifle more harmful impulses. Hence 
the reasoning which we find in a note from June 1804, where Stendhal defines such 
'habitudes de l’ame' according to a strict criterion of moral worth: 'On peut les separer 
en habitudes utiles ou vertus, nuisibles ou vices.'97
This promotion'of habit to the status of virtue or vice was an important step in 
Stendhal's reasoning on the question of the individual's responsibility for his own 
conduct.98 The implications of the above went further, however. For to argue as much 
was to come close to holding that character itself was subject to control and 
modification through the medium of habit. Defined crudely in January 1803 as 'la
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somme des desirs qui affectent un personnage,'99 'character' is indeed redefined by 
Stendhal in order to take account of the new factor in question. 'Caractere,' he notes in 
June 1804, 'est passions modifiees par les habitudes.’100 In a subsequent journal 
entry, he develops this idea and its implications for the relationship between heart and 
head: 'Le caractere est passions et habitudes; mais la tete influe beaucoup sur les 
habfitudes], done aussi sur le caractere. La tete influe done sur le cceur...’101
Here precisely was what Stendhal was seeking to establish. In 'habit', he believed, 
he had isolated one of the means whereby reason might exert some meaningful 
influence over the passions.102 Here, it seemed, was a factor in the human equation 
which man had the capacity to define to his own specifications.103 The idea itself was 
far from new. The eighteenth century, in its search for the means of legislating for 
virtue, had recognised the importance of habituation, which was assigned 
unequivocally to education and social environment. The interest in habit that is 
expressed by Helvetius or d'Holbach is indissociable from their view of man as a being 
determined in all aspects of his behaviour by the environment which he inhabits.104 As 
the notion is interpreted by Stendhal, however, there is a clear shift in emphasis, an 
internalising of the factors which are held to determine man's character and destiny. For 
the perspective in which Stendhal views human behaviour takes only very vague and 
fitful account of the deterministic forces at work upon the individual from without. In 
this sense, there is apparent from the earliest a gaping contradiction between the 
determinism to which Stendhal subscribes in principle and the capacities with which he 
is ready nonetheless to invest the individual in the formation of character and conduct. 
Habit is a case in point. For it requires to be set in train by some generative force which 
must itself (and here had lain the challenge for the eighteenth-century moralists) be 
subject to the vagaries of any all-embracing determinism. Stendhal does not trouble, 
however, with the finer points of the dialectic. Habit, it is suggested, is related to a 
faculty of reason wherein lies the capacity to choose between attitudes and courses of 
action on the grounds of their desirability alone. Reason, like some deus ex machina, 
would suffice to determine habit. 'Tout l'homme est habitude, songe done a t'en 
donner de bonnes,' Stendhal writes glibly to his sister Pauline in March 1806.105 In a 
subsequent letter, he cites his own case as an illustration of man's capacity to select his 
habits: 'Je suis etonne d'habitudes que j'ai ainsi contractees sans m'en douter et 
uniquement parce que je m'etais persuade qu'il etait vertueux et avantageux de les 
avoir.'106 The power that is accorded to reason in both of these cases carries a strong 
echo of a letter written to the same Pauline Beyle a year earlier. Counselling his sister to 
learn from her observation of others, Stendhal had urged:
Cherche le chemin que tu aurais du tenir, si tu avais ete a leur place, pour eviter les
habitudes de la tete et du cceur (ou le caractere) qu'ils se sont donnees.107
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Within a deterministic perspective, such remarks pose an obvious problem. For, as 
L.G. Crocker argues, there is a clear distinction to be observed between consigning 
control of character, with all its irrational impulses, to the rational and discerning 
faculties of a reasonable human being (as Stendhal does here), and making it contingent 
instead upon coercive mechanisms brought to bear from without (in the form, for 
example, of legislation and education, as the eighteenth-century determinists had 
insisted).108 Though Stendhal does subscribe, through Helvetius most notably, to the 
view that man's thoughts and, ultimately, his behaviour are moulded by social 
conditioning and education, he is prepared simultaneously to grant powers to the 
faculty of reason — and, by extension, to the will — which fly in the face of any 
thoroughgoing determinist logic.
The link between habit and reason, once established, had an obvious ethical 
extension. What one thought, one’s opinions or beliefs on a whole range of issues, 
would have an important role to play in shaping one’s habits and one's subsequent 
behaviour, and in furnishing the means whereby passion might tend, for good or for 
ill, towards its fulfilment. 'Toutes les actions de notre corps,' writes Stendhal in July 
1804, 'portent sur une opinion de notre tete qui est un jugement par lequel elle montre 
au desir du bonheur tel moyen comme le seul propre, ou comme le plus propre a 
parvenir a telle chose.'109 In a similar note dating from the same month, he goes so far 
as to conclude: 'L'hom[me] vit d'apres ce qu'il croit etre et non point d'apres ce qu'il 
est veritablement'; he then adds, by way of explanation: 'Toutes ses passions 
s'appuient sur les verites de sa tete qui souvent sont des faussetes.'110
However infelicitous the expression, it is clear from such remarks that truth has 
become an essential element in the ever more complex question of human motivation. 
'Nos volontes suivent nos opinions,' declares Stendhal in separate notebook entries of 
June and July 1804.111 That men act upon stimuli originating in the mind is the notion 
that again emerges from a note of 13 July 1804, in which Stendhal seeks to clarify his 
thinking on this question: 'C'est-a-dire que les passions agissent d'apres les enonces 
qui leur sont donnes pour vrais par [les] tetes.'112 To claim as much was to return 
squarely to the question of reason and passion and their influence one upon the other. It 
prepares the ground, moreover, for the far-reaching remark which Stendhal will make 
in a subsequent letter to his sister Pauline: 'Une ame forte qui parviendrait a faire tout ce 
que la raison lui dicterait serait maitresse de tout ce qui l'environne.'113
Whatever the merits or demerits of Stendhal's dialectic in all of this, he had good 
reason for wishing to ascribe a significant role to the rational element in man. As an
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aspiring comic dramatist, he thought it imperative that he should be able to relate 
responsibility for human behaviour to a discerning faculty of reason rather than to blind 
impulse. On that,.according to Stendhal, the whole edifice of comedy rested. In his 
endeavours to define the 'regies de la plus parfaite comedie' in June 1804, he 
establishes a distinction that was to have served as one of the canons of his dramatic art:
Les personnages peints par les poetes et les historiens:
1° ne sont odieux que par le cceur et jamais par la tete;
2° ne sont ridicules que par la tete et jamais par le cceur.114
Having elsewhere posited that passion is 'une maladie involontaire de l'ame', and that 
an audience cannot be disposed to 'se moquer d'un etat ou ils seront peut-etre demain,' 
Stendhal goes on to draw the following conclusion:
II suivrait de la qu'on n'est jamais ridicule par ses passions. On ne serait done 
ridicule que par la tete qui influe sur les passions de deux manieres en leur 
foumissant des moyens et par ses habitudes.
Si le caractere n'est compose que de passions et d'habitudes, et que les passions ne 
soient jamais ridicules, restent les habitudes.115
It was a character's reason, then, together with the habits which were a corollary 
thereof, that were to form the butt of Stendhal's comic art. His conception of the 
sublime, it is significant to note, is defined, conversely, by the same terms. 'Comment 
a-t-on le sublime d'un caractere?' he muses in July 1804: 'En mettant a l’ame qui fait ce 
caractere une tete la plus eclairee possible.’116 Stendhal's early notion of the sublime 
thus becomes synonymous not — as one might expect, in view of his subsequent 
admiration for passionate energy in all its forms — with strength of passion, but rather 
with reason as the arbiter and guide of human nature. Amid his notes of August 1804, 
he reinforces the point: 'Sublime veut dire ici bonne tete, pleine des verites les plus 
propres a faire le bonheur de ce qui l'environne.'117
Stendhal makes a number of noteworthy applications of this principle in his private 
diaries and correspondence of the period. Moliere's Alceste may be fundamentally 
admirable, and it is clear that Stendhal feels much sympathy — and, at times, no little 
affinity — with his predicament;118 but this does not obscure his judgment of Alceste's 
actions as seriously misguided:
II y a dans Alceste l'imperfection capitale que la tete n'est pas assez bonne. II 
devrait voir que tous ces maux qu'il ne peut endurer viennent du gouvemement 
monarchique, et tourner contre le tyran la haine que lui donnent les vices de ses 
contemporains. Ne prenant pas ce parti, n'en ayant pas la force, il devrait se faire 
une idee nette de la vertu, et pour faire encore quelques biens partiels (ne 
s'attaquant pas a la racine du mal), rester dans le monde pour s'y liguer avec le peu 
d'honnetes gens qui y sont et y faire le plus de bien possible.119
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Such criticism of Moliere's protagonist is instructive on several levels. In the first 
place, it presupposes that Alceste has the wherewithal to master his misanthropy and to 
channel his passion in a different, more constructive direction. Here again, it is reason 
alone which, it is suggested, provides the means for self-correction. It is significant, 
too, that virtuous action is equated here — ’faire le plus de bien possible' — with the 
service of one's fellow men. Alceste's fault is that he succumbs to sterile resentment, la 
haine impuissante, rather than attempting to salvage what 'partial good' he can from a 
fundamentally corruptive regime.
The significance of Stendhal's reasoning on this question carries us far beyond the 
occasions when he castigates Moliere's protagonist by name. A striking counterpoint to 
Alceste's case, for example, is provided by the legendary heroes of Ancient Rome, 
whose 'philanthropic eclairee', as typified by the actions of a Brutus or a Regulus, 
reveals in similar fashion Stendhal's concern to see fine sentiment matched with sound 
reason:120
Louis XII, par exemple, n'avait pas une tete digne de son cceur; le divin Brutus 
(Marcus) n'avait pas peut-etre un meilleur cceur, mais il avait une bien meilleure 
tete, c’est-a-dire pleine de bien plus de verites.121
Regulus, avec le caractere d'Henri IV, serait la perfection jusqu'ici connue de 
l'homme, l'hom[me] donnant le plus de plaisir a ses concitoyens.122
While the perfect coincidence of reason and sensibility was to have been reserved for 
but a few of Stendhal's more exemplary characters, who were to combine 'la plus belle 
ame avec la meilleure tete,'123 the principle that is here outlined gave renewed impetus 
to his whole conception of characterisation. In August 1804, he records ah idea for a 
new play:'L'homme irritable, comedie. Un protagoniste qui aurait une ame parfaite et 
une tete egalement parfaite a cette mauvaise habitude pres.'124 The significance of his 
play Les Deux Hommes was precisely that it would portray the characters of his two 
protagonists as an inevitable consequence of this heart-mind dichotomy. While the one
— Charles Valbelle — was to be a model of republican probity, the other — Chamoucy
— was to embody all the prejudice and hypocrisy of the 'caractere monarchique':125
Les hom[mes] ont interet que les bons coeurs soient eclaires. Charles ne peut faire 
un crime que par ignorance, tandis que ce n'est que par ignorance que Ch[amouc]y 
peut faire une belle action.126
The proper function of reason, however, is not simply to steer a character away from 
crime but — here again, as in the case of Alceste — to direct it towards the procurement 
of the greatest possible good:
II faut que Charles, renferme dans les bornes de la vraisemblance, montre le 
caractere le plus propre possible a faire le bonheur des autres.
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Et que Ch[amouc]y sans aller jusqu'a l'odieux montre le caractere le plus propre a 
faire le malheur des autres.127
Construire son ame: Freedom and Determinism in Character Formation
The foregoing passages, penned within a matter of months of one another in 1804, 
translate Stendhal’s growing conviction that, if passion was a sine qua non of virtue as 
of vice, so too was reason. In a note consigned to his journal on 30 August 1804, it is 
the case of Alceste which once more prompts a revealing observation on the nature of 
man:
Si je peignais jamais un misanthrope, lui donner pour ami un homme qui 
reviendrait d'un long voyage, d'Amerique, et qui lui expliquerait pour le consoler 
mon systeme de Yame et du cceur, comme quoi c'est par erreur et non par 
mechancete que la plupart des hommes commettent leurs plus grands crimes.128
For all the vagueness of Stendhal's terms here — 'la plupart des hommes', 'leurs plus 
grands crimes' —, the essence of his meaning is clear. The notion of education that is 
implicit here and in the previous examples does, however, beg a number of questions. 
For Stendhal's thought — and here we return to a point upon which we have touched 
— is complicated by his professed allegiance to a deterministic view of man as the 
product of forces which lie beyond his bidding. A remark in a letter dating from as 
early as 1800 appears to endorse the view that the human character is shaped by 
predetermining influences which man is powerless to direct. 'II faut le supporter,' 
writes Stendhal to Pauline of their young cousin, Gaetan Gagnon, 'nous ne nous 
faisons point nous-memes, et il y aurait autant d'absurdite a mepriser un homme parce 
qu'il a moins d'esprit que nous qu'a s'enorgueillir de ce qu’on a les cheveux blonds 
tandis qu'un autre les a noirs.'129 Stendhal seems to push this deterministic viewpoint 
still further when, in his journal of May 1803, he writes:'[...] on ne peut se refaire et 
malheur a qui tache.'130 Some notes on characterisation in the theatre written in July 
1804 again appear to bear out this notion. In the case of a well established passion 
which has mobilised habit in its service, avers Stendhal, 'il est tres difficile et par 
consequent tres rare de se corriger.'131
The quasi-fatalistic note that is struck in each of these instances is, however, far 
from characteristic of Stendhal’s early thoughts on the question of man's accountability 
for himself. For it is clear, from numerous examples which are to be found elsewhere 
in his notebooks and letters, that he fails to subscribe to what such a view of humanity 
would imply. The overwhelming emphasis is placed not on man's powerlessness or
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resignation in the face of some unfathomable determinism, but rather on his capacity to 
forge, to 'invent', himself despite the forces at work upon him. 'Construire son ame,' 
Stendhal urges himself in July 1804, 'de maniere a ce qu'elle ait le plus grand bonheur 
possible dans la carriere que je prevois que je parcourrai.'132 The notion that one could 
thus lay the ground for one's own character comes repeatedly to the fore in his diaries 
and letters of this period. Sketching a portrait of his character in August 1804, he 
reflects:'[...] ton education t'a donne une ame tres passionnee.’133 In another journal 
entry from the same period, he strikes a similar note:
Reflechir a cela pour perfectionner encore mon ame. J'ai etudie la nature dans les
chefs-d'oeuvre des maitres, voila ce qui m'a donne .cette ame.134
Such remarks recall the endless solicitations which we find in the letters to Pauline 
Beyle concerning the regime of study and self-cultivation which she should undertake 
and the moral benefits which, according to Stendhal, are to be derived therefrom. 'II 
faut te familiariser avec les chefs-d'oeuvre de nos grands ecrivains,' he entreats her in 
December 1801; 'ils te formeront egalement l'esprit et le coeur.'135 This insistence on 
the notion that one's innermost character can be forged through education, while it 
found endorsement in the out-and-out environmentalism of Helvetius, suggests a 
limitless potential residing in untutored human nature which is quite at odds with 
Stendhal's remarks about the irreversible character of his cousin Gaetan, or his 
suggestion that human character and reason are defined immutably from the earliest. 
Clearly, there is a serious philosophical problem in the disparity that exists between 
these two standpoints. It is, moreover, a problem which is never satisfactorily resolved 
— or even addressed as such — by Stendhal. What the above extracts demonstrate, 
however, is that, while appearing to endorse a deterministic rationale in his conception 
of human nature, Stendhal is by no means prepared to relinquish a very substantial 
measure of personal responsibility in the formation — and subsequent affirmation — of 
character. To argue as much was but a short step away from holding that one could 
correct a character that was already formed— a step which we find Stendhal, in a letter 
of March 1803, quite prepared to take. 'Sois persuadee,' he writes to Pauline, 'qu'on 
peut se corriger de tout; il n'y a qu'a se bien demontrer la necessite d'une chose et l'on 
en vient a bout.'136
If one looks back now to his letter of December 1800, or to his notes of May
1803,137 one has some measure of the latitude which Stendhal in fact allows on this 
question of the individual's capacity to define his own character. Two letters of 1804 
amply bear this out. In both cases, Stendhal takes up again the question of his young 
cousin, but his tone now is very different from that of his earlier letter. 'II faut 
retremper son ame, autrement ce ne sera qu'un faible,' he writes to his sister in July
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1804.138 In the second letter, dated the following month, he urges her: 'tache de [lui] 
donner un meilleur cceur...'139
The suggestion here, clearly, is that one character may be 'traded in' for another, 
or at least substantially overhauled, provided one has the will and know-how to effect 
the necessary changes. To Pauline herself, Stendhal's advice has a similar ring: 
'Voulez-vous done avoir de l'esprit: travaillez votre caractere, chassez-en non 
seulement les vices, mais meme les defauts...'140 The same note is more resonant still 
in another of the letters from this early period:
Songe a te connaitre toi-meme. Cherche quelle est ta plus forte passion, la
deuxieme en force, etc.; tes gouts, les habitudes de tes passions; en un mot,
cherche a faire ton propre caractere.141
Nor is Stendhal here, as in some other instances, dispensing counsel which he is 
himself quite content to flout. 'Conclusion: travailler sur mon caractere,' he exhorts 
himself in August 1804.142 'Je commence a corriger mon caractere,’ he notes in his 
diary of April 1805.143 In July of that year, he draws up a number of maxims under the 
rubric: 'Travail sur toi-meme.'144 Even his discovery of Ideology in 1805 is cast in this 
same light: 'Voila la grande utilite pour moi de l'ideologie; elle m'explique a moi-meme, 
et me montre ainsi ce qu'il faut fortifier, ce qu'il faut detruire dans moi-meme.'145 
Increasingly, the notion of self-correction comes to run like a leitmotif through 
Stendhal's journals and letters. 'Je continue a travailler sur mes sentiments,' he remarks 
in a letter of May 1807, 'c'est l'unique chemin du bonheur.'146 The same 
preoccupation is evideiit again in his diary of November 1807: 'II serait utile d'ecrire les 
annales de ses desirs, de son ame; cela apprendrait a la corriger...'147 The notion is 
one to which we find Stendhal returning with more insistence still in an entry dating 
from October 1808. 'Faire incessamment,’ he urges himself, '[...] l'examen de ma 
conscience: comme homme qui cherche a se former le caractere, les manieres, a 
s'instruire, a s'amuser, a se former dans son metier.'148
The point bears emphasising. For this notion that one could form, or reform, one's 
character is of crucial significance in Stendhal's early conception of human nature. 
Michel Crouzet is well founded in his contention that Stendhal 'attend de la raison une 
correction de soi, une sorte de salut.'149 It seems reasonable to propose, moreover, that 
the foregoing throws some light upon the manner in which this 'patentee of psychology 
and inventor of introspection'150 perceived the exercise in self-scrutiny in which he 
engaged through his diaries, notebooks and letters. According to Alain Girard, 
Stendhal's journal is more than 'un instrument de connaissance': it is the means 
whereby he seeks to forge the very 'self' whose thoughts and sentiments he is 
recording. 'Se connaitre,' writes Girard, 'c'est en realite se faire; et se faire, tenter
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d'etre soi.'151 For Jules Lemaitre likewise, Stendhal's journal is first and foremost 'un 
travail utile. C'est pour lui un moyen de se modifier, de se fat^onner peu a peu en vue 
d'un but determine...'152
On a strictly philosophical plane, the contention that the individual has power to act 
thus as arbiter over his character and conduct raises a number of important questions, 
not least about the nature of a determinism which, it has been assumed by critics, 
Stendhal inherited intact from the eighteenth century and passed on to later intellectual 
kinsmen such as Taine. For Stendhal as for Taine, it has been argued, man is 'un 
mecanisme a demonter, et tous ses mouvements, toutes ses actions s'expliquent, 
comme les mouvements et les directions de la matiere, par des faits physiques. C'est de 
part et d'autre meme determinisme.'153 Remi Bosselaers takes up this point, 
discovering in Stendhal a convinced materialist and an exponent 'du determinisme 
mecaniste de Hobbes.'154 This notion of Stendhal as a thoroughgoing determinist, a 
link in the chain from Hobbes to Taine, has gained much currency. For Gita May, 
Stendhal is a 'deterministic materialist' and disciple of the eighteeth-century 
sensationalists;155 for Manuel Brussaly and Etienne Rey likewise, he is an 'epicurean 
determinist', an exponent of that 'determinisme utilitaire' which reduced man to a 
complex of desires and fears, and set him irrevocably on a path towards the 
gratification of his self-interest as he perceived it.156
Though there may be ample evidence in Stendhal's writings to support them, such 
definitions call nonetheless for serious attenuation. For, contained within the same 
writings, with the premium which they set upon the individual's powers of 
self-determination, is a compelling case against the very necessitarianism in question. 
Alongside, and in contradistinction to, Stendhal's determinism must be placed what 
Marcel Prevost calls 'son culte de la volonte consciente et agissante.'157 The two 
stances require a reconciliation that is not easily arrived at. It is a problem which Gita 
May mirrors rather than resolves when she writes:
Like the eighteenth-century sensualists, Beyle denied the existence of free will and 
firmly believed that all our actions are determined by our physical make-up and our 
past experience. Yet he differed from the behaviorist school in that he was also 
convinced that the individual could, in a large measure, shape his own destiny by 
knowing what options are open to him and by choosing his course of action with 
as full an understanding as possible of what is best for him in each particular 
situation.158
This, we submit, is a less than convincing attempt to accommodate two such radically 
opposed standpoints.159 Nor does the vagueness of the language employed — 'in a 
large measure', 'as full an understanding as possible' — help to resolve the issue. One 
cannot, with logical consistency, as L.G. Crocker points out, make man subject to an
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overbearing determinism and grant him 'the special moral dignity of being privileged to 
decide his own fate.'160 The problem in the above analysis is centred on the notion of 
rational 'choice'. For one can argue that, so long as a man is not impeded in the 
execution of his will, then he is acting in a manner which can be construed as 'free', 
enjoying a liberty consistent with compulsion. This does not mean, however, that he is 
free to choose the course of action upon which he embarks. Choice cannot be defined 
independently of the determinism by which it is circumscribed: it merely becomes a 
function of that determinism.161 There is no better illustration of this point than 
Hobbes's definition of 'liberty' as 'the absence of Opposition’, or of 'externall 
Impediments of motion.'162 Water running down a hillside, insofar as it encounters no 
obstacle in its course, can be considered to run freely. This does not, of course, imply 
that the water is free to execute a motion other than that of flowing downhill.163
Though both of the positions outlined by May might, then, with more careful 
wording, be reconciled within a satisfactory determinist logic, they do not, as they are 
expressed above, constitute a coherent definition of human nature. The fact is that any 
attempt, however scrupulous, to reconcile the opposing currents — for opposing 
currents they are — in Stendhal's view of moral responsibility is doomed to 
inconsistency and failure. There is no easy middle way between determinism and the 
abolition of free will, on the one hand, and the capacity to 'shape' one's destiny, in any 
meaningful sense, on the other. Thus May finds herself, elsewhere in the same study, 
affirming 'Stendhal's lifelong belief in the fundamental freedom of the individual, in his 
aptitude for choice and for overcoming the sociological or psychological forces that 
would constrict him.'164 Fundamental freedom... choice... overcoming the forces that 
would constrict him: we are at some remove here, it will be agreed, from the 
'deterministic materialist and atheist, the loyal disciple of Helvetius and the Ideologists' 
who is elsewhere evoked by the same critic.165
From Helvetius to Stendhal: The Altered Ego
Though it may not be happily resolved, the problem addressed by May is an important 
one which goes to the heart of Stendhal's conception of human nature.166 It raises 
questions in particular about the manner in which, through his reading of Helvetius 
notably, he responded to the determinism that was such an essential feature of the 
latter's philosophy. Let us approach these questions by considering one central aspect 
of Helvetius's argument, the claim that human beings are, as D.W. Smith puts it,
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'simply pleasure-pain calculating-machines, physically incapable of desiring anything 
but their own material pleasure.'167 On 24 May 1804, lending his endorsement to 
Helvetius's theory of human motivation, Stendhal writes in his notebook: '[...] il n'y a 
que les sots qui croient que je puisse aller contre mes interets.'168 This idea is echoed 
and amplified in another notebook entry some weeks later, in which he explores its 
underlying rationale thus: 'II me semble constant qu'au moment ou nous agissons, 
nous agissons toujours pour notre plus grand plaisir.' He concludes:
II est done tres vrai que l'amour du bonheur ou amour-propre nous dirige dans 
toutes nos actions. Ceux qui nient cela appliquent notre bonheur a leurs passions et 
disent: "Cela n'est pas le bonheur, done il agit d'une maniere desinteressee". II 
fallait dire: "Cela n'est pas mon bonheur."169
As a reflection of Helvetius's theory of self-interest, these remarks cannot be 
faulted.170 Yet Stendhal proves unable to sustain this rationale and to give it anything 
approaching consistent application in his own writing. We saw earlier in this chapter 
how he recognises a need to correct the jaundiced view of the passions which, he 
claims, he has inherited from his family upbringing. This instance of a residual moral 
orthodoxy, however, is not unique. When Stendhal least suspects it, his language 
betrays a lingering legacy of the philosophical conservatism which he is everywhere at 
pains to denounce.171 Men are but egos seeking self-fulfilment, wills which collide or 
coincide according to the moment and circumstance. Such is the view professed by this 
avowed disciple of Helvetius and reputed forerunner of Nietzsche. Yet we surprise 
him, in his notes of June 1804, defining egoism as a 'd e fau f — or, more 
problematically still, in a note from September of the same year, as an 'habitude de 
l'ame, vicieuse.'172 Clearly, such value judgments should have been rendered 
redundant by an Helvetian philosophy which, as Michel Crouzet properly asserts, 'ne 
tend qu'a unir l'egoisme et la bonne conscience; cette conciliation qui doit deculpabiliser 
l'amour-propre (contre un christianisme juge castrateur)...'173 Egoism indulged to the 
detriment of others might, of course, be deemed reprehensible;174 but to condemn 
egoism per se was to take issue with the whole rationale upon which eighteenth-century 
radical determinist philosophy rested. Helvetius is tireless on this point:
Quel homme, en effet, s'il sacrifie l'orgueil de se dire plus vertueux que les autres 
a l'orgueil d'etre plus vrai, & s'il sonde, avec une attention scrupuleuse, tous les 
replis de son ame, ne s'appercevra pas que c'est uniquement a la maniere differente 
dont l'interet personnel se modifie, que l'on doit ses vices & ses vertus? que tous 
les hommes sont mus par la meme force? que tous tendent egalement a leur 
bonheur? que c’est la diversite des passions & des gouts, dont les uns sont 
conformes & les autres contraires a l'interet public, qui decide de nos vertus & de 
nos vices?175
The express intention of Helvetius was neither to deny nor to reprove man's innate 
tendency to seek what he perceived to be in his own best interest; it was rather, by
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convincing men that their interest lay in promoting the common good, to reconstruct 
morality on new foundations and forge 'une vertu toujours inebranlable au choc de 
mille interets particuliers & differents.'176 The challenge which such an aspiration 
issued to conventional morality is clear; for man is robbed from the outset of the 
capacity to suppress those very impulses which Christian moralism held to be 
incompatible with an ideal of altruistic virtue based on individual conscience and 
rational choice:
Les declamations continuelles des moralistes contre la mechancete des hommes, 
prouvent le peu de connoissance qu'ils en ont. Les hommes ne sont point 
mechants, mais soumis a leurs interets. Les cris des moralistes ne changeront 
certainement pas ce ressort de l'univers moral.177
The difficulty which Stendhal encounters in adapting his thinking and language to 
this most basic precept of philosophical egoism has occasioned remarkably little 
commentary. Yet the examples cited are no mere slips of the pen. The term 'egoisme' 
will throughout Stendhal's writings be charged with a pejorative value which flies in 
the face of all that he had read and apparently endorsed in a thinker such as Helvetius. 
From being the very source of 'virtue' for the latter, the Ego undergoes a serious 
distortion in Stendhal's value-system, emerging not as the protean deity of the moral 
world, but as its demon. Egoism, Stendhal plainly writes in a letter of 1806, is 'contre 
la vertu'; it is, as we find him repeatedly asserting, a mark of individuals incapable of 
generous sentiment.178 As Michel Crouzet observes, the term is consigned by Stendhal 
to the semantic fields of vanity, coldness and base calculation. ’A dire vrai, jamais ne 
cessera chez Stendhal, cet emploi pejoratif du mot egoisme, [...]. Cette pensee, si 
naturelle, si propre au "status naturae", Stendhal ne s'y resigne pas...'179
To recalcitrate thus against the ascendancy of the Ego was, however, to return to 
the very view of man — as a being with a dual nature, capable of good and evil alike 
and equipped with the moral apparatus required to arbitrate between the two — against 
which philosophers such as Helvetius had deployed their reasoning. The perception of 
'selfishness' as reprehensible implied the espousal of a quasi-Christian definition of 
moral man. For it assumed the capacity to choose between ^//-interested and 
disinterested behaviour. Stendhal, indeed, goes so far as to admit of what his 
eighteenth-century predecessors had striven to unmask as a pious fraud when, again 
amid his notes of June 1804, he expressly recognises the possibility of disinterested 
human endeavour. 'C'est qu’une passion peut rendre desinteresse,' he avers, adding 
the suggestion that one might even cultivate a habit of self-abnegation, 'l'habitude du 
desinteressement.'1S0
In this sense, Gita May makes an important point when she argues that, whatever
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Stendhal's debt to the radical precepts of hard-headed moralists such as La 
Rochefoucauld and Helvetius, 'il ne peut se resigner a souscrire entierement a une vue 
de l'homme selon laquelle il est un etre de peche, d'orgueil, de velleite passagere et 
surtout de monstrueux egoisme.'181 One suspects that Stendhal might have defended 
himself on this point by recourse to the poete-philosophe dichotomy which we 
discussed in Chapter II. For it was his contention that Helvetius, and other 'froids 
philosophes' of his like, were unable to apprehend the full range of human experience 
in precisely those emotive regions to which, argued Stendhal, they were, strangers. The 
suggestion, clearly, is that there exist some 'higher reaches' of human sentiment, where 
one may witness a refinement and a generosity of spirit that go beyond the narrow 
confines of self-interest as perceived by Helvetius. In a letter to Edouard Mounier of 15 
December 1803, Stendhal recounts how the latter's De I'Esprit has made him call into 
question such sentiments as love and friendship:
Enfin, j'ai cru reconnaitre qu'Helvetius, n'ayant jamais senti ces douces affections, 
etait, d'apres ses propres principes, incapable de les peindre. Comment pourrait-il 
expliquer ce trouble inconnu qui saisit a la premiere vue, et cette Constance etemelle 
qui nourrit sans esperance un amour allume?182
The remark shows some sensitivity to what may be deemed a major shortcoming of 
Helvetius's philosophy. For to suggest, as the latter does, that human happiness is 
reducible to some crudely defined common denominator of sensual gratification was to 
belie the range and complexity of the motivating forces by which human beings may 
find themselves impelled. 'The consequence,' as Charles Frankel notes, 'was that 
Helvetius parodied the nature (and diversity) of human happiness': he might recognise, 
quantitatively, the various domains in which self-interest is pursued, but he fails to take 
'account of the qualitative differences between these domains.'183 The point was one 
which made a lasting impression upon Stendhal. In a letter of 13 November 1820 to 
Adolphe de Mareste, he will reiterate his earlier reservations in terms which are far from 
arguing an unquestioning allegiance to the fundamental principles of Helvetius's 
thought:
Helvetius a eu parfaitement raison lorsqu'il a etabli que le principe d'utilite ou 
Yinteret etait le guide unique de toutes les actions de l'homme. Mais, comme il 
avait l'ame froide, il n'a connu ni l'amour, ni l’amitie, ni les autres passions vives 
qui creent des interets nouveaux et s i n g u l i e r s . i u
What Stendhal is clearly loath to accept is that the most refined and the most 
brutish sentiments alike should be judged according to the same narrow conception of 
material self-interest. He comes close here to a number of the criticisms levelled against 
Helvetius by Diderot, who, in his lengthy refutation of De VHomme, signalled the 
failure therein to recognise those noble motivating sentiments — 'ce genereux 
enthousiasme' — which could not be reduced to some base gratification of the
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senses.185 Stendhal, while identifying precisely the same lack in the author of De 
VHomme, goes much further than Diderot in his objection. For, where the latter 
questions the nature of the self-interest posited by Helvetius, finding in it too great an 
emphasis upon the pleasures of the flesh,186 Stendhal appears at times to question its 
very function, to cast doubt upon the hegemony of self-interest, however broadly 
defined, as the driving force in human affairs. His misgivings on this question, his 
insistence upon a separate category of experience to which the philosophers of egoism 
are not privy, together with the suggestion that some element of selflessness is the 
hallmark of a true passion, constitute a substantial departure from the stark Helvetian 
principle which he had spelt out some months earlier in a letter to his sister Pauline: 
'chaque homme juge tout par son interet.'1*1
Of the problems implied by the foregoing, Stendhal appears largely unaware. 
Though he identifies what he takes to be the limitation in Helvetius's treatment of 
human nature, he is far from suspecting the distortions which he visits at times upon 
the latter's most fundamental precept. In his earliest endeavours as a would-be 
playwright, he seeks to provide in dramatic form a demonstration of what he terms 'la 
vraie morale, celle d'Helvetius'.188 When it comes, however, to defining the characters 
for his projected play Les Deux Hommes (a heavy-handedly didactic demonstration of 
republican virtue and monarchical vice),189 the difficulty which he has in adhering to 
Helvetius's theory of human nature breaks through once more. 'Un homfme] 
meprisable,' opines Stendhal, reflecting on the villain of the piece, Chamoucy, 'est 
celui qui n'est pas susceptible d'etre passionne, et qui lorsqu’on lui montre qu'il y va 
de son interet n’hesite pas a faire une mauvaise action, tel est M. de Chamoucy.'190
Stendhal's thinking here, by his own stated principles, is surely flawed on a 
number of counts. The notion of a human being who is not susceptible of passion not 
only goes beyond the bounds of verisimilitude and calls into question the crucial role of 
the passions as discussed in the foregoing pages: it mns counter to the explicit claim by 
Stendhal, in a notebook entry of 5 May 1803, that each human being without exception 
is susceptible, by nature, to every passion.191 More importantly still, the example in 
question demonstrates the precarious hold which Stendhal has over Helvetius's central 
principle that we act everywhere and at all times to further our own best interest as we 
perceive it. This did not for Helvetius, or for the Ideologues who followed him closely 
on this point, render meaningless the notions of virtue and vice; nor did it imply 
resignation to a world of unfettered egoism. The solution, however, lay not in 
reproving individuals for their conduct, but in undertaking a thoroughgoing reform of 
the social order through education and legislation. As C.H. Van Duzer rightly 
observes, a 'strong humanitarian sympathy runs through the moral philosophy of the
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Ideologues. If man is the product of institutions, as the Sensationalists believed, then 
he is to be pitied rather than blamed for his immoral actions.’192 No thinker proved a 
more resolute exponent of this rationale than Helvetius. Without sound instruction, he 
argued, it availed nothing to criticise the behaviour of individual men:
L'homme d'esprit sait que les hommes sont ce qu'ils doivent etre; que toute haine
contr'eux est injuste; qu'un sot porte des sottises, comme le sauvageon des fruits
amers; que l'insulter, c'est reprocher au chene de porter* le gland plutot que
l'olive...193
If one applies this reasoning to Stendhal's Les Deux Hommes, one must recognise that 
Chamoucy, the product of a particular environment, instruction and political regime, is 
no more able to alter his character — or even to perceive its defects — than Charles, the 
hero of the play, the republican par excellence, is capable of abasing himself to commit 
reprehensible deeds.194 In characterising his two protagonists, indeed, Stendhal recalls 
Helvetius's imagery, describing Charles and Chamoucy as 'ces deux plantes', and 
stating that the former must be shown to produce 'de bonnes actions comme un poirier 
porte des poires.'195 Must not the same hold true, conversely, for his counterpart? The 
logic is inescapable; yet the judgment that is conveyed by the designation of Chamoucy 
as 'meprisable' implies a choice on the part of the character, the ability not to pursue his 
self-interest as he perceives it — and this is clearly at odds with Helvetius’s thesis. 'II 
ne faut done pas rendre passionne mon courtisan, parce que la passion excuse tout,' 
Stendhal takes care to note, 'mais lui faire commettre de [...] mauvaises actions de 
sang-froid. Alors on le haira ou on le meprisera.'196 The very purpose of Stendhal's 
play, it is clear, was that the audience should emerge from the theatre loathing and 
despising the hapless Chamoucy — that is, giving rein to the very sentiments which 
Helvetius deems misguided and unjust.
Stendhal's reading of Helvetius, then, is subject to caution. Francine Marill 
Alberes appears to misjudge the whole import of the latter's philosophy when she 
asserts that, under Helvetius's influence, Stendhal early espouses 'la notion 
d'altruisme' and comes to advocate 'le desinteressement personnel.'197 Nowhere in 
Helvetius's philosophy, nor in Stendhal's interpretation of the latter where it is 
accurate, is there a place for such concepts. Enlightened egoism, yes; self-abnegation, 
on no account. The author of De VHomme puts it emphatically: 'sans interet d'aimer la 
vertu, point de vertu.'198 It was Helvetius's contention that self-interest, by nature 
ineradicable, could nonetheless be harnessed within a well conceived social order and 
so made subject to the sanctions of praise and blame, reward and punishment, that it 
would be in the individual's interest to be always virtuous. 'Dans une excellente 
Legislation,' he contends, like Jeremy Bentham after him, 'les seuls vicieux seroient les 
fous.’199
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In such a social order, one might have all the appearance of being altruistic, of 
renouncing one's own well-being to procure that of others; but this in itself would be 
but an exercise of egoism, the pursuit of a higher and more laudable pleasure perhaps, 
but the pursuit of pleasure no less. Helvetius, as Michel Crouzet rightly observes, 'ne 
peut concevoir qu'un changement de direction, et non de nature, de l'amour de soi.'200 
The distinction is a crucial one. The Ego cannot transcend itself, even in the most heroic 
of actions. The highest virtue is no more for Helvetius than 'un conditionnement de 
l'amour de soi par les lois, et les regies de l'eloge et du blame.’201 Even Regulus (to 
cite again the example which Stendhal, like Helvetius, uses to illustrate this point), 
when he returned to be put to death in Carthage, chose the course of action which best 
served his interest as he conceived of it.202 His heroism, his compulsion to live up to 
the ideal of virtus, meant more to him than life itself: he had quite simply, as Stendhal 
puts it, 'un plaisir plus grand a satisfaire.'203
The same holds true for another case which Stendhal cites with some frequency, 
that of Lucius Junius Brutus, the semi-legendary hero who sacrificed his two sons for 
the preservation of Rome.204 The anecdote was, as H.T. Parker observes, 
commonplace in the later eighteenth century as a means of exciting admiration for the 
civic virtues of the Ancients;205 but Stendhal’s reflections on it, in his notebook entry 
of 9 July 1804, are revealing. 'Brutus meme en immolant ses fils,' he avers, 'agissait 
pour son plus grand plaisir. II prevoyait cette hauteur de renommee, ce rang presque 
divin qui le rend eblouissant pour les petites ames, et la preferait aux jouissances que 
pouvaient lui donner ses deux fils.'206 Thus far the analysis is quite consistent with 
Helvetius. But, in pursuing his line of thought and reflecting upon the sort of society 
which might give rise to such virtue, Stendhal introduces a new and alien notion — 
'l'amour direct de la vertu' — which, he opines, might well lead men to sacrifice all in 
the name of their fellow human beings.207 We have seen above Helvetius's dismissal 
of any suggestion that virtue might be embraced for its own sake; yet, as Michel 
Crouzet recognises, Stendhal clearly shifts his position towards just such a suggestion, 
betraying 'une arriere-pensee d’inneite, de spontaneite au Bien' which has no place in 
Helvetius's scheme of things 208 Had Stendhal consulted again De I'Esprit, he would 
have found unequivocally expressed there the contention that no motive other than 
self-interest may predispose a man to virtue:
Quel autre motif pourroit determiner un homme a des actions genereuses? II lui est
aussi impossible d'aimer le bien pour le bien, que d'aimer le mal pour le mal.209
Part of the problem in such instances arises from the inadequacies of Stendhal's 
language. For though he advocates, like his philosophical mentors, a strictly defined
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terminology as the sine qua non of sound reasoning,210 he himself falls far short of any 
such ideal. In considering the ties which, in civilised society, bind the individual to the 
community, Stendhal is clearly mindful of the Helvetian principle of praise and blame 
as powerful determinants of human behaviour. Yet the language in which he couches 
his reflection on this question, in a notebook entry dated 25 July 1804, reveals 
considerable confusion and a betrayal of the logic whereby the above sanctions are held 
by Helvetius to operate:
[...] il faut bien se souvenir que dans ces jugements c'est toujours l'amour-propre
qui decide seul la plupart du temps, et que, quand il est arrete, ce n'est jamais que
par la crainte d'encourir le blame du public 211
To argue that self-interest can be directed or channelled is one thing; to suggest that it 
can be stemmed — 'arrete* — is, of course, quite another.
These early instances are not exceptional. In his later published writings, too, 
Stendhal will defy Helvetius and accord to human nature a dimension which is 
indefensible in terms of the latter's strict determinist principle. Thus, in VHistoire de la 
peinture en Italie, Stendhal will confront the mercenary virtue of the Christian saints 
with the generosity evinced by the heroes of Antiquity. The criticism to be made of the 
'froids egoi'stes* who inhabit biblical history, he argues, is quite simply this: 'II n'y a 
jamais sacrifice de Vinteretpropre a quelque sentiment genereux.'212 The same note is 
struck in De I'Amour, where we find Livy's Romans praised as exemplars of 'cette 
simplicite heroique, fruit d'un sacrifice entier et de bonne foi.'213 The terms 'sacrifice 
entier’ should no more be overlooked here than the accentuated — the italics are 
Stendhal's — 'sacrifice de Vinteret propre' in the preceding example. In D'un nouveau 
complot contre les industriels, Stendhal goes further still, contending that, 'pour arriver 
a une haute estime, il faut, en general, qu'il y ait sacrifice de l'interet a quelque noble 
but.' Again the emphasis is that of Stendhal, who goes on to define disinterestedness 
itself — le desinteressement, no less — as 'cette plus facile des vertus.'214
In each of these examples, Stendhal conceives of a capacity for generosity which, 
while it may appear superficially to echo Helvetius’s perception of a Regulus or a 
Brutus, is, on a closer reading, much more akin to traditional notions which it was the 
author of De VEsprit's express purpose to refute 215 For, supervening the Helvetian 
principle of self-interest, there persists in Stendhal an obdurate conviction that the 
sublime in human affairs (manifest, for example, in 'heroism', or in 'love') could not 
be adequately evaluated in the crude terms of pleasure and pain.216 Stendhal, indeed, 
takes issue with the very coincidence o f interests which Helvetius posits as the 
summum bonum of any well organised society. 'Je veux croire que mille industriels 
qui, sans manquer a la probite, gagnent cent mille ecus chacun, augmentent la force de
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la France,' he insists in D'un nouveau complot contre les industriels; 'mais ces 
messieurs ont fait le bien public a la suite de leur bien particulier.'217 A remark such as 
this poses a considerable challenge to the view of Stendhal as a loyal disciple of 
Helvetius. For he remains entrenched in the notion that virtue in its highest form is 
indissociable not from self-interest but from self-abnegation. Fernand Rude, in his 
apologetic study of Stendhal as a socialist avant la lettre, cites the 'principe de I'utilite' 
which, he argues, is that of Helvetius, Bentham and Stendhal in turn:
La vertu n'est pas en effet le sacrifice de nos interets a nos devoirs, mais le 
sacrifice d'un interet moindre a uh interet superieur. Et, "en travaillant a notre 
bonheur particulier, nous travaillons pour le bonheur general."218
While the axiom cited from Bentham here remains true to Helvetius's theory of 
self-interest, it is at some considerable remove from Stendhal's criticism above of those 
who promote 'le bien public d la suite de leur bien particulier.'
It should, however, have been transparent to Stendhal, from his earliest 
philosophical readings, that an unalloyed virtue was not to be hoped for amongst men. 
Just as there is no such thing as Happiness, but only that happiness which /  perceive 
and pursue, there is no such thing as Virtue, if by that we mean a standard of behaviour 
which can be objectified and considered in isolation from the drives, wants and needs 
of individual human beings. Between the individual and the social whole, Stendhal had 
written in January 1803, virtue is that which is useful 'a l'un et a l’autre ou a l'un des 
deux seulement sans nuire a l'autre.'219 In April 1804, amid the notes from his reading 
of Vauvenargues, he goes so far as to assert:
La plupart des vices concourent au bien public. Sans l'avarice* la vanite, etc., qui 
ferait fleurir le commerce? [...] Si les vices font du bien, c'est qu'ils sont meles de 
vertu. Les vices qui font fleurir le commerce sont meles de patience, de 
temperance, de courage, etc., et ces choses sont des vertus.220
Somewhere between these lines and the pamphlet of 1825 Stendhal's reasoning 
goes awry. Nor are the discrepancies in question to be accounted for by his contention, 
voiced on a number of occasions, that a philosopher of egoism such as Helvetius had 
underestimated man's capacity to generate 'des interets nouveaux et singuliers';221 for 
the novelty, even uniqueness, of self-interest as it is construed by any individual does 
not alter its essence or make it the more easily denied. In a letter to Adolphe de Mareste 
dated 20 March 1820, Stendhal writes thus of a mutual acquaintance: 'Faites-lui lire 
Helvetius et Tracy. C'est mon dada.'222 In considering this ostensibly enduring debt to 
Helvetius, J.-C. Alciatore unhesitatingly asserts that Stendhal continued throughout to 
'puiser, dans ce fonds inepuisable, de nouveaux aper9us.'223 Yet a passing remark in 
his letter to Mareste dated 13 November 1820 raises questions about the precise nature
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of this alleged fidelity. Reflecting upon the range of different ways in which a powerful 
passion may prompt us to pursue our self-interest, Stendhal confesses:
II se peut qu'Helvetius n'ait jamais devine ces interets; il y a trop longtemps que je 
n'ai lu son ouvrage, pour pouvoir l'assurer.224
Such apparent indifference to the finer points of Helvetius's thought is revealing. 
Revealing, too, is the portrait of Stendhal which*Merimee leaves in his Notes et 
Souvenirs. ’II citait souvent Helvetius avec grande admiration, et meme il m'obligea de 
lire le livre de VEsprit;' records Stendhal’s friend; ’mais jamais, a ma priere, il ne 
consentit a le relire.'225 Such testimony, from Stendhal and Merimee both, should 
perhaps temper our view of the unflagging allegiance which the former is held to have 
owed to the principles of Helvetius. Even when one returns, indeed, to those early 
years when the reading of De VEsprit and De I'Homme was still fresh, it is clear that 
Stendhal, in his conception of reason, free will and human responsibility, has about 
him at times considerably more of the conventional moralist than of the radical 
determinist.226 As Roger Smith argues, 'the notion of the mind as an immanent 
spontaneous source of action is inseparable from the Christian idea of free will and the 
western social concept of individual responsibility.'227 Yet Stendhal cannot break free 
of this traditional perspective sufficiently to allow him to conceive of human nature in a 
manner consistent with the determinism which he posits in principle, and to relegate the 
mind from its status as the initiator and supreme arbiter of human resolution. Thus it is 
his contention that one can and should, despite all of the constraints that might appear to 
militate against such a prospect, strive, through an ostensibly free exercise of reason 
and will, to nurture certain passions and to suppress others. The unwavering criterion 
in one’s choice should be the question, firstly, of whether a given passion is adjudged 
to have a realistic prospect of fulfilment, and, secondly, of whether such fulfilment is 
of itself likely to conduce to happiness.228 'Nous qui avons le bonheur inappreciable 
d'etre passionnes,' he writes to Pauline in August 1804, 'tachons de deraciner les 
passions que probablement nous ne pourrons pas satisfaire; d'aviver, au contraire, 
celles que nous pourrons desalterer, et nous serons tres heureux.’229 Only those 
passions which can .be fulfilled should be indulged. 'Tacher de diminuer en moi les 
passions qui ne pourront jamais etre satisfaites,' reads a journal entry from July 
1804.230 'Une religion peut etre utile,' Stendhal notes among his plans for the Filosofia 
Nova: 'II faut deraciner les passions malheureuses, aviver les heureuses.'231 The 
remark is amplified in a further notebook entry from the same period:
Amortir, diminuer les passions que nous prevoyons qui ne seront pas satisfaites, 
augmenter, vivifier celle dont nous croyons les jouissances assurees: voila l’art du 
bonheur.232
This question of the happiness which should attend the pursuit of certain passions
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and renunciation of others is crucial to Stendhal's reasoning on this whole question. A 
letter written to Pauline Beyle on 19 April 1805 contains much that is instructive in this 
regard:
Le bonheur consiste a pouvoir satisfaire ses passions,’ lorsqu'on n'a que des 
passions heureuses. La haine, la vanite, la cruaute, par exemple, sont des passions 
qui, generalement parlant, donnent plus de malheur que de bonheur. On peut croire 
le contraire de l'amitie, l'amour, l'amour de la gloire, celui de la patrie, etc. II faut 
done fairfc le premier travail sur soi, et tacher de deraciner de son cceur les passions 
malheureuses; cela est facile lorsqu'on le veut; il faut ensuite acquerir les habitudes 
propres a diminuer autant que possible les inconvenients qui paraissent 
inevitables.233
With all its Epicurean overtones, this passage throws into relief the premium which 
Stendhal sets on self-control and, more importantly, on self-censorship. Undesirable 
passions should be repressed; desirable passions should be fostered. Reason, 
elsewhere adjudged by Stendhal to be nothing more than 'le valet de Vame'234 is here 
cast in the guise of arbiter, endowed with the power — the will power — to select from 
among the passions those that are to be encouraged and those that must be extirpated. 
This, however, raises a question to which the passage cited above provides no 
satisfactory answer. 'Facile lorsqu'on le veut' it may be; but how, in reality, does one 
rid oneself of an undesirable passion? In the same letter of 19 April 1805, Stendhal 
addresses this question:
Une fois qu'on a deracine de son cceur les mauvaises passions, ce qui, je crois, est 
aise en le voulant fermement (pour cela, il faut se demontrer qu'elles rendent 
malheureux dans tons les cas possibles), il est clair qu'il faut chercher a satisfaire 
le plus celles qui restent. Le degre de bonheur dont on est susceptible se mesure 
alors sur le degre de force des passions.235
The designation here of 'good' and 'bad' passions finds an echo in a letter of 
March 1806, where Stendhal asserts: 'Je cherche a arracher de mon ame tout plein de 
fausses passions.'236 What, though, is to be understood by 'false passions'? Is not the 
very juxtaposition of such terms a contradiction in itself, an impossible conflation of the 
two theatres — heart and head — between which Stendhal is at pains to differentiate? 
'J'appelle fausses passions,' he explains, 'celles qui nous promettent dans telle 
situation un bonheur que nous ne trouvons pas lorsque nous y sommes arrives.’237 
There is here, one feels, an early prefiguration of the 'N’est-ce que ga?' response which 
Stendhal would experience on a number of notable occasions in his life and which he 
would pass on, in turn, to the protagonists of his fictional world.238 The problem 
implicit in the passages cited, however, is that Stendhal commits precisely that error for 
which he elsewhere reproves Helvetius: he assumes the individual's capacity to 
determine what is in his own best interest and, in so doing, sets too great a store by 
some unerring faculty of judgment. Helvetius, he had written in January 1804, 'n'a pas
119
assez considere la difference entre notre interet reel et notre interet apparent. H a juge les 
hommes, trop raisonnables, d'apres lui, et ils sont presque toujours domines par leurs 
passions...'239
By no amount reasoning, it seemed, could the circle be squared. For Stendhal 
finds objections to determinism and to voluntarism in equal measure. No sooner does 
he appear to endorse the determinist's position than he postulates a faculty of reason 
which transcends all deterministic constraint; on other occasions, we find the same 
faculty of reason reduced to nothing more than an intermediary stage between passion 
and action ('La passion commande a la tete qui transmet l'ordre au corps'), or a mere 
instrument of the passions ('La tete est absolument le valet de 1 'ante').240 One could 
multiply the examples which show Stendhal tom between these two incompatible 
postures. What matters, however, is that he proves unable to sustain for long the logic 
of a position which he is readily assumed to have adopted alongside Helvetius, 
d'Holbach and other thinkers of a similar persuasion. We shall see more of the 
problems posed by this in the following chapter. Before that, however, it may be useful 
briefly to consider a number of questions which are called forth by our discussion thus 
far.
La metaphysique des mathematiques
Resumed in the foregoing pages is, in essence, the age-old philosophical debate 
between free will and determinism.241 Stendhal's all too apparent prevarications on the 
question of moral responsibility are a measure of the difficulty and complexity — 
indeed the patent inconsistency — of his thinking on reason, passion and the interaction 
of the two.242 That an important key to human nature lay at the core of this question, 
however, Stendhal had little doubt. Once the nature of heart and head respectively could 
be defined, it would remain to establish how and in what measure they exert a 
reciprocal influence; 'Quand j'aurai bien decrit la tete et le cceur, il ne me restera plus 
que ce probleme k resoudre pour avoir acheve de trouver les idees de la Filosofia 
nova,’243
Such, then, was the question to be resolved by the philosophical treatise which 
Stendhal undertook to write in summer 1804. Before considering the Filosofia Nova 
proper, however, a general point may usefully be made. For two outstanding features 
are to be noted about Stendhal's thought at this stage in his philosophical evolution. 
The first is the highly abstract terms in which he conceives of the object of his inquiry,
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human nature; the second, the ill-determined, variable but very real control which he 
assigns to the individual in the forging of character and conduct. For the Stendhal who 
is engaged in plumbing the depths of human nature in 1804, man is an amalgam of 
passionate and rational qualities which have no evident basis in any corporal reality. It 
is all very well, however, to conceive of passion as an irreducible defining 
characteristic of man; but what is passion? Where does it originate and by what outward 
signs is its presence or intensity to be gauged? Stendhal's definitions — and they are 
several in this early period — are revealing in terms of just how little they advance us 
on these questions:
Une passion est la continuite du desir d'une meme chose.
Un desir continue forme passion.
Une passion est une suite de desirs qu'une telle chose arrive.
Une passion est la longue perseverance d'un desir...
Un desir est une passion lorsqu'il absorbe toutes les autres affections de l'ame 244
Such a simplistic equation between passion arid 'desire' is surely inadequate to 
account for the nature and complexity of what is posited as the prime mover in the 
human economy. Stendhal falls here into just those semantic difficulties which had 
presented themselves to his eighteenth-century predecessors. 'Defenders of the 
passions,' writes L.G. Crocker, 'often confused them with sentiment or emotion, even 
using such vague words as "le cceur".' Thus, in Helvetius's De VEsprit, 'we find a 
general lumping together of needs, pleasure-pain reactions, sensibilite and violent 
emotions under the general concept of "passion"...'245 By the time Stendhal came to 
apply his mind to this problem, little had been done to refine the terms in which 
discussion of the passions could be conducted. Though he would attain, through his 
later interest in the physiological aspect of man, to a new vocabulary in which to 
express the concepts of heart and head, he is consigned at the outset to the same 
abstraction and imprecision as his eighteenth-century forebears. Nowhere is this 
problem of terminology more evident in Stendhal's case than in the putative 'definition' 
which we find in a notebook entry of 30 June 1804. 'Passions,' he writes: 'etat 
passager dans lequel les passions font passer l'ame; etat habituel de l'ame.'246
The point is an important one. Knowledge of man — 'la connaissance du cceur 
humain' — may from the first, as Henri Martineau argues, be Stendhal's 'indeniable 
vocation, sa vraie specialite';247 but examples such as the foregoing highlight the 
difficulty which this self-styled connoisseur of the human heart experiences in coming 
to terms with his subject. Compounding the vagueness and abstraction of the concepts 
and language at his disposal was a concern to 'resolve' man as one resolves a
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mathematical problem. Reason, passion, habit, will, character: all are seen as elements 
in an equation which it is the philosopher's task to break down into its constituent 
factors. We have only to consult the would-be dramatist, whose ambition it was to
portray the complex interplay of character and passion, as he deploys his science in
determining the possible combinations of character types:
Combinaisons 2 a 2: m (m -1) = 6 (6-1) = 30.
Combinaisons diff[erentes]:
m (m-1) = 6 T6-11 = 6 T51 = 15. 248 
2 [2 ] [2]
Whatever Frangois Michel's reservations about Stendhal’s prowess as a 
mathematician,249 it is clear that the latter considered mathematics to have provided a 
universal method of reasoning, whose precision and clarity were as pertinent to the 
ambitions of the playwright as they were to philosophy, science or indeed any form of 
intellectual endeavour. 'Je n'ai jamais su le calcul differentiel et integral,' Stendhal 
would much later recall, 'mais dans un temps je passais ma vie a songer avec plaisir a 
l'art de mettre en equation, a ce que j'appellerais, si je l'osais, la metaphysique des 
math6matiques.'250
In this attitude, Stendhal was more than the self-proclaimed fugitive from religion, 
hypocrisy and Grenoble, whose'passion mathematique' would be amply portrayed in 
the Vie de Henry Brulard,251 He was the inheritor of a current of eighteenth-century 
thought which placed mathematics, in its various branches, at the service of science and 
philosophy, holding that knowledge should be susceptible of mathematical notation and 
verification. The current is best exemplified by the Abbe de Condillac, whose influence 
Stendhal early encountered as a pupil in the Ecole Centrale.252 By the mid-eighteenth 
century, observes I.F. Knight in her study of Condillac, 'the word "geometry" had 
become a kind of ritual invocation of a whole cluster of virtues associated with science 
of all kinds, including the antimathematical science of the empirical tradition.'253
The remark is important for our consideration of Stendhal at this stage. For, by 
extolling indiscriminately both empirical and mathematical reasoning ('Hors la 
geometrie, il n'y a qu’une seule maniere de raisonner, celle des faits'),254 Stendhal 
confused what he should have been at pains to differentiate: figures and facts, abstract 
propositions and concrete reality, the 'simplicity and uniformity of mathematics' and — 
in the terms of I.F. Knight — the 'irreducible diversity of empirical data.'255 How was 
the neat, ordered but essentially abstract world of numbers and equations to be used as 
an instrument for exploring, as Aram Vartanian puts it in relation to Descartes, 'the 
order of res extensa'?256 Here again, Stendhal does not so much fail to resolve the
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problem as fail to recognise it. His professed empiricism is undermined from the outset 
by a propensity to cast complex reality into simplistic abstract formulas.257 
Conterminous with his cult of le petit fait vrai is a search for common denominators and 
universally applicable principles which could be used to explain human nature and 
society. The mathematical turn of mind which is evidenced by his early writings was to 
avail Stendhal little in his endeavour to push back the frontiers of his knowledge of 
man. As a throwback to the Cartesian search for absolute and unassailable clarity (we 
have noted already Stendhal's enthusiastic praise for Descartes's method), the 
mathematical paradigm embraced by Stendhal has about it, on the contrary, much of the 
'reve mis en equations' to which Paul Hazard reduces an eighteenth-century cult of 
mathematics which, he argues, lost its ascendancy precisely because it had no contact 
with reality.258
Such is the essence of the problem confronting Stendhal as he endeavours to 
discover the means of 'applying mathematics to the human heart.'259 For the crystalline 
certainty which he seeks through the mathematical method is sharply at variance with 
the opaque nature of the subject under consideration. 'Je me sens fou pour connaitre le 
caractere des hommes,' he declares in a letter of August 1804.260 Human character, 
however, poses from the outset an enormous philosophical and artistic problem for 
Stendhal. The boundaries between passionate impulse and rational control, between 
self-determination and impotence shift incessantly under his gaze. The more Stendhal 
seeks to penetrate the depths of man's nature, the more inscrutable the latter appears. 
'Dans la connaissance de l'homme,' he had noted in August 1803, 'c'est la finesse qui 
me manque le plus. Je sais bien qu'une certaine passion p a un effet p \  mais je ne sais 
pas reconnaitre dans l'individu que je vois dans le monde toutes les passions qui 
l'animent.'261 Here, however, it is not the finer points of Stendhal's reasoning but his 
very premise itself which is flawed. For the suggestion that a passion, once defined, 
elicits the same identifiable response from one individual to the next could not be long 
sustained. Instead, Stendhal would come to realise that, even if he were to succeed in 
identifying and labelling each passion, he would still be far from gauging its relative 
strength in any given case. The heart that was capable of the greatest hatred might not, 
he recognises, be capable of the greatest love. 'Ici il faut trouver le moyen d'estimer la 
force des passions,' he concludes in a notebook entry of 31 July 1804.262
What one finds here is a clear suggestion that Stendhal is recanting his belief, as 
expressed in earlier notes and letters, that all individuals shared the same basic potential 
in relation to the passions and to reason alike.263 This shared potentiality had been one 
of the pillars of the philosophy inherited from Helvetius in 1803. It was an argument to 
which the physiologist Cabanis was to bring a radical corrective, with his theories on
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the natural differences that separated men in matters affective and cognitive alike. For 
the moment, however, Stendhal is left to resolve the question with the limited tools 
which he has to hand. Some five months after penning the above remark, he suggests, 
in fact, what such a means of measuring passion might be; but the note in question, 
from his journal of 4 January 1805, shows his tendency to intellectualise the problem 
and to posit hypothetical rather than practicable — 'empirical' — solutions:
Pour apprecier la passion d'un homme, il faudrait savoir le prix, aux yeux de cet 
homme, de toutes les choses qu'il sacrifie a sa passion.
L'extreme de la passion peut etre a tuer une mouche pour sa maitresse.264
The more Stendhal ponders the difficulty of this whole question, the less feasible his 
undertaking — 'connaitre parfaitement l'homme'265— appears. ’Pour connaitre 
parfaitement le caractere d'un homme,' he concedes in August 1804, in a note whose 
arithmetical overtones point up once again the gulf between subject and method,
il faut connaitre 1° ses opinions sur tout; 2° jusqu'a quel point il y a conforme ses 
actions; 3° les habitudes de son cceur qui l'ont empeche de s'y conformer 
entierement.266
The Filosofia Nova was to represent in this sense Stendhal's first attempt to 
establish an unshakeable hold over questions which would be exercising still the author 
of Lamiel.261 Yet it is important to recognise that, between the draft treatise of 1804 
and the unfinished novel of the 1840s, there is a world of difference in terms of 
Stendhal's conception of man and of his belief in the means whereby human nature 
might be regulated or even understood. 'Bien me souvenir,' he urges himself in July 
1804, 'qu'il faut tout sacrifier au merite reel de la F[ilosofia] n[ova] qui est de montrer 
des verites, d'apres ce grand principe que tout malheur vient d'ignorer ou d’avoir 
ignore la verite.'268 By the time Stendhal had channelled his literary talents into more 
productive media than the theatre, such confidence in the therapeutic value of 
philosophical truth would have largely evaporated.269 The morally edifying tones in 
which he commits to paper his early projects were to find no echo in the darker 
reflections of his later years. It is our purpose, in the chapters which follow, to trace 
something of the evolution which Stendhal’s thought was to undergo over the course of 
his writing life, and to attempt in particular to chart the distance between the Stendhal 
who affirms in 1803 that 'on peut se corriger de tout,'270 and the Stendhal who, some 
two decades later, will declare more peremptorily than ever:
Notre caractere, bon ou mauvais, c'est comme le corps que nous reconnaissons a 
seize ans, quand nous commen§ons a reflechir. Beau, laid ou mediocre; il faut le 
prendre tel qu'il est; [...].
Une fois que nous savons quel est notre caractere, nous pouvons nous attendre au 
bien et au mal, qui en sont predits dans les livres qui donnent la description du dit 
caractere.271
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CHAPTER IV
FROM MATHEMATICS TO MATTER: THOMAS HOBBES 
AND THE FILOSOFIA NOVA
Sans repeter avec ce qu'on prendrait pour de l'emphase que je ne dis 
que le vrai, que je consacre ma vie au vrai, ne dire que la verite [...]. 
Donner, en un mot, des verites etemelles dans le langage le plus 
simple...
Such are the terms in which Stendhal records — with no little emphase — his aim in 
undertaking the Filosofia Nova} In a notebook entry dated 24 April 1804, he gives the 
first provisional title to his project: 'Philosophie nouvelle. Sentiments et idees.' Then 
follows the simple definition that was to be fundamental to the whole enterprise: 
'J'appelle idees les sensations du cerveau; je nomme sentiments les sensations du 
cceur.'2 While we may wonder at the value of such an altogether banal distinction, there 
is no denying the importance which Stendhal attaches to it. .'J’appelle cceur,' he writes 
to his sister Pauline, 'le centre des sentiments (desirs, peines, plaisirs, etc., etc.) et tete 
ou cerveau le centre des idees.' To this he adds: 'Je reviendrai une autre fois sur cette 
idee, qui est un flambeau qui eclaire bien dans la connaissance de l'homme.'3
Return to this notion Stendhal indeed does. His writings from the period are, as 
we have seen, replete with references to this division of man into the respective spheres 
of reason and passion. 'Pousser ma discussion du cceur et de la tete,' he exhorts 
himself on 13 June 1804.4 In a letter written shortly thereafter to Pauline, he outlines at 
some length the reciprocal influence of heart over head, and concludes by reaffirming 
the value of his principle: 'cela est bien sec, j'en conviens, mais cela mene a tout ce 
qu'il y a de sublime dans la science de l'homme.'5 Similarly, when he comes to draft 
his Filosofia Nova, we find the first task clearly set out: 'Parcourir toutes les qualites de 
l'homme (triste, gai, doux, irascible, etc., etc.,) les assigner au cceur ou a la tete.'6 
Defining the objective of his treatise in a subsequent journal entry, Stendhal writes:
Cet ouvrage a pour objet de connaitre la tete et les passions. Le desir que j'ai d'etre 
u[n] g[rand] p[oete] me conduira done jusqu'aux verites qu'il contiendra.7
Such truths, however, were to prove more elusive than Stendhal anticipated. It was one 
thing to posit distinctive theatres of head and heart; quite another, as we saw in Chapter 
HI, to define the nature and boundaries of their reciprocal influence.8 In an endeavour 
to advance his enquiry, Stendhal undertakes anew the breakdown of passions which 
had served him in his earlier plans for the theatre. 'M'occuper tout de suite de l'analyse
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de chaque passion,' he resolves, 'cela me rendra plus facile a decrire faction de l'ame 
sur la tete et de la tete sur l'ame.'9
If such, however, was the swell upon which the Filosofia Nova was launched, it 
proved also to be the rock upon which it would founder. While Stendhal can adduce 
examples aplenty to illustrate the reciprocal influence which he postulates,10 he can 
arrive at no satisfactory synthesis of what continues to read like a catalogue of 
contradictory assertions.11 The problems with which we saw Stendhal wrestle in the 
previous chapter were to bedevil the Filosofia Nova from its inception to its effective 
abandonment in August 1804. Though Stendhal's faith in his fundamental principle of 
'heart' and 'head' remains unshaken,12 his hope of articulating this in any formal 
'philosophy' would expire with the collapse of his project.13 The importance of the 
episode is that, by giving some tangible measure of Stendhal as a 'philosopher' — and, 
more precisely, a materialist philosopher — in the strictest sense of the term, it reveals 
an aspect of his mind which has never been properly appraised. For his writings, 
during a period when he is engaged, according to his own lights, in 'the loftiest 
philosophy',14 demonstrate the difficulty which he in fact experiences when called 
upon to master the concepts involved, and the effect which this in turn has upon his 
perception of himself as a thinker.15
The evidence is lacking, we submit, to sustain Henri Martineau's assertion that, by 
1803, Stendhal had applied the finishing touches to both his 'methode' and his 
'philosophie particuliere'.16 'Toutes ses positions etaient occupees, ses gouts affirmes; 
son systeme etait clos,' affirms Martineau.17 Yet, as Stendhal's own notebooks clearly 
attest, he emerges from his years of study in Paris in search still of a 'method' which 
has consistently eluded him, both as a dramatist and as a thinker.18 Nor can one readily 
subscribe to the view, expressed by Paul Arbelet and echoed by subsequent scholars, 
that the limited range of Stendhal's thought 'la sauve du vague ou de la confusion.'19 
The truth is that Stendhal's early private writings, as they record his attempts to fashion 
a philosophy, provide a veritable catalogue of confusion and imprecision, the record of 
a mind ill at ease with its subject and its medium alike. Alain Girard comes much closer 
to the mark than either Martineau or Arbelet, we contend, when he writes of Stendhal's 
early philosophical endeavours: 'On y sent les difficultes d'expression d'un ecrivain qui 
n'est en possession ni de ses moyens d'expression, ni de l'experience suffisante.'20
That said, the importance of these early writings for the student of Stendhal cannot 
be gainsaid. For they provide the starting-point from which any evolution of his 
thought must be measured. If it is the case, as Victor del Litto argues, that 'le role du 
Journal est fondamental dans la vie intellectuelle de Stendhal,' if it is here that is to be
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found 'la veritable assise de sa formation intellectuelle,'21 then it is here that any 
analysis of his thought must begin. For Stendhal himself, the notebooks and letters of 
the early 1800s were to have been of imperishable value, furnishing respectively the 
storehouse of his ideas — 'mes magasins', as he would call them22 — and the history 
of his mind, Thistoire de mon esprit.'23 The fact is, however, that the inchoate 
assemblage of maxims, reflections, project drafts, fragments of self-analysis and 
borrowings yielded by Stendhal's notebooks from this' period provides 'le recit d'un 
echec' not only — as Alain Girard suggests24 — in literary terms, but, as the following 
pages will seek to demonstrate, in philosophical terms too.
Hobbes and the Filosofia Nova: Homo Duplex Revisited
Stendhal's ambition in undertaking the Filosofia Nova had, we recall, been to 
'connaitre la tete et les passions.'25 His regimen of reading in 1803 — when the project 
was first intimated26 — and 1804 — when it was consigned to an ever-growing list of 
abortive enterprises27 — reflects this overriding concern. Thinkers as diverse as 
Helvetius, Vauvenargues, Lancelin, Rousseau, Montesquieu and Brissot de Warville 
were all grist to the same mill, confirming Stendhal in his intuition that man was a being 
governed by the now complementary, now conflicting imperatives of heart and mind.28 
No thinker, however, is more closely associated with Stendhal's endeavour to erect this 
principle into a philosophy than the English materialist philosopher, Thomas Hobbes. 
Enthusiastically enlisted in the cause of the Filosofia Nova, Hobbes enjoyed some of 
the warmest approbation reserved by Stendhal for any author. While there is no 
evidence to suggest that Stendhal ever had recourse to Hobbes's Leviathan,29 it is clear 
that between 15 and 22 June 1804 he read and extracted copiously from the treatise 
Human Nature, in d'Holbach's translation of 1772, a work which he at once deemed 
'un excellent ouvrage' and in which, he declared, was to be found 'le meilleur style 
philosophique que j'aie encore vu.'30 Helvetius, Lancelin, Condillac, Vauvenargues31 
— all are diminished by a work which contains more philosophy in a single paragraph 
than is to be found in the whole of Rousseau!32
In the weeks and months following Stendhal's reading of De la Nature humaine, 
Hobbes enjoyed an unchallenged ascendancy in his esteem. Placing the English 
philosopher 'sur la frontiere de la science',33 Stendhal urges his sister, in characteristic 
fashion, to procure the treatise in question. 'C'est la fin,' he writes anachronistically, 
'de l'edifice dont Helv[etius] jette les fondements. C'est l'analyse et la description de
143
nos passions. Helvetius doit quelquefois te paraitre insipide, parce que ce qu’il dit doit 
etre trop simple pour toi. Hobbes t'amusera.'34
High praise indeed; but to what precisely was it due? The question is one which has 
been the object of a surprising scholarly neglect. Stendhal's reading of Hobbes, though 
it remains one of the best documented among the events recorded in his journals, has 
been subjected to scant critical analysis.35 Victor del Litto has, in his invaluable edition 
of the Journal litteraire, meticulously reconstituted the extracts and commentaries which 
chart Stendhal's reading of De la Nature humaine; but die notes which accompany the 
text fall short of any sustained critical assessment. Del Litto’s La Vie intellectuelle de 
Stendhal likewise provides some useful textual references, but places more emphasis 
on documentation than on analysis.36 Robert Vigneron and J.-C. Alciatore, in their 
respective studies of the influence of Chateaubriand and Lancelin on Stendhal, refer to 
the latter's reading of Hobbes, but offer only the briefest of commentaries upon it.37
Such neglect is all the more surprising since it is generally acknowledged that 
Hobbes occupies a foremost place among the thinkers who exerted an influence on 
Stendhal. 'Ces trois noms,1 writes Henri Martineau, 'Helvetius, Hobbes et Destutt de 
Tracy, sont ceux de ses vrais maitres.’38 Martineau is echoed in this judgment by 
scholars from Frangois Picavet through to Victor del Litto 39 The tendency, however, 
has been to affirm rather than to examine the influence in question. Among those 
scholars who reserve a privileged place for Hobbes in Stendhal's intellectual lineage, 
there is a common assumption that the latter understood Hobbes aright, and that the 
extracts which he transcribed are an accurate representation both of this understanding 
and of the original text itself. There is not, claims Francine Marill Alberes, 'une 
interpretation stendhalienne de Hobbes. Beyle se borne a resumer la Nature  
Humaine.'40
Nothing, however, could be more at odds with the textual evidence available. On 
close examination, it becomes clear that there is much distortion, no little confusion, 
and a substantial element of invention in Stendhal's reading oiDe la Nature humaine 41 
From the very outset, indeed, the interpretation of Hobbes which we discover in 
Stendhal's notebooks betrays a serious misconception. Galvanised finally by his 
reading of this philosopher into putting pen to paper on his own treatise, he writes on 
23 June 1804:
Void le squelette:
Dans son livre De la Nature humaine, Hobbes a la division] qui fait la base de la 
Filosofia nova.
L'homme est compose: 1° d'un corps; 2° d'une tete ou centre de combinaisons; 3° 
d'un cceur ou ame centre de passions.42
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From this basic premise, Stendhal goes on to consider the ways in which these 
independently defined realms of man function, the boundaries that separate them, and 
the degree to which each-may be considered the driving force in human nature. 
Dismissing the body almost out of hand — 'Je ne m'occuperai que tres sommairement 
de l'influence du corps'43 — he founds his proposed philosophy on a conception of 
'mind' and 'heart' which, in truth, owes little to Hobbes. Does human motivation 
spring from the heart? From the head? From a combination of the two? What is the 
inter-relationship between reason and passion, and to which are we the more beholden 
for what we call the 'will'?44 So many questions which, if they are consonant with 
Stendhal's earliest philosophical concerns, point to a fundamental misunderstanding of 
Hobbes. For nowhere does the latter subscribe to the tripartite definition of man which 
Stendhal foists upon him, nowhere does he endorse any such view of reason and 
passion as faculties that may be considered qualitatively different from the material 
body.45 Indeed, it was precisely against such a view that the whole of Hobbes's 
philosophy militated. While Hobbes does speak in terms of 'heart' and 'head', and 
while he acknowledges reason and passion as 'les principaux ingrediens de la nature 
humaine'46 he does not attribute these to independently defined categories as such, but 
subsumes both under the term 'esprit'. Though we may discern and distinguish 
between the cognitive and affective aspects of human nature, both must be seen merely 
as variations of 'mental' activity, functions of the same 'mind'47 In the first chapter of 
De la Nature humaine — 'Nature de VHomme composee des facultes du Corps & de 
celles de VEsprit'— Hobbes is unequivocal on this point:
D'apres les deux parties dont l'homme est compose je distingue en lui deux 
especes de facultes, celles du corps & celles de l'esprit48
It might appear from this that Hobbes wishes to sustain a distinction between the 
corporal and mental realms, that he posits mind as a category independent of body. 
Nowhere, however, as Samuel Mintz stresses, does Hobbes entertain 'the possibility 
that the product of mental activity — thought — is different in kind from the physical 
processes which give rise to it.'49 Mental activity is material and therefore subject to the 
laws which govern all matter: there could be no compromise with any notion of mind, 
heart or 'soul' which implied distinction, however slight, from the body material. 
Thought, perceived by Hobbes as 'a complicated series of physical motions', is, as 
Mintz puts it, 'a reaction to other motions communicated to the head by means of the 
sense-organs and nerves. The whole process is mechanical and material.'50 To the 
reader of De la Nature humaine, the point should have been crystal-clear:
[...] les conceptions & les apparitions ne sont reellement rien que du mouvement 
excite dans une substance interieure de la tete; ce mouvement ne s'arretant point la 
mais se communiquant au cceur doit necessairement aider ou arreter le mouvement
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que l'on nomme vital.51
The refusal by Hobbes to see reason and passion as anything but transformations 
of the same physical phenomenon was consistent with a monistic materialism which 
held all 'mental' experience — cognitive, affective and volitional — to be but variations 
of matter in motion.52 Res cogitans for Hobbes is, as E.A. Burtt puts it, nothing but 'a 
combination of certain types of motion possessed by res extensae.'53 Any division of 
man such as Stendhal implies would have meant capitulation to the very orthodoxy 
which Hobbes was challenging.54 'C'est, en effet,' notes Raymond Polin, 'un 
monisme du mouvement que Hobbes edifie en unifiant le corps et l'esprit sous les 
memes lois mecaniques, sans jamais qu'aucune intervention d'une autre sorte ne vienne 
en troubler le cours.'55 In keeping with this basic principle, Hobbes expounds a 
mechanistic psychology whereby ideas and passions alike are but developments of 
primary sensation:
[...] le mouvement ou l'ebranlement du cerveau que nous appellons conception, 
est continue jusqu'au cceur ou il prend le nom de passion...
[...] la sensation est due a faction des objets exterieurs sur le cerveau ou sur une 
substance renfermee dans la tete, & [...] les passions viennent du changement qui 
s'y fait & qui est transmis jusqu'au cceur.. 56
It is clear from these statements that Hobbes recognises no substantive distinction 
between reason and passion, presenting both as respective stages in a single, complex 
process of sense-experience.57 We insist upon this point because its significance has 
been overlooked by all of the scholars who have commented upon Stendhal's reading 
of Hobbes. As the two short extracts cited above attest, there is no place in the latter's 
mechanistic sensationalism for any clear demarcation between 'mind' and 'heart' as 
theatres of independent, self-generating or self-sustaining activity 58
Stendhal, from the outset, then, makes a serious category eiTor in his reading of 
Hobbes. His conception of reason and passion as discussed in Chapter III could 
nowhere be aligned with Hobbes's reductionist view of man and his faculties. While 
Victor del Litto acknowledges Stendhal's distortion of Hobbes in this respect — 'alors 
que pour Hobbes l'homme est forme du corps et de 1'esprit, Beyle porte les 
composantes a trois: corps, tete, cceur (ou ame)'59 — he fails to draw any conclusion 
from this or to pursue the logical consequences of Stendhal's error. Robert Vigneron 
and J.-C. Alciatore, for their part, fail even to recognise that Stendhal has departed 
from Hobbes at all.60 'Aussi note-t-il avec plaisir,' writes Alciatore, 'que le livre de 
Hobbes renferme "la division] ,qui fait la base" de sa philosophic nouvelle.' Hobbes 
thus confirms for Stendhal, the critic goes on, 'la resolution d'etudier l'homme d'apres 
la distinction entre le cceur et la tete.'61 This supposed contribution by Hobbes to the
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very foundation of Stendhal's philosophy of man has entered into a received critical 
wisdom which has nowhere been challenged, even by those scholars who devote 
particular attention to the early years of study during which Stendhal conducted his 
reading of Hobbes. Thus, in a recently published article, we find J.-C. Augendre 
resting his discussion of the Filosofia Nova on the assumption that 'la structure 
fondamentale ou le "squelette" est empruntee au traite De la Nature humaine de 
Hobbes.'62
The misconception which such remarks denote is considerable. For there is clear 
evidence here both of a failure to appreciate the import of Hobbes's materialism and of 
a tendency to take on trust Stendhal's interpretation of this philosopher. What Stendhal 
does, however, in stark contrast to Hobbes, is to envisage quite separate theatres of 
thought and sensibility which — with varying degrees of autonomy — are capable of 
rivalling, complementing or eclipsing one another.63 When, a number of weeks after 
his reading of Human Nature, Stendhal defines the human economy as 'la reunion de 
notre corps, notre tete et notre cceur', it is clear how little of Hobbes's thought he has 
assimilated.64 In holding mind to be one with body, Hobbes was striving to 'reunite 
the sundered halves of the Cartesian dualism.'65 Stendhal, on the other hand, 
perpetuates this sundered view of man through insisting not upon the homogeneity but 
rather upon the coincidence, or union, between the components of man as he perceives 
them.66 For he denies — through the logical implication of the term 'reunion' — the 
whole basis upon which Hobbes founds his monistic view of man. The mind, as E.A. 
Burtt points out in discussing Hobbes's attack on Cartesian dualism, 'is simply a name 
for the sum of an individual's thinking activities, is thus nothing but a series of motions 
in an animal organism.'67 Reason, as Hobbes makes clear, is but one of man's 'natural 
- Faculties and Powers', along with those of 'Nutrition, Motion, Generation, Sense', 
etc.68 To set the mind up as an independent entity, to be distinguished in nature and 
activity from the body (even without compounding the issue with a third distinct 
category of cceur or ame) would have seemed to Hobbes, as Burtt puts it, 'a mere relic 
of the scholastic occult qualities.'69
Of his misappreciation of Hobbes, however, Stendhal remains blissfully unaware. 
No sooner does he establish the supposed correlation between his own thought and that 
of Hobbes than he addresses — in terms which savour more of a cloak-and-dagger 
farce than a philosophical disquisition — the question of a reciprocal influence among 
the three categories of ame, tete and corps'.
L'ame fait contracter des habitudes a ses deux valets: le corps et la tete.
Le corps et la tete ayant contracte des habitudes guident l'ame sans qu'elle s'en
aper9oive.70
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Such a conception of the human economy would, for Hobbes, have been so much 
nonsense, all human endeavour being determined by a simple pleasure-pain calculus 
over which no single 'part' of man has power to arbitrate:
Toutes les conceptions que nous recevons immediatement par les sens etant ou 
plaisir ou douleur, produisent ou le desir ou la crainte; il en est de meme de toutes 
les imaginations qui viennent a la suite de faction des sens.71
While this statement should have done no more than reaffirm for Stendhal a principle 
which, as we know, he had found elsewhere (most notably in Helvetius), it raises the 
fundamental question of the will. Here again, Stendhal's divergence from Hobbes is 
apparent. For it is Hobbes's contention that the will is nothing more than the last desire 
or the last fear by which a human being is actuated at any given moment:72 'Dans la 
deliberation le dernier desir, ainsi que la derniere crainte, se nomme volonte,'73 What 
Hobbes is especially keen to dispense with is the notion of the will as an independent, 
rational 'faculty', pre-existing — and therefore presiding over — the wishes and fears 
of the individual:
Le desir, la crainte, l'esperance & les autres passions ne sont point appellees 
volontaires, car elles ne procedent point de la volonte, mais elles sont la volonte 
meme, & la volonte n'est point une action volontaire, car un homme ne peut pas 
plus dire qu'il veut vouloir qu'il ne peut dire qu'il veut vouloir vouloir, & repeter 
ainsi a l'infini le mot vouloir, ce qui serait absurde ou depourvu de sens.74
The net result of this argument for Hobbes was to make of the term 'will' nothing 
more than a convention, a manner of denoting the desire or fear which tipped the 
balance of calculation to one side or the other in any given set of circumstances; and this 
Stendhal appears to acknowledge when he notes: 'Les passions (Hobbes dit le desir, la 
crainte, l'esperance et les autres passions) ne sont point volontaires, car elles ne 
procedent point de la volonte, mais elles sont la volonte meme.' He goes on, however, 
to add in parentheses what he clearly intends as an illustration of this point: '(hfenri]. 
L’amour d'une femme, la haine d'un hom[me], font la volonte).'75 This apparently 
insignificant shift of sense — from 'sont' to 'font' (the emphasis is Stendhal's own) — 
puts a world of difference between the conception of the will that is here evoked and 
that of Hobbes. For it promotes volition to the status of a separate category, 
independent from the passions that are said to be its source. In Hobbes, by contrast, 
they remain necessarily one and the same: 'elles sont la volonte meme.' The rift is 
widened still further, and the confusion of sense compounded, by Stendhal's claims, 
firstly, that the passions 'sont la cause et non pas l’effet de la volonte', then — 
conversely — that the passions 'sont un effet de la volonte.'76
It is clear from these examples that Stendhal fails to grasp the point which Hobbes 
is most at pains to make in his discussion of the will. To speak of passions as the
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'causes' or the 'effects' of will-is to return to the very 'senselessness' and 'absurdity' 
that Hobbes reproves in those who posit a faculty of willing as such. It may be 
instructive here to pause briefly and to anticipate something of what this alleged disciple 
of Hobbes was to make of the concept of 'will' in his later writings. For he will appear 
throughout quite heedless of the identity, postulated by Hobbes and the sensationalist 
tradition in general, between feeling, thinking and willing as transformations of the 
same essential experience. When he writes in Armance of those many philosophers 
who have sought to determine 'comment l'homme pense et comment il veut,'77 he is 
articulating a distinction which is ever present in his construction of the will as a faculty 
in its own right. The term 'faculty' is, of course, Stendhal’s own. 'Napoleon, Fieschi 
avaient la faculte de vouloir,' he writes in the Vie de Henry Brulard 78 Fieschi, we read 
again in a letter to Jules Gaulthier, 'avait plus de faculte de vouloir a lui seul que les 
cent soixante pairs qui l'ont condamne.'79 The presence or absence of this 'faculty of 
will' was to furnish Stendhal with a ready means of judging not only individual 
character but the whole environment from which human beings issued. Casimir Perier, 
we are told in the Vie de Henry Brulard, 'avait la qualite dauphinoise, il savait 
vouloir.'80 As inhabitants of Paris, Villemain, Delavigne and Pastoret lack this quality, 
while of the Italian Cardinal Tosti we read in a letter to Domenico Fiore: 'Comme il est 
homme du plus bas peuple, il a la faculte de vouloir.'81 Nor is this 'faculty' restricted 
to the individual: it can be the appurtenance of whole communities. The Arabs possess 
it in abundance; the Swiss not at all; whilst in France it is a dwindling resource.82 As 
the author of the Memoires d'un touriste puts it, 'la. faculte de vouloir manque de plus 
en plus a Paris.'83
Where it exists, la faculte de vouloir is for Stendhal a quantifiable, measurable, 
almost palpable quality, a means of discriminating between individuals, whole 
communities, and even, as on a number of occasions, historical periods.84 All of this, 
however, is predicated upon a fallacy, if one accepts the theory of will propounded by 
those sensationalist philosophers whom Stendhal took to be his mentors. For any such 
talk of a volitional faculty is a far cry indeed from the Homo simplex conceived of by 
Hobbes or, in turn, by Destutt de Tracy. We have not yet considered the influence of 
Tracy upon Stendhal;85 but it seems apposite, in view of his much hailed contribution 
to the latter's philosophy, to mention him briefly in this important regard. For Tracy's 
intention, like that of Hobbes before him, was not to endorse but, as Michel Crouzet 
rightly points out, to abolish the hard1 and fast boundaries which divided conscious 
experience, to define the will as nothing more than a modified sense impression, 
incapable as such of the independent powers which Stendhal so readily ascribes to it:
ainsi Tracy dans sa these generate, que sentir est tout, n'hesitait pas a ffanchir un
pas de plus que ses devanciers; en parvenant par un net ecrasement des termes a
soutqnir que sensation, jugement, memoire, desir etaient du ressort d'une seule et
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unique faculte de sentir, et [qu'il] etait inutile de tenter de transformer ces moments 
du sentir en facultes distinctes, en attitudes differenciees, de diviser l'esprit, a quoi 
il se declarait lui-meme incapable; employant couramment les mots "penser" et 
"sentir" l'un pour l'autre, [...], il protestait contre toute decomposition de la 
pensee...86
A glance at the Elemens d'ideologie confirms this assessment. For there Tracy 
defines the 'will' in the most reductionist terms as a simple 'resultat de notre 
organisation.'87 The will is no prime mover in the human economy, but rather the end 
result of a process which the agent is powerless to initiate or to forestall: ’la volonte, ne 
pouvant naitre sans motifs, nait elle-meme necessairement'%% This is what makes 
Maurice Larkin's argument suspect when he asserts that it was 'Tracy who brought 
home to Stendhal how determinism could be reconciled with a satisfying conception of 
the individual will.'89 For the two approach the whole concept of volition from quite 
different poles. Tracy may seek to mitigate the more fatalistic implications of his 
doctrine by admitting some degree of suggested choice through the rational process of 
'attention';90 Stendhal, on the other hand, may pay lip-service to a theory of the will as 
a passive instrument in the hands of some overriding determinism; but they do not'for 
long share common ground on this crucial philosophical issue. How, indeed, could the 
future author of Julien Sorel and Lamiel have endorsed any notion of la volonte as a 
vacant receptacle of determined stimuli, nothing more, in sum, than the necessary 
consequence of processes which originate beyond the bidding of the individual 
psyche?91 It was, Tracy insisted, 'un veritable non-sens de pretendre que la volonte est 
libre de naitre.'92 Thus conceived, the will, as Emmet Kennedy puts it, 'is not free to 
will or not to will what it actually wills, but simply free to act in consequence of its 
will, to fulfill its desires.'93
By such quasi-mechanistic logic, it is clear, the expressions savoir vouloir and la 
faculte de vouloir, which reappear time and again under Stendhal’s pen, would have 
been bereft of sense for Hobbes and Tracy alike. Through the association implied by 
Stendhal between the 'will' and some rational faculty of choice, the self becomes 
re-invested with precisely those powers of which the sensationalists had sought to 
divest it; for theirs was everywhere a concern, as Colin Smith observes, 'to play down 
the notion of an autonomous self, to insist upon 'the subject as the recipient of the data 
of consciousness rather than as their source.'94 By his readiness to reverse the terms of 
this principle, Stendhal commits what L.G. Crocker recognises to be the 'error of the 
proponents of free will' in general: it is 'to assume that the will is "the first motive force 
of its acts," whereas it is caused, independently of itself.'95 The problem, as we have 
seen, is apparent from the first in Stendhal's reading of Hobbes. Though Human 
Nature should have left him in no doubt about Hobbes's conception of the will, he 
would have found the point spelt out with more clarity and emphasis still in Leviathan:
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In Deliberation, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhering to the action, 
or to the omission thereof, is that we call the WILL; the Act, (not the faculty,) of 
Willing.96
In his reading of Hobbes, however, Stendhal is far from apprehending any such 
distinction. On the same question of human motivation, the picture becomes more 
confused still when, in a note dated 24 June 1804, he makes the following assertion: 
'Plus une passion est forte, plus elle vainc les dispositions des trois petites parties de 
l'hom[me]: le corps, la tete et le coeur.'97 The problem here stems partly, once more, 
from Stendhal's language; but the statement as a whole involves him in a number of 
divisions and sub-divisions within man — passion, dispositions, parts, body, head, 
heart — which are untenable not only within any strict materialist logic, but within 
Stendhal's own conception of human nature as it is elsewhere defined. What is the 
distinction that obtains between 'passion' and 'heart'? As in the earlier case of the 
'will', Stendhal here seems to envisage 'passion' as an entity which can be considered 
in isolation from — indeed in opposition to — corps, tete and cceur alike. More 
seriously still, what are the dispositions of body, head and heart? Stendhal's avowed 
belief — with Locke, Condillac and the sensationalist school —- that man is a tabula 
rasa on which all experience is inscribed through sense-impressions is clearly at odds 
with the suggestion here of inherent 'dispositions'. Stendhal is unsparing of Brissot de 
Warville when he encounters a similar suggestion in the latter's discussion of 
Descartes.98 Yet he clearly finds difficulty himself in adhering to the notion that the 
human being has no prevenient tendencies. For in his later writings, the same readiness 
as we have seen above to flout the first principle of the sensationalists will be in 
evidence. Witness the article for the London Magazine of October 1826, in which 
Stendhal will declare — with no apparent irony — that every well-born Italian woman 
abandons herself to her passions only when 'tous les principes de vertu que la nature 
avait mis dans son cceur se trouvent effaces par degres...'99 Or the assertion by the 
author of Le Rouge et le Noir that, in Mme de Renal's nascent affections for Julien, 'un 
instinct de vertu etait effraye.'100 Heretical language indeed from an avowed disciple of 
Locke and Condillac!
To return to the extract cited from Stendhal's notebook of 24 June 1804, we may 
observe that this is but one among a number of difficulties into which he is led by his 
tripartite division of man. Nor is the confusion dispelled when it is a question of 
applying the distinctions which he upholds in theory:
Je crois sentir (chez moi) qu'il n'y a proprement que mon ame qui ne suive point 
d'habitude et qui juge a chaque instant ce qui convient le mieux pour son bonheur. 
Le corps et l'esprit (la tete) suivent des habitudes.101
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If there is consistency between this passage and what Stendhal argues elsewhere, it is 
one of bare terminology alone. For we find overturned here the notion to which he 
holds in so many other instances: that reason is the preserve of the mind, the guiding 
eye of the passions. L ’ame can, the above remark suggests, dispense with the services 
of Vesprit and become, though we are told not how, the 'judge' of its own best route to 
happiness without the intervention of the intellect. If the heart indeed has its 'reason', 
this does much to confound the balance and interplay of faculties which Stendhal 
elsewhere imagines to be central to the very definition of human nature.
Such extracts from Stendhal's early private notebooks may be of limited 
significance within the overall corpus of his writings. Yet they merit consideration, in 
view of the claim by so many critics that the fundaments of his philosophy are laid 
down in his earliest journals and letters. Whatever reasons one may adduce to account 
for the problems experienced by Stendhal in handling the tools of his metaphysic at this 
stage, it is difficult to comprehend an altogether remarkable entry which he consigns to 
his notebook on 30 June 1804. 'Ame,' he writes, with his customary relish for 
definition: 'cette partie de nous qui regoit des impressions agreables ou desagreables qui 
ne peuvent se rapporter a aucune partie du corps.'102 A aucune partie du corps! 
Whether borrowed or of Stendhal's invention, such a definition clearly ascribes to the 
'soul' the very incorporeal quality which he is elsewhere so prompt to deny.103 It is all 
the more astonishing that this explicit endorsement of Homo duplex should find its way 
into Stendhal's notebook at the height of his admiration for a philosopher who — it 
need scarcely be reiterated — holds all talk of the 'immaterial' to be, quite simply, 'a 
senseless speech.'104
Nihil est in intellectu... : The Sensationalist Principle
The few examples cited above demonstrate the need to get behind the assumptions and 
to examine in some detail what are taken to be Stendhal's philosophical convictions. 
For his failure to adhere to the most basic principles of Hobbes's materialism signals a 
problem that goes beyond his reading of De la Nature humaine. His insistence on the 
distinction between heart and head, far from being sanctioned by the sensationalist 
philosophy which he early purports to espouse, is in fact a challenge to the very 
precepts upon which the latter is founded. Following through his own logic rather than 
that of Hobbes, Stendhal envisages (long in anticipation of a Proust or a Joyce) the 
stenographer who might record all that transpires within a given individual's
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consciousness over the course of an entire day. 'Supposons,' he muses, 'qu'un 
hom[me] put parler aussi vite qu'il pense et sent; que cet hom[me] une joumee entiere 
pronongat de maniere a n'etre entendu que d'un seul hom[me] tout ce qu'il pense et 
sent.' He then goes on to imagine the value which a transcription of this would have for 
the student of human nature:
Supposons que le stenogr[aphe], apres avoir note toutes les pensees et sentiments 
de notre hom[me], nous les traduisit [...], nous aurions un caractere peint pendant 
un jour aussi ressemblant que possible.105
This notion of the stenographer who might capture all of an individual's fleeting 
thoughts and emotions is one which is dear to Stendhal and which is to be found 
elsewhere among his private writings.106 His interest, it is clear, lies not with any 
limited 'stream of consciousness', but with the whole range and interplay of rational 
and affective influences which, he held, dispute possession of the individual and make 
up the experience of every moment. In a note on characterisation dated 4 July 1804, he 
imagines how an accomplished actor might reproduce on stage all of the physical 
gestures recorded by such a stenographer. He then makes the following, much more 
substantive point:
II y aurait un autre proces-verbal de la meme joumee bien plus interessant: ce serait 
celui que nous donnerait un dieu qui aurait tenu un compte parfaitement exact de 
toutes les operations de sa tete et de son ame. C'est-a-dire de ses pensees et de ses 
desirs dans l'ordre avec lequel ils se sont mutuellement suivis ou causes.
Ce second proces-verbal developperait le cceur humain avec tant de verite qu'il ne 
pourrait manquer de plaire generalement.107
The clear insistence, in both of the passages cited, upon the distinction between 
thought and feeling — a logical corollary of the division of man into head and heart — 
will colour Stendhal's reading of Destutt de Tracy as it colours his reading of Hobbes. 
The suggestion, however, that 'ideas' are the function of one domain, 'desires' that of 
the other, amounts to a betrayal of both the spirit and the letter of sensationalist 
philosophy. For the 'sensationalist' (from Hobbes through Locke and Condillac to the 
Ideologues),108 ideas are sensations: to think is to experience a transformed 
sense-impression; to think is to feel. Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in 
sensu — nothing is in the mind which was not first in the senses.109 Such was the 
contention of a philosophy which pushed the frontiers of Descartes's cogito back a 
stage and dug itself in behind a new axiom: sentio ergo sum — 1penser, c'est 
sentir.'110 Though the sensationalist may retain a place in his vocabulary for the terms 
'thinking1 and 'feeling', he must remain alive to the essential redundancy of the 
distinction. As much is made explicit by Destutt de Tracy in De la Logique, where the 
theorist of Ideology writes:
[...] je reunis et confonds dans la faculte generale de sentir, ce que l'on a coutume
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de distinguer en affections et connaissances, et ce qu'on appelle souvent en termes 
metaphoriques et peu exacts, Y esprit et le cceur. Effectivement je crois que cette 
division n'est pas fondee, que notre faculte de connaitre vient et depend de celle 
d'etre affecte, et lui donne naissance a son tour, qu'elles sont intimement liees et 
inseparables, et que toutes deux sont parties integrantes et indivisibles de celle de 
sentir...111
By insisting that penser and sentir are separate theatres of operation to be treated 
independently, Stendhal subscribes, therefore, to the very distinction which Tracy is at 
pains to abolish.'Penser, comme vous voyez,' insists the latter, 'c'est toujours sentir, 
et ce n'est rien que sentir.'112 Nothing could be more unequivocal than this reduction 
of all thought to sensation. It is a line of argument, moreover, which Stendhal himself 
energetically endorses on a number of occasions. One of the definitions upon which the 
Filosofia Nova purports to rest, we recall, designates 'idees' as 'les sensations du 
cerveau.'113 Though we find Stendhal defining thought as sensation from as early as 
January 1803, when he is fired with enthusiasm for Helvetius,114 the question is never 
more emphatically addressed than in a letter to Pauline Beyle dated 1 January 1805. 
'Qu'est-ce que penser?' asks the self-appointed tutor in Ideology:
Tu penses, tu le dis a chaque instant; mais as-tu examine ce que tu fais en pensant? 
je crois que non. Tu sens, ma chere amie, tu ne fais que cela. Penser est sentir; 
[...]
Mais, puisque penser et sentir sont la meme chose, pourquoi a-t-on fait deux mots? 
Parce que c'est la majorite des hommes qui fait la langue et non dix ou douze 
philosophes.115
Any distinction in essence between thought and feeling, Stendhal clearly 
recognises here, is at best redundant, at worst misleading. His letters, notebooks and 
diary from 1803 and 1804 proclaim the belief that 'toutes nos idees nous viennent par 
nos sens.'116 Yet Stendhal's language, more evocative often of Cartesian dualism than 
of the monistic rationale of the sensualistes,111 continues to belie his stated conviction. 
Resolving to undertake an analysis of the passions in June 1804, he reflects: 'Je 
trouverai peut-etre que toutes les habitudes sont dans le corps ou dans la tete.'118 Such 
a statement, like so many others that one finds in Stendhal's early writings, is 
predicated on a metaphor, and, to return to the judgment of Tracy above, a pernicious 
metaphor at that.119 'Against the traditional view of the dual nature of man,' writes 
Gilbert Chinard, 'the Ideologues held a belief in monism: they solved the problem 
which had for so many generations exercised the minds of theologians and moralists by 
denying the existence of the problem.'120 Even Condillac, intent though he was on 
retaining a place for the soul in the human economy, had sought, through his 'animated 
statue', to eschew the time-honoured distinction between body and mind.121 Though 
Condillac himself chose to follow his conclusions only part of the way,122 the 
materialism to which he pointed found more uncompromising proponents among those 
philosophes and Ideologues (Helvetius, d'Holbach, Tracy, Cabanis, to name but the
154
foremost) who erected sensationalism into a first principle of philosophical integrity.123
It may be useful once more, before concluding our thoughts on this question, to 
anticipate something of the later Stendhal. For the licence with which he interprets the 
sensationalist principle is not restricted to his early notebooks. 'Quelle difference! 
pensait ou plutot sentait Octave,' we read in Armance.124 The remark might appear at 
first glance to be a faithful reiteration of the formula so tirelessly expounded by the 
successors of Locke and Condillac. In truth, however, it pays service to a distinction 
between thought and sensation that is evoked on numerous occasions in Stendhal's 
later writings. Leon, in Le Rose et le Vert, 'etait un homme qui sentait plus qu'il ne 
reflechissait.'125 Lamiel had, we are told, 'non pas la conviction, mais bien mieux, la 
sensation qu’elle commettait un grand crime.'126 Nor will Stendhal be closer to the 
letter or spirit of Ideology on those occasions when he depicts the inner conflict of his 
protagonists as a struggle for ascendancy between heart and mind. ’[Sa] tete dominait 
son coeur,' we read of Julien Sorel in his fraught relations with Mathilde de la Mole.127 
'Le combat de son ame et de son esprit le rendait presque fou a la lettre,' writes 
Stendhal of Lucien Leuwen, in flagrant breach once more of Tracy's ruling that no such 
division should be upheld.128 Not that the conflict results in any clear resolution for his 
hero: 'Une seule tete, une seule ame ne suffisent pas pour y voir clair, au milieu de 
devoirs si compliques.'129 Should Fabrice del Dongo have killed in order to make good 
his escape on a stolen horse? 'Sa raison lui disait oui, mais son coeur ne pouvait 
s'accoutumer a l'image sanglante du beau jeune homme tombant de cheval 
defigure.'130
Stendhal's sensitivity to the vagaries of human consciousness, his clear 
recognition of what would later be explored as the sw^-conscious, may seem to us 
today to be the measure of his psychological acuity. Yet it should not be forgotten that 
his insights in this domain are more despite than because of the crude and overly 
restrictive equation between sensation and thought which was fundamental to Ideology. 
Of the founder of French sensationalism, Condillac, H.B. Acton writes:
His aim would today be called 'reductionist'. That is, he set out to show that 
reasoning, judgement, thought generally, are identical with, or nothing but, 
sensation. This he expressed in his famous phrase that thought is 'transformed 
sensation'. The transformation here meant is not magical but symbolical or logical. 
Although tie Tracy criticized Condillac on many points, he too, in his Elements de 
Vidiologie (1801), took the same course when he said 'penser c'est sentir', which 
I translate 'to think is to have sensations'.131
Such is the first precept of a philosophy which, for all its recognition of the complex 
effects of thought, invites a minimalist interpretation of mental activity at its source and 
in its various operations.132 Stendhal, however, presents a quite different case. His is a
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concern not to diminish but to amplify and give full play to the gradations and nuances 
of conscious experience. Thus we will read of a fleeting reflection of Lucien Leuwen: 
'Or, disait-il, ou plutot sentait-il sans se l'avouer, ma mere ne doit ni aimer ni hair 
madame de Chasteller.'133 Dire, sentir and avouer here denote three distinct operations 
of the conscious mind which place Stendhal at some remove from the reductionism of 
the Ideologues. When, in Le Rouge et le Noir, a troubled Julien Sorel seeks distraction 
in Napoleon's memoirs, we are told:
ses yeux seuls lisaient, n'importe, il s'y for9ait. Pendant cette singuliere lecture, sa 
tete et son cceur, montes au niveau de tout ce qu'il y a de plus grand, travaillaient a 
son insu. Ce coeur est bien different de celui de madame de Renal, se disait-il, mais 
il n'allait pas plus loin.134
Here again, the subtle gradations of consciousness are evoked in terms which take us 
far beyond the basic penser-sentir equation. No less is this the case when, in Armance, 
we are told of the eponymous heroine: 'Elle ne se disait pas, elle sentait (le dire en detail 
eut ete comme en douter), elle sentait cette verite.'135 The emphatic, repetitive interplay 
of verbs here — dire, sentir, douter — conveys the fragile and fleeting nature of the 
thought, the verite, in question. From all of Stendhal's novels, examples can be thus 
adduced which issue a challenge to the view (upheld, as we have noted, by Arbelet, 
Van Duzer, Cailliet and others) that in Stendhal the school of Ideology finds its 
novelist.'Une etude de son oeuvre,' insists Cailliet, '[...] ne peut quefaire constater un 
epanouissement des thimes du XVIIIe si&cle dans Vexpression que leur a donnee 
VEcole des Ideologues'136 The remark is open, as we see from the foregoing, to 
considerable qualification.
Reading Philosophy
Stendhal's early writings, then, throw into relief an aspect of his thought which has 
hitherto passed unattended by commentators — in particular by those who readily 
annexe him to the school of Ideology and make of him a champion of philosophical 
materialism. Stendhal is considerably less of an ideologue — and we shall have 
occasion to return to this point — than has been commonly asserted. Less of a 
'materialist', too, if we set store by what his reading of Hobbes reveals. For, as the. 
notebooks which record this reading amply demonstrate, Stendhal is quite unable to 
sustain any consistently materialistic definition of the world. The moment he departs 
from Hobbes's text and attempts to re-cast the latter's principles in his own terms, he 
exposes himself to inconsistency and contradiction. In extracting from chapter XII,
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where Hobbes develops a distinction between 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' activity, 
Stendhal notes: 'Les actions involontaires sont celles causees par les proprietes de la 
matiere. On pousse un hom[me]. II tombe contre une glace et la casse. Involontaire.'137 
Though Stendhal's example here is closely related to one which Hobbes himself cites, 
his attribution of involuntary action to 'les proprietes de la matiere' finds no echo in 
Hobbes. Nor could it. For what Stendhal is, in effect, implying here is some realm 
where the 'properties of matter', as he puts it, do not hold sway, which is a denial of 
the whole basis of Hobbes's plenist philosophy.138 What Hobbes in fact says in the 
passage which Stendhal transcribes d sa fagon is: 'Les [actions & les omissions] 
involontaires sont celles que [l'homme] fait par la necessite de nature, qomme quand il 
est pousse, qu'il tombe & fait par sa chute du mal a quelqu’un.'139 This is a far cry 
indeed from what is implied by Stendhal, whose thought on the question is further 
confused by a subsequent note in which it is 'voluntary' rather than 'involuntary' 
activity which is ascribed to 'les proprietes de la matiere'.140
In yet other instances, Stendhal's notes reveal that he is far from comfortable with 
some of the most basic terminology which he finds himself employing. In resuming 
Hobbes's discussion of 'amour' and 'haine' as manifestations of the process whereby 
external stimuli to the sense organs, by exciting movement within the body which 
impinges on the 'mouvement vital', gives rise to the 'mouvement animal' known as 
appetite or aversion, he notes in parenthesis: 'qu'est-ce que ce mouv[emen]t vital?'141 
Considering the nature of sensual, or 'organic', pleasure as discussed by Hobbes, 
Stendhal stops short to pose the question: 'Qu'est-ce que veut dire le mot 
organiqueT142 His extracts and notes from his reading of Hobbes are punctuated by 
interrogatives of this sort.143 Such questions, while they have about them an element of 
the rhetorical, a clear echo of the dialectical method in which Stendhal has been 
schooled, betray uneasiness in the presence of terms and principles whose meaning or 
application he clearly fails fully to grasp.
To isolate examples such as these is to place the emphasis upon one aspect only of 
Stendhal's mind in this period. Yet the detailed comparisons which his notebooks 
permit with the original text of Hobbes provide a valuable insight into the manner in 
which he conducted his early readings in philosophy. They demonstrate in particular 
the interaction which Stendhal has with the text in hand, posing questions, inventing 
examples, and developing ideas within his own frame of reference. In the midst of his 
extracts from Hobbes, there is a note which reads:
Hobbes, chap. IX, page 85:
'L'ennui est une maladie de l'ame dont le principe est l'absence des sensations 
assez vives pour nous occuper. Ce qui est habituel n'excite plus de. sensation vive 
en nous. Je crois que d'apres ce principe on peut forcer sa tete au travail, mais non
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son cceur.'144
The first noteworthy feature about this is that it is derived not from Hobbes but from 
Helvetius.145 The second is that it illustrates well Stendhal's method, in his 
philosophical reading, of grafting his own reflections onto the extracts which occasion 
them. Though the distinction is not made in the Journal litteraire, the final sentence is, 
in fact, the conclusion which Stendhal himself draws from the definition in question — 
a conclusion which, in servicing his continuing distinction between heart and head, 
takes him beyond the perimeter of Helvetius's reasoning on this point.
Stendhal's notes from Hobbes provide a number of similar examples,146 the most 
remarkable of which relates to the philosopher's discussion of the pleasure-pain 
principle and the moral implications which are to be drawn from it. In the lengthy 
extract which Stendhal transcribes in his notebook, we find Hobbes's conclusion not 
only expressed intact, but extended and employed as the basis for a further — and 
much bolder — conclusion which is Stendhal's own:
II n'y a point de bonte ni de mauvaisete sans relation. Chaque homme nomme bon 
ce qui est agreable pour lui-meme, et mal ce qui lui deplait, de maniere qu'il v a 
autant de bontes ou de mauvaisetes qu'il v a d'hommes.147
While Stendhal's contribution (here underlined) may be the logical corollary of 
Hobbes's argument,148 the conclusion which he draws takes us much further than the 
point at which Hobbes himself chooses — significantly — to rest his case.149 Thus 
Bertrand Russell, in interpreting Hobbes's thought on this question, points towards the 
conclusion drawn by Stendhal but, like Hobbes himself, stops some way short of 
drawing it:
It will be observed that these definitions give no objectivity to 'good' and 'bad'; if 
men differ in their desires, there is no theoretical method of adjusting their 
differences.150
Such minor misrepresentations of Hobbes and Helvetius may seem nugatory. But 
they do offer a glimpse into Stendhal's method of reading, indicating the extent to 
which his most apparently faithful rendering of an author's thought remains open to 
elaboration and distortion. What the foregoing examples demonstrate, moreover, is the 
way in which Stendhal uses his reading to reaffirm already formulated ideas. Just as 
Helvetius!s reflections on ennui are translated into Stendhal's own terms of reference, 
Hobbes serves in the above instance to confirm a principle which is already central to 
Stendhal's moral philosophy and which he had outlined thus, as early as February 
1803, in a letter to his sister Pauline:
Tout homme regarde les actions d'un autre homme comme vertueuses, vicieuses
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ou permises, selon qu'elles lui sont utiles, nuisibles ou indifferentes. Cette verite
morale est generale et sans exception.151
Since men necessarily pursue, in all their endeavours, their own self-interest as they 
perceive it, and since there is in nature no universal principle upon which such 
self-interest may be calibrated, the notion of an absolute standard of good or evil is 
meaningless. The idea that the human being was equipped with some indwelling moral 
gauge as to the rightness or wrongness of his actions — a faculty in situ, as the Church 
claimed, from the so-called 'age of reason' in the child — was dispelled as a nonsense 
if one accepted that self-interest, in all its manifold forms, constituted the sole 
determinant of human values and of human conduct alike.
Hobbes, in 1804, brings nothing new to an idea which, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, Stendhal had found clearly articulated by Helvetius. From that fact in itself 
however, there is a very significant point to be drawn. For Stendhal’s most enthusiastic 
approval is reserved not for those authors who, by challenging his assumptions, 
broaden his perspective or sharpen his powers of reasoning, but rather for those who, 
rightly or wrongly understood, confirm him in his ideas, not to say his idees fixes. 
There is nothing more inveterately subjective, at bottom, than Stendhal's reading of 
philosophy. This intense subjectivity is a feature of Stendhal's thought which has not, 
in this particular context, been recognised by critics; yet it informs his whole 
relationship with those authors from whom he is generally held to have derived the 
principles of his philosophy. Hobbes, though he provides an instructive case in point, 
is not the only thinker upon whom Stendhal visits his preconceptions. As Francine 
Marill Alberes rightly observes, 'Stendhal se cree une ideologic personnelle et ne voit 
dans les philosophes que ce qu'ils lui apportent.'152
We should not wish, certainly, to suggest by this that Stendhal’s ideas did not 
undergo very significant development with time or through the influence of particular 
thinkers. But he does approach his reading, in adulthood as in his youth, with a marked 
predisposition towards those authors who appear to echo, reaffirm or amplify his ideas 
as they are already defined. Hence his judgment of Montesquieu's De VEsprit des lois, 
read some months after Helvetius in May 1803: 'J'avais devine d'apres la lecture du 
livre de VEsprit faite six mois auparavant beaucoup des decouvertes que Montesquieu y 
montre.'153 No less than Montesquieu, Vauvenargues serves to confirm Stendhal in 
what are already his established ideas. 'De l'ame. All my decouverte is in this §', he 
notes in April 1804, believing he finds the essence of his theory of human nature in 
Vauvenargues's Introduction a la connaissance de Vesprit humain.154 Helvetius, too, 
delivers. 'Je reviens a Paris en lisant Helvetius,1 we read in Stendhal's diary of 6 
August 1810, 'il me semble que je lis des notes ecrites par moi en style lache, tant je
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suis d'accord avec lui.'155 Elsewhere, the same sentiment is applied almost verbatim to 
a somewhat less likely candidate: 'Quand je lis Pascal, il me semble que je me relis 
[...]. Je crois que c'est celui de tous les ecrivains a qui je ressemble le plus par 
l'ame.'156 Even Mme de Stael, for all the endless criticisms levelled against her inflated 
style, has her moment: 'Je retrouve mes idees et jusqu'a mes expressions favorites dans 
ce que Mme de Stael dit de l'ltalie...'157
Such remarks give evidence in Stendhal of a keen desire to anticipate the lessons of 
his reading, to prove himself something more than the passive recipient of another's 
wisdom. 'Si j'avais su analyser une seule de mes joumees [...],' he reflects ruefully in 
a notebook entry of 18 June 1804, 'j'aurais decouvert ce que j ’ai lu dans Hobbes.'158 
Nor is the latter alone in upholding, as Stendhal has it, the 'division' of man upon 
which the Filosofia Nova rests.159 'Prevost avait vu,' we read in a note of 24 April 
1804, 'la division] de l'esprit et du coeur, il parle souvent d'une maniere consequente a 
ce principe.'160 Stendhal's enthusiasm for Mirabeau in particular is redoubled when he 
finds in him what he takes to be confirmation of this same principle: 'Tout ce que je lis 
dans Mirabeau et tout ce que j'entendis hier soir a Feydeau m'engage de plus en plus a 
croire a ma div[isi]on de la tete et du cceur.'161 From such a meeting of minds, one 
could not but take heart. 'Je suis flatte,' declares Stendhal, with no excess of modesty, 
'de voir que Mirabeau pense souvent comme moi.'162 The remark resonates with an 
exultant diary entry dated 23 July 1804:
Je lis UEsprit de Mirabeau a la Bibliotheque. Ouvrage a mediter et a discuter 
profondement. Je lis la partie: Philosophie. Je suis dans un des etats les plus 
delicieux que j'aie eprouves de ma vie. Je retrouve dans les ecrits di quel grande 
plusieurs des pensees que j'avais deja eues: par exemple, sur Montesquieu, [...]; 
mes idees sur l'incontinence, [...]. II a developpe, je crois, ce que je pensais sur le 
christianisme.163
This readiness to conclude that the rightness of an author's ideas is commensurate with 
the degree to which they resemble his own would become a marked and enduring 
feature of the commentaries which Stendhal provides on his reading. On 8 August 
1804, it is with the Scottish philosopher Dugald Stewart that he registers his affinity, in 
terms which betray not the merest hint of objectivity:
Je lis [...] la Philosophie de Vesprit humain [...] par Dugald Stewart, [...] ou se 
rencontrent beaucoup des choses que j'ai decouvertes il y a un mois. Cela prouve 
leur v6rite.164
Some sixteen years later, Stendhal's response to the Italian philosopher and economist, 
Pietro Verri, will be no less conclusive — and no less intensely subjective. 'Que 
dites-vous du traite SulV indole del Piacere e del Dolore du c[om]te Pietro Verri?' he 
inquires of Adolphe de Mareste:
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Je le lis pour la premiere fois; je tremble sans cesse d'y trouver mes idees. Done je 
le trouve fort bon.165
The list of such examples is long166 and testifies clearly to the predispositions 
which informed Stendhal's judgment of the authors whom he undertook to read. For he 
is ever on the lookout to discover, as he puts it on one occasion, 'des choses qui 
confirment mes idees au lieu de les modifier.'167 Though he would later claim, as we 
have seen, to have been pursuing the same few fundamental ideas throughout,168 it is 
clear that he felt a need to have these expressed in new and ever more cogent forms.169 
Even the highly personal 'philosophy' for which Stendhal, in 1811, coins the term 
beylisme cannot assume its full 'truth' until it undergoes ratification against the 
sounding-board of another intellect. Reading Mme du Deffand's letters to Horace 
Walpole, Stendhal is, as he declares in a letter of 9 January 1812, confirmed in the 
principles of his 'Beylism'. 'Mme du Deffand me fait sentir encore mieux tout le bon de 
mon systeme,' he boasts to his sister Pauline, adding in conclusion: 'J'ai ete bien aise 
de voir toutes mes idees confirmees par Mme du Deffand.'170
On recording dissatisfaction with his various draft projects in July 1804, Stendhal 
exempts from an otherwise sweeping criticism 'mes anciennes observations, par ou il 
fallait passer pour en venir ou j'en suis.’171 The remark clearly suggests that he 
perceives his philosophical development as a process of accretion, the overlaying of 
one truth by another which confirms, corrects or extends it. Reflecting in June 1807 
upon his intellectual progress to date, he notes with some approval: 'L'experience m'a 
vieilli de deux ou trois ans depuis mon depart de Grenoble, a en juger du moins par la 
couche d'idees nouvelles que je suis oblige de traverser pour retrouver celles de ce 
temps-la.'172 This image of retracing one's course through past 'layers' of thought, or 
of advancing to new levels of truth, is one that is recurrently employed by Stendhal. 
Observing, in the aftermath of the Russian campaign, that he has lost his enthusiasm 
for reading, he will record a graphic description of his etat d'esprit in his diary of 15 
September 1813:
Reste la lecture [...]. Je ne b[ande] pour aucun livre, et ce n'est que dans cet etat 
heureux que je lis avec fruit, avec augmentation de mon magasin d'idees, ou plutot 
avec rectification de mes idees, et approche toujours plus voisine de la verite. Elle 
est pour moi (dans la connaissance de l'homme) comme une peinture recouverte 
d'une couche de chaux; sans cesse quelque parcelle de chaux tombe, et j'approche 
de cette verite desiree.173
This notion of 'rectification' is central from the earliest to Stendhal's intellectual 
evolution.174 It goes some way, too, towards accounting for the shifting allegiances 
that lie beneath the surface of what is generally seen as Stendhal's adherence to a single 
school of philosophy. Thus Condillac and Vauvenargues find themselves amplified and
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superseded by Helvetius, who is both confirmed and eclipsed by Hobbes, who will 
give way in turn to Tracy, Cabanis and a reinstated Helvetius.175 For philosophy, in 
Stendhal's perception, is always personalised, incarnate in the thinkers who vie for his 
superlatives. Condillac is 'la base de tout',116 Cabanis 'le pere du materialisme',177 
Hobbes 'le meilleur style philosophique’,178 Helvetius '[le] plus grand philosophe 
qu'aient eu les Fransais', 'le seul Frangais qui raisonne',179 Tracy 'le plus grand de 
nos philosophes, ou, pour mieux dire, le seul philosophe que nous ayons.'180 
Condillac's Logique contains 'plus d'idees que toutes les bibliotheques du monde!' — 
until that of Tracy comes to hand.181 The latter will be recalled as 'l'homme que j'ai le 
plus admire a cause de ses ecrits, le seul qui ait fait revolution chez moi.'182 Plaudits 
which do not, however, prevent Stendhal from deeming the Encyclopedie 'le livre le 
plus utile qui ait jamais ete publie', or from declaring Pierre Bayle to be 
'indiscutablement dans l'ordre chronologique, et peut-etre dans l'ordre de merite, le 
premier philosophe de France.'183
'Stendhal, that arch-materialist'
Whatever distinctions Stendhal establishes between and among those philosophers 
whom he read with what he took to be the greatest profit, there is good reason to 
endorse Paul Arbelet's assertion that 'il ne croira trouver chez eux que les aspects 
differents d'une meme doctrine.'184 The reading of Hobbes provides a clear illustration 
of this point. The precepts of mechanistic materialism, the analysis of the passions, the 
pleasure-pain principle, the egoistic ethic, the importance of philology and the precision 
of language, even Hobbes's celebrated definition of laughter185 — all are known to 
Stendhal prior to his reading of Human Nature, all have about them more of the 
familiarity that reaffirms than the revelation that converts. Yet for all that, and for all 
Stendhal's assiduous note-taking, his reading of Hobbes, as we have seen, remains 
superficial and distorted. A simple remark made in a letter to Pauline Beyle in 
November 1804 gives evidence of just how impervious Stendhal has been to the 
philosophy expounded by Hobbes. It demonstrates, too, the extent to which his 
reasoning remains hostage to an ill-defined and highly inadequate terminology:
Tu connais le cceur et tu as une ame ardente qui te l'explique assez; reste la tete.186
To rend man thus into cosur, ame and tete, to confer upon a vague notion of 'soul' 
powers (of explication notably) which are elsewhere reserved for the 'mind', was to 
fragment beyond all recognition Hobbes's view of human nature. No sooner indeed
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had Stendhal completed his reading of the philosopher than we find him writing to his 
sister: Tu te souviens sans doute que je t'ai ecrit que l’homme etait compose de trois 
parties: '1° le corps; 2° l'ame ou toutes les passions; 3° la tete ou le centre des 
combinaisons.’ To tete, ame, cceur, corps, Stendhal then introduces a fifth category, to 
confound still further the conception of human nature in question: 'Le corps et la tete 
sont les valets de l'ame, et l'ame obeit elle-meme au m oi, qui est le desir du 
bonheur.’187
That such reasoning reveals more about Stendhal than about Hobbes should by 
now be clear. It is in this sense, however, that Stendhal's reading of the philosopher 
can be said to attain its fullest significance. For it raises a number of fundamental 
questions, in particular about the depth and range of Stendhal's materialism. The notes 
by which the event is documented may appear at a glance to be littie more than a 
transcription of Hobbes; as a critical reading shows, however, they testify to the 
difficulty which Stendhal experiences in breaking out of a traditional, not to say 
profoundly orthodox, view of man that is more akin to Christian or Cartesian dualism 
— or, borrowing the forbidding terminology of C.D. Broad, to 
'Differentiating-Attribute Pluralism'188 — than to the monistic materialism of 
Hobbes.189
Such a claim, of course, runs counter to a received critical wisdom which, ever 
since Merimee's description of his friend as a 'materialiste outrageux',190 has held 
philosophical materialism to be the very bedrock of Stendhal's world view. 'Stendhal 
est pleinement materialiste,' declares Jean Melia,191 while Albert Collignon discovers 
in his thought a
Theorie materialiste et experimental, fondee uniquement sur l'utile et qui donne
une explication simple et naturelle du libre arbitre, de la moralite, de la
responsabilite, de l'heroisme et de tous les autres phenomenes de cet ordre.192
Such a judgment was, even in Collignon’s day, far from novel. As early as 1842, in 
the obituary article published by E.-D. Forgues in Le National, Stendhal had been 
hailed as 'le plus spirituel parmi les demiers champions de la philosophie materialiste; le 
seul homme peut-etre a qui Diderot, de nos jours, eut volontiers tendu la main...'193 
Rarely, however, was this view of Stendhal to occasion such fulsome praise. While the 
same alleged materialism would find sympathy in Hippolyte Taine and in the young 
. Paul Bourget,194 it constituted, as we saw in Chapter I, the very essence of criticisms 
levelled against Stendhal throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century. Barbey 
d'Aurevilly acts as spokesman for a whole generation of reactionary critics when he 
proclaims Stendhal to be Texpression la plus raffinee et la plus sobre de ce 
materialisme radical et complet dont Diderot fut le philosophe et le poete.'195 Stendhal
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is, he charges, a 'materialiste sans emphase, souterrain et ferme', a latter-day proponent 
of 'le materialisme raccourci et brute de d'Holbach, d'Helvetius, de Cabanis...'196 
Fashions in philosophy, however, ebb and flow just as surely as those in any other 
field of human interest. Divining a change in the intellectual and moral climate of the 
later nineteenth century, Paul Albert ascribes the renascent appeal of Stendhal in the 
1880s to the very materialism which had hitherto proved a source of critical 
condemnation:
Si Stendhal a eu peu de succes vers 1830, c'est qu'alors on etait idealiste et
spiritualiste et il etait, lui, materialiste. S'il en a davantage aujourd'hui, c'est qu'il y
a plus de materialistes et ceux-ci saluent Stendhal comme un des leurs.197
The twentieth century, while it has, as we have noted, tempered the morally 
censorious tendency among Stendhal's critics, has brought no significant reappraisal of 
his materialism. Writing in 1909, James Huneker summed Stendhal up as a 
'descendant of Diderot and the Encyclopaedists, a philosophe of the salons, a petit 
mattre, a materialist for whom nothing exists but his ideas and sensations.'198 Huneker 
articulates here a notion which has a formidable body of critical opinion behind it. 'In 
the sphere of philosophy,' writes H.B. Samuel, Stendhal's 'logical and mathematical 
turn of mind embraced with natural facility the materialism of the French sceptics.'199 
Pierre Martino goes further, discerning in Stendhal 'la negation de tout ideal moral, un 
materialisme absolu.'200 Etienne Rey subscribes in turn to the view of a Stendhal who 
is 'nettement materialiste';201 so too J-C. Alciatore, who discovers in Stendhal not the 
'materialisme a brule-pourpoint' of an intellectual 'brigand' — as Barbey d'Aurevilly 
had a century before202 — but a reasoned materialism which predates the influence of 
his philosophical mentors. 'Appartenant par son education d'adolescent a la tradition 
des philosophes du XVIIIe siecle,' writes Alciatore, 'Helvetius, Destutt de Tracy et 
Cabanis renforcent son materialisme.'203 Stendhal is a 'faithful materialist' for Matthew 
Josephson, a 'deterministic materialist' for Gita May, an 'arch-materialist' for Robert 
Adams.204
The sheer weight of the critical opinion that has rallied behind this view might be 
deemed sufficient to discourage fresh inquiry. What none of the above assessments 
endeavours to establish, however, is the nature of the materialism which is so 
consistently ascribed to Stendhal. Instead, there is a marked tendency to assume — 
with Jean Melia — that Stendhal, as the inheritor of an eighteenth-century philosophical 
legacy and a self-proclaimed disciple of Ideology, 'ne pouvait etre que materialiste.'205 
The recent article by J.-C. Augendre, 'La "Filosofia nova" dans l'histoire du 
materialisme', gives evidence of how little has been done to further our understanding 
of Stendhal on this question. Augendre rests his analysis upon a number of the 
preconceptions which have informed so much of Stendhal criticism in this domain.206
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To read Hobbes may indeed, as he argues, be to effect 'un retour au "berceau" du 
materialisme';207 but Stendhal's place in any 'history of materialism' requires most 
surely to be defended on grounds more rigorous than these. Nor is Augendre's 
suggestion that Stendhal might be held to mark a new departure in materialist thought 
convincing;208 for the critic does not pursue this reflection beyond a simple allusion to 
the psychologist who would be so appreciated in Stendhal by Nietzsche.
Despite its promising title, Augendre's study fails in turn to raise the question that 
is called forth by each of the definitions cited above: by what criterion is Stendhal's 
'materialism' to be judged? The question must be posed, for, as his notebooks and 
diaries from the earliest attest, if Stendhal is a materialist, he is a materialist who is 
singularly uninterested in matter. Even at the height of what Georges Blin calls 'ses 
annees d'ideologie militante et experimentale', his 'fanatisme "philosophique"',209 
Stendhal's materialism, such as it is, is no more than a vaguely formulated and highly 
abstract principle. Nowhere is there evidence, for example, that he takes steps to 
ascertain what Hobbes actually meant by 'mouvement vital','organique', or any of the 
terms which had caused him to punctuate with questions his reading of Human 
Nature.210 Never, even at the height of his enthusiasm for Hobbes, does he trouble to 
pose the questions: What is matter? How is it organised? How does it function? What 
distinctions are to be made between apparently different categories of matter? How are 
these to be related to differences in sensation: sound, sight, smell, pain, desire, rage...? 
All of this may be fare for the philosophically curious; but it does not detain 
Stendhal.211 What is the basic structural element of the material universe as he 
envisages it? The answer is nowhere in evidence. Nor does Stendhal, as he sets about 
drafting his Filosofia Nova, trouble to inquire into the physical seat of the reason and 
the passion which so preoccupy him; these he is content to ascribe, in keeping with 
time-honoured metaphysical — and metaphorical — convention, to la tete and le cceur 
respectively. 'Je ne m'occuperai que tres sommairement de l'influence du corps,' he 
resolves. 'Tirer de l'ouvrage de Cabanis Influence du physique sur le moral quelques 
verites claires.'212
Such is the store which this latter-day Diderot, this 'materialiste jusqu'a 
l'heroisme',213 sets, in June 1804, by the material aspect of man. What is perhaps 
most surprising of all in this context is that Stendhal did not graduate from Hobbes to 
his translator, the Baron d'Holbach, enfant terrible of French materialism and author of 
the notorious Systdme de la nature. Stendhal could not have failed to appreciate the 
significance of this 'Bible of all Materialism', as F.A. Lange dubs it.214 Yet for all his 
reputation as an intellectual kinsman of d’Holbach, there is, as we stated in our 
Introduction, no evidence that Stendhal ever read the latter, and his writings contain so
165
few references as to rule out any suggestion that d'Holbach contributed in any 
meaningful way to the formulation of his thought215 Would a mind so given to entering 
into a recorded dialogue with those authors who engaged his intellect have passed over 
in silence a reading of this most formidable exponent of French atheistic materialism? 
The thought is an unlikely one, which does little to sustain Sergio Moravia's 
description of Stendhal as a devotee of d'Holbach, or Ernest Abravanel's more tentative 
suggestion that he probably read the Systeme de la nature.216
That Stendhal read Cabanis, on the other hand, there can be no doubt. Yet here 
again there is little evidence to suggest that he had any genuine interest in the concept of 
matter or the first principles of philosophical materialism. His earliest recorded reading 
of Cabanis in January 1805 does not even acknowledge the central question raised by 
the physiologist concerning the intimate relationship between the 'physical' and the 
'moral' states, with all its radical materialist implications. A critical commentary on the 
style of the Rapports du physique et du moral de I'homme provides the grounds for the 
summary judgment of Cabanis as a 'vague' author to whom Bacon and Hobbes are to 
be preferred.217
Stendhal's materialism, we submit, is a conviction, a faith, a 'religion renversee', 
to borrow Alain Girard's suggestive expression:218 it is not, in the strictest sense of the 
term at least, a 'philosophy'. For it is not arrived at or sustained through any dialectical 
process, but is the fruit rather of a massive presumption, a leap of faith; it is, quite 
simply, accepted from the outset as a donnee, the logical consequence of the evacuation 
of God and the incorporeal soul from the Universe. Stendhal's materialism is in 
essence a partisan stance for which he seeks — and finds — support among those 
philosophers with whom he registers a ready affinity. 'Tout le monde sait,' he would 
write, as we recall, 'que la philosophie est une republique divisee en deux factions; la 
faction materialiste et la faction spiritualiste.'219
It is precisely this spirit of engagement which informs from the earliest Stendhal's 
commitment to the materialist 'cause'. Philosophical materialism in the 1790s was, as 
G.V. Plekhanov puts it, 'a "militant doctrine", a revolutionary doctrine.'220 Stendhal's 
adherence to those philosophers who were to exert an enduring appeal has, within this 
perspective, all the hallmarks of a surrogate religious faith. Hence his 'croyance' in 
Helvetius, where almost everything is 'divin';221 his veneration for Cabanis and 
Tracy;222 the 'source de toute lumiere' which he would discover in the latter's Elemens 
d'ideologie;223 and the status of 'bible' to which his recollection would elevate the 
Rapports du physique et du moral de I'homme 224 Hence, too, the 'adoration pour le 
vrai' which he avows in the Vie de Henry Brulard,225 and the 'espece d'examen de
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conscience' which, he claims in a letter of 1808, the reading of philosophy helps him to 
conduct.226 Thus, in 1811, Stendhal records his intention to re-read Tracy’s Logique at 
least once a year, 'afin que mon esprit soit toujours ouvert a la lumiere.'227 The same 
work, he writes with irony to his sister Pauline in 1814, is 'aussi vrai que l'Evangile 
pour le moins et aussi clair.'228 The remark finds an echo in a subsequent letter to the 
same Pauline, in which Stendhal denies that the baser passions can conduce to 
happiness in old age. 'Cela est aussi vrai,' he concludes, 'que le vrai en l'evangile ou 
dans Helvetius.'229
At one level, of course, this is all so much rhetoric. At another, however, it 
suggests Stendhal's readiness to commit himself to belief in what he takes to be 
right-thinking philosophy. 'Mon pere et mon grand-pere avaient YEncyclopedie in-folio 
de Diderot et d'Alembert,' he will write in the Vie de Henry Brulard. He recalls: 
'J'avais la plus entiere confiance en ce livre a cause de l'eloignement de mon pere et de 
la haine decidee qu'il inspirait aux p[retres] qui frequentaient a la maison.'230 What 
more could be required as a recommendation of the philosophy in question? From faith 
to certitude, moreover, would be but a step. Writing for the British press in the 1820s, 
Stendhal will be no less Manichzean in his perspective than had been the recalcitrant 
Brulard. 'Je crois vraiment, avec M. de Tracy,' he writes in the London Magazine of 
December 1825,231 'que la science des idees [...] est fondee sur la physiologie. Cette 
verite exaspere les pretres de toutes les religions et les Allemands de toutes les 
conditions.' So it is, we read in the New Monthly Magazine of December 1828, that the 
'reveries de Platon' seek to triumph over the 'verites de Locke et de Tracy.'232 In yet 
another submission to the same journal, the 'speculations ideales' of philosophical 
idealism are contrasted with the 'realties etablies par Locke et Condillac.'233 The same 
tone of trenchant certitude everywhere characterises Stendhal's thoughts on the 
philosophical schools over which he sits in summary judgment. It is evident still in a 
letter of February 1838, where he confidently affirms 'la verite des idees dans Bentham 
ou dans YEsprit d'Helvetius.'234
Stendhal's language in such instances is significant on two counts. Firstly, his 
readiness to perceive certain authors as oracles of truth and others as purveyors of 
falsehood runs counter to the spirit and the letter of the 'methodical doubt' which he is 
ever prescribing for himself and for his sister Pauline. We have noted in the preceding 
chapter that, where Helvetius in particular is concerned, Stendhal is far from being the 
scrupulous reader which his declared enthusiasm for this philosopher might at times 
suggest. Secondly, and more importantly for our considerations here, it says much 
about Stendhal's philosophical posture that it should be defined not as a self-sustaining 
truth but by reference to — and in the very terms o f— the Christian faith against which
167
it is mobilised. There is truth in Emile Cailliet's assertion that, where Stendhal is 
concerned, TIdeologie se met au service du mot d'ordre: Ecrasez l'lnfame!'235
It is this relationship between religion and philosophy for Stendhal which helps to 
explain a somewhat cryptic remark found in a note dating from 7 September 1803. 'Les 
douleurs dans l'enfantement,' Stendhal writes quite simply, 'sont une preuve du 
materialisme.'236 The meaning of this remark is elucidated by a subsequent note, 
penned some three weeks later, in which an acrimonious apostrophe to the Christian 
God reveals much about the basis of Stendhal's 'materialism':
Si vous etes bon pourquoi avez-vous souffert que les maladies rendissent I'homme 
malheureux une partie de sa vie?
Pourquoi les douleurs de l’enfantement, la prosperite des mediants?
Moi, qui ne suis qu'un simple homme, je vous dis: Pourquoi apres vingt-cinq ans 
n'a-t-il pas ete donne a la seule vertu de prolonger nos jours? [...]
N'est-ce pas votre faute si votre machine au lieu de produire des actions vertueuses 
en produit de vicieuses?
Et je ne vois pas comment il est digne de votre bonte de faire des machines 
vicieuses et de les punir ensuite de l'avoir ete.237
The importance of these extracts is twofold. In the first place, they suggest very 
clearly that Stendhal conceived of his materialism as a reaction against the notion of a 
providential deity overseeing the workings of humanity. The very fact that Stendhal's 
thought should be couched here in an imaginary address to the Christian God tells us 
much about the source from which he derives his philosophical animus and recalls 
Merimee's revealing assertion that his friend 'etait fort impie, materialiste outrageux, 
ou, pour mieux dire, ennemi personnel de ia Providence [...]. II niait Dieu, et, 
nonobstant, il lui en voulait comme a un maitre.'238 Merimee's qualification here is 
significant; for it signals the quasi-logical connection in Stendhal's mind between a 
denial of the divine, on the one hand, and the embracing of 'materialism', on the other. 
The same point is clearly underlined by another of Stendhal's intimates, Louis Crozet, 
in a letter written after the author's death to Romain Colomb. Of their deceased friend, 
Crozet, ever mindful of the reception which Stendhal's works were likely to enjoy 
among the reading public, writes:
[...] les fondements de ses ecrits sont assis sur la philosophic des sensations, sur 
le pur materialisme, et sur un mepris hautement affiche, je dirai meme sur une 
haine de l'esprit religieux qui sont parfaitement opposes aux idees du moment et 
qui sont injustes meme philosophiquement parlant.239
Whatever doubt one may cast on the value of such remarks as a means of 
advancing the appreciation of Stendhal's art, they do shed important light upon the 
philosophical posture which he exhibited to his friends and associates. The second 
noteworthy feature about the extracts from Stendhal's notebooks cited above is that
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they provide the first intimation of a problem which would haunt him throughout his 
life and which re-emerges on a number of occasions in the published work of his later 
years. Here again, moreover, the 'philosophy' to which Stendhal's remarks attest 
comes over less as a self-sustaining dialectic than as a means of filling the void that is 
left when the notion of a providential deity is abolished. Thus, in De iAmour, he fires 
off the following salvo:
Pourquoi au moment ou un assassin tue un homme ne tombe-t-il pas mort aux 
pieds de sa victime? Pourquoi les maladies? et, s'il y a des maladies, pourquoi un 
Troistaillons ne meurt-il pas de la colique? Pourquoi Henri IV regne-t-il vingt et un 
ans, et Louis XV, cinquante-neuf? Pourquoi la duree de la vie n'est-elle pas en 
proportion exacte avec le degre de vertu de chaque homme?...240
In Rome, Naples et Florence, we find the same question related directly, as it had been 
in September 1803, to the notion of the supernatural. 'Si l'on admet des miracles,' 
protests Stendhal, 'pourquoi, lorsqu'un homme en tue un autre, ne tombe-t-il pas mort 
a cote de sa victime?'241 This flagrant absence of any natural — or, a fortiori, 
supernatural — justice, the insistence, in as many words, upon 'la mechancete de la 
Providence',242 is indissociable from Stendhal's denial of God and from the 
philosophical standpoint which he early adopts. Henri Martineau, succumbing to the 
temptation to seek the psychological determinants of the later author in the child, dates 
what he terms 'cette absence quasi totale de spiritualite' from Stendhal's seventh year, 
when, as we read in the Vie de Henry Brulard, he heard his mother's death described 
as God's will. 'Jamais,' writes Martineau,
[...] il ne pardonna a un Dieu capable de ravir sa mere a un enfant. Desormais, 
sans crainte de se contredire, il niera la Providence ou l'accusera d'etre mechante: 
"Qu'est-ce qu’un Dieu qui a invente la peste et la gale?"243
Whatever the precise source of such reasoning, it is true that it represents a 
deep-seated and constant feature of Stendhal's world-view. In a passage which would 
be excised from the published version of VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, he deploys 
an acerbic logic-against what he deems the absurdity of Christian faith in a benign 
Providence:
Je ne crains pas de le dire, I'homme qui souhaite un enfer catholique a Neron ou a 
Philippe II ne sait ce qu'il dit, ou est lui-meme plus atroce que ces monstres. S'il 
en est ainsi d'un simple mortel qui sent gemir dans son cceur l'humanite qu'ils 
outragerent, que peut-on dire du createur de Tibere qui, lorsque ce monstre etait 
encore au bras de sa nourrice, voyait tous les maux qu'il ferait peser sur 120 
millions de sujets, et toutefois le laissait vivre, sauf ensuite a commettre une 
seconde atrocite aussi imbecile que la premiere, en le punissant d'un supplice 
etemel?244
These remarks give expression to a sentiment which, as D.G. Charlton observes, was 
felt by a growing number of anxious intellectuals in the nineteenth century. For there
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was an increasing tendency, among thinkers notably who held fast to some religious 
aspiration, to question the very morality of Christian doctrine. Concepts such as the 
Fall and eternal damnation, far from arguing a benevolent deity, ’presupposed a 
morally repugnant idea of God,' particularly when set against the notion that man is 
determined by hereditary and environmental forces that lie beyond his control.245 Such 
is the idea that we find expressed again by Stendhal in the margins of Schlegel's Cours 
de litterature dramatique, where he sustains his view with a telling reference to thinkers 
whose very names, he suggests, serve to demolish any defence of a providential deity:
Quand on a lu et compris Helvetius, Tracy, Gibbon et Cabanis, on ne croit a
aucune religion. Theos lui-meme parait absurde, car pourquoi l’existence des
Pans? Pourquoi I'homme qui m'assassine he tombe-t-il pas mort a mes pieds?
Tout ce qui suit dans Schlegel parait extremement absurde.246
Stendhal's materialist view of the world, it is clear from these examples, rests 
upon a denial of any spiritual dimension to life, which is closely linked to a denial of 
natural justice and a belief in an arbitrary and inscrutable destiny. But he takes no 
delight — as some of his eighteenth-century predecessors had done247 — in 
concluding thus that the endeavours of humanity are subject to no inherent logic or rule 
of law. On the contrary, it is a question which troubles him deeply and which serves to 
buttress his early atheistic — and, by extension, 'materialist' — stance against claims 
that any divine Providence is at work in the government of human affairs.248 'Moi 
aussi, j'aimerais d croire,' he protests in the Promenades dans Rome; 'mais la fievre 
vient de faire perir trois pauvres petits enfants chez mon voisin, ce qui mq  force a croire 
que tout n'est pas juste et beau dans ce monde.'249
In this view of a morally indifferent universe there was, of course, nothing new. 
The problem of evil, with the attendant prosperity of the wicked and suffering of the 
righteous, was one which had exercised the eighteenth century and fuelled an age-old 
debate between optimism and pessimism.250 The mid-eighteenth century had, as I.F. 
Knight argues, witnessed 'the rediscovery of evil in the universe' and confronted the 
conclusion that there was 'too much cruelty, too much waste and destruction, too many 
monstrous and anomalous occurrences, to suppose design in nature.'251 The sentiment 
expressed by Stendhal in the above instances recalls the denunciation of philosophical 
idealism and attack on Leibnizian optimism which one finds in the later Voltaire.252 
Whereas, however, the latter's deism survived the doubts which he came to harbour 
about a beneficent Providence overseeing the affairs of men, Stendhal is sweeping from 
the outset in his rejection of any supernatural order. 'II n'avait aucune idee religieuse,' 
recalls Merimee, 'ou, s'il en avait, il apportait un sentiment de colere et de rancune 
cpntre la Providence: "Ce qui excuse Dieu, disait-il, c'est qu'il n'existe pas'"253
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In this simple aphorism, which would so arouse the envy of an admiring 
Nietzsche,254 we find the first principle of Stendhal's 'materialism'. Nor would the 
frank denial of God lead Stendhal, as would the 'honest doubt' of so many of his 
contemporaries, to seek new deities to replace the fallen.255 One has a choice, 
according to Stendhal, between two ways of viewing the world: materialism or myth. It 
is within this quasi-Manichaean perspective that he reflects, in the Promenades dans 
Rome, upon the philosophy best suited to the Italian cast of mind. 'Le materialisme 
deplait aux Italiens,' he contends. 'V abstraction est penible pour leur esprit. II leur faut 
une philosophic toute remplie de terreur et d'amour, c'est-a-dire un Dieu pour premier 
moteur.'256
As our discussion thus far shows, Stendhal's materialism is in large part a stance 
of reaction and negation. One does not, however, have to probe far beneath the surface 
to discover just how hollow is the base upon which he rests his conviction in all of this. 
The principles of philosophical materialism proper are not only a matter of limited 
interest to Stendhal; they are the expression of- a notion which confronts him with a 
serious intellectual problem. For it did not require extensive observation of the world to 
discover aspects and dimensions of reality for which matter alone appeared to provide a 
less than satisfactory explanation. In what has been perceived as a clear profession of 
his materialism,257 Stendhal commits a brief but pregnant remark to his notes of 
August 1803: 'Tout le materialisme est dans ces mots: tout ce qui est, est cristallise.'258 
This is one of the few occasions, in all of Stendhal’s writings, when he employs the 
term 'materialism', and the only occasion, to my knowledge, when he ventures a 
definition, however rudimentary, of the concept. The remark carries a suggestion, 
however, less of conviction than of doubt. For it is followed at once by a telling 
qualification, whose significance has been ignored by those critics who cite the above 
statement as testimony of Stendhal's materialism.259 Taken in its entirety, the journal 
entry in question reads thus:
Tout le materialisme est dans ces mots: tout ce qui est, est cristallise.
Toute l'objection dans ceux-ci: en jetant sur des feuilles de papier des milliers de
caracteres, quelle absurdite qu'une Made se soit trouvee imprimee.
Mais si tout ce qui n'etait pas une Made a ete detruit?260
That Stendhal should conclude here with a question is significant. For the objection to 
materialism which he cites indicates clearly his hesitation about reducing all human 
potential and achievement to mere functions of brute matter. Where, for example, could 
notions of 'greatness', or 'genius', or 'beauty' (in any but the most superficial sense) 
be accommodated within a strictly materialist-deterministic conception of human nature? 
The failure of mechanistic materialism, argues Marx Wartofsky, lies in its inability to 
'account for such refined qualities as sensibility, intelligence, mind.’ He goes on:
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Cartesian dualism rests on this. Thinking being is seen as qualitatively distinct 
from extended being, and it is this qualitative gap that a quantitatively-limited 
mechanism, the mechanism of homogeneous matter, cannot bridge.261
Though Stendhal does not pose the problem in such terms, he clearly finds it 
impossible, within a strict materialist perspective, to bridge the 'qualitative gap' in 
question.
On the face of it, certainly, Stendhal seems tireless in his endeavour to incorporate 
within the world of physical reality those areas of human experience habitually placed 
beyond the realm of matter. Hence the unequivocal definition of the 'soul' which we 
find among his writings of 1804: Tame est une partie du corps, [...] un morceau de 
matiere (cervelle) qui sent.'262 As with the soul, so with man's other supposed higher 
faculties. The imagination, Stendhal insists, 'fait partie de l'organisme humain tout 
comme l'oeil ou la main.'263 Ideas, he argues, are but sensations, and sensations but 
'des portions de matiere [...] entrant en mouvement.'264 Music may afford the most 
ineffable of pleasures; but, as we read in the Vie de Rossini, it can be fully appreciated 
only if the listener is 'isole comme pour les experiences electriques.'265 The most 
'metaphysical' of notions, according to such logic, have their roots in a physical reality. 
Thus can Stendhal speak of those 'beaux sentiments qui electrisent l'ame',266 or of an 
'effet electrique de la verite' which, as Georges Blin puts it, denotes '[le] court-circuit 
emotionnel provoque par l'ceuvre d'art, lorsqu'elle depeint au plus juste le 
sentiment.'267 Thus, too, will Stendhal speculate upon the prospect that some day a 
machine might be developed to measure human intelligence,268 or that strength of 
character might be registered in the individual as electricity is registered in the 
atmosphere.269 In such reasoning, it would seem, there is room only for the concrete, 
transient world of the materialists. A diary entry of 22 December 1804 is expeditious in 
its dismissal of any higher dimension:
Le principe de Locke que toutes nos idees nous viennent par nos sens, et 
l'anatomie des passions telle que celle qui se voit dans Helvetius prouvent que 
nous ne voyons dans I'homme aucun effet de l'ame, qu'il n'y a que des effets de 
sens, que par consequent il n'y a point d'ame.270
All of these examples may be adduced as evidence of the 'tentation du materialisme 
integral' which Philippe Berthier discerns in Stendhal's thought.271 They provide, 
however, only a very partial picture. For such concepts, like the language in which they 
are couched, prove impossible for Stendhal to sustain. Thus, in a notebook entry dated 
10 July 1804 — within twenty-four hours of defining 'l'ame' as 'une partie du corps', 
'un morceau de matiere'272 — we find him writing of the death of Marcus Junius 
Brutus as recounted by Plutarch:
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Elle a quelque chose de divin. Le corps n'y triomphe point. C'est une ame d'ange 
qui abandonne un corps, sans le faire souffrir. Elle s'envole.273
The tone of these remarks may be consonant with Stendhal's early reverence for the 
heroes of Ancient Rome. They suggest clearly, however, his readiness to dispense with 
the notion that men are mere agglomerations of matter. The instance is not unique. 
Similar betrayals of Stendhal's 'materialism' are not difficult to find in writings 
contemporaneous with his readings in materialist philosophy. Thus, for example, the 
entry in his diary of February 1805, where he congratulates himself on having shone, 
despite his unprepossessing physique, in the company of his mistress-to-be, Melanie 
Guilbert. 'Toute mon ame paraissait,’ he notes triumphantly, 'elle avait fait oublier le 
corps...'274 Such a remark would merit not even a footnote in any history of 
Stendhal's thought. Yet it does offer a candid glimpse of his failure to carry his 
declared philosophy over into his day-to-day preoccupations, underlining the residual 
dualism by which his thinking continues to be informed. The same divide between 
corporal and spiritual qualities is evident once more when, writing from his posting in 
Brunswick, Stendhal reflects upon what he terms the 'belles ames logees dans des 
corps de femme.'275 This distinction between body and 'spirit', sustained by a 
time-honoured philosophical tradition, was clearly one from which Stendhal found it 
difficult to disengage his mind. Thus, of a certain Amelie de Bezieux, he writes in a 
letter of September 1808:
Elle a de grands yeux d'un bleu fonce se detachant sur le plus beau blanc du 
monde; des yeux qui, par leur eclat et leur purete, percent au fond de l'ame; c'est 
quelque chose d'immateriel que ces yeux-la; c'est une ame toute nue.276
Scarcely the idiom one would expect from 'le disciple de Diderot et des 
philosophes amis du baron d'Holbach'!277 Yet these are but a few illustrations of a 
tendency that is evident across the range of Stendhal's writings. Thus, in the Vie de 
Rossini, we find a clear distinction upheld between a material and a non-material 
dimension in man. 'Ce qui fait de la musique le plus entrainant des plaisirs de l'ame,' 
avers Stendhal, '[...] c'est qu'il s'y mele un plaisir physique extremement vif.'278 
Similarly, in De VAmour, we read: 'Le degre de tension des nerfs de l’oreille pour 
ecouter chaque note explique assez bien la partie physique du plaisir de la musique.'279 
As with music, so with love we find the recourse by implication to another realm 
beyond the confines of the material world. Love, as Stendhal puts it, 'a un melange 
force de physique'; in a hundred years, he predicts, medical science will provide 'la 
description de la partie physique de ce phenomene.'280 So much, then, for Stendhal's 
protestations that the 'soul' is but a lump of feeling matter housed in the body organic. 
Encountering in Rome, Naples et Florence a number of women whom he credits with 
more reason than sensibility, Stendhal concludes: 'avec tant de raison, on ne doit
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comprendre que la partie materielle de l'amour.'281
In each of the above cases, Stendhal falls, despite himself, into the traditional 
dualist categories of body and soul, suggesting that there is a realm, an ’essence', 
within man that is in some way independent of his physical constitution. What he sends 
packing through the front door, one might say, he ushers in again by the rear. For he 
could not with any consistency endorse a philosophy which made no distinction 
between man and the material universe, presenting the former merely as a mode of 
some undifferentiated matter. Such a philosophy, Stendhal frequently suggests, has as 
its net effect to leave man bereft of what is most essential, most precious within him. 
Alongside the desire to pierce the veil of mystery surrounding man, to reduce human 
consciousness and sentiment to the terms of a simple theorem, to admit of nothing that 
is not sanctioned by the maxim 'Facta, facta, nihil praeter facta',282 there persists in 
Stendhal a strong hankering after the ineffable. How else to understand his deep-seated 
and lasting ambivalence towards 'les froids philosophes', or the disdain which — his 
ideologic notwithstanding — he manifests at times for the 'esprit sage, calculateur, ne 
pensant jamais qu'a ce qui est demontre vrm'.'283 How else to account for a remark 
which, issuing from the pages of Racine et Shakespeare, runs counter to every 
philosophical principle that Stendhal is elsewhere at such pains to exalt:
Platon avait l'ame d'un grand poete, et Condillac l'ame d'un chirurgien anatomiste. 
L'ame ardente et tendre de Platon a senti des choses qui resteront a jamais 
invisibles a Condillac et gens de son espece 284
Stendhal himself provides a gloss on this intriguing remark. Plato's reasoning may be 
puerile and obscure, he contends, but it is saved ipso facto from the soul-destroying 
aridity that characterises the thought of Condillac. Of the latter, by contrast, Stendhal 
goes on to assert:
comme il fait profession d'y voir clair et qu'il ne voit pas ce qu'il y a de genereux 
et de noble dans la vie, il semble la condamner au neant; car nous sentons qu'il a la 
vue tres nette.285
Such a reversal of the cherished ideals of precision and clarity, for all its aberrant * 
aspect, is far from exceptional. For there is in Stendhal a wilful 'blindness' which 
asserts itself at times to defy the eye of reason, an anti-philosophical tendency which 
delights in the very mysteries that it was his avowed ambition to see dispelled 286 'Je 
benis le ciel de n’etre pas savant,' declares the author of Rome, Naples et Florence. He 
explains: 'Si j'avais les moindres connaissances en meteorologie, je ne trouverais pas 
tant de plaisir, certains jours, a voir courir les nuages et a jouir des palais magnifiques 
ou des monstres immenses qu'ils figurent a mon imagination.'287 In the Memoires 
d'un touriste, it is in just such a spirit that Stendhal describes the thunder claps which
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accompanied his visit to the Grande-Chartreuse monastery in the French Alps. 'Que 
j'aurais voulu dans ce moment,' he exclaims, 'ne rien savoir de l'electricite ni de 
Franklin! '288
With this denial of reason's claim to usurp the place of sentiment, we come back to 
the fundamental irreconcilability between philosophy and poetry which is evident from 
the earliest in Stendhal.289 'Je m'instruis ici, a la verite,' he had written from Paris to 
his sister Pauline in January 1803; 'mais que la science est froide aupres du sentiment!' 
He goes on:
Malheureux et bien a plaindre, le coeur froid qui ne sait que savoir! Eh! que me sert
de savoir que le soleil toume autour de la terre, ou la terre autour du soleil, si je
perds, a apprendre ces choses, les jours qui me sont donnes pour en jouir?290
Such a powerful appeal against the hegemony of reason, recurring as it will in his later 
writings, must be borne in mind when assessing Stendhal's thought. 'Ne se fier qu’a 
ce qu'on comprend, telle est sa devise/ argues Georges Blin.291 Yet this 'positivisme 
de l'evidence', as Blin puts it,292 goes only part of the way towards explaining 
Stendhal's perception of the world. 'II n'y a qu'une tres petite partie de l'art d'etre 
heureux, qui soit une science exacte,' we read in De VAmour.293 In Rome, Naples et 
Florence, the idea takes on a more personal aspect: 'Enfin, je suis si peu fait pour les 
sciences sages, qui ne s'occupent que de ce qui est dimontri...'194 The emphasis is, 
significantly, Stendhal's own.
The irrational velleities of which such remarks are an expression would seem to 
call into question Blin's assertion that Stendhal rejects 'non seulement tout postulat et 
tout credo, mais meme tout mystere, fut-ce celui que recele I'homme.'295 Blin cites in 
support of this point Andre Gide, who, for all his acute sense of Stendhal's merits, is 
surely much too categorical in asserting: 'II reste en I'homme bien des regions qu'il 
n'aura pas su decouvrir, et meme il n'aime a decouvrir que ce qu’il va pouvoir 
expliquer; les tons ultra-violets lui echappent...'296 What both Gide and Blin in turn 
appear to overlook is the celebration of the un-known, and w/i-knowable, which is to be 
found in Stendhal and which is patently at odds with his pursuit of empirical certitudes. 
'Je sais parfaitement bien qu'il est permis a un poete d'ignorer les realties de la vie,' he 
writes in the London Magazine for July 1825.297 ’J’irai plus loin, il est necessaire a 
son succcs de poete qu'il en soit ainsi.' Such a remark rescues the intuitive dimension 
to life that is threatened by the cold edge of philosophy, and allows the artist access to 
some terra incognita where the incursions of reason have no place. Again in the 
Memoires d'un touriste, the same eschewal of 'reality' in favour of some richer realm 
of experience is in evidence:
175
He bien! je voudrais presque redevenir une dupe et un nigaud dans la realite de la 
vie, et reprendre les charmantes reveries si absurdes qui m'ont fait faire tant de 
sottises, mais qui seul, en voyage, comme ce soir, me donnaient des soirees si 
charmantes...298 . *
What has all this to do with Stendhal’s 'materialism' as it is discussed above? To 
this question, Stendhal himself provides an answer in Racine et Shakespeare, where, in 
the debate between the Romantic and the Academician, the former makes a telling point. 
If the Academician persists in contesting the sentiment which should accompany a 
particular dramatic illusion, then no amount of reasoning will bring him round to the 
opposite view. 'Et j'avoue,' declares the Romantic, 'que je ne puis rien vous 
repondre.'
Vos sentiments nfe sont pas quelque chose de materiel que’ je puisse extraire de 
votre propre cceur, et mettre sous vos yeux pour vous confondre.
Je vous dis: Vous devez avoir tel sentiment en ce moment; tous. les hommes 
generalement bien organises eprouvent tel sentiment en ce moment. Vous me 
repondrez: Pardonnez-moi le mot, cela nest pas vrai.
Moi, je n'ai rien-a ajouter. Je suis arrive aux demiers confins de ce que la logique 
peut saisir dans la poesie 299
Stendhal puts his finger squarely here, with this question of aesthetic sensibility, upon 
a fundamental difficulty in the materialist conception of man, what E.J. Dijksterhuis 
calls 'the hopeless problem of deriving psychic from physical phenomena.'300 
Stendhal’s response to the problem is indicative of his readiness to concede to a 
conventional dualist view of man's nature rather than pursuing the logic of the 
materialist doctrine through to its conclusion. The explicit affirmation that there exists a 
sensibility which lies beyond the realm of the material, beyond the outer confines of 
what can be apprehended through reason, is a reminder of the difficulty that bedevils 
his materialism from the outset.301 Stendhal comes perilously close here, in fact, to 
articulating the very argument which was levelled against the Ideologues at the height of 
their disfavour under Napoleon, and which is well summed up in Degerando's Rapport 
historique sur les progres de Vhistoire depuis 1789:
Le scalpel et le microscope ne peuvent atteindre qu'une portion de nous-memes; il 
en est une autre, et la plus noble, qui leur echappe, mais qui se decouvre a cet ceil 
interieur de la reflexion dont les observations, pour etre delicates, n'en sont pas 
moins reelles. La physiologie qui ne peut expliquer la vie physique elle-meme, 
expliquerait-elle le sentiment et la pensee?302
It is, it seems, with such reasoning in mind that Stendhal, the self-styled 
physiologist who reduces love to the terms of a geo-physical process,303 who defines a 
lover as 'un instrument auquel on se frotte pour avoir du plaisir',304 is just as prone to 
conceive of the same phenomenon as 'un pur fait de conscience' which has no 
apprehensible link with any neuro-biological reality.305 'Sa conception intime et
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personnelle de l'amour,’ argues Etienne Rey in his preface to De VAmour, ’vient 
aussitot a la traverse de la conception du philosophe, lui barre la route et se substitue a 
elle.'306 The remark is pertinent, for it acknowledges the divide in Stendhal's view 
between what is measurable in the crudest, most clinical terms, and what is beyond the 
reach of all that philosophy, aided by the physical sciences, can apprehend. The point is 
given graphic expression by Stendhal in a letter of 23 March 1831 to Adolphe de 
Mareste:
Un homme apres six mois de reves, aspire a emettre i/2 once d'une petite liqueur
visqueuse. Qu'importe au genre humain? Rien assurement; mais pour lui c'est le
bonheur, c'est la vie.307
Where then, in which of these two radically contrasting perspectives, is reality to 
be located? Stendhal provides no answer; but that he should acknowledge the question 
is ample commentary upon the many-sidedness which he recognises to be a defining 
feature of human experience. There are different orders of 'reality' which call for 
different definitions. Thus it is that, while holding man to be a 'machine' devoid of any 
but material components,308 Stendhal, as Jean Melia recognises, 's'en tient a la dualite 
classique: l'ame et le corps.'309 Thus, too, that the Stendhal who defines art as 'cette 
espece d'ecume', 'le produit necessaire d'une certaine fermentation',310 yet finds 
something in great literature which defies the simplicity of this 'materialisme 
artistique'.311 It is impossible, contends the student of Helvetius, that anyone negate 
his ego and 'agir contre ses interets';312 yet in the Vie de Henry Brulard he describes 
himself in terms devoid of sense for any advocate of utilitarian determinism: 'Mon 
amour-propre, mon interet, mon moi avaient disparu en presence de la personne aimee, 
j'etais transforme en elle.'313 In De VAmour, Stendhal goes to some lengths to 
demonstrate, through his classic example of Regulus, that man is no more than the 
pleasure-seeking animal described by Helvetius, physically incapable of pursuing 
anything beyond his own selfish gratification.314 Yet in VHistoire de la peinture en 
Italie, as we have seen, he flies in the face of this very principle by holding that the 
self-seeking protagonists of the Bible are inferior to the heroes of Antiquity precisely 
because their egoism takes precedence over nobler sentiments.315
Such are the difficulties and contradictions which emerge when one brings a 
critical eye to bear on Stendhal's thought. Whether one designates it a 'romantisme 
logique' (like Adolphe Paupe),316 or a 'romantisme analytique', Helvetius attempting 
to explain Saint-Preux (like Leon Blum),317 there is an inescapable antinomy — a 
'double aspiration', as Georges Blin puts it, 'de logicien et de romantique'318 — in 
Stendhal's perception of the world and in the philosophy which is a function of it. We 
have suggested earlier that the much evoked split between a rationalist and a romantic in 
Stendhal is of itself insufficient to account for the complexities and inconsistencies
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which are evident in his perception of the philosopher.319 Stendhal's ambivalence 
resides not between two clearly delineated regions of Philosophy and Romanticism, 
but, to a very large degree, within the domain of Philosophy itself. That said, the 
recourse by critics to the 'romantic' label has provided some means, however 
schematic, of approaching what remains one of the most ambiguous and challenging 
areas of Stendhal's thought.320 'All his life long,' declares George Brandes, Stendhal 
remained 'the unfaltering philosophic antagonist of everything in the great Romantic 
movement which was of the nature of a reaction against the spirit of the eighteenth 
century.'321 The very sweeping nature of such a statement militates, one fears, against 
its truth. For if Stendhal never took up arms with the Romantics against the excesses of 
the preceding century, he nonetheless waged his own private opposition to much that 
the Romantics found most indictable in the scientific rationalism which was the 
hallmark of that earlier age.322 The 'more complete epistemology' which, as D.G. 
Charlton observes, the Romantics strove to attain beyond the confines of 
eighteenth-century rationalism was, as we saw in Chapter II, Stendhal's goal from the 
outset.323 On this question, Auguste Bussiere's article of 1843 retains its freshness and 
acuity:
M. de Stendhal, qui ne veut voir dans I'homme que des fonctions et des
phenomenes physiologiques, prend a chaque instant parti pour l'ame pure et pour
toute cette portion de la sensibilite, pour tous ces mouvements de la passion
immaterielle dont le scalpel ne saurait retrouver le ressort.324
It is for this reason, we contend, that Maurice Larkin is quite wrong to suggest that 
Stendhal has none of the 'divided view of mind and matter' so characteristic of Balzac, 
or that his cult of the will, free of all spiritual tincture, results in an 'intellectually 
satisfying reconciliation between his respect for willpower and his recognition of the 
material basis of mind.'325 There is no thornier question in all of Stendhal than that of 
reconciling his concept of the will with the material basis of man and mind. Tete, coeur, 
ame, volonte: all are concepts which — traditionally accorded a place apart within man 
— pose enormous difficulties for Stendhal, and which he finds it impossible to express 
satisfactorily within any strict and consistent materialist idiom.326 Even when he most 
wishes to reason away the distinction between the physical and spiritual realms, when he 
appears to be subscribing to an out-and-out materialism, the problem is apparent. For, 
although he can claim (under the influence of Hobbes), that all human experience is 
reducible to matter in motion,327 or (under the sway of Helvetius) that the soul, 'n'etant 
prouvee par rien, n'existe pas,'328 it is clear from the application which he proceeds to 
make of such principles that he fails to subscribe to their logical implications. Among the 
notes drafted for the Filosofia Nova, there is one in which Stendhal ventures a 
step-by-step demonstration of the corporeality of the soul. The passage is worth citing in 
some detail, for it provides a glimpse of Stendhal grappling with a problem that is central
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to the whole materialist question. 'Une preuve que l'ame est une partie du corps,' he 
reasons, 'c’est qu'elle se fatigue.' He goes on:
II est done probable: 1° que c'est un morceau de matiere (cervelle) qui sent; 2° que 
ce morceau de matiere est dans la tete.
Car, quelle que soit cette chose, elle se fatigue comme le corps. Ce n'est qu'un 
rapport, mais nous n'en connaissons point d'autre. Voici ce rapport en entier: 
L'ame se fatigue, existe completement (sante), incompletement (douleur) comme le 
corps. Quand le corps cesse d'exister elle s'evanouit.
Elle s'endort ordinairement avec lui, quelquefois elle veille en partie quoiqu'il 
dorme, elle dort aussi en partie quoiqu'il veille.329
Despite the principle for which he is arguing, the whole of Stendhal's language here 
sustains rather than abolishes the distinction between the two separate categories of 
body and soul. For this unique attempt by Stendhal to construct a reasoned defence of 
monistic materialism is itself couched in dualist terms ('elle se fatigue comme le corps'; 
'Quand le corps cesse d'exister, elle s'evanouit'; 'Elle s'endort [...] avec lui, [...] elle 
veille [...] quoiqu'il dorme...'). Nothing here, certainly, of the 'natural facility' with 
which it has been claimed that Stendhal embraced his philosophical materialism.330 His 
uneasiness in handling here what he would clearly like to regard as a rigorous 
demonstration of materialism is betrayed by a.final, hesitating question: 'Tout cela est-il 
vrai?'331
Back to the Drawing-board
In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are better able to appreciate the nature of 
Stendhal's materialism. If we are to define materialism as the denial of conventional 
dualist categories (mind/matter, body/soul) and an insistence upon matter as the sole 
constituent of the universe, then it is clear that the Stendhal whom we have been 
considering is a fitful materialist at best. For he cannot relinquish his adherence to a 
conception of man which draws upon and reinforces the very categories which he seeks 
to refute. On this whole question, his reasoning fails to remain in tune with his stated 
conviction. Hence the jarring disparities between what he purports to hold as a disciple 
of Hobbes and Helvetius, on the one hand, and the distortions to which he subjects 
some of their most fundamental axioms, on the other. 'Ce psychologue qui se met a 
Vicole de la science,' observes with some piquancy Francine Marill Alberes, 'nest en 
fait qu'un amateur d'ames'332
In its 'narrower and more technical sense,' argues E.A. Gellner, materialism 'can
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be defined as the doctrine that only matter exists, and hence that all other phenomena 
and features of the world are explicable as manifestations of the organization and 
movement of matter.'333 The point is self-evident, perhaps; but it is worth stating. For 
if, as Paul Feyerabend suggests, one discards the refinements of what modem science, 
with its particle and high energy physics, has brought to theories of matter, one is left, 
in philosophical materialism as it has presented itself to the human mind through the 
ages, with a single, inescapable contention: 'that the only entities existing in the world 
are atoms, aggregates of atoms and that the only properties and relations are the 
properties of, and the relations between such aggregates.'334 It is on this latter point, 
that of the 'properties' and 'relations' existing within and between entities, that the 
materialist’s view of the world is, arguably, at its most intellectually exacting. As 
Maurice Mandelbaum puts it,
a strict materialism is a reductionist philosophy in a two-fold sense: it not only 
claims that all entities, however immaterial they may appear to be, have a material 
basis by means of which they are to be explained, but it also claims that whatever 
properties these entities reveal are explicable in an identical set of terms, regardless 
of their apparent disparities 335
We emphasise the point since it is to this monistic rationale precisely that Stendhal 
fails to subscribe with any semblance of consistency. There is, however, a broader and 
looser understanding of materialism, which incorporates a number of concepts 
associated with materialist philosophy as it evolved during the French Enlightenment 
notably: anti-clericalism and the rejection of the supernatural; the contention (though in 
Stendhal's case, as we have seen, this calls for substantial qualification) that human 
beings are, like all other objects, material entities; a deterministic psychology based on 
the principle of egoism and issuing in a utilitarian ethic; the overthrow of tradition in 
favour of empiricism and of absolute standards in favour of relativism; a belief in the 
power of education and government to determine human character and conduct. All of 
these, argues E.A. Gellner, can be seen as off-shoots of the materialist doctrine as 
articulated by the exponents of eighteenth-century progressive thought.336
If Stendhal is to be accurately termed a 'materialist', we submit, it is within this 
latter category that his 'materialism' must be understood. He is far, certainly, from 
being the thoroughgoing materialist for which he has been taken by so many of his 
critics. 'Son point de depart,' writes Emile Cailliet of the young Stendhal, 'est 
materialiste.'337 Anti-religious and fiercely secular Stendhal's point of departure may 
be; materialist, in any strict philosophical sense of the term, it is not. His one sustained 
attempt to come to grips with the metaphysical materialism of Hobbes results in his 
abandonment of the Filosofia Nova and his ultimate rejection of Hobbes's philosophy, 
in August 1806, as 'le discours d'un hom[me] de bon sens qui n’a pas assez
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approfondi sa matiere, ou des verites sans objet.'338
This is anything but an objective reappraisal of the work which had inspired such 
admiration in Stendhal only two short years before. His repudiation of Hobbes is 
indissociable, one must conclude, from the realisation that he himself has failed a test of 
his own philosophical mettle. On 12 September 1805, Stendhal, then working as a 
commercial clerk in Marseille, had struck an optimistic note in his diary. 'Ma pensee,' 
he declares, 'acquiert plus de verite, plus de force et plus de profondeur’:
Je ne desire pas lire les philosophes que je connais, ils me rejetteraient dans 
l'omiere ou j'etais il y a six mois. J'ai cependant envie de relire Hobbes et les 
pensees que j'ecrivais a Paris, pour en tirer ce qu'il y a de bon.339
The measured confidence that is conveyed by this note was, however, to be 
short-lived. For the re-reading of his earlier reflections on man would bring home to 
Stendhal the fact that he was still very firmly in the 'rut' from which he believed he had 
emerged. On 1 October 1805, he confesses in a letter to Pauline the serious misgivings 
which this realisation has given him about his capacities as a thinker:
J'ai lu hier par hasard les cahiers que j'ecrivais a Paris en messidor an 12, sur la 
tete et le coeur et la div[isi]on des passions que je faisais a cette epoque. J'ai trouve 
ce principe vrai, mais tout le reste gisquet, orgueilleux, vide, peu reflechi, 
ressemblant a un article de Geoffroy, surtout par la presomption de l'ignorance. 
Cela m'a fait faire de serieuses reflexions.
Je crois que je m'en vais reetudier a fond YIdeologie, et relire le plus froidement 
possible Helvetius, [...], Hobbes et Duclos.340
As a critical self-assessment, Stendhal's remarks here could scarcely have been 
harsher. His diary of 1 October 1805 carries a strong echo of these reflections, calling 
into question the whole basis of his ambition as a poite-philosophe:
J'ai relu aujourd'hui une partie du cahier della Filosofia nuova, ecrit en messidor 
an XII. J’ai trouve ce qu'il y avait jeunet, peu profond, pas profond du tout meme, 
?a n'est pas pense. I  believe that my talent is perhaps for be the bard, mais je sens 
que je n'ai pas le genie (la toumure d'esprit) philosophique. Je crois qu'il faut que 
je me mette serieusement a l'ideologie et a relire les philosophes.
II y a, outre cela, dans ce cahier, la presomption de l'ignorance. Je suis plus 
content de mes cahiers of poetry341
When one considers the dubious quality of Stendhal's verse, together with the 
unsparing criticisms to which he elsewhere subjects his Muse,342 one can appreciate 
the strength of his feeling here with regard to his philosophical achievement. His 
admiration for Hobbes is too closely associated, moreover, with the fortunes of his 
Filosofia Nova to survive its demise. When at last Stendhal reopens Hobbes in August 
1806, it is with a predisposition which could scarcely have resulted in renewed 
enthusiasm for the English philosopher. 'Je viens de lire La Nature humaine de
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Hobbes,' he notes laconically in his diary of 26 August 1806:
A l'exception du chapitre IX, ce livre est de la force des cahiers que je composais il 
y a deux ans dans le meme lieu ou j'ecris ceci [...]. Ce livre, qui m'avait laisse une 
telle admiration, m’a ennuye.343
In these few curt lines, we find Stendhal's definitive assessment of the work in 
question and of its author. For it is an assessment that he was never thereafter to revise. 
All that is common to this summary dismissal of Hobbes and the rhapsodic terms of 
Stendhal's earlier commentary is the subjectivity which informs his judgment and his 
admiration for the analytical method of which the ninth chapter of Hobbes's treatise 
stands as a model. Even this, however, was soon to be forgotten, leaving Stendhal 
with a single exiguous precept which he will acknowledge as Hobbes's contribution to 
his thought: the definition of laughter.344 Yet the view persists unchecked, as we said 
at the beginning of this chapter, that in Hobbes Stendhal embraced a philosopher who 
made a deep and lasting contribution to his thought. Francis Picavet identifies Hobbes 
as an important formative influence, while Jean Prevost suggests that Stendhal's debt to 
the English philosopher is greater than his debt even to Helvetius.345 Victor del Litto, 
too, considers Human Nature to be one of the most fruitful readings undertaken by the 
young Stendhal, while Arthur Chuquet places Hobbes first among those select few 
thinkers to whom Stendhal, as he claims, 'resta fidele jusqu'au dernier jour.'346
All of this, however, stands in need of correction. For what Stendhal found in 
Hobbes was largely of his own invention. 'J'ai change Hobbes ici et ailleurs. Relire 
son livre dans un an,’ he remarks nonchalantly in his notebook on 16 June 1804.347 
Stendhal never sought to further his acquaintance with Hobbes beyond the treatise in 
question, and he never progressed beyond the sketchiest notion of Hobbes as a political 
theorist.348 When his short-lived enthusiasm for the philosopher had run its course, 
Stendhal seldom again (from 1806 onwards) deigned even to mention the name of 
Hobbes. Francine Marill Alberes, alone among Stendhal scholars, brings an important 
-corrective to the assessments cited above when she writes that Hobbes’s influence on 
Stendhal 'parait singulierement restreinte et limitee a l'epoque ou il le lit.' Hobbes, 
Alberes rightly concludes, 'n'a guere contribue a la formation intellectuelle et morale de 
Stendhal...'349
If the whole episode in question leaves us with no more than a distorted view of 
Hobbes, it lends a valuable insight into Stendhal's perception of himself. Not least 
among the reasons which may be seen to account for the dramatic reversal in Stendhal's 
estimation of Hobbes is the fact that, for all the light which the latter had appeared to 
shed upon man, human nature remained an enigma. As much is made clear by a
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notebook entry penned only some six weeks after Stendhal's reading of Human 
Nature, but at a moment when his confidence in the Filosofia Nova was already nearing 
its end:
En general le froid genie de l'observation est bien plus propre a faire des 
decouvertes dans I'homme que l'etre passionne tel qu'Henri B. II faut cependant 
remarquer que le froid philosophe ne sait plus ce qu'il dit lorsqu'il veut analyser ce 
qu'il n'a jamais senti. Je ne crois pas que je fasse jamais de grandes decouvertes 
dans l'analyse des sentiments ordinaires de I'homme. Ce n'est pas mon genie, 
mais je puis decrire les sentiments que j'ai eprouves, analyse qui sera neuve.350
In this passage, which brings us back squarely to the problem of combining the poet 
and the philosopher, we find the balance tipping markedly in favour of the former. 
Even at the height of his enthusiasm for Hobbes and the Filosofia Nova alike, Stendhal 
is alive to the fact that all is not well in his reasoning:
Cependant parmi les verites que j'ecris ici et ailleurs, il en est qui semblent se 
contredire. C'est qu'elles ne sont pas completes et aussi claires que possible.
[...]
Enoncer done les verites le plus nettement et le plus completement.351
The 'truths' in question, however, were not to be so readily substantiated. On 25 
June 1805, a year almost to the day after having launched his 'new philosophy', 
Stendhal records a dispirited assessment of his progress to date:
Je relis la plupart de mes cahiers, je les trouve remplis de choses communes, mais 
peut-etre elles ne me paraitraient pas si simples si je ne les avais pas laborieusement 
decouvertes.
Je vois qu'a l’avenir je n'ecrirai que the world lui-meme ou des anecdotes.
Us m'ennuient et me rendent triste.352
Here, at the no longer tender age of twenty-two, Stendhal finds himself confronting 
squarely his shortcomings as a thinker. Nor, as the extracts cited above testify, would 
the weeks that lay ahead do anything to bolster his flagging confidence. Instead, a note 
entered in his journal on 16 October 1805 gives evidence of a Stendhal whose 
'philosophy' is being returned, once more, to the drawing-board:
Je me sens je ne sais quel nuage sur la confnaissance] de I'homme. J'ai envie de 
bien lire VEsprit de Mirabeau et YIdeologie 353
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fashions from his reading of the sensationalists (Locke, Helvetius, Condillac, 
Hobbes) and Ideologues (Cabanis and Tracy): 'Our physical and intellectual 
faculties are governed by the soul, and the latter, in turn, obeys our moi, whose 
essence is the universal, human desire for happiness. [...] And sometimes, 
ironically enough, the body and the mind may in turn influence the soul.' There 
is little need to insist upon what the philosophers in question would have made 
of such a travesty of their thought.
119. Though M. Crouzet is among the few critics to recognise the 'glissement vers la 
trahison’ which takes place in Stendhal's reading of the Ideologues (Raison, p. 
4), he gives no hint of this significant departure by Stendhal from his avowed 
maitres. On the contrary, Crouzet affirms Stendhal's adherence to 'toute la 
partie de Tracy qui decrit un depliement unitaire et continu du psychisme, et 
decouvre une non-rupture du sentir au penser, du spontane au reflechi, de 
l'existence a la conscience...' {Ibid., p. 264). As the foregoing examples 
demonstrate, it is far from being the case that Stendhal 'recueille pieusement 
l'assimilation du penser au sentir', that he is, in Crouzet's words, 'entierement 
fidele a la conception de la sensation-jugement, ou de l'idee "sentie"...' {Ibid., 
p. 269).
120. Introduction to Cailliet, p. 14. On this question of Homo duplex versus Homo 
simplex, see also ibid., p. 20.
121. The whole of the Traite des sensations {CEuvres [Paris: Libraires Associes, 
1777] vol. Ill, pp. 1-286) is intended as a demonstration of this principle. See 
on this question Knight, The Geometric Spirit, pp. 79-108.
122. While contending that all ideas are derived from sense-experience, Condillac 
offers a spurious account of how the mind — 'l'ame '— would be capable of 
direct knowledge, without the mediation of the senses, were it not for man's fall 
from grace. See the Essai sur Torigine des connoissances humaines {CEuvres, 
vol. I), part I, sect. I, ch. 1, pp. 3-7.
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123. ’[...] dans l'homme, tout se reduit a sentir,' proclaims Helvetius in De VEsprit 
(vol. I, disc. I, ch. 1, p. 18). On this 'reduction of complexity to basic 
elements', which was common to Condillac, Helvetius and the Ideologues, see 
Creighton, pp. 706-707. It may be pointed out here that the semantic difficulties 
into which Stendhal's terminology at times leads him are shared by thinkers 
more eminent than he. The problem of breaking out of the traditional lexicon 
was one which, as E. Kennedy observes, bedevilled even Destutt de Tracy, and 
conflicted with his emphatic appeals for the precise definition of words and for 
the abolition of linguistic superfluities such as double meanings and synonyms 
(A ’Philosophe’ in the Age o f Revolution, pp. 149-150). One need only glance 
at a letter written to Pauline Beyle in the first flush of his enthusiasm for 
Ideology to uncover something of the difficulty which lies in wait for Stendhal 
in the sensationalist philosophy. Purporting to define for his sister the nature of 
physical sensibility, he writes: 'La sensibilite est cette faculte, ce pouvoir, cet 
effet de notre organisation, ou, si vous voulez, cette propriete de notre etre en 
vertu de laquelle nous recevons des impressions de beaucoup d'especes, et 
nous en avons la conscience' (Corr, 1 ,174). Though the passage is drawn from 
Tracy (Elemens d ’ideologie, vol. I: Ideologie proprement dite, ch. 2, p. 20), 
Stendhal shows no awareness of the problems implicit in such loose 
terminology. His readiness to equate 'faculties', 'powers', 'effects' and 
'properties', sanctioned though it may be by Tracy himself, is evidence of how 
imprecise are the instruments of his dialectic. Though the sensationalists were at 
pains to rest their reasoning upon firmly established definitions, they were far 
from unanimous in determining what constituted the most basic element of their 
philosophy, sense experience, and by what means this became 'transformed' 
into thought. (See Acton, 'The Philosophy of Language in Revolutionary 
France', pp. 208-211; Kennedy, A ’Philosophe’ in the Age of Revolution, pp. 
112-116, 157-160; Smith, 'Destutt de Tracy and the Bankruptcy of 
Sensationalism.') Whatever Stendhal's esteem for the analytical precision of 
Hobbes, Condillac or Tracy, he remains, under their tutelage, far from the 
objective which he had set himself in proposing to bring the cutting edge of a 
clearly defined and unambiguous language to bear upon his reasoning (JL, I, 
250, 362).
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was eliminated, and Tracy found perception synonymous with idea, without 
adequately explaining what mechanism produced either' (A ’Philosophe’ in the 
Age o f Revolution, pp. 57-58).
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134. Ibid., I, 620.
135. Ibid, I, 71.
136. Op. cit., p. 140.
137. JL, 1,396.
138. There is no clearer affirmation of Hobbes's plenist materialism than that which 
is to be found in Leviathan, Part IV: 'Of the Kingdome of Darknesse’, ch. 46, 
p. 371: 'The World, (I mean not the Earth onely, [...], but the Universe, that is, 
the whole masse of all things that are) is Corporeall, that is to say, Body; and 
hath the dimensions of Magnitude, namely, Length, Bredth, and Depth: also 
every part of Body, is likewise Body, and hath the like dimensions; and 
consequently every part of the Universe, is Body, and that which is not Body, 
is no part of the Universe: And because the Universe is All, that which is no 
part of it, is Nothing, and consequently no where.1
139. De la Nature humaine, p. 146, § 3. Contrary to Stendhal's reading of it, such a 
remark implies no departure from the definition of a world composed, from first 
to last, of matter. See Polin, pp. xiv-xv.
140. JL, I, 455.
141. Ibid., I, 369. For Hobbes, the 'vital motion' of the body was to be found in 
such spontaneous functions as the circulation of the blood and breathing. It was 
distinct from 'animal motion', which resulted from stimuli to the senses and 
involved some endeavour towards pleasure and away from pain. See R. Peters, 
Hobbes (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967), pp. 129-130; Polin, pp. 57-59. On 
the moral implications of Hobbes's thought here, see B. Gert, 'Hobbes, 
Mechanism, and Egoism’, The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XV, no. 61 
(1965), pp. 341-349; F.S. McNeilly, 'Egoism in Hobbes’, ibid., vol. XVI, no. 
64 (1966), pp. 193-206.
142. JL, I, 375-377.
143. See ibid., I, 453, 379, 375, 370.
144. Ibid., I, 382.
145. See Alciatore, Stendhal et Helvetius, pp. 65, 84-85; Del Litto, JL, I, 534 n.
146. See Stendhal's remarks on love and desire, which are again part transcription
from Hobbes, part invention: JL, I, 391. Cf. De la Nature humaine, p. 101, §
16.
147. JL, I, 370. Cf. De la Nature humaine, p. 66, § 3: 'Chaque homme appelle Bon 
ce qui est agreable pour lui-meme & appelle Mai ce qui lui deplait.'
148. See Lange, bk. I, sec. 3, p. 281; Mintz, The Hunting o f Leviathan, pp. 25-28.
149. Hobbes goes only so far as to conclude: 'Ainsi chaque homme differant d'un 
autre par son temperament ou sa fa?on d'etre, il en differe sur la distinction du 
Bien & du Mai; & il n'existe point une bonte absolue consideree sans 
relation...' (De la Nature humaine, p. 66, § 3).
150. Op. cit., p. 534. See also on this question Polin, p. 133: 'Les biens et les maux
ne sont ni bons, ni mauvais en eux-memes [...] II n'existe pas, a proprement
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des desirs.'
151. Corr, I, 56. Stendhal's reasoning in this letter bears all the hallmarks of 
Helvetius.
152. Le Naturel chez Stendhal, p. 63. It is within this 'personal ideology' that 
Stendhal can consider Hobbes not as a forerunner but as a successor to 
Helvetius {Corr, I, 270), and that he can deem Cabanis, in the early 1800s, to 
be 'le pere du materialisme' (S d'E, 56).
153. /L ,1 ,171.
154. Ibid., I, 302.
155. 01, I, 616. Cf. the diary entry of 19 June 1807, where Helvetius's D e  
VHomme is deemed 'le bon sens meme' {Ibid., I, 477).
156. JL, II, 172.
157. Ibid., n, 295.
158. Ibid., I, 366.
159. See ibid., I, 433.
160. Ibid., I, 311.
161. Ibid., II, 36. Cf. ibid., II, 58: ’[...] Mirabeau croyait evidemment a la 
distinction utile de Vesprit et du cceur.'
162. Ibid., II, 32. Cf. ibid., n , 35: 'Je retrouve dans Mirabeau mes idees sur 
l'incontinence.'
163. OI, I, 102.
164. JL, E, 102.
165. Corr, I, 1018-1019. A revealing admission from Stendhal's diary of 1811 is 
worth citing in this context:'[...] savoir d'avance que la musique de tel opera 
est de Pergolese me fait trouver l'opera beaucoup meilleur que si j'ignorais le 
nom de l'auteur' {OI, 1,724 n.). So much for objective critical standards.
166. See, in addition to the examples cited, OI, I, 457 (on Hobbes), 495 (on 
Lambert). Cf. JL, II, 15: 'Hier j'ai beaucoup medite sur l'hom[me]. 
Aujourd'hui j'ai lu une histoire. Cette methode est excellente. Tous les faits que 
je lisais confirmaient mes principes.'
167. OI, I, 495.
168. HB, I, 30.
169. The ever-present fear of 'contracting' prejudice is at the source of Stendhal's 
desire to revise and 're-prove' even his best established notions. See the 
notebook entry of 16 December 1802: 'Faire l'inventaire de son savoir de temps 
en temps, et se reprouver tout ce qu'on croit; c'est ainsi qu'on peut esperer de 
ne contracter aucun prejuge, vice aussi nuisible a l'avancement du genie que 
facile a prendre’ {JL, I, 31). On this intellectual 'hygiene', see also ibid., I, 42, 
92, 127. Every influence becomes a potential source of prejudice and dupery: 
ibid., I, 130, 239, 258, 366, 403, 458; n, 18; III, 6. On this recurrent need to
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170. Corr, I, 626-627. For the full significance of Stendhal's remarks on Mme du 
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172. Corr, I, 352.
173. OI, I, 885.
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Stendhal comes to seek not only from his reading but from his friends and 
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nova" dans l'histoire du materialisme', p. 263.) One need look no further than 
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by Stendhal to be 'sur la frontiere de la science' {Corr, 1 ,168); by March 1806, 
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irredeemably — from grace {Ibid., I, 313-314).
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which marks him apart from all of the other thinkers in question does not alter 
the fact that, in his earliest philosophical readings, he seeks ratification for the 
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185. On the definition of laughter, see Del Litto, La Vie intellectuelle de Stendhal,
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Stendhal's 'materialisme presque crapuleux', see also Paupe, La Vie litteraire 
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continuateur de la pensee de Diderot, Montesquieu ou Maupertuis' (p. 282).
205. Les Idees de Stendhal, p. 12. Few indeed, as we argued in our Introduction, 
are the dissenters from this view. M. Tumell ventures the suggestion that 
Stendhal 'was very far from being the intransigent materialist for which he is 
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VAmour, II, 470.
196
217. 0 1 ,1, 195.
218. Op. cit., p. 290.
219. Mel. Journ., 206.
220. Op. cit., p. 82.
221. HB, H, 238; Corr, I, 920.
222. HB, I, 14.
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metaphysical reality of evil, and the very existence of a "problem of evil," 
inasmuch as the universe is simply empty of moral value.' Such, argues 
Crocker, was the view 'basic to La Mettrie, Helvetius, d'Holbach, and Diderot' 
{An Age o f Crisis, p. 44).
249. Italie, 900.
250. See P. Hazard, 'Le probleme du mal dans la conscience europeenne du 
dix-huitieme siecle', The Romanic Review, vol. XXXII (1941), pp. 147-170; 
A.O. Lovejoy, 'The Principle of Plenitude and Eighteenth-Century Optimism', 
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257. See Melia, Les Idees de Stendhal, p. 291; 'Le Materialisme de Stendhal', La 
Nouvelle Revue, vol. XVI (1902), p. 385; Picavet, p. 490.
258. JL , I, 202.
259. For Stendhal,, writes J. Melia, 'le domaine d'universalite ou d'eternite, le 
connaissable ou l'intelligible, chaque chose est contenue dans cet axiome: "Tout 
ce qui est est cristallise'" {Les Idees de Stendhal, p. 291).
260. JL , I, 202.
261. 'Diderot and the Development of Materialist Monism', Diderot Studies, vol. II 
(1952), p. 304.
262. JL, I, 467.
263. CA, IV, 26. Cf. Plekhanov (p. 35) on the materialism of d'Holbach: 'Does not 
a caprice also consist of molecules?'
264. JL, I, 581 n.
265. Rossini, I, 21. 'La chaleur animale d'un corps etranger me semble fatale au 
plaisir musical.'
266. Romans, II, 1069.
267. Roman, p. 55.
268. H deP , 11,37.
269. Italie, 388.
270. OI, I, 165.
271. Stendhal et Chateaubriand. Essai sur les ambiguites d'une antipathie, p. 106.
272. JL, I, 467. See above.
273. Ibid., II, 14.
274. OI, I, 238 n.
275. Corr, I, 371.
276. Ibid., I, 514.
277. Jourda, Etat present des etudes stendhaliennes, p. 96.
278. Rossini, I, 19. 'La musique est une jouissance tellement physique...'
279. De VAmour, II, 166.
280. Ibid., I, 56 n. 1, 217-218: 'Si l'influence des temperaments se fait sentir dans
l'ambition, l'avarice, l'amitie, etc., etc., que sera-ce dans l'amour qui a un
melange force de physique?'
199
281. Italie, 493. Cf. Armance, where Octave’s 'monomanie' is thought by his 
doctors to 'provenir non point d'une cause physique, mais de l'influence de 
quelque idee singuliere' (Romans, I, 46).
282. H de P, II, 64 n. 1.
283. Italie, 381. It is interesting to note that in the Vie de Henry Brulard (II, 237), 
Stendhal would deem himself 'une des ames les moins raisonnables.1 On 
Stendhal's 'revolt' against clinical reason, see Blin, Personnalite, pp. 525-541.
284. R et S, 255. We are close again here to Stendhal's earliest criticism of 
Helvetius: 'Comment pourrait-il expliquer ce trouble inconnu qui saisit a la 
premiere vue...? (<Corr, I, 84).
285. R et S, 256.
286. See on this question the perceptive remarks of J.-P. Richard.
287. Italie, A ll. Cf. Stendhal's note of 12 March 1819: 'Le meme evenement qui 
plonge le poete dans les plus brillantes illusions donne a reflechir pour trois 
jours au philosophe’ (OI, II, 32).
288. M de T, n , 233. The same rationale inspired Keats — 'Do not all charms fly/At 
the mere touch of cold philosophy?' — to lament Newton’s explanation of the 
rainbow. See H. Dingle, 'The Relations between Science and Literature', 
Literature and Science. Proceedings o f the Sixth Triennial Congress of the 
International Federation For Modern Languages and Literatures, Oxford, 1954 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1955), pp. 1-11. Stendhal could not be further here from 
the spirit of Ideology as it is defined by L. Pearce Williams, pp. 316-319. Cf. 
the very different reference to Franklin in the New Monthly Magazine of 
September 1824 (CA, II, 193-194).
289. On the 'etat de guerre' which prevails between reason and sentiment in 
Stendhal, between 'la vision logique, l'ideal de secheresse, le besoin de 
determination et, d'autre part, l'impressionisme de la tendresse, la reverie 
musicale et la magie de Y indistinction,' see Blin, Personnalite, pp. 525-528.
290. Corr, I, 40-41.
291. Roman, p. 122.
292. Ibid., p. 123.
293. De VAmour, n , 188. See on this point Crouzet, Raison, p. 410; Blin, 
Personnaliti, p. 526 n. 1.
294. Italie, 381.
295. Roman, p. 122.
296. Ibid., p. 122 n. 3.
297. CA, V, 103. M. Crouzet recognises clearly this conflict in Stendhal between the 
cult of demonstrable truth, Tagenouillement devant le petit fait', and '[le] 
pouvoir infini du moi de nier, inventer ou croire.' Under such conflicting 
impulses, writes Crouzet, Stendhal's philosophy could not but 'evoluer vers 
des retoumements, des paradoxes, la coexistence d'enonces contradictoires, de 
visees incompatibles’ {Raison, p. 8).
200
298. M deT, HI, 178. Stendhal's embracing of the unknown comes to the fore in his 
admiration for Italy, 'Paese della virtii sconosciuta' (De VAmour, II, 17 n. 1). 
See, for instance, Italie, 1414 n.: 'Done il y a une superiority dans ce pays. D y 
a quelque chose d'inconnu, que n'a pas la France, par exemple, ni l'Espagne, 
ni l'Angleterre.' Cf. ibid., 139, 193; JL, in, 119; OI, II, 5.
299. R et S, 19-20. On the philosophical problem which Stendhal identifies here, see 
W.H. Sheldon, 'Critique of Naturalism’, The Journal o f Philosophy, vol. XLH 
(1945), pp. 266-267. On the 'necessity d'ignorer' in which, as M. Crouzet 
argues, Stendhal seeks redemption from the 'calvaire cynique de l'esprit qui 
sait\ see Raison, pp. 435, 442-444.
300. Op. cit., p. 432. While for the sciences the concept of mechanistic materialism 
was, as Dijksterhuis argues, 'stimulating and productive, it confronted 
philosophy with the difficult problem of the real relation between the world of 
our perceptions and feelings and the world of the mechanical processes outside, 
which is so entirely different in character' (Loc. cit.).
301. 'Le moi,' as M. Crouzet observes, remains for Stendhal 'porteur et accoucheur 
de sa verite' (Raison, p. 9). Beyond the "demontrable" lies the realm of the 
"devinable" (p. 525). Hence 'la rehabilitation de l'intuition, de l'ignorance, de 
l'ingenuite de pensee' in contradistinction to the certainties vouchsafed by 
Ideology (p. 532): '[...] l'etre s'evade de la raison, le vrai se passe de preuves, 
le moi s'identifie k un donne inexplicable comme injustifiable' (p. 543). On the 
important role which Crouzet assigns to Maine de Biran in this context, see 
ibid., pp. 559-590.
302. Cited by Plongeron, p. 389. Cf. the criticisms levelled, in Le Mercure of 6 
January 1802, against Tracy's Pro jet d'elemens d'ideologie (Kennedy, A 
Philosophe' in the Age o f Revolution, pp. 116-117). 'As physics tried to 
account for the world without God,' writes R. Adams (p. 56), 'so ideology 
tried to account for man’s brain without a soul.'
303. De TAmour, I, 20-21.
304. Romans, I, 1365.
305. See Delacroix, p. 236. The incompatibility between these two positions is 
discussed by J.J.C. Smart. Against die classic dualist argument that 'you can't 
put love in a test tube', Smart sets the by now no less classic objection that 'you 
can’t put a gravitational field in a test tube’ — but that the latter is quite 
defensible within the terms of a materialist conception of the world. See the 
article 'Materialism', The Journal o f Philosophy, vol. LX (1963), p. 652.
306. Preface, De TAmour, I, xli.
307. Corr, II, 261.
308. H d eP ,U , 37-38.
309. Stendhal et ses commentateurs, p. 350. The same critic writes elsewhere: 'C'est 
que Stendhal est avant tout un psychologue. II s'en tient a cette duality classique 
qui forme la base de l'ancienne philosophic: l'ame et le corps' ('Stendhal et 
Emile Zola', Mercure de France, May 1899, p. 569). It is curious that Melia can 
make such an assertion whilst adjudging Stendhal 'pleinement materialiste' 
(Stendhal et ses commentateurs, p. 265). Cf. Les Idees de Stendhal, pp. 13-14.
310. Corr, I, 839; Italie, 28,1343 n.
311. See Collignon, p. 530; JL, I, 202.
201
312. Italie, 1411 n. See CA, IV, 28: '[...] l'homme est invariablement determine 
dans ses actes par la vue d'un plaisir immediat; [...] un etre humain n'est jamais 
porte a agir que par l'appat d'un plaisir immediat.' For the defence of this 
rationale, see/L, II, 11-12; IE, 178-186; De VAmour, II, 108, 171-172; CA, I, 
303-304.
313. HB, 1,29.
314. . See De VAmour, II, 108, 171-172. See also in this regard CA, I, 303-304; JL,
IE, 178-186. On this view of man as it is expounded by Helvetius, see Smith, 
Helvetius: A Study in Persecution, pp. 14, 115-116; Alciatore, Stendhal et 
Helvetius, pp. 167-170.
315. H deP, 1 ,116. If one compares Helvetius's treatment of the same question (De 
VEsprit, vol. I, disc, n, ch. 2, pp. 71-72), one has a measure of the distance 
which separates the two.
316. La Vie litteraire de Stendhal, p. 170.
317. Op. cit., pp. 191-192, 302.
318. Personnalite, p. 468. P. Arbelet describes Stendhal as 'un curieux et hybride
melange des tendances les plus opposees' (La Jeunesse de Stendhal, vol. I, p.
7). Cf. R. Alter (p. 28), for whom Stendhal is 'an extraordinary compound of 
superrational intellectuality and extravagant emotionalism'. See above all on this 
question the analysis of J.-P. Richard.
319. See the introductory discussion to Chapter n. V. Brombert goes further than 
most in claiming: 'The real masters of this pseudo-ideologue are not Helvetius, 
Condillac, and Destutt de Tracy, but rather Rousseau, Corneille, and Tasso' 
('Stendhal, Analyst or Amorist?', Stendhal: A Collection o f Critical Essays, p. 
164).
320. The question of Stendhal's 'romanticism' is treated at length in Stendhal et le 
romantisme. Actes duXVe Congrds International Stendhalien (Mayence 1982), 
ed. V. del Litto and K. Ringger (Aran: Editions du Grand Chene, 1984).
321. Op. cit., p. 217.
322. See J.-C. Augendre's definition of Stendhal as '"pre-romantique" puisqu'on y 
reconnait l'opposition du "savoir”, de la "science", et du "sentiment"' ('La 
"Filosofia nova" dans l'histoire du materialisme', pp. 262-263).
323. 'The French Romantic Movement1, The French Romantics, vol. I, p. 25. See 
also on this point Bowman, ibid., pp. 77-78.
324. Talbot, La Critique stendhalienne, pp. 91-92. See also on this question Alberes, 
Stendhal et le sentiment religieux, pp. 74-82; Blum, pp. 171-202; Prevost, Les 
Epicuriens frangais, p. 131.
325. Op. cit., p. 40.
326. It is interesting to note that J. Melia, while retailing the classic view of Stendhal 
as 'le disciple convaincu des sensualistes du XVIIIe siecle' (Les Idees de 
Stendhal, p. 295), is among the few critics to show any real awareness of the 
problem that exists in defining the boundaries of Stendhal's materialism. There 
are, as Melia observes, occasions when 'Stendhal se montre moins absolu que 
les philosophes ses maitres. Le corps n'est pas toujours preponderant. Le
202
cerveau se degage, se perfectionne de par lui-meme...' Stendhal indeed goes so 
far at times that 'il semble abandonner le chemin trace par les sensualistes. II fait 
eclater l'importance du cerveau, de la volonte. II est sur les confins ou, plutot 
pour employer un mot qu'il affectionne, il est sur la frontiere du spiritualisme.' 
These remarks take us back to our discussion of Hobbes and of volition as 
Stendhal construes it, and convey something of the difficulty that is encountered 
when seeking in Stendhal the logical corollaries of his ’materialism'. The mind 
for Stendhal — call it head, reason, will — takes on an autonomous aspect that 
has no place in the philosophical materialism which we have been considering. 
Though Melia fails, surprisingly, to see in this any problem for the coherence of
Stendhal's thought — 'Materialiste dans son oeuvre, Stendhal l'est egalement
dans sa vie' (Ibid., p. 291) — the point on which he touches is an important 
one.
327. JL, I, 581 n.
328. Ibid., I, 206. Cf. OI, I, 165.
329. JL, I, 467.
330. Samuel, p. 71.
331. JL, I, 467.
332. Stendhal et le sentiment religieux, p. 81. The remark is made in relation to
Stendhal's reading of Johann Kaspar Lavater. On Stendhal and Lavater, see Del
Litto, La Vie intellectuelle de Stendhal, pp. 124-125, 495; Theodorides, 
Stendhal du cote de la science, p. 115. . *
333. Op. cit., p. 278.
334. 'Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem', The Review o f Metaphysics, vol. 
XVII, no. 1 (1963), p. 49.
335. History, Man, and Reason: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Thought (Baltimore 
and London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 22.
336. Op. cit., pp. 278-279.
337. Op. cit., p. 136.
338. OI, I, 457.
339. Ibid., I, 343.
340. Corr, I, 230-231.
341. OI, I, 344-345.
342. See, for example, JL, II, 77; OI, I, 229.
343. OI, I, 457.
344. See the many references to this definition in JL, 1 ,146,167; n , 385; III, 28-29, 
34-35, 328; Corr, 1 ,108-109, 110; OI, I, 629, 838-839; H de P, I, 183 n. 2; R 
etS , 26, 159; HB, II, 251.
345. See Picavet, p. 490; Prevost, La Creation chez Stendhal, pp. 66-67.
346. See Del Litto, La Vie intellectuelle de Stendhal, p. 152; Chuquet, p. 73.
According to Del Litto, Touvrage [de Hobbes] a ete, sans nul doute, l'une des 
lectures les plus profitables de Stendhal a cette epoque.' G. Saintville (p. 44) 
likewise reserves for Hobbes a place alongside Helvetius, Tracy and 
Vauvenargues as one of Stendhal's 'maitres'.
347. JL, I, 356 n. 2.
348. See, for example, OI, I, 203.
349. Le Naturel chez Stendhal, p. 64.
350. JL, II, 102.
351. Ibid., I, 470.
352. Ibid., H, 206.
353. Ibid., E, 255.
204
CHAPTER V
FROM HOBBES TO CABANIS: THE DISCOVERY OF
PHYSIOLOGY
'Rational Ideology': Destutt de Tracy
The reading of Mirabeau in autumn 1805, Stendhal might have hoped, would reaffirm 
his theory of 'heart' and 'head',1 whilst the recourse to Tracy's Ideologie would 
furnish the means to locate and root out the flaws in his reasoning. Stendhal's first 
encounter with the latter, recorded in a much quoted diary entry and letter to his sister 
Pauline,2 had taken place on the eve of 1 January 1805 when, he tells us, he had been 
prompted to brave the elements and purchase the first volume of Tracy's work, 
VIdeologie proprement dite. The impression had been that of a veil being lifted. As he 
declares in his diary of 7 January 1805, 'je reconnais a mille germes de pensees 
nouvelles les heureux fruits de VIdeologie.'3
Of the nature of these 'felicitous fruits', Stendhal's letter of 1 January 1805 gives 
some indication. Sensation is the primary datum of cognition; an 'idea' is no abstract 
phenomenon, but a resolvable compound of sensations.4 Nothing here, certainly, 
which should not already have been clear to a reader of Hobbes and Condillac. Yet 
Tracy brings home with all the force of a conversion ideas already present, if less 
developed, in works with which Stendhal was by now quite familiar, in  his letter to 
Pauline, he dilates upon the four 'operations' which Tracy defines as sensation, 
memory, judgment and will, and which are all, argues the philosopher, reducible to 
simple sensation.5 Here was a manual, Stendhal was convinced, to guide him through 
the labyrinth of his own thoughts and to elucidate the mental processes which lay 
behind the thoughts of every human being. The art of reasoning could be mastered, he 
declares triumphantly, 'avec neuf livres d'argent et une heure par jour pendant six 
mois.'6
In autumn 1805, however, Stendhal had need of reassurance. As it happened, he 
turned neither to VEsprit de Mirabeau nor to Tracy's Ideologie; but he would soon find 
himself engrossed in the third volume of the Elemens dfideologie, the newly published 
De la Logique, where he would read, to his delight: 'La cause premiere de toute erreur 
est, en definitive, l'imperfection de nos souvenirs.'7 Such unhesitating confidence 
could not but engage a reader in search of definitive answers. To the aspiring 
playwright who held the essence of comedy to lie, as we have seen, in the operations of 
the mind, Tracy's identification of human error with the function of memory seemed to
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offer a new departure.8 'Je me suis procure la Logique de Tracy, ouvrage sublime,' 
writes Stendhal to his sister Pauline on 9 November 1805; 'la cause de nos erreurs est 
dans l'imperfection de nos souvenirs.'9
Sensation, from which all ideas derive, is infallible. Sound reasoning comes of 
perceiving one idea within another and establishing an accurate relationship between 
ideas; error lies in the confusion of ideas through imperfections of memory.10 Though 
it is difficult to gauge with any precision the correlation between Stendhal’s enthusiasm 
and the benefits which he would ultimately derive from this discovery,11 the immediate 
impact of his reading of Tracy is recorded in a second letter of November 1805, in 
which he describes the 'bien heureuse revolution' which his ideas have undergone as a 
result. 'Au bout de toutes mes connaissances,' he writes, 'je voyais un voile qui me 
desesperait. Ce voile etait: peu d'exactitude dans les souvenirs des premiers faits.'12 In 
a note penned in his diary the following month, Stendhal takes to heart Tracy's lesson: 
'Toutes nos erreurs viennent de nos souvenirs. C'est done un immense avantage 
d'avoir une bonne memoire. J'en ai, je crois, une tres bonne...'13
Yet if Tracy's Logique appeared to offer Stendhal some issue from the impasse 
into which his reasoning had led him, it did little to substantiate his view of human 
nature. On the contrary, Tracy cuts the very ground from under Stendhal's definition of 
man by affirming the redundancy of any distinction between mind and heart. There is 
but one 'faculte generate de sentir': any talk of a further division of man into 'heart' and 
'head' is a fallacy.14 The very analysis of memory over which Stendhal so enthuses 
provides a pretext for Tracy to insist upon the essential redundancy of any distinction 
between the cognitive and the emotive in man:
Cette analyse approfondie de nos souvenirs nous montre pourquoi on a cru devoir 
faire deux choses essentiellement differentes de sentir et de penser, de ce qu'on 
appelle Vesprit et le cceur, des impressions que l'on nomme affectives et 
perceptives. C’est l’effet d’un examen superficiel. II n’y a entre ces deux classes 
de perceptions, d'autre difference que celle d'un degre plus ou moins grand 
d'energie et de vivacite; mais c'est toujours sentir.15
There could be no clearer denial of the fundamental principle of Stendhal's Filosofia 
Nova than this statement, in which Tracy says neither more nor less than Hobbes had 
done some hundred and fifty years before him. Yet Stendhal appears to be no more 
alive to the fallacy in his own reasoning here than he had been in his reading of Human 
Nature. It is curious to note that he nowhere records a reaction to Tracy's insistence on 
the single, indivisible faculty of 'feeling', restricting himself instead to evoking the 
'foule d'idees neuves'16 which his reading of the latter's Logique has occasioned.
That such a crucial point should have escaped the notice of this 'disciple reconnu
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de Destutt de Tracy'17 is indeed remarkable. More than that, it makes the whole 
question of Tracy's real influence upon Stendhal subject to caution. It is clear from the 
tenor of the latter's notes and letters that Tracy's value lay less in what he could reveal 
— objectively — about human nature than in what he could teach Stendhal — in 
subjective terms — about himselfI18 Though self-knowledge was closely linked for 
Stendhal to knowledge of man,19 the distinction in this case is a significant one. For 
Stendhal's trammelled ambition to achieve fame as a philosopher-playwright receives 
renewed impetus under the influence of a thinker who offers not a comprehensive 
philosophy of man, but rather the prospect of attaining, through a process of intellectual 
self-discipline, to a comprehensive philosophy of conscious experience.20 'Ideology' 
provides Stendhal with a do-it-yourself course in reasoning, a 'propedeutique positive', 
as Michel Crouzet puts it.21 'Voila la grande utilite pour moi de l'ideologie,' notes 
Stendhal in January 1805; 'elle m'explique a moi-meme, et me montre ainsi ce qu'il 
faut fortifier, ce qu'il faut detruire dans moi-meme.'22 At the end of the same year of 
1805, he will reflect upon the enormous intellectual benefit which he feels he has 
derived from Tracy and which, he observes in a note dated 12 December 1805, has 
coincided with the reawakening of his literary ambitions.23 'Cet homme,' we read in a 
further diary entry from April 1806, 'a eu la plus grande et la plus salutaire influence 
sur moi depuis un an.'24
It has been easy for critics to conclude from such remarks that Stendhal is indebted 
to Tracy for the sum of his philosophy after 1805. All indications are, however, that the 
benefits to be derived from Ideology relate much more to the method than to the 
substance of Stendhal's thought. 'Je sens,' he writes in a letter of 28 December 1805, 
'que les lectures (je suis a la deuxieme) de la Logique de Tracy augmentent 
singulierement la force de ma tete...'25 His powers of reasoning — not, it should be 
noted, the store of his ideas. In this sense, it is important to recognise that Ideology 
was for Stendhal a means to an end, not an end in itself. Tracy may, as Stendhal puts 
it, bring to fruition the science founded by Locke and developed by Condillac;26 but it 
was not here, in Stendhal's estimation, that the greatest discoveries about man's nature 
were to be made. Ideology was an exercise in intellectual hygiene. That was both its 
appeal and its shortcoming for Stendhal. His ambition was to use the method of 
Ideology to pass beyond the achievements of the Ideologues.
This, however, raises questions about the extent to which Stendhal may accurately 
be termed an exponent of Ideology and disciple of Destutt de Tracy. Described by 
Henri Delacroix as 'le plus intellectualiste des ideologues',27 Tracy elaborates a science 
of ideas which one notably unsympathetic contemporary, Louis de Bonald, was moved 
to denounce as an 'etude sterile, [le] travail de la pensee sur elle-meme, qui ne saurait 
‘produire.'28 It is interesting to note that, in principle at least, Stendhal (though for very
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different motives) shares something of Bonald's aversion to excessive rationality. One 
recalls the dismissive tone with which he refers, in the planning of his Filosofia Nova, 
to :1La tete. Tous les metaphysiciens s'en sont occupes (Locke, Condillac, Lancelin, 
etc).'29 More revealingly, in his notes on Hobbes, Stendhal betrays something 
approaching disdain for thinkers who, he suggests, have concentrated their attentions 
on man's rational faculties at the expense of a more compelling object of study:
II me semble que jusqu'au chap. VII, page 64, Hobbes a parle uniquement de la 
tete, il va parler du cceur. On dirait qu'Helvetius, Lancelin, Condillac n'ont jamais 
eu celui-ci qui leur est superieur.30
Stendhal's language here articulates clearly that impatience with clinicians of the 
intellect which is early so evident in his thought. Rationalism — insofar as it seeks to 
rationalise man's behaviour — becomes synonymous with a coldness and sterility, a 
lack of emotional elan, which render the philosopher insensitive to, and therefore 
ignorant of, part of a human nature for which he can provide only a deficient account at 
best.31 In laying the ground for his Filosofia Nova, Stendhal, as we have seen, 
resolves therefore to eschew 'les phrases si froides des philosophes du XVIIIe siecle' 
in favour of an idiom that reflects human experience in its entirety, taking account of 
reason and passion alike.32 The philosophers of the eighteenth century, he declares, 
'ont si peu connu les passions et leur langage qu'ils se sont trahis eux-memes par leurs 
ecrits.'33 Even the most trustworthy thinkers, 'les philosophes les plus constants 
diseurs de verite', as Stendhal puts i t , 'peuvent se tromper quand ils parlent de passions 
violentes.'34
The net effect of such statements was to widen and to deepen still further the trench 
which Stendhal perceived between the two main constituents of human nature, reason 
and passion. It was also to keep the world of intellectual endeavour firmly divided into 
the camps of philosophy and poetry. By sustaining the distinction between 'la science 
des idees' and 'la science des passions', however, Stendhal continues to rend what 
Ideology strove to fuse.35 This is never more explicit than in some lines which he pens 
in 1818 as part of a draft pamphlet on the Italian language:
Le philosophe soumet au feu de reverb&re de l'attention [...] les problemes encore 
obscurs de la formation et de l'expression des idees. Le poete ecoute les sentiments 
de son ame ardente, nounit cette ame par les passions orageuses et etudie dans les 
poetes anciens l'art d'exprimer avec grace les sentiments passionnes qui l'agitent 
ou l'art de peindre les images magnifiques qui se presentent a sa vue.36
The head, it is clear, is still the province of the philosopher; the heart, that of the poet. 
'Est-il possible,' Stendhal concludes by musing, 'qu'arrives a un certain age et deja 
lances dans la carriere et couronnes de lauriers ces deux hommes changent de metier?'
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That he should pose — and leave unanswered — such a question in 1818 is a measure 
of Stendhal's enduring failure to reconcile, in the words of Georges Blin, 'des 
intentionalites non seulement divergentes, mais incompatibles.'37
All of this must be taken into account when considering Stendhal's place in relation 
to the school of Ideology. For, while the tenets of Tracy's philosophy — that reason 
and passion alike are reducible to sensation, and that the 'science of ideas’ itself forms 
but part of a wider science of man in which philosophy and physiology are one38 — 
should have bridged the gulf between sentiment and reason, they serve instead to 
entrench Stendhal still further in his distinction:
On ne saurait comparer des faits qu'apres les avoir connus, dit tres bien Tracy. 
C'est ce qui fait que Tracy lui-meme, avec son excellente maniere de raisonner, ne 
pourrait jamais devenir poete, a moins d'etre tres sensible 39
In this remark, we glimpse something of what Stendhal took to be the limitation of 
Ideology. 'L'homme que l'on voudrait reconstruire avec les quelques leviers simplifies 
qu'il nous laisse ne serait plus qu'une machine a penser, un automate intellectuel,' 
writes Gilbert Chinard of Tracy.40 The point is one that is keenly felt by Stendhal. It is 
for this reason, we submit, that Emmet Kennedy is quite mistaken when he contends 
that 'in one deft stroke Tracy destroyed precisely the distinctions between reason and 
sensibility, mind and heart, which had beset [Stendhal]. He was now eminently 
rational, for to think was no different from to sense.'41 The fact is that Stendhal 
identifies only up to a point with a school of thought which he greatly esteemed but 
aspired to surpass through the study of an object which the Ideologues; and their 
sensationalist forerunners were seen to have neglected.42 The elaborate qualification 
with which he appropriates the label of 'Ideology' in De VAmour is highly significant 
in this regard:
Je demande pardon aux philosophes d'avoir pris le mot ideologie: mon intention 
n'est certainement pas d'usurper un titre qui serait le droit d'un autre. Si l'ideologie 
est une description detaillee des idees et de toutes les parties qui peuvent les 
composer, le present livre est une description detaillee et minutieuse de tous les 
sentiments qui composent la passion nommee Yamour. [...] Je ne connais pas de 
mot pour dire, en grec, discours sur les sentiments, comme ideologie indique 
discours sur les idees.43
This insistence upon the distinction between his own undertaking and that of the 
Ideologues is instructive on two levels. Firstly, by harking back to such a clear divide 
between idees and sentiments, it runs counter to the essentially monistic spirit of the 
philosophy in which Stendhal here seeks nominal legitimation at least for his ideas. 
Secondly, it articulates unequivocally Stendhal's ambition to depart from, to supersede, 
Ideology and to push his inquiry instead into that 'large undiscovered country' which,
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as Peter Gay puts it, the eighteenth century had glimpsed 'behind and beneath 
reason.'44 Here, Ideology was a bankrupt currency according to Stendhal; here, as we 
have seen, lay things 'a jamais invisibles a Condillac et gens de son espece.'45 
Stendhal's desire was not to flush out and reason away intuition and passionate 
impulse, but rather to observe them at close quarters in their natural state. To the 
'Apollonian philosophy' which Robert Adams ascribes to him, 'implying throughout a 
belief in the therapeutic value of sunshine, open air, and rationality,'46 there is a darker 
underside, and one which Stendhal is at pains to preserve from the withering glare of 
the rationalists 47
In the light of the above, Stendhal's perception of Ideology becomes somewhat 
clearer. Intensely concerned with the nature of consciousness Stendhal, as Adams 
rightly argues, was and would remain 48 But his intention from the outset was to 
forsake the path trodden by Tracy and to devote himself instead to exploring the inner 
reaches of the human heart, to seeking not a science of reason, but, in Harry Levin's 
apt expression, 'a rationale of the emotions.'49 It is here that the true goal of Stendhal’s 
enterprise lies from the earliest, from those days when, as Brulard would recall, 'Mon 
grand-pere m'etourdissait sans cesse du grand mot: la connaissance du cceur 
humain.'50 It is here that we find, as Henri Martineau puts it, the 'leitmotiv oblige'51 of 
Stendhal's intellectual world — a leitmotiv which becomes no less evident with time. 
To be an interpreter of the human heart, 'un grand peintre de passions': such is 
Stendhal's ambition as he records it in a notebook entry of 23 February 1803.52 'Je ne 
retiens que ce qui est peintUre du cceur humain. Hors de la, je suis nul,' affirms the 
same Stendhal in August 1811, adding: 'Tout ce qui m'eloigne de la connaissance du 
cceur de l'homme est sans interet pour moi.'53 From these remarks to the Chroniques 
italiennes, the thread — 'J'aime ce qui peint le cceur de l'homme’ — would remain 
unbroken.54
Tracy, though he may lay claim to an important place in the genealogy of 
Stendhal's thought, does little to advance this much sought 'connaissance du cceur 
humain.' M.E.M. Taylor is quite unfounded in her assertion that from Tracy 'Stendhal 
learns the theory and the analysis of the passions.'55 Rousseau, Vauvenargues, 
Lancelin and Helvetius are only some of the influences whom Stendhal had absorbed 
by the time he came to read the analysis of the passions which he would prize so 
highly, for a time, in Hobbes. Tracy's influence, by contrast, begins and ends with the 
intellect. VIdeologie, as Victor del Litto puts it, 'lui offrait non pas un systeme tendant 
a expliquer la nature de l'homme, mais une analyse circonstanciee et exempte de toute 
metaphysique de la formation des idees.'56
Nor can there be any question over the gulf which separates Stendhal's
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philosophical enterprise from that of his mentor in Ideology. When Stendhal sent a 
copy of his 'Ideological' treatise on love to Tracy, the latter is reported to have found it 
quite incomprehensible. His daughter-in-law, Sarah Newton de Tracy, who records the 
event, cites De I’Amour indeed as the reason for a marked cooling in relations between 
the two men:
. M. de Tracy se lia avec M. de Stendahl, qui n'etait autre que l'auteur de Rouge et 
Noir; mais ils se brouillerent bientot a cause du livre de cet ecrivain sur la theorie 
de l'amour, demontree par la cristallisation, qui etait Yideologie de M. de Stendahl. 
M. de Tracy essaya de lire cet ouvrage, n'y comprit rien, et declara a l'auteur que 
c'etait absurde.57
As a letter written by Tracy to Stendhal in September 1822 attests, he quite failed to 
understand the book's most celebrated notion, that of 'crystallisation'.58 'Tracy's 
literal-minded sensationalism and his disdain for metaphor,' writes Emmet Kennedy, 
'did not allow him to appreciate De l'amour.'59 Such, in fact, was the philosopher's 
inability to take the work seriously that he remained convinced Stendhal had written it 
as a spoof. As much is clear from a letter addressed by Victor Jacquemont to Stendhal 
on 22 December 1825. 'Pour M. de Tracy,' writes Jacquemont in reference to De 
I'Amour, 'il n'a jamais cru et ne croit pas encore que vous ayez ecrit ce livre 
serieusement...'60
It is difficult to establish with precision the extent to which Stendhal himself would 
have recognised the grounds for such misgiving. He would, one feels, have defended 
his method as 'Ideological', even if he was himself at pains to draw distinctions in 
terms of the subject matter. The essentially practical value of Tracy had emerged at the 
outset from the cours d'ideologie which Stendhal provided for his sister Pauline in 
letters of 1805.61 From these and other letters of the period it is clear that Stendhal 
perceived Ideology as Kennedy defines it, as 'a science of method applicable to all 
sciences.'62 Beyond its strictly methodological value, however, Ideology had about it a 
whiff of the superfluous, not to say the redundant. Robert Adams is overly dismissive 
perhaps when he asserts: 'Like most rationalist philosophies, it tells us brilliantly what 
we already knew before we started to philosophize and do not particularly need to hear 
again.'63 Yet, as a jibe in Racine et Shakespeare makes clear, Stendhal himself was 
alive to just such a weakness in Ideology's pretension to provide a 'new' science of 
man:
L'ideologie est une science non seulement ennuyeuse, mais meme impertinente. 
C'est comme un homme qui nous arreterait dans la rue, nous proposant de nous 
enseigner a marcher.64
While such a contribution was, for the Stendhal of 1805, a welcome one, it did not 
guarantee any substantially new philosophical departure to compensate for the collapse
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of the Filosofia Nova and the loss of faith in Hobbes. 'En realite,' writes Victor del 
Litto, 'ce qu'il a retire de Tracy se resume en un petit nombre de principes pratiques 
constituant un systeme clair, simple et precis de la science du raisonnement.'65 Robert 
Adams pares the influence down still further, evacuating of much of its substance what 
Stendhal is generally held to have inherited from his preceptor in Ideology. 'For what 
Beyle derived from De Tracy,' argues Adams, 'was essentially an ideal, an attitude, 
and only the mask of a manner or method.'66 Though Stendhal would to the end 
consider himself beholden to Tracy as a foremost intellectual influence,67 he is far from 
being the faithful disciple depicted by so many of his commentators. For all its 
protestations of 'Ideological' rigour, a work such as Stendhal's De VAmour remains 
indefensible on any grounds other than its own. The point is ably demonstrated by 
Gilbert Chinard, who, while recognising the reality of Stendhal's debt to Tracy, rightly 
calls into question its proportions. Confronting the text of De VAmour with the pages 
penned by Tracy under the same title, Chinard concludes that, in relation to the 
Ideologues as a whole, Stendhal 'est beaucoup moins leur disciple qu'il ne le croit et 
qu'il ne voudrait nous le faire croire.'68
'Physiological Ideology': Cabanis
It is in vain, then, that we should look to Destutt de Tracy for any major development in 
Stendhal’s conception of human nature. Tracy built upon and carried to new stages of 
refinement a thinking with which Stendhal had been acquainted since his days as a 
student at the Ecole Centrale in Grenoble* where he had first heard Tracy's 
predecessor, the Abbe de Condillac, vaunted as 'la base de tout.'69 Even at the height 
of his admiration for Tracy's Ideology, Stendhal's notes and letters show that he has 
made no substantive advance in his philosophy since his earlier readings of Condillac, 
Helvetius and Hobbes. Man remained still a compound of abstract qualities (desire, 
will, judgment, memory), a disembodied object of rational inquiry. 'So abstract is most 
of Tracy's "ideology",' writes Emmet Kennedy, 'so little sinew and muscle is there, 
that it is difficult to call it materialist.'70 The role of bringing a new dimension to 
Stendhal's understanding of man was to fall not to Tracy but to the thinker who is the 
real object of our interest in this chapter, Tracy's friend and ieUovz-ideologue, 
Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis. For it was the passage from the 'ideologie rationnelle' of 
Tracy to the 'ideologie physiologique' of Cabanis71 that was finally to bring about a 
serious development in Stendhal's thinking and, as he himself would later recognise, 
provide a whole new foundation upon which to rest the study of man.72
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It is with the reading of Cabanis, first in 1805, then, much more notably, in 1811, 
that Stendhal's conception of human nature enters a new and decisive phase. Decisive 
in the sense that Cabanis furnishes him with a philosophy of man to which he will 
relate much more readily than to the abstract conception he had found in other thinkers. 
In his earliest considerations on man, Stendhal's thinking is in large part a throwback to 
seventeenth and eighteenth-century rationalism; for it is predicated, as we have seen, 
upon a view of passion and reason as concepts which have no discernible root in a 
physical reality. There is truth in Robert Adams's claim that, as the exponent of an 
outmoded eighteenth-century philosophy, Stendhal 'was a philosophical anachronism 
almost before he started to think.’73 Like many truths about Stendhal, however, it is 
open to substantial qualification. For, with the reading of Cabanis, Stendhal takes a 
leap into the nineteenth century.74 To the metaphysical and rational analyses of 
Hobbes, Helvetius and Tracy, Cabanis brings a whole new physiological dimension; to 
the 'animated statue' of Condillac, of the 'man-machine' of the mechanistic 
philosophers, he gives a new depth, richness and vitality.75 'L'homme metaphysique' 
was being replaced by 'l'homme physiologique' long before Zola suggested as much in 
1880.76 Under the influence of Cabanis, Stendhal would come to believe that the 
science of physiology, though in its infancy, was the repository of hope for man's 
future knowledge about himself. The Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme — 
curiously — did not endear Cabanis to Stendhal from the outset; but the work would, 
through time, become one of the surest pillars of his philosophical world, an 'immortal' 
achievement inspiring in him all the fervour — or 'veneration',77 as he would put it— 
of a convert and prompting him, in 1829, to define himself as 'un philosophe de 1'ecole 
de Cabanis.'78
The importance of Cabanis has proved something of a 'blind spot' in Stendhal 
scholarship. Georges Blin's regrettably unrealised promise of a study on the question79 
has left a lacuna which remains yet to be filled. Henri Delacroix, Francine Marill 
Alberes, Jean Theodorides and Michel Crouzet have in turn devoted consideration to 
the influence of Cabanis upon Stendhal's thought, but their aggregate research falls 
short of an etude d‘’ensemble?0 Victor del Litto, by contrast, in La Vie intellectuelle de 
Stendhal, plays down the importance of this influence, asserting that other thinkers 
predate Cabanis in introducing Stendhal to the notion of temperament, and that it is 
Philippe Pinel 'qui va lui reveler l'interet de la physiologic, et non pas, comme on aurait 
pu le eroire, Cabanis.'81 Referring the reader to Paul Arbelet's I'Histoire de la peinture 
en Italie et les plagiats de Stendhal, Del Litto does not seek to account for the substantial 
debt which Stendhal owes in his writings to Cabanis.82 More surprisingly still, neither 
does Arbelet. For the latter is concerned only to signal a number of the more obvious
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borrowings, without considering what these contribute qualitatively to I'Histoire de la 
peinture en Italie, or what motivates Stendhal in his recourse to Cabanis.83
Among other scholars, the importance of Cabanis, where it has not been denied 
outright, has been seriously neglected. 'L'influence propre de Cabanis sur Stendhal 
n'est qu'apparente,' declares Claude Liprandi.84 In similar vein, Rene Girard reduces 
what Stendhal derived from'Cabanis, on the theory of the temperaments notably, to the 
exiguity of 'quelques emprunts sans lendemain.'85 This lack of recognition for Cabanis 
has proved commonplace among scholars who devote consideration to Stendhal's 
philosophical development. Henri Martineau omits the name of the physiologist 
altogether from the roll-call of Stendhal's maitres d penser, a list which includes 
Helvetius, Hobbes, Tracy, Vauvenargues, Chamfort, Mirabeau, Maine de Biran, and, 
in a lesser capacity, Dugald Stewart, Brissot de Warville and Lancelin.86 G. Saintville, 
too, excludes Cabanis from the ranks of Stendhal's mentors, restricting the latter to 
Helvetius, Hobbes, Tracy and Vauvenargues.87 Margaret Tillett, in her Stendhal: The 
Background to the Novels, examines works such as THistoire de la peinture en Italie, 
De VAmour and Rome, Naples et Florence, but nowhere mentions the name of 
Cabanis. In his Stendhal: The Education of a Novelist, Geoffrey Strickland likewise 
makes nothing of the influence of Cabanis, while devoting considerable thought to 
Helvetius and Tracy. Strickland makes two passing references only to Cabanis, neither 
of which gives any insight into the importance which Stendhal accorded to this 
medecin-ideologue, or the role played by Cabanis in the 'education' which this study 
undertakes to explore.88
. Such has been the curious fate of Cabanis at the hands of Stendhal's critics. Yet 
the fact is that, between 1805 and 1815, Stendhal had recourse on as many as five or 
six occasions89 to a reading — however partial or selective90 — of the Rapports du 
physique et du moral de l'homme, hailing its author as a great physiologist and a 
founder of French philosophy.91 To no thinker does Stendhal owe a more substantial 
philosophical debt, we submit, and to none will that debt be more enduring. It is our 
purpose in the pages that follow to consider in some detail the nature of Cabanis's 
influence upon Stendhal and to determine something of the place occupied by this 
neglected mentor in the evolution of his thought.
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Man as Organism: Instinct, Temperament and the Body Corporeal
i. Instinct
Towards the end of August 1804, Stendhal, preoccupied as ever by the question of the 
passions, consigns to his journal’ a note in which he reflects upon man in a state of 
nature. In so doing, he touches upon a question which clearly troubles him. What does 
one mean, he asks, by a 'state of nature'?
Ou trouver cet etat de nature'? Je ne l’ai jamais vu. Qu'est-ce que c'est? Entend-on 
Adam et Eve transports adultes l'un et l'autre au milieu du jardin d'Eden? Qui leur 
donna l’idee de porter les fruits a la bouche quand ils eurent faim? Cette idee 
est-elle inneel92
Stendhal's own emphasis here indicates his awareness of the implications of his 
question, for he was only too conscious of the pointed rejection of innate ideas by 
Locke, Condillac and the sensationalist school to which he subscribed. In posing such 
a question, however, he clearly recognises the need to account for natural desires and 
impulses which do not appear attributable, in their origin, to experience. For the 
moment, Stendhal pursues his thought no further. Some months later, however, in 
January 1805, he enters the following note in his diary on the same date under which 
he records for the first time his reading of Cabanis:93
Je vois dans Cabanis que nous agissons souvent pour satisfaire a des besoins qui . 
viennent d'apres des idees qui viennent de l'interieur du corps au cerveau. La 
reunion des desirs qui nous viennent de cette maniere se nomme instinct. Condillac 
a entierement ineconnu l'instinct: deux oiseaux enleves de leur nid patemel au 
moment ou ils viennent d'eclore et eleves a la brochette n'ont certainement aucune 
idee de nid, d'oeufs et d'accouchement; cependant, dans la saison des amours, 
quinze jours ou plus avant que la femelle ponde, ils constituent un nid.94
This is a highly significant passage. For what we find here is the first clear 
recognition by Stendhal that the body exercises its own empire over the mind. In all of 
his previous lucubrations on passion and reason, the body had been in attendance only, 
the valet of 'head' and 'heart' in turn. Now the suggestion of unconscious needs and 
instincts which have a distincdy corporal source brings a new dimension to the question 
of human motivation. There are, as Cabanis argues, certain 'determinations [qui] ne 
sauraient etre rapportees a aucune sorte de raisonnement, et [qui], sans cesser pour cela 
d'avoir leur source dans la sensibilite physique, [...] se forment le plus sbuvent sans 
que la volonte des individus y puisse avoir d'autre part que d'en mieux diriger 
l'execution.'95 These unreasoned 'determinations' Cabanis designates as 'instinct', 
before going on to cite examples from the behaviour of birds and animals in order to 
sustain his premise.96
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Stendhal does not at once seize the full import of the above as a corrective to the 
exclusive environmentalism of Helvetius.97 As his reference to Condillac makes clear, 
however, he does not fail to recognise that Cabanis is taking issue here with the whole 
’sensationalist tradition that held the mind to be a tabula rasa upon which the experience 
of the world alone left its imprint.98 'Au moment de la naissance,' argues Cabanis, 'le 
centre cerebral a done regu et combine deja beaucoup d'impressions: il n'est point table 
rase, si l’on donne au sens de ce mot toute son etendue.'99 This recognition of an 
animal impulse which owes nothing to experience resolves at a stroke for Stendhal ('Je 
vois dans Cabanis1; 'Condillac a entierement meconnu l'instinct') a question for which 
he has failed hitherto to find any plausible explanation. 'Je me souviens,' he reflects, 
'que je demandais a tout le monde pourquoi les petits cochons cherchent le mamelon de 
leur mere. On ne me repondait pas.'100
It was in its application to man, however, that the notion of instinct, which we find 
dawning in Stendhal’s diary of 24 January 1805, was to have its most far-reaching 
implications.101 If he could not be sure of the limits of instinct, Stendhal, as his later 
writings attest, would be in no doubt as to its importance. A passing reference to 
instinct in De VAmour will prompt him to add in a footnote: 'Grande question. II me 
semble qu'outre l'education qui commence a huit ou dix mois, il y a un peu 
d'instinct.'102 The vagueness of Stendhal's language here should not obscure the 
importance of this remark as a corrective to the idea that environmental influences alone 
accounted, at source, for human character and conduct. The point is made with much 
more conviction in a contribution to the British press in 1822, where Stendhal 
recognises the shortcoming of Helvetius in this important respect. 'II est sur,' he 
declares, 'que les philosophes modernes les plus estimes, et Helvetius a leur tete, n'ont 
pas connu l'un des plus grands motifs des actions de l'homme: \'instinct.'103*
ii. The Body as Differential
Such is the first of Stendhal's debts to a philosopher for whom he registers a curious 
antipathy at the outset. Cabanis's cardinal failing lies, according to Stendhal, in his 
method of argument. 'La maniere d'enoncer les faits,' he notes, 'me semble si generate 
qu'elle en est vague. Cet auteur ne me plait point, lire Bacon et Hobbes.'104 To 
conclude from this, however, that Stendhal took nothing more from his first reading of 
Cabanis is to miss a very important point. 'II n'attache pas beaucoup d'importance aux 
theories de Cabanis,' affirms Victor del Litto,105 noting his surprise that Stendhal
216
should have failed to set any store by Cabanis's chapter on the temperaments in 
particular. To argue as much, however, is to take no account of an entry which 
Stendhal makes in his journal on 7 February 1805, some two weeks after his reading of 
Cabanis, in which he adds a fundamental corrective to his conception of the passions:
Les hommes ont des passions differentes. L'amour senti par Crozet n'est point le 
meme amour senti par Beyle. C'est tout simple: ils ne peuvent etre charmes par les 
memes objets, puisque ces objets leur font des impressions differentes et qu'ils 
mettent leur bonheur dans des etats differents et de l'ame et du corps, ou, pour 
mieux dire, du dernier seul, corps etant pris dans le sens de Cabanis.106
Before considering the significance of these remarks for Stendhal, it is worth citing 
here what Cabanis, in the ’Premier Memoire' of his work (which we know Stendhal to 
have read when he penned the above passage),107 has to say on this question of 
sense-impressions as they affect different individuals:
Certainement les hommes ne se ressemblent point par la maniere de sentir: l'age, le 
sexe, le temperament, les maladies, mettent entre eux de notables differences; et 
dans le meme homme, les diverses impressions ont, suivant leur nature et suivant 
beaucoup d’autres circonstances accessoires, un degre tres-inegal de force, ou de 
vivacite. Cela pose, l'on voit [...] que de ces impressions, si peu semblables chez 
les divers individus, doivent resulter des toumures tres-diverses d'esprit et d'ame; 
et que de l'association, ou de la comparaison chez le meme homme d’impressions 
inegales dans les diverses circonstances, doivent resulter egalement des idees, des 
raisonnements, des determinations tres-variables, qui ne permettent pas de leur 
assigner de type fixe ou constant, et surtout de type commun a tout le genre 
humain.108
Having thus recognised the important differences which separate men in their 
experience of sense-impressions, Cabanis goes on, in the 'Troisieme Memoire’, to 
attribute this to their physical organisation:
Tout nous porte done a croire que la difference des impressions tient a la structure 
differente non des nerfs, mais des organes dans lesquels ils sentent; a la maniere 
dont leurs extremites y sont epanouies; a celle dont les causes des impressions 
agissent sur leurs epanouissements.109
If we return now to the specific terms of Stendhal's note of 7 February 1805, its 
full significance becomes clear. For it constitutes a serious revision by Stendhal of his 
understanding of the nature and workings of passion. Tai cru pendant un temps,' he 
adds in the same notebook entry, 'que les passions ne differaient qu'en intensite, 
qu'elles etaient comme la temperature. Crozet, par exemple, marque 2 degres de 
chaleur, Beyle 1V2.'110
JButtressed by the influence of Helvetius, this latter notion — that the difference 
between men's passions was one of degree rather than of kind — is prevalent in 
Stendhal's early considerations on the question. 'L'homme,' he had written in August
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1803, 'dans quelque etat qu'il soit renferme en lui le germe de toutes les passions.'111 
Nor were there limits to what such passions, once aroused, might achieve. 'Les 
grandes passions viennent a bout de tout,' writes Stendhal to his sister Pauline in a 
letter of 29 January 1803.112 Nothing, as we suggested in an earlier chapter, could 
have been more reassuring to this aspiring poite-philosophe than the belief that the 
strength and constancy of his ambition might alone suffice to awaken the genius latent 
in all men. It is a notion which he proposes as a 'verite generale' in a subsequent letter 
to his sister, urging her to recognise 'Que l'education seule fait les grands hommes; par 
consequent, qu'on n’a qu'a le vouloir pour devenir grand genie.'113
These remarks have about them the unmistakeable ring of Helvetius,114 whose 
central tenet was that men, in their common humanity, shared a uniform organism and a 
uniform capacity for passion and reason alike. [Les] memes objets font a peu pres les 
memes impressions sur tous les hommes,' insisted the author of De I'Homme, who 
concluded that men must, as a result, perceive 'toujours les memes rapports entre les 
memes objets.'115 This standardisation of the human mind — what H.B. Acton terms 
'the epistemology of egalitarianism'116 — was central to Helvetius's social philosophy. 
By a judicious stimulation of desirable passions, he argued, men could be guided in 
concert towards virtue and away from vice.117 The role of the legislator and of the 
educator was to actualise and turn to the common weal the inborn and uniform potential 
of men to experience, in a comparable — ergo predictable — fashion, the whole range 
of passions to which human nature is susceptible.118 Such a view of man leaves no 
room for disparities in the natural inclinations and potential talents of 'normally 
constituted' individuals, of what Helvetius terms 'les hommes bien conformes, doues 
de tous leurs sens.'119 Omnia possunt omnes was the notion upon which rested the 
thoroughgoing environmentalism of a thinker whose whole philosophy can be reduced 
to the simple but radical axiom:'L’education pent tout.'120
Though Stendhal may not have grasped at once their full implications, he is aware 
that the observations inspired by Cabanis mark a significant departure from his 
previously held conviction. For they introduce a whole new relativistic dimension into 
his conception of man. While his early reservations about Cabanis did attenuate his 
enthusiasm, there is no doubt that Stendhal found in the Rapports du physique et du 
moral de I’homme ample cause for reflection, for he cites the work in a diary entry of 4 
March 1806 as one among 'plusieurs ouvrages utiles que j'aurai lus cette annee', and 
he recommends it, on a number of occasions, to his sister Pauline.121
What Cabanis was, in essence, obliging Stendhal to do — though it would be 
some time before the problem would fully crystallise in these terms — was to re-pose
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the question of 'human nature' itself. Does the latter signify some universal fund of 
characteristics and potential (as Helvetius claimed), or is it merely a generic notion 
employed to denote the whole range of varying dispositions, inclinations and needs 
which the individual undergoes as a result of his particular constitution (as Cabanis 
held)?122 At what point did the uniformity of the species give way to the diversity and 
individuality of the organism?123 Stendhal had, in fact, prefigured just such a question 
when casting around for a guide to dramatic plot in summer 1804:
Voici un moyen de faire les plans de mes poemes, relativement aux actions que je 
fais faire aux personnages. C'est de bien m'assurer par des anecdotes certaines du 
point au-dela duquel l'education et les qualites que l'homme apporte en naissant ne 
peuvent pas le porter. De maniere que je puisse dire de toutes les actions qui 
passeront cette limite: elles sont hors de la nature.124
That Stendhal should, as early as August 1804, have been ascribing some role to 
innate qualities raises the question of his acquaintance with Cabanis's principal theories 
prior to his reading of the Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme in January 
1805. He certainly knew of the work in summer 1804; and he seems to have had a clear 
idea of what was to be found there, for he regarded it as preparatory reading both for 
his Filosofia Nova and for his projected comedy, Les Medecins.125 Whatever the 
precise inspiration for the above remark, it anticipates an important development in 
Stendhal's view of human nature. The fact that he posits some 'point', however 
ill-determined, beyond which education relinquishes its power to prevail over human 
conduct marks a notable departure from the limitless potential which he had previously 
assigned to the educative process as envisaged by Helvetius. 'A l'exception du omnia 
possunt omnes de Helvetius,' he would write to Adolphe de Mareste in 1818, 'tout y 
est divin.'126 Everyone is not, then, capable of everything: capacities are not 
interchangeable from one human being to the next, but are determined — and restricted 
— by the range of factors that define us as individuals. Again in Racine et Shakespeare 
Stendhal would return to refute this central point of Helvetius's theory. We perceive the 
world not according to any fixed and immutable standard, he argues, but from our own 
very singular point of view:
Avouez done bonnement [...] que non omnia possumus omnes; que, quelque bons 
yeux que nous ayons, nous ne pouvons pas voir a la fois les deux cotes d'une 
orange.127
What led Stendhal to recant his faith in the boundless educability of the human 
being is nowhere explicitly acknowledged in his writings. It is clear, however, that the 
assumption of a universal human nature, constituting a reservoir of like potential shared 
by all, is seriously undermined by the notion that the differences between men arise not 
only from the intensity with which they respond to sense-impressions, but from the 
very nature of those sense-impressions as they are experienced from one individual to
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the next. For if passion lies — as Helvetius held — at the root of all human motivation 
and achievement, and if the same passion differs — as Stendhal now recognises — 
from one individual to the next, then this pointed surely to ineradicable differences 
between men which called the whole basis of Helvetius’s social philosophy into 
question.
In the light of the above, Stendhal's notebook entry of 7 February 1805 provides a 
glimpse of two notions that were to become central to his philosophy of man. The first 
of these is implicit in the reference to corps as a term denoting both body and 'soul'. By 
recognising the preponderant role of physiology in the determination of human 
sentiment, Stendhal was to bring an important new dimension to his conception of 
man. If one's moral characteristics are indissociable from, indeed reducible to, one's 
organic constitution, if the passions by which one is motivated have a physical seat, 
then the notions of 'heart' and 'head' which had formed the basis of the Filosofia Nova 
become subject to serious revision. Though he would continue to have recourse to a 
metaphysical model predicated on the relationship between 'heart' and 'head', Stendhal 
would defer increasingly hereafter to a more physiologically-inspired conception of 
man.128
The second notable development that is heralded by the passage in question lies, as 
we have argued, in the new relativism which comes to characterise Stendhal’s view of 
human nature. For if men experience the same passions in different ways, if they are 
not so many automata responding in like fashion to like stimuli, then the problem of 
establishing any uniform measure by which to gauge their character and conduct 
becomes infinitely more complex. This realisation had begun to dawn on Stendhal with 
his reading of Tracy's Ideologic some weeks before he records his first reactions to 
Cabanis. In a notebook entry dated 4 January 1805, he reflects on the fact that no 
'thermometer' can accurately measure passion from one individual to the next:
Les passions sont divergentes, chacune fait sa route; si elles se rencontrent, c'est
par hasard. Cela vient de ce que chacun a ses idees a lui de tout ce qui est tombe
sous ses sens.129
This quasi-solipsistic conclusion finds reinforcement in the note which we have been 
discussing, with its reference to Cabanis and its evocation of the unbridgeable 
difference — both in degree and in kind — between the passions of Beyle himself and 
those of Crozet. Though the relativistic attitude that results from this conclusion would, 
in the longer term, offer Stendhal some means of accounting for extraordinary qualities 
in men, and for the very real differences that exist between them in terms of their 
potential.and achievement, it placed, in the short term at least, a serious obstacle in his 
path. For it deprived him of what he most required as a student of human nature.
220
'Quelle doit etre pour moi l'unite, le point de comparaison de ces passions?' he asks:
Est-ce leur force dans l'individu? Comment la mesurer? Par la quantite de vie qu'il 
sacrifierait pour arriver a la jouissance. Mais cette mesure est incomplete; il 
faudrait, pour qu'elle satisfit a la condition, que tous les hommes aimassent 
egalement la vie.
Dans une ame faible, ce serait une grande preuve d'amour que de traverser la 
Vendee en l'an VI, a cheval, seul avec un domestique, pour aller voir sa maitresse. 
La preuve d'amour sera bien moins grande dans une ame ferme.130
Stendhal's logic here is as inescapable as his vexation is evident. For he had, on 
more than one previous occasion, argued the necessity of establishing some common 
standard against which the range and intensity of passions could be measured.131 'Pour 
mesurer le degre d'intensite des passions,' he had written during his reading of Hobbes 
in June 1804, 'trouver un terme commun de compa[raison], une unite, c'est la le 
premier travail. h[enri].'132 It becomes clear now, however, with the reading of 
Cabanis, that such a 'terme commun' or 'unite' might not be so easily formulated, that 
the method of reasoning of which it is a function might itself be seriously defective.133 
Hence the short but illuminating commentary by which'Stendhal qualifies his note of 7 
February 1805, on transcribing it into his diary over a year later:
Tout cela n'est point encore creuse, l'approfondir. Je corrige infiniment cette note, 
je la denature, je vois bien mieux les objets sur lesquels elle porte qu'il y a un an, 
mais je suis loin d'etre content.134
iii. Temperament: Early Adumbrations
Far from happy Stendhal may have been; but the questions he had raised were to be of 
lasting consequence. His early reflections on Cabanis constitute the thin end of a wedge 
which, on the question of instinct and the differential role of physiology in the 
determination of character and conduct, would prise Stendhal increasingly away from 
the unmitigated environmentalism of his original mentor, Helvetius, and force him to 
accommodate a number of new and important considerations within his conception of 
man. In the Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme, it is the distinguishing 
features of character, not the common denominators, which come into their own. By 
embracing human beings in all their diversity, Cabanis would offer Stendhal some 
means of accounting not just for Man as a generic concept, but for the artist, the hero, 
the criminal — the Individual, in a word, made flesh. Physiology would provide him 
also —- and not least — with a means of understanding, or attempting to understand, 
himself.
221
As early as 3 February 1805, indeed, barely a week after his first recorded reading 
of Cabanis, Stendhal's diary bears the imprint of the physiologist, as he recognises in 
himself 'une grande ame melancolique' which, he laments, only his friend, 'le 
philosophe Mante', can appreciate.135 In a subsequent letter to his sister Pauline, the 
description of his mistress Melanie Guilbert gives rise to the same romanticised 
portrayal of the melancholy temperament. 'Elle est comme toi,' he writes, 'et comme 
tout ce qui est trop parfait pour cette terre, gatee par la melancolie.'136 As Francine 
Marill Alberes observes, 'Stendhal se veut melancolique.'137 His 'bestowal' of a 
melancholy temperament upon himself, his mistress and his sister has about it a ring 
more suggestive of Rousseau than of medical philosophy. It is for that reason, 
however, significant to note that Cabanis, for all the clinical nature of his undertaking, 
does much to sanction the romanticised notion of the melancholic of which Stendhal 
gives evidence in the instances cited above. The physiologist, it can be argued, lends a 
whole new legitimacy to the 'caractere melancolique' of which Stendhal had early 
sought to 'cure' himself through his process of so-called 'derousseauisation'.138 'Leur 
physionomie est triste, leur visage pale, leurs yeux enfonces et pleins d'un feu 
sombre,' writes Cabanis of the melancholic. He goes on:
Ils fuient les hommes, dont la presence agit sur eux d'une maniere incommode: ils 
cherchent la solitude qui les soulage de ces impressions penibles. Cependant, leur 
physionomie porte l'empreinte d'une sensibilite qui interesse, et leurs manieres ont 
un certain charme auquel peut-etre je ne sais quel commencement de compassion 
donne encore plus d'empire.139
It is tempting to seek here some legitimation of the misanthropy which proximity to 
his fellow men could prove so apt at inspiring in Stendhal. The coincidence between his 
reading of Cabanis and his renewed appreciation of the melancholy temperament 
certainly suggests that he took to heart something of the sympathetic portrait presented 
by Cabanis. Though Stendhal's journal does not elaborate upon his debt to the 
physiologist at this juncture, the discovery of Tracy's Logique, with all its praise of 
Cabanis, appears to have prompted him to reopen the Rapports du physique et du moral 
de l'homme towards the end of 1805. While the evidence of this second reading among 
Stendhal's notes is slight,140 he does nonetheless cite Cabanis early in 1806 among 
those thinkers whom he considers adept in Tart de conduire son esprit a la verite,' and 
who will help him, as he puts it, to 'perfect' his reasoning.141
A number of letters to Pauline Beyle which date from the same period suggest, 
however, that Stendhal had absorbed rather more from this early excursion into 
physiology than his notebooks reveal. Tetais comme toi, ma bonne amie,' he writes 
on 23 December 1805, 'les circonstances et le temperament nous ont donne a peu pres
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la meme ame.'142 In a subsequent letter, dated 28 December, he echoes this point, 
enjoining his sister to 'cultiver cette sensibilite profonde et delicate a la fois que les 
circonstances et ton temperament t'ont donnee.'143 This is followed, in the same letter, 
by the recommendation that she take steps to procure Cabanis.144
The same notion is prevalent in a letter which Stendhal addresses to his sister on 
22 March 1806, in which he recounts how he is overcoming his aversion for history. 
'J'entre dans ces details,' he explains, 'parce qu'il est possible que les memes maitres 
agissant sur un temperament et un caractere analogue, t’aient donne le meme 
eloignement pour cette base de toute connaissance de l'homme.'145 Reason, Stendhal is 
clearly arguing here, goes to work not on a 'blank slate’, but on an already existent raw 
material. Yet again, several letters later, we find him urging his sister to procure a copy 
of Cabanis.146
Some weeks before penning the above, Stendhal had insisted to the same Pauline 
that, on days when she found herself beset by 'I'ennui', she should 'avoir l'attention de 
peu manger.' He explains: 'avec ton temperament et le mien, I'ennui vient souvent d'un 
mal a la tete sourd, et ce mal a la tete d'un embarras dans l'estomac.'147 The whole 
tenor of this remark, the reference to temperament, the close association between the 
moral and physical states, the causal chain from 'embarras dans l’estomac' through 
'mal a la tete’ to 'ennui', is strongly suggestive of Cabanis, whose reflections on the 
'moral' effects of diet and regimen are developed in the ’Huitieme Memoire' of the 
Rapports: 'De Vinfluence du regime sur les dispositions et sur les habitudes 
morales.'14* In a subsequent letter, Stendhal lists a number o f 'habitudes' which he is 
endeavouring to adopt. Among these, he specifies: 'Habitude de la sobriete. Etudier les 
aliments qui nous font du bien et en prendre l'habitude.'149 Though there is some 
disagreement among critics over the inspiration of this remark,150 it attests clearly to the 
store which Stendhal was coming to set by the role of the body, and of attendant 
regiminal factors, within the human economy.
iv. From the Physical to the Moral: 7 festomac gouverne la cervelle*
On 29 March 1805, Stendhal consigns to his diary the following note: 'J’ai du feu dans 
les veines. II faut que je prenne un regime rafraichissant.’151 It is not clear whether, in 
his earliest reading of the Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme, he had turned 
to the 'Huitieme Memoire.' If he did, however, he would have seen that no aspect of
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daily regimen was insignificant for the physiologist: 'Ainsi done le regime, e'est-a-dire 
l'usage joumalier de l'air, des aliments, des boissons, de la veille, du sommeil et des 
divers travaux exerce une influence tres-etendue sur les idees, sur les passions, sur les 
habitudes, en un mot, sur l'etat moral.'152 Even a cup of coffee, Cabanis held, could 
alter the moral state; coffee was, as he put it, 'une boisson intellectuelle', capable of 
sharpening sensibility and of rendering 'les idees plus actives et plus nettes.'153
Whether the two are directly related or not, this evocation of the stimulant 
properties of coffee resonates with a remark which Stendhal makes in a letter of 27 
November 1805, when he urges his sister Pauline: 'Prends du cafe une fois et lis 
YIdeologie,'154 Whilst working as a commercial clerk in Marseille, Stendhal in fact 
adopted as part of his routine the consumption of a daily measure of coffee. Towards 
the end of his spell in Marseille, we find him deliberating in his diary upon the 'moral' 
effects of this calculated habit 'II y a un mois que je prends chaque jour une demi-tasse 
de cafe,' he records on 17 May 1806, 'je n'en ai point pris aujourd'hui et suis 
infiniment plus gai, plus au niveau des hommes. II semble que le cafe donne le genie et 
la tristesse.'155 Much later, in 1818, we will find Stendhal invoking once more the 
logic underlying these remarks. Reflecting upon the difficulty of establishing any 
permanent and unerring perspective within which to apprehend reality, he writes among 
his notes for a second edition of Rome, Naples et Florence:
Comment juger de la vraie couleur des objets a travers une lunette dont les verres 
changent de couleur suivant le temps qu'il fait ou le nombre de tasses de cafe que 
vous avez prises?156
In these brief lines, Stendhal raises a time-honoured philosophical question about 
'reality' and the perception thereof.157 When one considers the notion of 'reason' that 
is implied here — a reason that is subordinate to the contingent factors of climate and 
diet —, one appreciates something of the distance which Stendhal has come since his 
earliest definitions of this faculty. For it is clear from the above that le cerveau is more 
now than just 'le centre des idees', as he had defined it in 1803.158 It is an organ 
dependent upon the range of influences to which the body as a whole is subject. In a 
text penned in 1838, which may have been destined for inclusion in the Memoires d'un 
touriste, Stendhal will recount the tale of a certain Lisimon, who has cured himself of a 
misanthropic and suicidal tendency and who describes his 'premier pas vers la 
guerison' — the adoption of a healthy regimen — in the following terms:
Dans mon malheur, je me souvins de mon ancien et respectable ami, l'illustre 
Cabanis; j'attaquai le physique pour venir a bout du moral; oserai-je vous dire que, 
depuis douze ans, je ne me suis pas permis d'autre viande que celle du poulet...159
Reason, it is clear, is a fragile faculty, one element only in a complex — and
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variable — human equation. This emerges clearly from an arresting entry which we 
find in Stendhal's diary as early as 30 December 1805:
Je dois etre sobre si je veux conserver l'usage de mon esprit: le moindre 
derangement d'estomac influe sur ma tete, m'y donne mal, ou m'empeche de voir 
nettement mes idees par un trouble d'un autre genre. La chicoree amere me rendant 
l'usage de mon esprit et ce libre usage etant une des choses que je desire le plus, 
elle me rend gai.160
This conception of the organism as a filter colouring reason, serving now as support, 
now as hindrance to the intellect, had far-reaching implications. The 'mind' could not 
be divorced from the body and its operations.161This example, like others which we 
have cited, calls into question the suggestion that Stendhal was awakened to the 
importance of physiology by his reading of Pinel and not of Cabanis.162 Stendhal 
would not come to read Pinel until late January 1806,163 by which time he was clearly 
aware of the significance of physiological factors and of their close relationship with the 
moral state. The same echo of physiology, and of Cabanis notably, will continue to 
ring out from the correspondence which Stendhal despatches from his administrative 
posts with the French War Office in Brunswick and Vienna. Thus, in a letter written to 
Pauline Beyle in June 1807, he expresses his fears that the woman he has been 
courting, Wilhelmine von Griesheim, is dispensing her favours elsewhere. 'Enfin 
hier,' he writes, 'la rage dans le coeur je me suis souvenu de l'influence du physique 
sur le moral, j ’ai pris beaucoup de the et j'ai retrouve un peu de ma raison.'164
A clearer echo still of the ideas expounded by Cabanis is to be found in a letter 
written from Vienna in July 1809. 'Je suis encore malade de la fievre,' Stendhal 
informs his sister; 'on me fait esperer que six jours de calmants me remettront a flot; 
mais le moral a la fievre, le medecin n'en sait rien et s’etonne du peu d'effet de ses 
drogues.'165 These remarks, evoking as they do the absence of any real differentiation 
between the physical and moral states, lead Stendhal to make an altogether more 
substantive point:
la sante est le premier des biens; il faut prendre une consultation chez tous les 
grands medecins. Tu finiras par connaitre ton temperament; ne point faire de 
remedes et changer le mauvais equilibre des humeurs uniquement par la diversite 
de la nourriture et de la diete generale; voila de la science, je crois; mais 
souviens-toi que la mere des emotions douces et par consequent du bonheur, c'est 
une bonne sante.166
Much has been made by certain critics of Stendhal's valetudinarian tendencies.167 The 
significance of a remark such as the above, however, carries beyond a narrow 
preoccupation with personal health and permits of a more broadly philosophical 
interpretation. Happiness itself is invested here with a physiological dimension; indeed, 
to judge by Stendhal's language — 'le premier des biens', 'la mere [...] du bonheur'
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— corporal well-being becomes a pre-requisite of the 'moral' state of happiness. While 
this can be read, on one level, as good common sense, it contributes once more to an 
obscuring of the distinctions between the physical and the moral realms, recalling 
Cabanis's contention that 'le bonheur moral’ resides in 'le bien-etre physique1: both are 
but 'ce meme bien-etre, considere sous un autre point de vue et dans d'autres 
rapports.'168 When, in a letter written some weeks later, Stendhal recounts how 'l'air 
du mois de septembre me donne toujours le bonheur, sans avoir aucun sujet de 
contentement de plus ou de moins qu'a l’ordinaire,'169 he conveys something of this 
notion. In a diary entry of 19 December 1815, however, he will go much further, 
attempting to localise the experience in question, to assign the sensation of happiness to 
a particular region of the human organism:
Je sens vivement que le bonheur tient aux nerfs. J'ai un sentiment de bien-etre par 
tout le corps, surtout au diaphragme, apres six heures de travail. II y a un bon 
moment dans chaque joumee. Lorsqu'il est passe, donner le reste a la societe.170
A measure of chicory, a cup of tea or coffee, a breath of September air, a few 
hours of work at a desk: all suffice to lend a distinctly physical quality to the operations 
of head and heart, and to the happiness or unhappiness that may ensue. Such a notion, 
if its expression gains in assurance through time, was, as we have suggested, not new 
to Stendhal. As early as 12 August 1804, in fact, we find a diary entry in which the 
consumption of a particular tisane is recorded for the intellectual inspiration and the 
feeling of intense happiness with which it coincides. The event brings to mind a meal of 
spinach and bread which, Stendhal recalls, had accompanied a similar feeling of elation 
one Sunday evening in Claix, 'apres avoir fait les premiers bons vers que j ’aie trouves 
de ma vie.1 Such moments of ecstasy, he concludes, 'd'apres la nature de l'homme, ne 
peuvent pas durer.'171
The remark is worthy of note. For if Stendhal seeks here to identify some of the 
mechanisms whereby a state of happiness may be induced, he places severe limitations 
upon the nature and possible duration of that state. The diary entry in question might be 
overlooked, were it not for the much more extensive treatment of the same question 
which we find in*a number of letters written to Pauline Beyle between 1805 and 1812, 
in which the ephemeral nature of happiness is related to contingent factors in the human 
organism itself.172 'Une ou deux fois par an on a de ces moments d'extase ou toute 
l'ame est bonheur,' Stendhal writes in a letter dated 20 August 1805. He explains:
Un peu d'etude de l'homme moral apprend la rarete de cet etat delicieux, un peu 
d'etude de l’homme physique montre comment il est rare. Pour le produire, il faut 
un erethisme (une chanterelle de violon lache donne le r&\ on la tend a son ton 
naturel, elle donne le mi; on la tend encore, elle donne It fa , mais bientot elle se 
casse, elle est en erethisme); voila nos nerfs. L'etat d'extase les met dans un etat 
qui ne peut durer sans produire d'horribles douleurs.173
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More colourful than physiologically accurate, perhaps, this passage nonetheless 
illustrates what Stendhal clearly considers to be an important idea, if we are to judge by 
the number of occasions on which we find it reiterated in subsequent letters.174 The 
same notion, as J.-C. Alciatore points out, could have been inspired by a number of the 
thinkers with whom Stendhal was acquainted.175 The idea, however, that man is 
constrained by the limits of his organism found no more emphatic expression than in 
Cabanis’s Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme. No work appears to have 
been more influential in bringing Stendhal to identify not only reason and happiness but 
the essence of character itself with man's physical constitution. Thus, in a diary entry 
dated 20 September 1808, we find him reflecting upon the lack of character which he 
deems to be the principal defect of the Germanic people. This he ascribes to a number 
of causes, such as climate, government and a predilection for the Bible. He then goes 
on to assert:
La froideur des Allemands s'explique bien par leur nourriture: du pain noir, du 
beurre, du lait et de la biere; du cafe cependant, mais il leur faudrait du vin, et du 
plus genereux, pour donner de la vie a leurs muscles epais.176
In the segment of his journal of 1808 headed 'Voyage a Brunswick', Stendhal 
endeavours similarly to account in physiological terms for the German character. 
Generally speaking, he argues, 'c'est le ton qui manque aux organes allemands: ils sont 
sains, d'une belle taille, mais le ton y manque. II me semble que leur biere, leur 
butter-brod et leurs laitages etemels ne sont pas propres a leur donner plus de vivacite.' 
To this brief description of the German diet, Stendhal then adds the reflection: 'Je ne 
doute pas que la physionomie morale du paysan changeat si chaque homme buvait une 
bouteille de vin de Languedoc par jour.'177
These remarks, however apparently cmde in their assumptions, recall very closely 
indeed Cabanis's discourse on the effects of diet, his bold contention that Testomac 
gouveme la cervelle.'178 In particular, they echo the latter's observations on the 
tendency of milk to impose 'des habitudes de lenteur aux mouvements musculaires', 
and the capacity of wine, by contrast, to inspire 'une douce excitation du cerveau', 'un 
sentiment vif d'accroissement dans les forces musculaires', 'les penchants 
bienveillants, la confiance, la cordialite.'179 Stendhal's ruminations on the Germanic 
character and its rapport with diet serve too, in some sense, as a pendant to a curious 
personal observation which he consigns to his diary in March of the same year:
Pour moi.
Remede souverain contre l'amour: manger des pois. Eprouve aujourd'hui, 25 
mars, apres une promenade tres agreable a cheval et un gout vif eprouve pour la 
petite voisine du palais Bewem.180
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While the response on the part of today's reader may be mild amusement, there is 
nothing to suggest that Stendhal is anything less than serious here. The fanciful nature 
of his reflection serves only to throw more clearly into relief his conviction that the 
properties of the food one consumed could have a very significant effect upon one's 
moral disposition. Nor is the detail of his ride on horseback gratuitous, since, as his 
letters and diaries from Prussia testify, he had come to regard horse-riding as a valuable 
therapeutic exercise within his daily regimen.181 'Mais je tombe dans le sentiment,' he 
writes in a letter of 26 November 1809. 'Je vais fumer trois ou quatre pipes et monter a 
cheval.'182
Human Nature Redefined
It seems reasonable to conclude from the foregoing that Stendhal set considerably 
greater store by his early reading of Cabanis than has been suggested by some critics. 
His diaries and letters from 1805 onwards, with their increasing insistence on the 
physiological dimension of human nature, demonstrate the sharp contrast that exists 
between the highly abstract conception of man which characterises Stendhal’s earliest 
writings and the much more naturalistic vision which emerges with his reading of the 
Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme. We have noted how, on a number of 
occasions, Stendhal registers dissatisfaction with his reasoning on human nature as it is 
developed in his notebooks of 1802 to 1805.183 It would be some time, however, 
before he would be able to address himself to the business of reaffirming his 
convictions in this domain, and of bringing the ideas encountered in Cabanis fully to 
bear upon his philosophy of man.
The years 1805 to 1810 mark something of a hiatus in Stendhal's philosophical 
endeavours. During this period, which he spent firstly as a commercial clerk in 
Marseille and then, from October 1806, in the service of the imperial bureaucracy in 
Prussia and Austria, Stendhal's wordly ambitions were at their height and left him little 
leisure with which to indulge his more intellectual interests. Consequently, the names 
of Helvetius, Tracy, Cabanis et al are cited with decreasing regularity, disappearing 
almost entirely from his letters and diaries between 1807 and 1810.184 It is only when, 
in 1810, Stendhal returns for a prolonged spell to Paris that his writings reveal a 
rekindled interest in philosophy. What prompts him, significantly, is the reawakening 
of his dramatic ambitions. In May 1810, amid a number of notes which signal a 
renascent interest in his long neglected play Letellier,185 he remarks upon the scant 
insight into human nature which he has to show for his years of study and wordly
228
experience.186 The following month, he commits to his diary a short note outlining the 
measures that might help to re-establish on a firmer foundation his understanding of 
man:
II peut etre utile, pour mettre de la clarte dans mes idees, de repenser, apres cinq 
ans d'oubli, a mon ancien travail de 1805, sur les caracteres naturels et sociaux et 
leurs oppositions avec les passions, avec le classement de ces oppositions en sujets 
• tragiques ou comiques.
Combiner avec le temperament physique.187
It is the final remark here that is most significant. For it indicates quite clearly that 
Stendhal now considered the physiological aspect of temperament to be essential in any 
complete representation of human nature. After a brief review of the 'liens naturels', 
'passions' and 'habitudes' which had so absorbed him in 1803 and 1804, he makes a 
new and very telling point:
Les passions font faire des actions presque entierement differentes suivant qu'elles 
se nichent dans des temperaments oil des caracteres ou ensembles d'habitudes, 
differents.188
Here, in 1810, we find an explicit reaffirmation of the ideas contained, in germ, in 
Stendhal's notebook entry of 7 February 1805. For the introduction into the human 
equation of an indwelling physiological factor, preceding the operations of 'heart1 and 
'head' and influencing the ways in which passions are at work from one individual to 
the next, signals a far-reaching advance upon the more rationalistic analysis of character 
which Stendhal had attempted in his earliest writings.189 The role of physiology in 
determining the intensity of passion was a notion, we recall, which had not even 
occurred to him in his initial reflections on the question.190 In a note dating from June 
1804, Stendhal had posited the following distinction — described then as 'lumineuse' 
— between sensual and cerebral pleasure:
Le plaisir des sens ou pour mieux dire du sens doit etre le meme chez toutes les 
nations, l'autre [le plaisir de l'esprit] varie et augmente a mesure que la civilisation 
se perfectionne.191
Though he had tempered this assertion with the question 'Est-il vrai?', the notion that 
physiological particularities and differences could determine the very character of the 
sensation undergone — from one region to the next, one individual to the next — had 
nowhere entered into Stendhal's rationale at this early stage. Commenting, in August 
1804, upon the need for some aesthetic sensitivity in the depiction of passion, he had 
observed:
H faut peindre l'Apollon du Belvedere dans les bras de la Venus de Medicis, dans 
les plus delicieux jardins des environs de Naples, et non un gros Hollandais sur sa 
Hollandaise dans un sale entresol. Les degres de passion sont les memes, voyez 
l’effet.192
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Now, in February 1811, the inadequacies of this earlier view are clearly 
acknowledged by Stendhal:
Quoique les temperaments de Cabanis nous paraissent tres peu prouves, il est a 
croire que le bilieux, le flegmatique, le sanguin, le melancolique, le musculaire et le 
nerveux prennent le meme plaisir et la meme peine d'une maniere differente.
Ce qui est vrai de l'un de ces temperaments ne l'est pas de l'autre.193
In this note of February 1811, we find a clear restatement of the physiologist's 
contention that 'les impressions que font sur nous les memes objets n’ont pas toujours 
le meme degre d'intensite' — a phenomenon which Cabanis attributes in no small 
measure to the role of temperament.194 While Stendhal recognises the hypothetical 
aspect of what he regards as a pioneering thesis, he is nonetheless prepared, by 
concluding thus that different individuals 'prennent le meme plaisir et la meme peine 
d'une maniere differente', to subscribe to the implications of what Cabanis postulates.
Once again, the letters to Pauline Beyle provide a valuable insight into Stendhal's 
mind. From a letter dated 13 April 1810, it appears that Pauline has responded to her 
brother's exhortations and embarked on a reading of the Rapports du physique et du 
moral de l'homme. 'Je suis convaincu,' writes Stendhal, 'que le baron Cabanis t'a 
ennuyee. As-tu ete frappee des caracteres des quatre temperaments? Tache d'observer 
cela dans la nature.'195 Some ten months later, suspecting still that his sister has found 
Cabanis heavy going, Stendhal sends her an extract, as he puts it, 'de la partie la plus 
essentielle: les temperaments':
C’est incomplet, mais cette science commence. Dans cent ans, on fera la-dessus de 
bons livres que nous ne lirons pas.196
These remarks convey not only Stendhal's new-found enthusiasm for Cabanis, but 
the altogether new premium which he has come to set on the latter's discussion of the 
temperaments. In February and March 1811, together with his friend Louis Crozet, 
Stendhal painstakingly extracted the descriptions of the temperaments from the 
'Sixieme Memoire' of Cabanis's work, 'De Vinfluence des temperaments sur la 
formation des idees et des affections morales ', dividing these into 'caractere physique' 
and its corollary, 'caractere moral'.197 It was a labour whose fruits were not to have 
been of a purely intellectual kind. The following month, we find the two friends once 
more bent over a joint enterprise, this time committing to paper plans for an assault by 
Stendhal on the virtue of his cousin by marriage, Alexandrine Daru. The result is the 
so-called 'Consultation pour Banti', drawn up to guide Stendhal in his deliberations 
over whether and how best to seduce Mme Daru.198 What is striking is the evidence 
which we find already here of the reading and note-taking sessions in which Stendhal
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and Crozet had been engaged some weeks earlier. Mme Daru, we read, has all the 
characteristics of ’un temperament ardent'; she is not given to 'la reverie melancolique'; 
her father has 'un caractere tres sanguin'; her husband, Pierre Daru, is choleric and, 
like his wife, lacking in any 'melancholy' quality.199 As it happened, Stendhal would 
never put to the test the ardour of Mme Darn's temperament, the sanguinity of her 
father, or the choler of her husband. That he should be ready to press into service 
concepts so clearly derived from Cabanis in the perilous business of wooing his 
protector's wife, however, says something about the store which he was now setting 
by temperament as a guide to human character and conduct.
In August 1811, the influence of Cabanis is evident once more in a number of 
notes on the passions grouped together by Stendhal and Crozet. Here, we find Stendhal 
returning to the question which had troubled him some six years earlier: that of 
establishing a common measure by which to gauge the intensity of passion. Observing 
that 'l'homme est en general pousse par cinq ou six passions qui tour a tour sont 
dominantes,' he goes on to conclude:
Par les connaissances theoriques que nous possedons, nous parvenons bien a 
distinguer ces six forces; mais nos connaissances sont trop vagues pour que nous 
puissions apprecier avec exactitude leur intensite. Par consequent, nous ne 
pouvons connaitre la resultante = la conduite de l'homme.200
In this short but very significant statement, we find the renunciation of Stendhal's 
earlier belief that some 'mathematical' principle could be applied in the study of the 
human heart. Man's nature, it was increasingly clear to him, would not fit conveniently 
within the confines of any simple theorem. The recognition of this fact alone represents 
a major development in Stendhal's conception of man. To the questions that he had 
posed — but left unresolved — in 1805 and 1806, he now provides some semblance of 
an answer:
La meme passion, aux yeux de Dieu, s'il existait, est peut-etre differente dans 
chaque individu; tout ce que nous pouvons faire, c'est de les voir differentes dans 
les temperaments differents. Voir la description que nous avons faite en suivant la 
plupart des idees de Cabanis; il est clair que l'amour dans Calon et dans Bitche est 
extremement different.
II parait que certaines passions ne peuvent pas prendre et pousser dans certains 
temperaments; on se figurerait difficilement l'avarice passion dominante d'un 
sanguin.201
In its open-minded tone, this passage marks a clear departure by Stendhal from his 
erstwhile quest for neat and all-encompassing certainties. What is more, the suggestion 
that certain passions and certain temperaments are mutually exclusive, or, put another 
way, that particular passions are the preserve of particular temperaments, constitutes an 
outright denial of his earlier claim that each man, by his very nature, 'renferme en lui le
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germe de toutes les passions.'202 For it had, we recall, been Stendhal's express belief 
that each passion was a definable phenomenon, uniform and universal. 'Je sais bien 
qu'une certaine passion p a un effet p’,' he had asserted confidently in August 1803.203 
This belief in the fundamental uniformity of passion had led him to conclude that 
circumstance alone must account for the differing degrees to which particular passions 
are experienced from one individual to the next. 'Quelles sont les circonstances propres 
a porter chaque passion a son maximum?' he had pondered amid his early notes on 
dramatic characterisation and plot204 Nor was there any method, it had seemed then, 
for matching particular passions to particular individuals. 'Lorsque j'aurai fait un plan,' 
Stendhal had noted in April 1803, 'essayer successivement a chaque personnage tous 
les vices et toutes les vertus. Voir ceux qui leur conviennent.'205
The important point about the extracts cited from Stendhal's notes and 
correspondence of 1811 is that they demonstrate the extent to which his philosophy of 
man was evolving during a period when his thought is generally held to have remained 
unchanged. The role played by Cabanis in this evolution, and the degree to which it 
marks a departure from Helvetius, are of particular significance. Hence the remark 
which we find scribbled by Stendhal on a volume of Vauvenargues in 1811:
Un hom[me] avec un esprit ordinaire qui des l'age de dix ans mettrait tout son
bonheur a faire la guerre par ex., serait probablement un genie militaire. Son genie
serait modifie par son temperament, sanguin: Conde; bilieux; V[auvenargues].206
The insertion of the tentative 'probablement', and the insistence on the modifying role 
of temperament, underline Stendhal's considerable departure here from his earlier 
belief, as expressed in 1803, that one had only to set one's mind to it in order to 
become a great genius, warrior, geometer or poet, according to one's preference.207 
The body, Stendhal was increasingly to recognise, has its own laws and its own logic, 
however inscrutable. Hence the reflection, consigned to his diary of 27 October 1813, 
on the dramatist Charles Colle, 'a qui il n'a manque qu'une plus grande force de tete 
[...] eties passions fortes d'un bilieux, pour etre bien pres de Moliere.'208 Here was a 
rationale that was to exert a powerful and enduring influence upon Stendhal's thought. 
'Or, pour faire un homme superieur,' he will argue much later in the Memoires d'un 
touriste, 'ce n'est pas assez d'une tete logique, il faut un certain temperament 
fougueux.'209
Let us return, with these remarks in mind, to Stendhal's notes of 1810 and 1811, 
in which we find a reawakening of his interest in philosophy. For here, in the 
'Classification des etats de l'ame' which he draws up in August 1811, we discover a 
whole new emphasis on passion as the product of an organism:
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Passions simples.
Besoins physiques: faim, soif, sommeil, chaleur, coit. Un homme n'est 
susceptible de passions qu'autant que ces besoins sont satisfaits.
U ]
Voir la description des temperaments page... Cette description doit etre suivie des
Qualites de l'ame.210
Consideration of physical man must, it is now clear, precede that of ’moral' man. Once 
more, we note that Stendhal's philosophical conviction leaves room for a significant 
element of faith. 'Nous prenons tout cela pour vrai,' he writes, on completing the 
review of the temperaments undertaken with Crozet in March 1811, 'nous n'avons pas 
assez de donnees pour juger du degre de confiance a accorder a ces assertions.'211 In 
1812 still, he hesitates over the degree of certainty which can be ascribed to some 
thoughts on the nature of pleasure and pain as they relate to the temperaments: 'En 1812 
les temperaments nous paraissent trop peu prouves pour que nous puissions y 
appliquer la theorie ci-dessus.'212
Such reservations, however, were not to diminish the esteem in which Stendhal 
would now come to hold Cabanis and his work. To the passages on temperament 
extracted from the latter in 1811, we find appended, some two years later, the 
following reflection:
Je pense en 1813, a Sagan que nous etions trop severes envers Cabanis. II fallait 
voir dans son livre des observations et non des assertions. Peut-on nier a un 
astronome qu'une comete par lui observee a fait tel mouvement? II dit l'avoir vue; 
la cause de ce mouvement, il l'ignore 213
The same sentiment is expressed in a subsequent note, which we find in Stendhal’s 
diary of September 1813, where he cites Cabanis on the nature of sensibility before 
adding:
Cet auteur n'a pas tout le tort que Crozet et moi lui trouvons; ses torts sont dans la 
forme; il affirme trop, et montre trop comme etant prouvees des choses qu'il devait 
donner comme des aper^us singuliers, comme des revolutions singulieres vues 
dans les astres.214
It is, then, as a practised observer of reality, an exponent of that all-important art of 
seeing, that Stendhal comes to view this medecin-ideologue who serves as a guide to 
the physiological nature of man. From 1811 onward, a version, however rudimentary, 
of Cabanis's theory of temperament becomes increasingly integral to Stendhal's 
perception both of his own character and of human nature in general. Hence the 
proliferation of labels — 'bilieux'215 melancolique',216 'sanguin',217 'flegmatique'218 
— by which he now seeks to make sense of himself and of those around him. In 
VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, Stendhal would claim that, during the Russian 
campaign, he carried with him a copy of Cabanis, 'et devinant ses idees a travers ses
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phrases, je cherchais des exemples dans les figures de tant de soldats qui passaient 
aupres de moi en chantant...'219 Later, towards the end of 1813, Stendhal would 
undertake afresh the reading of a number of Moliere's plays and interpret their 
characterisation and plot with an eye to the role of temperament.220 Les Femmes 
savantes in particular he would qualify as a 'Comedie fondee solidement sur les 
principes medicaux des temperaments.'221 His dramatic ambition revived, he was by 
now convinced that any accurate representation of human reality on stage must take 
cognisance of the physiological dimension in man. Hence his palpable dissatisfaction 
with Schlegel's Cours de litterature dramatique, in whose margin he scribbles the 
criticism: 'Manque de physiologie et de la doct[rine] de l'interet. Tout cela vague, faute 
de physiologie.'222
The means which he afforded of observing others was, however, only part of 
what Cabanis had to offer his newly appreciative student. For Stendhal, as we have 
seen, would not hesitate to discern in himself certain characteristics of the temperaments 
(melancholic and bilious notably) as'he finds them defined by Cabanis. Thus, of his 
discretion with regard to the women he has loved, Brulard will recall: 'J'ai eprouve 
absolument a cet egard tous les symptomes du temperament melancolique decrit par 
Cabanis.'223 His amorous disposition,224 his sensibility,225 his sexual discretion,226 
his timidity,227 his lack of memory,228 his very skin-type,229 all will in turn find a 
physiological touchstone in the Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme.730
It is only after his readings of Cabanis — readings which, as we have said, span 
the decade 1805 to 1815 — that one can say Stendhal has all the essential ingredients of 
his philosophy. On both of the occasions when, in 1813, Stendhal defines the sum of 
the philosophy required of the dramatist, Cabanis features alongside Helvetius, Tracy 
and Hobbes (the latter for his definition of laughter only): 7 see no other springs de 
gout-raisonneur que la Vine section de I'Homme, Hobbes sur le lire, and myself sur le 
sourire, la table analytique de Cabanis par Tracy et la Logique du meme.'231 Some ten 
years later, when it falls to Stendhal to provide a review of the CEuvres completes de 
Cabanis for the New Monthly Magazine of April 1823, he will be more effusive still in 
his assessment, hailing the physiologist as 'ce grand philosophe', Tun des fondateurs 
de la philosophic frangaise.'232
In Cabanis's theory of the temperaments in particular, Stendhal discovered (or 
rediscovered, since 'temperament' itself was a far from novel notion)233 a principle 
whose chief virtue lay in its simplicity and in its ready applicability across the whole 
range of human experience and endeavour. In his analyses of theatre, of music, of the 
fine arts, of national character, of love, Stendhal would consistently acknowledge the
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important role of physiology. The deference to Cabanis which is to be found in his 
private writings from 1811 onwards was to become in turn an essential feature of his 
published work. The shift in focus to which this bears witness, from a 
pseudo-mathematical to a pseudo-physiological perspective on man, is of fundamental 
importance for any appreciation of Stendhal's intellectual development. Michel Crouzet, 
one of the few scholars to recognise the full impact of Stendhal's 'conversion' to 
physiology, sums up his evolution in the following terms:
L'itineraire de l'egotiste revolte va de l'algebre a la biologie: ce sont deux fois; de 
la confiance en l'infinie plasticite de l'homme entierement acquis, sinon construit 
volontairement, a la reconnaissance de l'instinct du foetus, et des temperaments, et 
meme de l'heredite. De l'apologie de la conscience universellement claire au 
sentiment d'un donne definitif de l'economie corporelle cachee dans d'obscures 
profondeurs.234
Stendhal would never, of course, give the dramatic expression he had envisaged to 
the store of ideas within which Cabanis's theories are brought to bear. But the latter do 
claim their place in works which go to the very heart of Stendhal's considerations on 
human nature. The digressions on temperament which one finds in VHistoire de la 
peinture en Italie and De VAmour, far from being mere 'padding' — as Margaret Tillett 
claims235 — bespeak a very real concern with the role of physiology in determining 
human character, taste and behaviour. For in such determinism Stendhal clearly 
believed. 'Le bilieux,' writes the author of VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, 'est force 
aux grandes choses par son organisation physique.'236 It is the role of the painter, he 
argues, to express 'par les formes de son personnage le caractere que ses organes le 
forcent a avoir.’237 Stendhal's choice of verb in both these instances is far from 
gratuitous. The previously held notion that one could create oneself, that one could 
forge a character in which desirable passions would be cultivated, is undermined now 
by a new, increasingly deterministic resignation to character as it is defined by the 
intrinsic qualities of temperament. As the author of VHistoire de la peinture en Italie will 
recognise, 'une partie de la biographie des grands hommes doit etre foumie par leur 
medecin.'238
In thus acknowledging what Diderot had taken to be the fundamental lacuna in 
Helvetius, Stendhal is far indeed from the philosophy of his earliest mentor. 'Interrogez 
le medecin,' Diderot had urged in his refutation of De VHomme, 'et il vous dira que le 
caractere qu'on a n'est pas toujours celui qu’on montre, et que le premier est le produit 
de la fibre raide ou molle, du sang doux ou brulant, de la lymphe epaisse ou fluide, de 
la bile acre ou savonneuse, et de l'etat des parties dures ou fluides de notre 
machine.'239 As with Diderot so with Cabanis, the overriding conception is, as Sergio 
Moravia puts it, 'that of a man fully reducible to his own physical unitary
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"organization'’ without dualistic, metaphysical, or spiritualistic residuals.'240 The 
comparison which Stendhal draws in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie between 
Leonardo da Vinci and the medecins-ideologues, Cabanis and Pinel, is instructive in 
this regard. For all three are upheld-as pioneers of 'une partie de la science de l'homme, 
qui meme aujourd'hui est encore vierge: la connaissance des faits qui lient intimement la 
science des passions, la science des idees, et la medecine.'241 It is in this sense that 
Leonardo da Vinci attains his full status in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie. For it is to 
Leonardo's enduring credit, argues Stendhal, that he, alone among his peers, 
recognised the essential inter-relationship between the physical and the moral realms of 
human experience:
Le vulgaire des peintres ne considere dans les larmes qu'un signe de la douleur 
morale. II faut voir que e'en est la marque necessaire. C'est a reconnaitre la 
necessite de ce mouvement, c'est a suivre l'effet anatomique de la douleur depuis 
le moment ou une femme tendre regoit la nouvelle de la mort de son amant jusqu'a 
celui ou elle pleure, c'est a voir bien nettement comment les diverses pieces de la 
machine humaine forcent les yeux a repandre des larmes, que Leonard s'appliqua. 
Le curieux qui a etudie la nature sous cet aspect voit souvent les autres peintres 
faire courir un homme sans lui faire remuer les jambes.242
Stendhal's language here, with its insistence on necessity and its evocation of the 
human anatomy as a composite 'machine', explicable in terms of identifiable laws, has 
strong overtones of mechanistic determinism. The importance of anatomy to the painter 
or sculptor is underlined by Stendhal on a number of occasions.243 Here, however, his 
considerations go far beyond the aesthetic aspect of artistic representation. As a model 
of empirical scruple, Stendhal goes so far as to deem Leonardo a forerunner of the new 
pioneers in the physiological sciences:
Je ne connais que deux ecrivains qui aient approche franchement de la science 
attaquee par Leonard: Pinel et Cabanis. Leurs ouvrages, pleins du genie 
d'Hippocrate, e’est-a-dire de faits et de consequences bien deduites de ces faits, 
ont commence la science.244
What Stendhal is extolling in both of the passages cited is, in essence, that same 
empirical approach to knowledge, through observation and experiment, which he had 
held from the outset to be the foundation of any sound scientific or philosophical 
method.245 What is significant about these extracts, as they reflect Stendhal’s thinking 
in 1817, is that philosophy and science — in particular medical science — no longer 
constitute separate modes of inquiry, but are coalesced into a single 'science' of man 
which takes on now its fullest meaning. Physiology becomes the ground on which 
Science, Philosophy and Art meet. The sometime ideal of the poete-philosophe is 
expanded now by Stendhal to embrace a whole new area of consideration: the ideal 
henceforth will be the podte-philosophe-medecin. The title of the chapter of VHistoire 
de la peinture en Italie in which Stendhal calls attention to Leonardo's method and
•236
achievement is at once a transcription of Cabanis's title and a profession of 
philosophical faith:
Ghap. LXI. Leonard voit les rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme, 
fondements de toute bonne philosophie.246
The implications of this statement, and the marked development in Stendhal's 
conception of man to which it attests, provide the subject for our considerations in the 
following chapter.
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246
'caractere melancolique* in the Promenades dans Rome {.Italie, 1053). Though 
the melancholic temperament is — as Cabanis (Rapports, pp. 286-287) and 
Stendhal (H de P, II, 59-60) both assert — close to the bilious in its 
physiological features, F.M. Alberes appears to confuse the two in her 
discussion of this question. See Le Naturel chez Stendhal, p. 109 n. 43. Cf. 
Cabanis, Rapports, pp. 81-85.
140. See Del Litto, La Vie intellectuelle de Stendhal, p. 287; OI, I, 363.
141. OI, I, 425, 394.
142. Corr, I, 261.
143. Ibid., I, 263.
144. Ibid., I, 264.
145. Ibid., I, 312.
146. Ibid., I, 326.
147. Ibid., I, 272.
148.- Rapports, pp. 337-409.
149. Corr, 1,316.
150. While J.-C. Alciatore ('Stendhal et Pinel', p. 120 n. 24) finds here an echo of 
Cabanis, V. del Litto {La Vie intellectuelle de Stendhal, p. 287 n. 62) discerns 
the influence of Pinel, whom Stendhal had begun reading in January 1806.
151. 07,1,302.
152. Rapports, p. 409.
153. Ibid., pp. 386-387.
154. Corr, 1,257. A similar sense appears to underpin a note which Stendhal pens as 
early as May 1803: 'Quand je voudrai traduire en vers franqais VUgolin du 
Dante, me laisser souffrir de la faim apres m'etre echauffe avec du cafe' {JL, I, 
183).
155. OI, I, 440. Cf. H de P, II, 77: 'On sait que Voltaire prenait douze ou quinze 
tasses de cafe par jour. L'usage de ce genre de boissons stimulantes [...] fait 
predominer les forces sensitives.'
156. Italie, 248. Cf. OI, II, 18: 'Le cafe pris dans ces circonstances me rend 
sanguin.' To the end, Stendhal would retain the same view of the moral state as 
a precarious balance of regiminal factors. See the description in the Vie de 
Henry Brulard (I, 11) of a visit to the Sistine Chapel ruined by 'un exces de 
cafe'.
157. Cf. M de T, II, 505: ’[...] dans les moments de passion, la lorgnette du 
raisonnement est entierement troublee; il ne peut plus apercevoir rien de ce qui 
existe reellement.' See also JL, II, 18, 21 ('Tous les hommes agissent suivant 
ce qui leur parait et non suivant ce qui est'), 302-303.
158. JL, I, 248.
159. Ibid., HI, 196. On the fragment in question, see V. del Litto, ibid., Ill, 413 n.
247
160. OI, I, 367. See M.A. Simons, who, in citing this example, signals the 'extreme 
susceptibilite de l'esprit, dont la vision claire et distincte peut etre facilement 
brouillee par l'etat d'un organe, ici, l'estomac' (Semiotisme de Stendhal 
[Geneva: Droz, 1980], p. 210).
161. The consequences of such an argument for a disciple of Helvetius were serious 
indeed. On this point as on others, the reasoning to which Stendhal subscribes 
through Cabanis is anticipated by Diderot, who, in his critical analysis of De 
VHomme, states the case with force: 'Vous persuaderez-vous bonnement que la 
nature des humeurs, du sang, de la lymphe, la capacite des vaisseaux de tout le 
corps, le systeme des glandes et des nerfs, la dure-mere, la pie-mere, la 
’ condition des intestins, du cceur, des poumons, du diaphragme, des reins, de la 
vessie, des parties de la generation, puisse varier sans consequence pour le 
cerveau et le cervelet? {Op. cit., p. 366).
162. See Del Litto, La Vie intellectuelle de Stendhal, p. 321.
163. See ibid., p. 287.
164. Corr, I, 354. See later, in the same letter, Stendhal's suggestion that his sister 
choose for a husband 'un homme [...] dont le caractere changera tous les dix 
ans avec le physique.' For the beneficent effects of tea, one need look no 
further than Cabanis's 'Huitieme Memoire', where the physiologist describes 
the 'particules narcotiques ou sedatives' which are properties of the drink and 
which can act as 'un calmant direct' on the human organism (Rapports, p. 388).
165. Corr, I, 534.
166. Ibid., I, 535. Cf. H de P, I, 89 n. 1: 'il n'y a pas de bonheur sans la sante.' On 
the relationship between health and happiness, see Cabanis, Rapports, p. 206; 
on the 'humours', see ibid., pp. 350-351.
167. See Imbert, 'Etat present des etudes stendhaliennes', pt. I, p. 168; Alberes, Le 
Naturel chez Stendhal, p. 440; .Theodorides, Stendhal du cote de la science, pp. 
101-230 passim ; Bosselaers, Le Cas Stendhal, passim. See also on this 
question Crouzet, Raison, pp. 617-621.
168. Rapports, p. 206.
169. Corr, I, 540.
170. OI, I, 951. On the role of the diaphragm and its interplay'with the nervous 
system, see Cabanis, Rapports, pp. 589-590.
171. OI, I, 112-113. On the question of diet and its effects, see Simons, pp. 
209-211; Bosselaers, Stendhal, pilerin du bonheur, pp. 34-35.
172. On '[la] recherche de ce bonheur impossible avec notre corps', see Corr, I, 
214, 278, 292, 343, 649.
173.’ Ibid., I, 214.
174. Stendhal is more precise still in his letter of 4 March 1806: 'Par la nature de nos 
nerfs, le bonheur extreme, lorsqu'on y parvient, ne peut pas durer plus d'une 
heure' {Ibid., I, 292). Cf. ibid., I, 278: 'Crois que cet etat d'extase que tu te 
figures peut-etre, [...], l'hom[me] d'apres sa nature ne peut le trouver que deux 
ou trois fois dans sa vie et une heure ou deux chaque'; ibid., I, 343: 'cela 
remplit la vie non d'emotions de roman qui sont physiquement impossibles 
(d'apres la nature des nerfs, qui ne peuvent pas etre tendus longtemps au meme
248
degre [...]), mais d'un contentement raisonnable.' See in the same vein the 
letter dated 14 July 1812: 'II n'y a jamais de position delicieuse. Rien de ce qui 
est excessif ne peut etre permanent' {Ibid., I, 649).
175. See Stendhal et Helvetius, p. 49; Stendhal et Maine de Biran, p. 17.
176. OI, I, 506.
177. Ibid., I, 1045.
178. Rapports, p. 590.
179. Ibid., pp. 370, 381.
180. OI, I, 499.
181. See, for example, Corr, I, 354; 540; OI, I, 475.
182. Corr, I, 544. Cf. ibid., I, 713: '[...] il faut, pour la sante morale encore plus 
que pour la physique, faire cent lieues tous les six mois...' See also Romans, I, 
562: 'II faut que je tue mon cceur a force de fatigue physique, se disait [Julien] 
en galopant dans les bois de Meudon.' On the therapeutic effects of smoking, 
see OI, I, 1045.
183. See, for instance, JL, II, 206; OI, I, 344-345; Corr, I, 230-231.
184. Among the very sporadic references to these philosophers which are to be
found during the period in question, see Corr, I, 345, 352, 354, 495, 496; OI, ' 
I, 474, 478, 490, 491 n.
185. Though the conception of Letellier dates from as early as 1803, the project was 
to exercise Stendhal's mind at intervals for some two decades. It is, as R. Alter 
(p. 68) puts it, 'the gear in which he gets stuck in his futile efforts to become a 
playwright.' See, for example, OI, I, 577, 599, 601, 604, 652, 663, 885.
186. Ibid., I, 578.
187. Ibid ., I, 622; JL, II, 295-296. See Vigneron, 'Stendhal disciple de 
Chateaubriand', pp. 61-62.
188. OI, I, 623; JL, II, 296-297.
189. See, for example, JL, I, 159, 240-244, 447-449.
190. See ibid., I, 157, 160-161.
191. Ibid., I, 390.
192. Ibid., II, 95-96. There is a curious irony in the fact that H. Martineau 
(UCEuvre de Stendhal, p. 44) should suggest this very passage as the point by 
which Stendhal's ideas were essentially cast in their definitive mould.
193. JL, II, 315.
194. Rapports, p. 79. See also ibid., pp. 81-85, 260-300.
195. Corr, I, 562.
196. Ibid., I, 605.
249
197. JL, II, 324-331.
198. For the ’Consultation' and the separate character portrait of Pierre Daru, see OI, 
I, 1058-1079, .1617-1626 nn.
199. See ibid., I, 1059, 1061, 1062, 1066, 1073, 1078-1079.
200. JL, II, 352.
201. Ibid., II, 353-354.
202. ibid., I, 157. On this point again, Stendhal's objection to Helvetius, like that of 
Cabanis, is anticipated by Diderot in his critical analysis of De I'Homme: 'Les 
hommes de constitution differente sont siisceptibles des memes passions. Cela 
est faux de tout cote. On ne se donne pas toutes les passions. On nait colere, on 
nait insensible, on nait brutal, on nait tendre, et les circonstances excitent ces 
passions dans l'homme, et quand elles seraient communes a tous les hommes 
ils ne les auraient point au meme degre' (Op. cit., p. 455).
203. JL, I, 237.
204. Ibid., I, 188.
205. Ibid., I, 144.
206. Ibid., in ,  328. On Stendhal's reading of Vauvenargues in 1811, see Del Litto, 
La Vie intellectuelle de Stendhal, p. 414.
207. See Corr, I, 52; JL, II, 125.
208. OI, I, 895.
209. M de T, I, 123.
210. JL, H, 355-358. Cf. Stendhal's earlier and much more abstract treatment of the 
same question: ibid., I, 444-450.
211. Ibid., H, 330.
212. Ibid., II, 316 n. 1.
213. Ibid., II, 331 n. 1; OI, I, 879.
214. OI, I, 889. Cf. Cabanis, Rapports, p. 134.
215. OI, I, 660, 663, 687, 689, 697, 700, 720, 895, 897; Corr, I, 621, 658; JL, n,
334, 361, 399, 401, 405; III, 20, 267, 268, 269, 328, 369.
216. JL, II, 340, 386; III, 20-23; OI, I, 738.
217. OI, I, 766, 869; JL, II, 399, 410; III, 20, 235, 328.
218. O I ,  I, 666, 867. Though Stendhal, in line with Cabanis, admits of six 
temperaments, he accords the bilious, melancholic, sanguin and phlegmatic 
much greater salience than the nervous and athletic.
219. H deP, n, 40. Though it scarcely afforded him the leisure to philosophise, and
though the instance which he cites here is apocryphal (see P. Arbelet's note,
ibid., II, 441), the Russian campaign must have given Stendhal ample 
opportunity to observe at first hand what he could take to be the signs of
250
temperament at work. It certainly served, as we shall see, to reaffirm his 
perception of his own character as he believed he had found it defined by 
Cabanis. His correspondence from Russia carries some echo of the 
physiologist. See, for example, the letter from Moscow dated 2 October 1812 
0Corr, I, 658).
220. See JL, II, 399, 401, 405, 410, 420.
221. Ibid., II, 399.
222. Ibid., HI, 288.
223. HB, I, 19.
224. 'Mais Yamour (comme l'entend Cabanis) formait le grand mobile de mon 
caractere...' (OI, I, 363); '[...] pour l'amour j'ai le temperament melancolique 
de Cabanis' (HB, II, 61).
225. 'Toutes mes experiences me rappellent la citation de Cabanis a propos de 
Mozart: la sensibilite se comporte a la maniere d'un fluide...' (Corr, I, 847).
226. 'Par pudeur de temperament melancolique (Cabanis), j'ai toujours ete a cet 
egard d'une discretion incroyable, folle' (HB, I, 25).
227. 'J'avais un temperament de feu et la timidite decrite par Cabanis' (Ibid., I, 33).
228. 'La chose qui me manquera le plus tot lorsque je vieillirai, ce sera la memoire. 
Le passage suivant de Cabanis est une description rigoureuse de ce qui se passe 
en moi' (OI, I, 888). Stendhal goes on to cite an extract from Cabanis's theory 
of sensibility. (Cf. Rapports, p. 134.) On the significance of this extract, see 
below, Chapter VIII.
229. 'J'emprunterai pour un instant la langue de Cabanis. J'ai la peau beaucoup trop
fine, une peau de femme...' (HB, I, 236).
230. See, in addition to the examples cited, ibid., I, 175: '[...] j'eus toujours
l'habitude d'une discretion parfaite que j'ai retrouvee dans le temperament 
melancolique de Cabanis.' On the place of Cabanis in Stendhal's 
autobiographical reflections, see Chapter IX.
231. See JL, II, 385; III, 28-29. Later editions of the Rapports contained a 
comprehensive 'Table analytique' by Destutt de Tracy.
232. CA, I, 96.
233. Not only temperament, but climate, diet, organic disposition, and heredity had, 
as A. Levi points out (pp. 234-238), an established place in post-Renaissance 
moral philosophy. The problem was one of codifying these factors within a 
strictly empirical science and freeing them of their more fanciful connotations.
234. Raison, p. 595.
235. Op. cit., p. 71. H. Delacroix (p. 66) is of a very different mind on this 
question, arguing that to Cabanis 'Stendhal doit sans conteste possible, la 
doctrine des temperaments dont il a fait un des principes fondamentaux de la 
psychologie et d'une maniere generale, la consideration de l'homme physique.' 
See in similar vein the early assessment of A. Bussiere, in Talbot, La Critique 
stendhalienne, p. 78.
236. H de P, II, 46. See also JL, II, 327.
251
237. H  de P , II, 47.
238. Ibid., II, 60.
239. Op. cit., p. 283.
240. 'From this perspective, the science of man cannot be represented in the first 
place other than as a general physiology' ('Cabanis and His Contemporaries', 
p. xviii).
241. H de P, I, 244.
242. Ibid., I, 244-245. Stendhal’s insistence on Man as the very 'stuff' of Art is
noteworthy. As M.A. Simons observes (p. 113), 'tout grand artiste se distingue
par sa connaissance de l'homme [...]: pour Stendhal et, dans une certaine 
mesure pour toute l'epoque classique, il n'est d'art qu'anthropocentrique.'
243. See Theodorides, Stendhal du cote de la science, pp. 145-150.
244. H de P, I, 245.
245. We have earlier observed how Francis Bacon is recognised by Stendhal to be 
the model of scientific empiricism. In VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, the 
English philosopher is presented, however, as no more than a successor to 
Leonardo in this respect: 'Or, cent ans avant Bacon, Leonard de Vinci avait ecrit 
ce qui fait la grandeur de Bacon; son tort est de n'avoir pas imprime. II dit: 
"L'interprete des artifices de la nature, c'est l'experience; elle ne trompe jamais; 
c'est notre jugement qui quelquefois se trompe lui-meme. II faut consulter 
l'experience, et varier les circonstances jusqu'a ce que nous en ayons tire des 
regies generales, car c’est elle quifournit les regies generales"' (H de P, I, 
248-249). See also ibid., I, 179, for 'l'idee de Leonard, que toute science ne 
consiste qu'a voir les circonstances des faits.'
246. Ibid., I, 393.
252
CHAPTER VI
MECHANISM AND NATURALISM: CABANIS IN THE
ASCENDANT
Commencer par le commencement: Italian Painting and the 
Lessons of Physiology
Stendhal's reading of the Rapports du physique et du moral de Vhomme brings a new 
and definitive dimension to his conception of human nature. Cabanis gives flesh, 
nerves and viscera to the abstracted 'machine' of other thinkers for whom sensibility, 
though considered physical in its origin and nature, continues to suggest, as Sergio 
Moravia puts it, 'a deep gap between the bodily organism and a meta-organic being or 
function (be this Buffon's or Condillac's AME, or Helvetius's ESPRIT [...]), 
responsible for man's higher emotional and intellectual activities.'1 In Cabanis, this 
lingering vestige of traditional dualism is abolished and replaced by a unitary-organic 
definition of man. With the endorsement of an advancing medical science, Cabanis 
undertook to dispel the distinction between body and mind, claiming, in one of his 
more notorious assertions, that the brain is an organ equipped to secrete thought 'de 
meme que l'estomac et les intestins a operer la digestion, le foie a filtrer la bile, les 
parotides et les glandes maxillaires et sublinguales a preparer les sues salivaires.' He 
goes on to draw from this an uncompromising definition of man's supposed 'higher 
faculties':
Nous voyons [...] les impressions arriver au cerveau par l'entremise des nerfs: 
elles sont alors isolees et sans coherence. Le viscere entre en action; il agit sur 
elles: et bientot il les renvoie metamorphosees en idees, que le langage de la 
physionomie et du geste ou les signes de la parole et de l'ecriture manifestent au 
dehors. Nous concluons avec la meme certitude que le cerveau digere en quelque 
sorte les impressions; qu'il fait organiquement la secretion de la pensee.2
By providing a vision of man which, referring everything to the physical 
organism, takes account of the innate and the instinctive, the irrational and the 
unconscious,3 Cabanis gives Stendhal not so much a new direction as a whole new 
point of departure. Foremost among the conclusions that he will draw from the 
Rapports du physique et du moral de Vhomme is the contention that the study of human 
nature must take as its starting-point the study of human physiology. 'En politique 
comme dans les arts,' we read in a fragmentary note appended by Stendhal to a volume 
of Shakespeare,
on ne peut s'elever au sublime [...] sans connaitre l'homme, et, pour conn[aitre] 
l'hom[me], il faut avoir le courage de commencer par le commencement, 
e'est-a-dire par la physiologie.4
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The note in which this remark features was to reappear, in a form very close to the 
original, in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie.5 In both cases, Stendhal ventures a 
quasi-physiological definition of man's nature in terms of what he calls 'la vie 
organique et la vie de relation.'6 The conception of man — as a being divisible into 
corps, tete and cceur (or ame) — which had characterised his early philosophical 
deliberations is transformed now and given a much less abstract expression:
Le nerf grand sympathique est la source de la vie des organes, la respiration, la 
circulation, la digestion, etc., etc. Le cerveau est la source de la vie de relation, 
ainsi nommee parce qu'elle nous met en relation avec le reste de l!univers. [...]
Les mouvements causes par le grand sympathique sont involontaires: il y a de la 
volonte dans tout ce qui vient du cerveau...7
We are back here, in essence, to Hobbes's distinction between 'vital' and 'animal' 
motion. What is important, however, is the form in which Stendhal now expresses this 
idea. For the attempt to trade in the vague abstractions of 'head' and 'heart' in return for 
a more physiologically sustainable definition translates the store which Stendhal has 
come to set by man as a physical organism. In the discussion of the sanguine 
temperament which occasions the passage cited above, the author of VHistoire de la 
peinture en Italie echoes Cabanis's central tenet that 'le physique et le moral se 
confondent a leur source; ou, pour mieux dire, le moral n'est que le physique, 
considere sous certains points de vue particuliers.'8 Having sketched the physiological, 
intellectual and affective characteristics which accompany the sanguine temperament, 
Stendhal goes on to conclude:
Le medecin, qui verra les signes physiques, s'attendra aux effets moraux. Le 
philosophe, qui trouvera les signes moraux, sera confirme dans ses observations 
par l'habitude du corps.9
This simple but far-reaching assertion takes as its foundation one of the major planks 
upon which Cabanis rests his thesis. For it was the latter's objective, as Emile Cailliet 
notes, 'de porter les preoccupations de la philosophic dans la medecine et celles de la 
medecine dans la philosophic.'10 Thus, in the preface to the Rapports, Cabanis writes:
Ici, le moraliste et le medecin marchent toujours encore sur la meme ligne. Celui-ci 
n'acquiert la connaissance complete de Vhomme physique, qu'en le considerant 
dans tous les etats par lesquels peuvent le faire passer Faction des corps exterieurs 
et les modifications de sa propre faculte de sentir: celui-la se fait des idees d'autant 
plus etendues et plus justes de Vhomme moral, qu'il l'a suivi plus attentivement 
dans toutes les circonstances ou le placent les chances de la vie, les evenements de 
l'etat social, les divers gouvernements, les lois, et la somme des erreurs ou des 
verites repandues autour de lui.11
Despite the welter of putative sources which Stendhal cites in support of his
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assertions in this domain,12 he remains for his grasp of physiology heavily indebted to 
Cabanis. This is not, however, to suggest that Stendhal approached the highly 
specialised science of physiology with any rigour or real insight. His knowledge in this 
area remains, by his own avowal, superficial and approximate. 'Ce que je dis ici de 
mon temperament,' he writes in his diary of 8 September 1811, 'est done tire du peu 
que je sais en histoire naturelle.'13 On visiting the Natural History Museum in Florence 
towards the end of the same month, he would note: 'Je vois avec plaisir des yeiix d'un 
ignorant les muscles et les nerfs, qui sont exprimes tres nettement.'14
These self-avowed limitations notwithstanding, it is important to recognise that the 
nature and emphasis of Stendhal's 'materialism' undergoes a profound change in the 
transition from Hobbes to Cabanis.15 For there is a very substantial distinction to be 
made between the philosophy expounded by these two thinkers. There has been an 
almost universal tendency among scholars to neglect the distinctions between those 
philosophers who are held to have influenced Stendhal's thought. We find the names of 
Hobbes, Helvetius, Condillac, d'Holbach, Tracy and Cabanis cited quite 
indiscriminately, as though they were so many purveyors of the same essential corpus 
of ideas. Thus Stendhal is dubbed a 'disciple of the Ideologues and the 
eighteenth-century mechanists', or a 'loyal disciple of Helvetius and the Ideologists,'16 
with no recognition of the problems which this poses for any complete or consistent 
appreciation of his thought. 'Hobbes, Condillac, Helvetius, Cabanis, Tracy sont les 
seules autorites qu'il invoque, et il leur resta fidele jusqu'au dernier jour,' writes Arthur 
Chuquet.17 Yet one cannot, in any meaningful sense of the term, remain 'faithful' to all 
of these thinkers at once. Part of our purpose in this chapter is to demonstrate the 
critical importance of distinctions that are to be made between and among such thinkers, 
and to refine thereby our understanding of what a reading of them had to offer 
Stendhal.
It is a curious irony of language that the term 'materialism', as applied to a great 
metaphysical thinker like Hobbes, should denote such a highly abstractive 
philosophical scheme, so apparently removed in its terms of reference from the concrete 
realities of the observable world.18 Matter in motion may be all very well as a principle; 
but how does it correspond to observed reality? This was no easy issue to resolve, as 
Stendhal had discovered to his chagrin in wrestling with the precepts of Hobbes's 
philosophy and attempting to relate these to reality as he perceived it. The endeavour, as 
we have seen, was to last only as long as the drafting of the Filosofia Nova: the matter 
of a few short weeks.
• Cabanis, on the other hand, brings to Stendhal a theory which could be readily 
related to the world around him. For this reason, he would exercise a much more
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meaningful and a much more enduring appeal for a mind which, as Stendhal himself 
concedes, needs to see what it thinks. 'J'ai la qualite la plus essentielle peut-etre a 
l'homme qui veut devenir poete,’ we read in Stendhal's notebook for August 1803, 
'une imagination excessivement vive, qui voit tout ce qu'elle pense. La preuve est que 
je ne puis pas faire d'abstraction complete.'19 The sketches and diagrams with which 
Stendhal adorns his manuscripts provide, of course, the most striking evidence of this 
tendency. It is a tendency, moreover, which is apparent from the outset in his reading 
of Hobbes, when he recognises his proneness to conceive of ideas as images. 'Presque 
tous nos souvenirs sont images, du moins chez moi qui aime a voir,' he notes in a 
digression relating to Hobbes's use of the word 'conception'. He gives an example: 
'Au mot de son je vois la grande cloche de saint Andre en balanfcant].'20 No less does 
the abstract idea of 'study', prompted by the same reading of Hobbes, conjure up for 
Stendhal a very concrete image: 'Cette idee est image chez moi. Je me figure my 
great-father a son bureau vert dans son cabinet sur la terrasse, lisant.'21
Under the influence of Cabanis, this tendency to translate the most abstract notions 
into concrete terms would be given renewed impetus. In the Rapports du physique et 
du moral de Vhomme, Stendhal encountered a thinker who eschewed abstraction to 
concentrate upon a world of concrete, visible realities. It is noteworthy that, in the 
Souvenirs d'egotisme, it is Cabanis, not Hobbes, who will be dubbed 'le pere du 
materialisme.'22 Stendhal's claim, in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, that he took a 
copy of Cabanis with him on the Russian campaign is, in this sense, a very meaningful 
one.23 For the simple fact of being in society with other human beings — whether it be 
on the steppes of Russia or in the salons of Paris — allowed him to put the 
physiologist's theories to the test. He might misread the signs, he might even distort the 
theories themselves;24 but he would have the impression of renouncing, as he puts it, 
'de vaines conjectures' for '[des] connaissances positives.'25 It is not without 
significance that the notes on temperament which Stendhal had extracted from Cabanis 
with his friend Crozet in 1811 were to be found among his luggage on the Silesian 
campaign of 1813.26
The reflections on temperament which proliferate (from 1811, notably) in 
Stendhal's writings do appear to bear out these observations. Whether it be a matter of 
judging himself,27 or his friends and acquaintances,28 or a particular genie,29 or a 
dramatic character,30 or a historical figure 31 or a whole people or nation,32 the 
principles remain as applicable as they are apprehensible. 'Tous les amours, toutes les 
imaginations,' Stendhal will assert with confidence in De I'Amour, 'prennent dans les 
individus la couleur des six temperaments.'33 Though an infinite number of possible 
permutations will determine the precise hue of passion in any given case, the same 
broad categories could provide a telling index for the discerning eye. While she
256
over-schematises the issue, crediting Stendhal with an easier passage through the 
School of Reason than we have seen to be warranted, Francine Marill Alberes has some 
point in asserting: ’Stendhal avait deja appris l'art du raisonnement, il apprendra dans 
Cabanis l'art de l'observation.’34
There is a further important sense in which Cabanis was to appeal to Stendhal's 
mind in a way that Hobbes could never have done. Stendhal was, as Maurice Larkin 
observes,35 intensely preoccupied with Vhomme superieur and the factors to which the 
latter owed his outstanding qualities. The notion that human potential and achievement 
are, in part at least, the product of one's organic constitution provides Stendhal with 
some means both of accounting for the obvious disparities that exist between men and 
of rationalising the superior talents of the extraordinary individual. The six broad 
categories of temperament proposed by Cabanis did not, as Stendhal recognises, 
preclude an infinite number of possible 'combinaisons*.36 The fundamental datum of 
temperament was then overlain with a whole range of regional, climatic and regiminal 
factors, before educative processes, political regimes, historical moment or chance 
came into play. It is as the result of this complex amalgam of innate and environmental 
influences that each individual lives out his own very particular destiny.
Cabanis thus furnishes a much more substantial and comprehensive basis for 
explaining human character and behaviour than had the thoroughgoing 
environmentalism of a thinker such as Helvetius, with his exclusive insistence on 
education and circumstance. Michel Crouzet is well founded in his judgment of Cabanis 
as 'le plus synthetique' of all Stendhal's maitres, 'puisqu’il admettait l'interaction du 
moral et du physique, de l'acquis et de l'organique, du milieu naturel et du milieu 
humain, de l’interieur et de l'exterieur.'37 It was in the reduction of a complex and 
bewildering world to a number of strong, clear principles that the attraction of Cabanis 
lay. In the theory of the temperaments as Stendhal integrates it into his view of man, 
Remi Bosselaers discerns 'le sens du relatif, du complexe, de l’interpenetration des 
facteurs, sens auquel s'alliait d'ailleurs, par le plus etrange des contrastes, la tendance a 
la systematisation, a la schematisation generalisante.'38 Thus the 'great achiever', the 
'man of action', becomes synonymous for Stendhal with the bilious temperament,39 
the lover and artist with the melancholic.40 Such designations were of particular 
significance for an aspiring man of letters. For in the theories of Cabanis, Stendhal 
comes to recognise at last some means whereby cognisance might be taken of the 
irrational dimension in man, a means whereby the Philosopher, if he could not be the 
Poet, might at least arrive at a better understanding of the factors that made the poet 
what he was. 'Pour traiter les problemes qui s'offrent a lui, ceux de la creation et plus 
tard ceux de l'amour,' writes Francine Marill Alberes,
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Stendhal abandonne l'enseignement d'Helvetius et de Tracy pour recourir a une 
explication physiologique et positive de tout ce qui semble irrationnel chez 
l'homme, le genie et la passion. La solution physiologique apportee'par Cabanis le 
seduit par la facilite qu'elle presente. Le temperament de l'homme suffit a motiver 
ses productions litteraires et artistiques.41
The privileged status accorded in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie to Cabanis, and 
to a lesser degree Pinel, underlines very clearly the alliance which Stendhal had by then 
come to recognise between philosophy and physiology. It is notable that his definition 
of the 'philosopher' expands from this point to admit a number of eminent medical 
practitioners. Thus, in the Vie de Rossini, the Neapolitan doctor Domenico Cotugno 
will be deemed a 'philosophe, car ce grand medecin Cotugno etait digne de ce titre.'42 
In similar vein, we find the physician Luigi Cabonargi feted by Stendhal, in a letter of 
1835, as a 'vrai philosophe'.43 In a subsequent letter, written to Domenico Fiore in 
1839, it is the anatomist Luigi Metaxa — 'un philosophe de soixante-trois ans' — 
whom we find celebrated in these terms.44
Stendhal's respect for the advancing science of physiology, with all its apparent 
clinical scruple, is not difficult to appreciate. Though he is aware of the tentative 
character of a science still in its infancy, physiology provides him as an adult with that 
haven from hypocrisy which he had sought in mathematics as a child. In this sense, 
Cabanis provides the counterpoint par excellence to the charlatanry and obscurantism 
with which Restoration France becomes synonymous for Stendhal. The point is clearly 
made in a contribution to the London Magazine of September 1825:
Toute la jeunesse d'ici lit l'ouvrage immortel de Cabanis sur les rapports du 
Physique et du Moral de VHomme. Le clerge en est furieux, aussi donne-t-il 
chaque annee des places de professeur dans les seminaires publics aux imbeciles et 
aux hypocrites qui ont tente de refuter Cabanis.45
Again in the New Monthly Magazine of November 1826, Cabanis is presented as a 
champion of philosophical probity and, ipso facto , an enemy of the ruling 'parti 
devot'46 All that might tend to confirm 'l'influence des causes physiques' and to 
substantiate 'les mechantes doctrines de Cabanis,’ declares Stendhal, is outlawed by an 
establishment engaged in a holy war against the progress of science:
Plusieurs hommes de science, dont l'existence depend des traitements de quelques 
places insignifiantes, ont du refuser de publier leurs recentes decouvertes 
physiologiques, de peur d'etre accuses de jeter une lumiere. nouvelle sur les 
rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme41
The years 1805 and 1811 respectively occupy a crucial place in the charting of 
Stendhal's philosophical development. For it is through Cabanis, as we have argued, 
that he comes to acknowledge the deficiency in the tools with which he has sought
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hitherto to construct his definition of man. Cabanis, Stendhal would claim in the Vie de 
Henry Brulard, was one of those authors who helped him to 'complete his 
education.'48 The physiologist's name, moreover, appears'repeatedly in the course of 
reading which he prescribes for his sister Pauline's instruction 49 as it would appear 
among those few chosen authors who, Stendhal reflects, would have provided a 
privileged Italian youth with a sound education had that country benefited from the 
establishment of an Ecole Polytechnique under Napoleon.50 Though he might continue, 
through allegiance to his earlier division of man, to cling to that 'dualistic residue 
related to the parlance of a body and of a spirit' which, according to Sergio Moravia,51 
had been the mark of Cabanis's sensationalist predecessors, Stendhal would 
nonetheless evince an increasingly acute awareness of man's physical constitution as a 
determining agency in human affairs. Thus, ip a review of Francis Broussais’s De 
Virritation et de la folie for the New Monthly Magazine of September 1828, he takes the 
opportunity to praise an 'ouvrage dans lequel les rapports du physique et du moral sont 
etablis sur les bases de la medecine.' It is, he asserts pointedly, 'un livre plein de faits 
et d'observations. II attaque les nouveaux philosophes de l'ecole de MM. 
Royer-Collard et Cousin, auxquels il donne le nom de "Kanto-Platoniciens".'52
This defence of medical philosophy against the 'fiction poetique' of the 
'philosophes qui sont en guerre avec Condillac et Cabanis'53 had, by 1828, become an 
established feature of Stendhal's writing. Though the Vies de Haydn, de Mozart et de 
Metastase reflects already something of this stance, it is in VHistoire de la peinture en 
Italie that Stendhal gives the first clear articulation of his philosophy as it had evolved 
by the end of the Empire and the first years of the Restoration. Contained here is a 
whole corpus of ideas that were to find expression and development throughout the 
range of Stendhal's later work. In its pages, writes Maurice Bardeche, 'celui qui sait 
lire decouvre deja tout.'54 The point is vigorously endorsed by others. For Paul 
Arbelet, VHistoire de la peinture en Italie can be considered 'le plus substantiel, le plus 
riche en idees' of all Stendhal's works,55 whilst for Pierre Martino it is 'un livre de 
pure ideologic', 'la clef de toute son oeuvre critique.'56
In a work which undertakes to rationalise the canons of taste governing the 
production and appreciation of the visual arts throughout the ages, however, it is easy 
to overlook the extent to which Stendhal's ideas both derive from and reaffirm a much 
broader conception of human nature. It has been an unfortunate tendency of some 
critics to perceive this latter dimension as peripheral, even superfluous, to the substance 
of the work. Thus, for example, Margaret Tillett, for whom Stendhal's observations on 
wider questions such as national temperament and education are nothing more than an 
otiose excursion into 'borrowed theories and generalizations.' There is, declares Tillett, 
'nothing more boring than dated pronouncements on national temperament and
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education.'57 Certainly, there was little that was new by 1817 in the relativity of taste as 
a principle, or in the notion that contingent factors such as climate, education and 
physical constitution had a modulating role to play in the determination of individual 
and national character. To find in such factors nothing more than an, irksome 
superfluity, however, is to misappreciate the way Stendhal perceived his task and the 
manner in which he defined — or, more appropriately, refused to define — the 
boundaries of his subject. For Stendhal's whole endeavour — and, one can rightly say, 
his whole achievement — in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie was precisely to inscribe 
the fine arts within a context that was constrained by no narrow technical limits, but 
addressed the full range of social and cultural influences which impinge upon the artist. 
Stendhal's originality here lies, as D.F. Wakefield argues, not in invention but in 
exploitation:
Where Stendhal differs [...] from his eighteenth-century precursors is that he 
brings these social and cultural factors directly to bear on the visual arts, whereas 
for most earlier writers the latter were of only incidental concern. Stendhal was one 
of the first writers to recognize that the arts were in a state of constant interplay 
with other human activities. Indeed, one of his great strengths as a writer is his 
refusal to divide things up into separate compartments; he was never tempted to 
detach arts, music or any other creative activity and to raise it on an artificial 
pedestal.58
With this in mind, let us return to the question of what VHistoire de la peinture en 
Italie reveals about Stendhal's conception of man. For there has, as we have suggested 
above, been a tendency towards misapprehension here, with regard in particular to the 
contribution of Cabanis. Thus the latter is often seen as nothing more than a ready 
source of plagiarism, a lesser Carpani or Lanzi,59 used by Stendhal to give a semblance 
of physiological legitimacy to his observations on 'moral' man.60 The influence of 
Cabanis, however, is not restricted to those borrowings — on the temperaments 
notably — which incorporated verbatim into the work, but, as our discussion will 
attempt to make clear, informs the whole of the philosophical logic which underpins 
Stendhal's thesis throughout.
When VHistoire de la peinture en Italie was first conceived in 1811, the influence 
of Cabanis was in its ascendancy.61 At a moment when Stendhal and Crozet were 
extracting wholesale from the 'Sixieme Memoire' of the Rapports du physique et du 
moral de Vhomme,62 the former entered a significant note in his diary. 'Nos jugements 
sont exclusifs et tranchants,' he writes: -
Je ne vois rien de si sot, par exemple, que le voyage de M. Creuze. Mais il faut 
ajouter a chaque phrase ces mots: "pour notre caractere et notre temperament." [...] 
Son recit est bon pour ceux qui lui ressemblent, le notre pour les etres formes par 
le meme climat, la meme education, etc., etc., que nous.63
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Such remarks betoken a clear preoccupation with the relativity of human character. 
Taste becomes a function not only of education or cultural environment but of one's 
very organic constitution, as it is determined from within by temperament, from 
without by climate. The diary entry in question belongs to a period during which, as we 
have noted, Stendhal was increasingly concerned to apply the theories of Cabanis, or at 
least to seek evidence for them, in. the examples of humanity which he has before 
him.64 It is a period, too, in which man is seen more and more by Stendhal as a 
constituent and indissociable part of Nature. As Nature herself varies from place to 
place, so too does human nature. Thus, in the same diary of March 1811, Stendhal — 
writing, as he points out, 'dans un appartement parfaitement convenable' — reflects 
upon what might be gained from a visit to Sicily, where 'la nature humaine [...] est 
aussi forte et aussi curieuse a etudier que celle des plantes et des rochers.’65 A similar 
suggestion is present in the designation of Cimarosa, in the same diary entry, as 'cette 
belle plante napolitai'ne.'66
One did not, however, have to journey so far afield in order to encounter marked 
variations in human nature. Travelling from Paris to Rouen in April 1811, Stendhal 
notes in his diary: 'Le climat a change cinq ou six fois pendant notre voyage; en 
g[ener]al, il a ete froid et desagreable et contraire a mon imagination.' He then goes on 
to establish a pointed comparison between the habitat and character of the Parisian and 
Rouennais respectively:
On voit que le sol est bien superieur a celui qui environne Paris et qui presente
l'embleme exact de la chaleur des ames de ce pays-la.67
On the same trip, Stendhal suggests a further rapprochement between physical 
landscape and human character. 'Les habitants des cotes,' he reflects, 'doivent avoir 
l'esprit moins etroit que les habitants de l'interieur.'68 Though the argument which 
Stendhal adduces in order to sustain this suggestion is highly tenuous, a heightened 
sensitivity to the relationship between man and the wider environment is once again in 
evidence. On his journey to Italy in the late summer of the same year, Stendhal will 
pursue this parallel between geographical location and human character. The arte di 
godere which he encounters in Milan, he concludes, is not a reasoned attitude but 
springs rather from the prevailing climate and recent government.69 Even that most 
fleeting expression of human sentiment, laughter, is invested with a quasi-physical root 
which defines it from one place to another. 'Quelle difference cette diversite du sol sur 
lequel il croit introduit-elle dans le rire?' muses Stendhal in his diary of 17 February 
1813.70
These few examples demonstrate what was to become an increasingly marked
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i, feature of Stendhal's thought: the identification between human nature and experience 
on the one hand, and the wider world of natural phenomena on the other. To liken 
something as intangible as laughter to vegetation was to suggest that no aspect of the 
human condition was impervious to the influence of a wider realm of Nature. In 
VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, human intelligence likewise finds itself defined as an 
organic entity. 'Mais les philosophes,' writes Stendhal, 'savent que l'esprit humain est 
une plante fort delicate que l'on ne peut arreter dans une de ses branches sans la faire 
perir.'71 In Rome, Naples et Florence, a similar perspective is applied to the fine arts, 
'cette espece d'ecume' which, Stendhal asserts, is 'le produit charmant d'une 
fermentation generale et profonde dans un peuple.'72 In a note scribbled on a volume of 
Shakespeare, Stendhal takes up and develops this notion:
Les beaux-arts sont le produit d'une fermentation dans un peuple. II ne faut pas 
croire qu'en imitant par les moyens artificiels l'ecume produite par cette 
fermentation l'on aura les memes effets. D[omini]que.73
As Emile Talbot points out, there is nothing original in such use of the plant 
analogy to describe the creative process 74 For natural metaphors of this sort, however, 
Stendhal would develop a marked predilection which extends far beyond the artistic 
context. 'La societe,' we read in Rome, Naples et Florence en 1817, 'est une fleur de 
plaisir qui ne peut naitre que lorsque l'eau de la source, troublee par la tempete des 
revolutions, a depose le limon de l'esprit de parti, et repris peu a peu sa premiere 
transparence.'75 The celebrated concept of 'crystallisation' itself is, of course, but the 
incorporation into the sphere of human emotions of a mineralogical phenomenon, a 
metaphor in which Jean Theodorides discerns the influence of the naturalist Victor 
Jacquemont.76 To interpret such images as mere rhetorical conceits, however, would 
be to misunderstand something of Stendhal's intention. Man does not exist in vacuo. 
He is no longer for Stendhal an abstract mathematical value, but a physical organism, 
the variable and unpredictable result of a complex interplay of air and earth, 
temperament and environment. In his diary of February 1815, Stendhal makes the 
following entry:
Un vent chaud succedant a un vent froid me donne une sensibilite vive pour la 
musique qui me porte presque a verser des larmes. La sensibilite physique est sur 
les cotes, en dessous des cotes, entre les cotes et le bassin, et sur les demieres 
cotes.
En fevrier 1815,1 [am] working to the temp[eraments].77
This attempt to run even the finest sensibilities to ground, to define for them a 
place, quite bereft of mystique, in the mundane world of physical reality, is an 
important feature of the lessons in physiology which Stendhal had absorbed (even if, as 
we noted in the preceding chapter, he is not always quite as ready to embrace the 
implications of this rationale). Man is neither above nor outside Nature, but is inscribed
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within the natural order and is subject to the laws which govern natural phenomena. 
Such is the very premise upon which VHistoire de la peinture en Italie rests. The 
contribution of Cabanis in this respect, far from being incidental, is central to 
Stendhal's conviction. For it is the physiologist's express contention that man is no less 
a part of the natural order than animals, vegetables or minerals, and that means should 
be sought of evolving a single science which would embrace Nature in its entirety. 
R.W. Hepburn reflects an important aspect of this rationale when he writes:
To count man as part and parcel of nature emphasizes the continuity of the human, 
animal, organic, and inorganic worlds and suggests that human behavior may be 
amenable to the same kinds of investigation that are effective in studying other 
domains of nature.78
One of the most striking examples of this notion of a unified nature as it relates to 
Stendhal is to be found in the chapter of VHistoire de la peinture en Italie which 
immediately precedes the discussion of the temperaments. Reflecting on the desirability 
of combining tinexorable sagacite du philosophe et la science physiologique du grand 
medecin,’ Stendhal goes on to speculate, portentously, about the future place of 
chemical and electrical properties within the study of man. Might one not some day, he 
ponders, be able to measure with scientific precision man's innermost thoughts?
Cette chose, si difficile en 1789, sera peut-etre assez simple en 1900. Qui sait si 
l'on ne verra pas que le phosphore et l'esprit vont ensemble? Alors on trouvera un 
phosphorometre pour les corps vivants. Peut-etre parviendra-t-on a saisir entre le 
galvanisme, l'electricite et le magnetisme, certains fluides dont on entrevoit tout au 
plus l'existence.79
The identification between man and the natural world is such, Stendhal is here 
suggesting, that human beings may be explicable in terms not only of animate Nature 
but of inanimate Nature too. The continuum is complete. Stendhal's reflections here 
echo closely those of Cabanis, who concludes from the results of experiments carried 
out on corpses that 'la quantite de phosphore qui se developpe apres la mort est 
proportionnelle a l'activite du systeme nerveux pendant la vie. [...] II parait meme que 
l'organe nerveux est une espece de condensateur, ou plutot un veritable reservoir 
d'electricite, comme de phosphore.’80 Stendhal is doing more in the above passage, 
however, than merely aping Cabanis's pioneering interest in phosphorus, electricity 
and the like.81 He is laying the ground for a much more general — and, in cauda 
venenum, an altogether more radical — point, which serves as a conclusion to the 
chapter in question and a prelude to the pages on physiology drawn largely from 
Cabanis:
Enfin il faut se figurer que ce n'est que pour la commodite du langage que l'on dit 
le physique et le moral. Lorsqu'on a brise une montre, ou est alle le mouvement?82
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L*Homme m achine
If one were seeking a single passage in Stendhal with which to substantiate his 
reputation as an uncompromising materialist, one would be hard pushed to better the 
foregoing. Certainly, Louis Crozet, entrusted with the publication arrangements for 
VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, felt constrained to mitigate the audacity of the passage 
in question by adding what he describes in a letter to Stendhal as 'une note 
emphatiquo-comique':83
On sent fort bien qu'on ne parle ici que de Yetre vivant, et de l'intime liaison qui,
pendant la vie, rend le physique et le moral inseparables. A Dieu ne plaise qu'on
veuille nier l'immortalite de l’ame, la plus noble consolation de l'humanite!84
In describing the human economy in mechanistic rather than animistic terms, in 
banishing the ghost so unequivocally from the machine, Stendhal was, of course, 
challenging the whole basis of an incorporeal soul. The analogy of the clock was a 
familiar enough item in the repertoire of eighteenth-century mechanistic materialism.85 
La Mettrie, to cite but the most notorious example, had employed it to predictable ends 
in UHomme machine*6 The mechanistic language and imagery which are to be found 
in Stendhal echo something of La Mettrie's iconoclastic intent, evidencing as they do a 
desire to 'deflate the conceits of mankind,' to undercut the claims of Christian dogma 
and the anthropocentrism which they implied.87 Set against the tendency to see man as 
an elevated being, with a 'soul' that is the repository of some essential quality (a 
perception which, we recall, bedevils his 'materialism' from the outset), there is in 
Stendhal a countervailing tendency to drag man down, to consign him to an abjectness 
that he shares with other elements of the material universe. To relegate man to the status 
of machine was to deny him any intrinsically higher realm, function or destiny than 
those reserved for all other components of the physical world.88 Hence the definition of 
friendship which, in a letter written from Moscow to Felix Faure in October 1812, 
Stendhal frames in the stark language of animal attraction and physico-chemical affinity: 
'Deux corps se rapprochent; il nait de la chaleur et une fermentation, mais tout etat de 
cette nature est passager.'89 Hence, too, the assertion, made in a letter of June 1810, 
that 'la connaissance de la machine nommee homme' should be acquired as the 
anatomist acquires knowledge of corpses: heedless of 'la mauvaise odeur', the 
philosopher must 'dissect' man and study, part by part, his moral characteristics — 
'passions, gouts, caracteres' — with the same scientific rigour as the anatomist applies 
in studying 'la forme des muscles, nerfs, etc., etc.'90 The unhappy lot of those, 
'machines vicieuses' called men, we recall, had early constituted for Stendhal a
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powerful argument against a beneficent deity.91 Much later, in the Souvenirs 
d'egotisme, he holds still to this line of reasoning, shifting the weight of moral 
responsibility from man to the forces that act upon and against him:
Malgre les malheurs de mon ambition, je ne crois point les hommes mechants; je 
ne me crois point persecute par eux, je les regarde comme des machines poussees, 
en France, par la vanite et, ailleurs, par toutes les;passions, la vanite y comprise.92
For all that, however, Stendhal is no 'mechanist* in any true philosophical sense of 
the term. For he reserves the licence to ascribe to man an unpredictable, spontaneous, 
'inspirational* quality, the capacity, through his powers of reason, passion or instinct, 
to give the lie to any hollow mechanistic logic. The concept of 'mechanism' sits ill with 
the dynamic, energetic, wilful qualities which Stendhal so prizes in those human beings 
for whom he reserves his admiration. For the 'mechanist', writes D.G. Charlton,
Nature is a perfectly-ordered machine, operating in a fixed, unaltering way in 
accordance with the laws of mathematics. It is a perfect 'clock', [...] a completed 
and immutable system, determined in all its operations, generating no novelties, 
and in that way it is passive, not active in the manner of "animism" earlier.
The mechanist's world is, as a result,
a somewhat grey, geometric world, composed in essence of such monochrome 
abstractions as "extension" and "motion" 93
One need not insist upon the distance which separates such a world from that which is 
evoked in Stendhal's writings, with all their deference to the human being's capacity 
for 'inspired' self-assertion through individualistic endeavour and creative energy. We 
have seen, in the distortions which he visits upon Hobbes and Helvetius alike, 
Stendhal's failure to subscribe to the full implications of a mechanistic conception of 
man. For the latter, by its very definition, demands the consistent reduction of human 
reason, sentiment and behaviour to knowable and invariable laws of causal necessity.94 
To retain any realm within which these laws might not apply, where autonomy of will 
and spontaneity of endeavour are ascribed to the human being, is to confound the 
world-picture of the mechanist with the orthodox view of human nature with which it 
takes issue.
For this reason, one is compelled to qualify Robert Niklaus's suggestion that 
Stendhal's fascination was reserved for a notion of man 'reduced to a clockwork' 
mechanism, a compound of intellect, emotion and sensuality which can be accurately 
gauged.'95 That Stendhal was fascinated by the 'mechanics' of man and society, there 
can be no doubt; that he sought laws (self-interest, environmental determinism, 
heredity, historical moment), and an idiom ('la machine nommee homme'; 'la force du
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ressort'; 'la machinerie [sociale])96 to account for human nature and experience in these 
terms, is equally clear. Yet there is a point beyond which he considers a mechanistic 
explanation of the world injurious to what is most precious in man; a point beyond 
which his fascination is engaged not by what is seen to be in keeping with pre-ordained 
mechanical laws, but rather by what appears to transcend or to fall without such laws: 
in events, the unpredictable, 'Yimprevu, le divin imprevu';97 in men, the exceptional, 
the individual of extraordinary genius, talent or energy.98 Any view, however partial, 
of Stendhal's world cannot but confirm that his fascination is compelled less by those 
who are seen to bear their determinism with fortitude than by those who, in asserting 
themselves through wilful energy, appear to challenge its very basis 99
The more tightly one circumscribes the notion of 'mechanism', the more Stendhal 
escapes it. The definition of man as a machine was, of course, pursued quite literally by 
a number of eighteenth-century determinists, in the wake of Descartes's designation of 
animals as ingenious machines.100 The philosophy which M.E. Carcassonne ascribes 
to Stendhal, 'cette philosophic materielle qui [voyait] partout machines, rouages et 
ressorts,'101 is one, however, which the latter embraced only fitfully and superficially 
at best. Though he does on occasion evoke the metaphor — by then commonplace — 
of the 'man-machine',102 his perception of the living being is much more akin to 
Cabanis's 'machine vivante'103 than to the 'relatively undifferentiated, dynamically 
inadequate notion of machine' which, as Aram Vartanian argues, characterised the 
mechanistic philosophy of a thinker such as La Mettrie.104 The point is one which 
Michel Crouzet recognises when he discerns in Stendhal's physiological materialism 'le 
recours a une substance, a une pseudo-substance, la vie, cette "valeur radicale" du 19e 
siecle ou mieux, ce "quasi-transcendental" qui constitue [...], du cote de l'etre, un 
horizon inaccessible de la connaissance.'105 As Crouzet rightly notes, Stendhal's 
continued use of the term 'ame' in this context — 'avoir une ame, de Yame, exprimer 
son ame, avoir une ame de telle qualite, parler a Yame, montrer son ame' — takes him 
far beyond any literal mechanistic materialism.106 Though he might seek at times to 
reduce humanity to the 'clockwork mechanism' evoked by Niklaus and Carcassonne, 
man remains ever for Stendhal, in Crouzet's fine expression, 'un tout superieur a ses 
parties.'107
The difficulty which Stendhal encounters in adhering to any consistent 
mechanico-materialist definition of man is symptomatic of the wider problem posed for 
philosophers who, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, had the task of redefining 
man's place in a scheme of things bereft of moral design. As I.F. Knight argues, the 
development from Cartesian mechanism, with its view of animals as unconscious 
automata-, to the later 'vital mechanism', with its insistence.on an active organism 
equipped with the powers of purposive motion, did not resolve 'the philosophical
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problems raised by mechanistic materialism.1 Instead, it left philosophers more than 
ever 'caught between contradictory intellectual commitments':
on the one hand, they wanted to integrate man fully into the order of nature, to 
explain man and all his works in terms of mechanical laws just as they explained 
the phenomena of physics; on the other hand, as residuary legatees of the Western 
humanist tradition, they were concerned to preserve man's uniqueness as a rational 
and moral being.108
Such is the dilemma of which Stendhal in turn partakes. The preponderant role 
which he assigns at times to the faculty of reason, together with his ineradicable 
conception of I'ame as the repository of some indefinable quality of 'self, fly in the 
face of any strict mechanistic materialism. Do not the very deficiencies of the human 
economy militate against a mechanistic view of man? So much, certainly, is suggested 
in Rome, Naples et Florence, where Stendhal contrasts the human organism — in its 
unreliability, its susceptibility to fault — with the watch to which he had compared it in 
VHistoire de la peinture en Italie:
Breguet fait une montre qui pendant vingt ans ne se derange pas, et la miserable 
machine, a travers laquelle nous vivons, se derange et produit la douleur au moins 
une fois la semaine.109
In illustrating, by means of this simple analogy, the inadequacy of the 
man-machine equation, Stendhal was in tune with a current of informed opinion that 
had been growing since the mid-eighteenth century. For it seemed increasingly clear, to 
those engaged in the medical sciences particularly, that living organisms exhibited an 
irreducible vitality, a dynamic quality which could not, as Sergio Moravia observes, be 
adequately accounted for by the 'mechanical presuppositions and mathematical 
procedures employed with success in other branches of knowledge.'110 Moravia puts 
the question confronting the eighteenth-century medecin-philosophe thus:
Could one really believe that life is nothing but the movement of solid and liquid 
parts; that organic matter is identical with inert matter; that the living being is really 
devoid of principles and forces that are in some way active; in short, that the 
organism is really a machine, functioning according to processes and laws of an 
exclusively physical and mechanical nature?111
The answer to this question was increasingly, towards the turn of the century, to be a 
negative one. 'The undeveloped state of chemistry and biology was,' as John Lough 
suggests, 'responsible for the definition of man as a machine, common to all materialist 
philosophers of the eighteenth century.'112 It was inevitable, therefore, that progress in 
these fields should bring about some revaluation of man as a component of the natural 
world. As R.E. Schofield argues, the late eighteenth century, with its advances in the 
medical and natural sciences, is characterised by a 'flight from mechanism', an 'escape 
from mechanical reductionism, in which causation is sought in undifferentiated matter,
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motion, and forces...'113 Physiology in particular, as Schofield observes, broke away 
from the mechanistic theory by developing an 'empirical nosology' and 'erecting a 
barrier of vitalism behind which it defined its own problems and modes of 
investigation.'114
Beyond Mechanism: Cabanis and the Vital Self
Of this 'escape from mechanical reductionism', Cabanis provides a case in point. 
Reluctant, as Aram Vartanian points out, 'to commit himself, lexically or conceptually, 
to iatromechanism,' Cabanis 'nowhere uses the expression homme machine,' 
preferring instead 'the somewhat ambiguous coinage: Uhomme physique'115 For it 
was his contention that there existed within organic systems 'des forces qui ne sont 
proprement ni mecaniques, ni chimiques,' but which argued instead for what he 
postulates — taking care to avoid any suggestion of a spiritual 'essence' or 'soul' — as 
'un principe, ou une faculte vivifiante, que la nature fixe dans les germes...'116 The 
language is tentative and approximate; but it serves to support Vartanian's view that, 
between the homme machine and the machine vivante, 'there was, undeniably, a 
considerable distance which reflected the evolution of physiology and medicine from 
1750 to 1800.'117 By the turn of the century, under the influence of Bordeu and the 
Vitalists of the Montpellier Medical School notably, important changes had been 
wrought in the conception of life and the living organism, changes that would filter to 
Stendhal through his reading of Cabanis and his lively interest in the medical theories of 
his day.118 Moravia sums up of the development in a passage that is worth quoting in 
extenso:
As for the living individual, it is no longer (not even metaphorically) a machine, 
but an etre sensible. It is an organic being made up of flesh, nerves, and muscles; 
possessing dynamic forces and impulses; and characterized by processes that have 
nothing to do with the working of a machine. This image of the living being, 
opportunely elaborated (by Cabanis especially) would soon be contrasted, not only 
to the iatromechanical model of the man-machine, but also to Condillac's model of 
the man-statue. Unlike the machine and the statue, the living organism does not 
lead a life which is exclusively determined by the external environment and its 
modifications. Made up of sentiment and dynamic centers, Bordeu's man 
possesses an internal vitality and activity as well. His organs carry out determined 
functions, produce determined sensations, and interact among one another 
independently from external stimuli. Whereas the sensationalist school stressed (in 
ways sometimes exaggerated dr not adequately justified) the importance of the 
external milieu, Bordeu and the Vitalists centered attention on the organic interieur 
of man — a motion which some late eighteenth-century philosophes would find 
very stimulating.119
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How, then, does all of this relate to Stendhal? The answer is: in a very significant 
way. For his thought moves between the poles outlined above, between the view of 
man as a simple — inert — product of his environment (a view dear to the current of 
eighteenth-century thought represented by Condillac and Helvetius) and a point much 
closer to the 'dynamic-vitalistic' conception of man described by Moravia and reflected 
to some degree in the pages of Cabanis.120 For Stendhal clearly came to see the 
organism not as a ‘mere intermediary between milieu and ame\ but, to remain with 
Moravia's terms, as the 'active protagonist of a complex vitalphenomenology.'121 
Though much closer to the former position in his earliest reflections, Stendhal is 
disposed, under the influence of Cabanis, to integrate into his view of man a whole 
range of inherent qualities — instinct, temperament, hereditary dispositions, and an 
ill-defined v ital'ressort'122 — which suffice to abolish the notion of man as a tabula 
rasa and to set in train an interactive relationship between the individual and the 
environment, in contradistinction to the one-way process posited by Condillac and 
Helvetius. To the 'one-sided and over-abstract [...] epistemological psychology of 
Locke and Condillac,' writes Aram Vartanian, Cabanis was to bring a 'concrete 
energetic basis.'123 One need reflect only momentarily upon Stendhal's notions of 
energie, force d'ame, volonte and the like to recognise that these develop in ways 
which the influence of external forces alone is patently inadequate to explain. No 
scholar has better expressed the significance of this development in Stendhal's thought 
than Michel Crouzet. For it is the case, as Crouzet notes, that
le disciple des Ideologues, pour qui le moi se deploie comme une suite de relations 
extrinseques a partir d'une "nature" pauvre et "rase", va devier vers la 
proclamation d'un determinisme intrinseque, d'une auto-production du moi, d'un 
fond tenebreux et puissant qui produit tout sans etre produit.124
It is this notion of an 'intrinsic determinism' which has no discernible source 
outside man that comes to distinguish Stendhal from the mechanistic philosophers who 
had early inspired his thinking. 'Penser l'homme en termes mecaniques,' writes Michel 
Delon, 'c'est le reduire a l'etat d'automate, ensemble de pieces detachees, soumis a une 
necessite exterieure.' Delon goes on:
La methode pronee et mise a l'ceuvre par les sensualistes et les materialistes est 
analytique, elle divise, decompose et se condamnerait ainsi a ne rien comprendre 
aux forces qui constituent la vie.125
Of Stendhal's desire to apply just such a method to the study of man we have seen 
evidence in an earlier chapter. In the writings which predate his interest in physiology, 
his language is much more suggestive of a mechanistic conception of man:
Chercher a decomposer toutes les forces qui font agir les homfmes]...
[...] je combine ces forces [les passions] dans des proportions differentes; elles
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produisent des actions.
Je sais bien qu'une certaine passion p a un effet p \
[...] un leger changement dans la tete en fait un grand poete, un grand guerrier, un 
grand geometre, etc.126
Such extracts from Stendhal's early writings echo the mechanistic definition of the 
'will' as nothing more than a link in a chain of causal necessity, the involuntary 
processing, through desire and aversion, of the stimuli to which the individual is 
exposed at any given moment. As Stendhal's thought develops, however, it becomes 
increasingly removed from any such conception of the will as a passive, not to say 
redundant, faculty. For all his early ambition to reduce human character and sentiment 
to their barest, most clinical terms, Stendhal will prove sensitive to a view of the living 
self as an entity animated by principles which defy any simple deterministic 
explanation.127 The notion of an obscure inner force, or ressort, will come to constitute 
an important factor in his concept of energy notably. One might, like Helvetius, hold 
self-interest as it is perceived and directed by reason to be the ultimate arbiter of all that 
man might be or do. Yet it became clear to Stendhal that no faculty of reason, however 
enlightened, could suffice to stifle the irrational impulse within man, or to provide any 
invariable, predictable model of human behaviour applicable to all.128 Within this 
perspective, Stendhal, as F.P. Bowman acknowledges, would come to insist upon the 
'blind' force of energy as a vital component of man:
If he still defines happiness in terms of enlightened self-interest, its pursuit 
involves recourse to irrational or inspired action; the 'naturel' which can lead to 
happiness tends to be the contrary of 'la logique'...129
The importance of Cabanis as a counterpoint to Helvetius in all of this is crucial. 
For Stendhal's philosophy as it evolves under the influence of Cabanis, far from 
endeavouring to reduce humanity to some all-embracing mechanical regime, retains a 
respect for the vitality, the uniqueness, even the mystery and unpredictability, of the 
living organism.130 Rooted in 'la zone des tenebres biologiques ou energetiques,' the 
vitality of the individual, as Michel Crouzet observes, will take on for Stendhal a 
mysterious quality, existing 'independamment de toute cause, comme effet pur et 
mystere, que les causes extemes peuvent favoriser, jamais creer.'131 The distinction is 
critical. For it opens the way towards a much fuller appreciation of human nature as the 
point of intersection between a predetermined moi and a relentlessly pervasive 
environment. In contrast to the static, reductionist vision of man propounded by the 
mechanists, Cabanis opens up to Stendhal, as Francine Marill Alberes asserts, 'un 
univers en mouvement',
une vision plus complexe et plus riche de l'espece humaine, en la montrant 
soumise a des lois a la fois poetiques et scientifiques, en la reliant a son milieu
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physique et a son cadre naturel.132
The notion of the physical and natural environment is an important one. The most 
telling insights into human nature were to be had, Stendhal would come to believe, by 
no amount of cogitation about man and matter, but by comparative anatomy within and 
between the species and by the extension to man of the natural sciences.133 Nature, as 
we shall see, becomes a central criterion in Stendhal's appreciation of the individual and 
of society alike; le naturel furnishes a standard to be brought to bear against all aspects 
of human sentiment and behaviour. The very concept of the natural as an overriding 
value which is there to be observed or betrayed by man has no place within mechanistic 
determinism as understood above. Within the latter perspective, the distinction between 
nature and artifice is rendered redundant by the fact that all our actions, from the 
simplest to the most contrived, are the necessary — natural — result of a given set of 
determining factors. The distinction which E.B. Tenenbaum signals in Stendhal 
between 'natural' and 'socially conditioned behavior'134 would, in this sense at least, 
have meant little to Hobbes or Helvetius. Still less would these philosophers have 
endorsed the further distinction, to be found in the same critic's discussion of Stendhal, 
between 'conscious self-creation' and 'natural impulse.'135 Yet in this notion of the 
'natural' as a realm apart, a repository of the purest form of selfhood, Stendhal will 
discover an ultima ratio of sorts, a means of measuring man against himself (his own 
inner nature), his fellow men (human nature in general), and a much vaster notion of 
Nature in which humanity is viewed as but part of a universal scale of being.
From the Idea of Matter to the Science of Nature
For these reasons, we contend, and in the light of what has been argued in Chapters IV 
and V above, Stendhal's 'materialism', if it is to be further defined, can more properly 
be termed 'naturalistic' than 'mechanistic'.136 For man is much more akin for Stendhal 
to plant or animal than to machine, and will be integrated, even at this basic level of 
analogy, into a dynamic world of Nature, rather than forming part of any clockwork 
realm of 'bodies in motion', 'statue-men' or 'man-machines'.137 Through the 
ascendancy which Stendhal comes to grant Cabanis over his predecessors, Helvetius 
and Condillac, he takes sides in a debate between 'mechanism' and 'organicism' 
which, as D.G. Charlton observes, constitutes an important element of French 
philosophical thought in the later eighteenth century. For a significant shift was taking 
place between 'the old machine model of the natural world’ and 'the new organicist 
model’:
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The utterly predictable order of nature was being replaced by the unpredictable, 
dynamic power of nature, capable of throwing up novelties and variations not 
fixed in advance. Creative energy from within, not static design from without, was 
increasingly being perceived as a fundamental characteristic of the natural 
world.138
In his reading of the Rapports du physique et du moral de Vhomme, with all that 
work’s anticipations of Lamarck and later theories of transformism, Stendhal bears 
witness to what Charlton describes as 'the gradual replacement of the mechanistic 
concept of nature by a new concept, by a re-interpretation that saw nature as creative, 
dynamic, organic, and self-developing.'139 Man, endowed as he is for Stendhal with 
vital properties and conscious purpose, brings something to the world in which his 
destiny is played out; he is emphatically not the mechanical man who would be required 
to sustain the 'grossly simplified mechanical materialism'140 of La Mettrie, Condillac or 
Helvetius, with all their substantial affinities to Hobbes.141
With the exception of La Mettrie, whom Stendhal appears never to have read, these 
are the thinkers to whom he owes his 'materialism' in its earliest — metaphysical — 
form. From none of these philosophers, however, does Stendhal evolve any notion of 
man as a physical entity. The whole thrust of Cabanis, from the first words of his 
Preface, is in this respect new for Stendhal. 'L'Etude de l'homme physique est 
egalement interessante pour le medecin et pour le moraliste: elle est presque egalement 
necessaire a tous les deux.'142 Man must be studied as a living, breathing, eating, 
reproducing animal. 'La nature produit l'homme avec des organes et des facultes 
determinees’:143 such is the principle which, for all its truistic aspect, informs the 
whole approach and substance of Cabanis's philosophy, with its stress on man as an 
intricately organised creature of flesh and blood.144 Whereas Stendhal's 'materialism' 
in its earliest expression is defined more by what it denies than by what it affirms, his 
thinking takes on a much more positive aspect with Cabanis.
Materialism, in the sense in which the term has been employed in our discussion 
thus far, is a philosophical construct, a model imposed upon the world rather than a 
verifiable representation <9/ it.145 The materialism of Hobbes provides a striking case in 
point. Predicated, as Samuel Mintz puts it, upon a 'gratuitous and unproved' 
assumption (the 'assumption that there can be no other substance but matter'), 
Hobbes's 'philosophical system was a grand imaginative conception — a complex 
structure of ideas having unity, order, coherence.’146 While such qualities may be 
commendable from a strictly rationalistic point of view, materialism thus conceived is 
no more susceptible of definitive demonstration than the dualism with which it takes 
issue.147 To this extent, even the most cogent of materialist theses remains, as W.D. 
Oliver observes, 'a metaphysical postulate' rather than 'a conclusion of empirical
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investigation.'148 The argument is well put by R.G. Collingwood, who maintains that, 
from a scientific point of view, materialism, as it passed from Renaissance to 
Enlightenment and beyond, was 'from first to last an aspiration rather than an 
achievement.' Failing experimental confirmation in. the laboratory, argues 
Collingwood, 'the scientific credit of materialism was maintained by drawing very large 
cheques in its own favour on assets not yet to hand.' Whatever the materialists' respect 
for empirical principles, they were left in the end with a theory which amounted in large 
part to 'simple bluff.149 A point which is tellingly demonstrated by the closing 
exhortation of La Mettrie's L'Homme machine:
Concluons done hardiment que l'Homme est une Machine; & qu'il n'y a dans tout
l’Univers qu'une seule substance diversement modifiee.150
Naturalism, in the sense in which the term may be applied to the early 
nineteenth-century medecins-ideologues, can be rescued from the above charge. For it 
denotes the apprehension of reality through observation and experiment rather than 
hypothesis. It is, as Sergio Moravia defines it, a philosophical stance in which 
'l'observation se presente avant tout comme une reaction a l'abstrait, au systeme.'151 
The concern is to observe and draw conclusions from natural phenomena, not to 
advance any ultimate definition of Nature itself.152 'Cabanis's model of acceptable 
explanation,' writes Martin Staum, 'stressed observed relationships among phenomena 
rather than understanding of the essence of objects.'153 E.H. Ackerknecht echoes this 
point, discerning in the same Cabanis 'an antitheoretical attitude' which issues in the 
cult of a singularly anti-philosophical Hippocrates, a Hippocrates who 'had revolted 
against the philosophers, a Hippocrates free from hypothetical subtleties, a Hippocrates 
that had found the true method of thought and observation, the greatest physician of all 
times.'154
Naturalists, like materialists, of course, come in all shapes and philosophical 
guises. The task of marking out the ground between the two has provided a source of 
sometimes acrimonious debate among philosophers.155 Between the 'materialistic and 
mechanistic metaphysics'156 of Hobbes, however, and the 'psychophysiological 
naturalism'157 of Cabanis, there is a world of difference waiting to be defined by 
Stendhal scholars who cite the names of these two philosophers in tandem, as though 
their respective philosophies — and, by extension, their influence upon Stendhal — 
were but variations on a theme. Let us consider briefly, therefore, the distinctions that 
obtain here, before going on to draw some conclusions about the relative contributions 
of these two philosophers to Stendhal's thought.
Though his critics never tired of levelling the charge of materialism against his
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work, Cabanis himself disavowed the label. One may conclude, as does Martin Staum, 
that this was more than just a gesture of appeasement towards the censors.158 While 
Cabanis made no secret of his anticlericalism, his denial of the materialist charge is 
explicit even in writings not destined for public consumption.159 The repudiation of 
materialism in this case seems to have rested on: genuine philosophical grounds. 
Claiming not even to understand the meaning of the designation 'materialist', Cabanis, 
as Staum puts it, chose to maintain 'a kind of Newtonian agnosticism on the ultimate 
constituents of the universe.'160
The primacy of open-minded empiricism over rationalism lies, as has been argued 
above, at the very heart of Cabanis's philosophical enterprise.161 This, as Michel 
Crouzet acutely observes, poses something of a problem for the coherence of Ideology 
as a philosophical doctrine: 'On dit les ideologues "materialistes": peut-etre, mais en fait 
ils sont cloues a leur propre piege; s'ils le sont, ils ne peuvent pas le dire pour rester 
coherents avec leur meconnaissance absolue de la metaphysique.'162 The point is a 
highly pertinent one. For it identifies the crucial sense in which Cabanis is to be 
distinguished from Hobbes and from the whole range of materialist philosophers who, 
though they may belong, broadly speaking, to an 'empirical' tradition, take as their 
starting point some metaphysical concept of matter upon which they elaborate their 
theses. The approach is one that is studiedly shunned by Cabanis, whose remarks on 
Hobbes are particularly noteworthy in this regard. For if the merits of Hobbes as a 
thinker are recognised by Cabanis, it is as a thinker precisely that he is criticised. 
Among Hobbes's limitations, Cabanis signals the fact that the English philosopher 
'etait entierement etranger a plusieurs parties des sciences,' and that his achievement 
must be seen to lie 'dans les matieres de pur raisonnement.'163
All of this is germane to our concern. For Cabanis, as Moravia points out, was 
engaged in a philosophical endeavour 'de type nouvellement "naturaliste".'164 As 
physician and philosopher both, it was his aspiration to preside over 'la fondation tant 
souhaitee d'une rigoureuse science de la nature.'165 Observation and experiment — 
'une sorte de methodologie du regard'166 — were to provide the primary data of a 
scientific naturalism that would refute or substantiate what had been achieved by 
'l'analyse rationnelle' alone.167 'Peut-etre avons-nous passe l'age des plus brillants 
travaux d'imagination,' writes Cabanis, with implicit criticism of his more rationalistic 
predecessors.168 ^
Though, by 1800, such aspirations had something about them already of the deja 
v m , they bespoke a growing concern to better understand the nature of man by better 
understanding man's place within Nature.169 Thus the medical considerations of 
Cabanis the physician were indissociable from a philosophical conviction that all
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phenomena are part of some over-arching natural order wherein a common method of 
scientific inquiry holds good for all things and all events: man 'must be observed and 
analyzed like any mineral or vegetable.'170 Naturalism, as I.F. Knight puts it, 'may be 
defined as the belief that nature is all-embracing, that nothing exists apart from it, that 
all man's endeavors — in science, in morality, in religion, in social organization — 
must rest upon the principles of nature.'171 Defining the said 'principles of nature' was 
therefore (and here we must be mindful of the overriding aspiration of Cabanis and his 
compeers to effect thoroughgoing social and moral reform) the first step in redefining 
man.172
It would be a misleading simplification to suggest that there is no common ground 
between mechanism and naturalism as we have sought to distinguish these above. If we 
take as our points of reference Hobbes and Cabanis, then the distance between the two 
is indeed substantial. From the metaphysics of Hobbes to the physiology of Cabanis, 
however, there are many gradations and continuities. The title of La Mettrie's treatise 
and the boldness with which he sustains his mechanistic idiom,173 for example, should 
not obscure the fact that he, like Cabanis, was a physician sensitive to the human 
organism and at pains to define man within a continuous scale of Nature.174 
D'Holbach, Diderot, Condillac, Helvetius, all alike may be considered inheritors of 
Hobbes and forerunners of Cabanis. All alike, too, may (with the qualified exception of 
Condillac) be deemed 'naturalists' in the sense that they admit of no discontinuities in 
Nature — between animal and human nature, or between the physical and 'moral' 
aspects of man — and of no intrusion of the supernatural into an all-embracing natural 
realm.175 Distinctions, where they obtain between such thinkers, are often those of 
emphasis and imagery rather than of philosophical conviction.176 'Tout se tient dans la 
nature' was the conviction of a La Mettrie, an Helvetius or a Diderot long before it 
informed the Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme.111
It is upon the extremes of our scale, however, Hobbes and Cabanis, that we wish 
to focus for the purposes of this discussion; and here, we submit, a distinction such as 
we have established is warranted and helpful.178 For it allows us to contrast Stendhal's 
reading of Hobbes with his reading of Cabanis, and to measure the relative contribution 
of each of these philosophers to his thought. Read within the space of a few months, it 
was the fate of the one to be consigned to near-oblivion, of the other to be celebrated to 
the end as a pioneer in the study of man. From Hobbes, as we have seen, Stendhal 
derived a metaphysical philosophy with which he was patently ill at ease, and which 
issues in the confusion and contradictions of his reading notes. From Cabanis, he 
inherits a much more readily apprehensible world picture which, for all its lack of range 
and depth in Stendhal's hands, allows him to remain firmly anchored in a real and 
observable world, using his powers of perception and comparison without being
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spirited into the realms of abstract reasoning. Hobbes, in his mechanistic materialism, 
lacks a biological dimension.179 Cabanis, by contrast, develops a physiological' 
psychology wherein the body organic is everywhere the touchstone, refusing 
conspicuously to adopt, as Vartanian puts it, 'any metaphysical position as regards the 
nature of reality.'180 With his reflections on animals, plants, climate, soil, air pressure, 
temperature, electro-magnetic forces and the like, Cabanis gave Stendhal licence to 
extend his considerations on man to the whole of observable nature and to seek 
empirical confirmation for precepts which could be tried and tested in the real world.181
Here lay the future direction of philosophy according to Stendhal. It was a 
direction, moreover (and this is the crucial point), in which the layman could partake of 
the inquiry as readily as the specialist. For once observation and experiment have 
yielded their results, it falls to any who so choose to verify these, to seek what Stendhal 
calls the 'concomitance d'effets.'182 Hence the diary entry of 20 July 1813, in which 
Stendhal writes:
Cabanis ne prouve point qu'un homme a teint jaune ait necessairement ce que nous 
appelons le caractere moral bilieux; il dit seulement qu'il l'a vu. C'est a nous d'y 
regarder si nous voulons.183
Later, in his diary for September 1813, he would write in similar terms of the 
physiologist:
II a voulu etre au niveau des connaissances en 1900. II a laisse aux autres le soin 
de prouver.184
Both of these diary entries give a clear insight into the revised judgment which 
Stendhal would come to pass on physiology in the period following his re-reading of 
the Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme in 1811. Here was a 'philosophy' 
whose very strength lay in its refusal to furnish definitive conclusions, to take refuge in 
remote metaphysical 'certainties'. M.A. Simons recognises the crucial stimulus which 
physiology delivers to Stendhal's perception of the world when she writes:
II lit Cabanis, Pinel et Gall, et tente d'evaluer leurs theories a la lumiere de ses 
observations dans le monde, et, non seulement dans les salons, mais dans la rue, 
en diligence, sur un bateau, sur le champ de bataille, bref, d'apres nature; et dans 
les arts, a commencer par l'art dramatique: il scrute la physionomie des acteurs, 
leurs poses, leurs mouvements.185
Here, in sum, is Cabanis's contribution to Stendhal. For the Rapports du physique 
et du moral de l'homme provided him with a comprehensive manual against which 
human reality in all its variegated forms might be measured. 'Tache d'observer cela 
dans la nature,' Stendhal urges his sister Pauline, referring to Cabanis's theory of the 
temperaments in April 1810.186 Alongside this theory, with all its range of attendant
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variables directly affecting human sensibility, Hobbes's analysis of the passions could 
only seem primitive and removed from reality.187 While Human Nature is deemed, as 
we have seen, 'le discours d'un hom[me] de bon sens qui n'a pas assez approfondi sa 
matiere, ou des verites sans objet,'188 the Rapports du physique et du moral de 
l'homme was to become for Stendhal an 'immortel ouvrage', one of the foundation 
stones of modem philosophy, and the basis on which he would come to define himself, 
in 1829, as 'un philosophe de l'ecole de Cabanis.'189 It is in the reader of Cabanis — 
not in the reader of Hobbes, Tracy, Helvetius, or any other of Stendhal's 
acknowledged maitres a penser — that is to be found the 'naturaliste' whom Hippolyte 
Taine would extol thus:
on n'a pas vu que sous des apparences de causeur et d'homme du monde, il 
expliquait les plus compliques des mecanismes internes, qu'il mettait le doigt sur 
les grands ressorts, qu'il importait dans l'histoire du cceur les procedes 
scientifiques, l'art de chiffrer, de decomposer et de deduire; que le premier il 
marquait les causes fondamentales, j'entends les nationalites, les climats et les 
temperaments; bref, qu'il traitait des sentiments comme on doit en traiter, 
c'est-a-dire en naturaliste et en physicien, en faisant des classifications et en pesant 
* des forces.190
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CHAPTER VH
MAN, NATURE AND HUMAN NATURE: FROM PHILOSOPHY
TO THE NOVEL
In Search of Animal Man: The ’Great Chain1 and the 'State of Nature*
We argued in Chapter VI that the ’naturalism* of Cabanis and his fellow 
medecins-philosophes owes much to the notion of a unified nature, a concept that was 
far from new at the beginning of the nineteenth century.1 Stendhal himself appears 
from the earliest to subscribe to a secularised version of that classic notion of a ’Great 
Chain of Being' which, next to the word 'Nature', as A.O. Lovejoy puts it, 'was the 
sacred phrase of the eighteenth century, playing a part somewhat analogous to that of 
the blessed word "evolution" in the late nineteenth.'2 In a notebook entry penned on 19 
August 1803, Stendhal, citing the Swedish naturalist, Linnaeus, divides Nature into 
three simple categories: 'Les animaux sentent, vivent et croissent. Les vegetaux vivent 
et croissent. Les mineraux croissent.'3 Though there is nothing remarkable about this 
definition, it does, if only by omission, sanction an identity between man and animal 
which would find an echo elsewhere in Stendhal's early writings. In an entry to his 
diary on 26 August 1806, he records how he is struck by the 'esprit', the 'physionomie 
humaine', of a mandrill to which he has been feeding pastilles in the Jardin des 
Plantes.4 The account contrasts curiously with the 'vie purement animale' of a German 
family whom he describes in a letter from Harburg in the following year, or with the 
'animal parisien' whom he had set out to observe at close quarters as a young 
philosopher-playwright in the capital.5
Such examples in themselves are of only minor interest. The suggested absence in 
each case, however, of any rigid demarcation line between man and animal appears to 
be more than rhetorical contrivance. As early as September 1803, Stendhal had 
consigned to his notebook a remark which demonstrates in striking terms the proximity 
which he recognised between the human and animal realms, and suggests a 
consanguinity between man and the higher primates notably:
On trouvera tot ou tard par l'hygiene les moyens d'augmenter ou de diminuer la 
vivacite de l'esprit; alors, s'il est vrai que l'extreme vivacite du singe soit le seul 
obstacle a ses progres, on pourra en faire un homme, et peut-etre qu'un jour un 
homme-singe lira ceci.6
This short passage, remarkable in the boldness of its hypothesis for 1803 (when 
theories of evolution and biological transformism were still very much in their
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infancy),7 is among the most arresting to be found in Stendhal's early writings. Implicit 
within it is the notion that the higher animals might, to borrow the terms of Peter Gay, 
be 'stunted, undeveloped, potential human beings.’8 To suggest as much was, of 
course, to strike at the very core of a conventional wisdom which, abetted by Christian 
doctrine, reserved a place apart for humanity within Creation. The idea was not new. It 
had been anticipated most notoriously by La Mettrie, who held that a primate taught to 
talk 'seroit un Homme parfait, un petit Homme de Ville, avec autant d'etoffe ou de 
muscles que nous-memes, pour penser & profiter de son education.'9 By minimising 
— indeed going so far as to abolish — the distinctiveness of man's nature vis-a-vis 
other anthropoids, by lowering to such a degree his estate in the scheme of things, 
Stendhal was early lending his mind to a view, prevalent in a current of 
eighteenth-century scientific and philosophical thought, which called into question the 
allegedly clear-cut and unbridgeable divisions between animal species.10 In so doing, 
he was subscribing to a notion which challenged the Christian proposition that man was 
the telos of universal design, that all Creation was subordinate to his moral purpose.11 
The implications of such a view, as L. G. Crocker puts it, were 'revolutionary'; for its 
net conclusion — already clearly latent, in Stendhal's case, in the passage cited — was 
to 'derive man from below, rather than from above.'11
The note from Stendhal's journal of September 1803 raises once more, too, the 
question of when he first read, or at least became acquainted with, the philosophy of 
Cabanis. For, in the conclusion to his chapter on the temperaments, the latter contends 
precisely that the process of 'hygiene' which could be used for the betterment of animal 
and plant species should be employed in the improvement of mankind. The 
physiologist-moralist charged with implementing such 'hygienic' reform 'doit 
considerer l’espece humaine comme un individu dont l'education physique lui est 
confiee; [...] il faut en un mot que l'hygiene aspire a perfectionner la nature humaine 
generale.' To these bold statements, Cabanis adds the no less bold injunction:
II est temps, a cet egard comme a beaucoup d'autres, de suivre un systeme de vues 
plus digne d'une epoque de regeneration: il est temps d'oser faire sur nous-memes 
ce que nous avons fait si heureusement sur plusieurs de nos compagnons 
d’existence; d'oser revoir et corriger l'oeuvre de la nature.13
Both the passage cited from Stendhal's notebook and the foregoing lines from 
Cabanis provide a similar view of human nature as part of a wider Nature within which 
man and animal are distinguished more by degree than by kind. Both, moreover, 
foreshadow a footnote which we find in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, and in which 
the influence of Cabanis is clear. Here, Stendhal will borrow from the Rapports du 
physique et du moral de Vhomme an anecdote concerning 'un homme si mobile qu'il se 
sentait force de repeter tous les mouvements et toutes les attitudes dont le hasard le
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rendait temoin.'14 To this Stendhal adds:
C'est le.defaut des singes, qu'un regime suivi pourrait peut-etre guerir. L'homme 
agissant au hasard a fait du meme animal l'enorme chien de basse-cour et le petit 
carlin. II faudrait un prince qui eut pour l'histoire naturelle la passion que Henri de 
Portugal avait pour les decouvertes maritimes...15
Two points emerge clearly from these remarks. The first is Stendhal's evident belief 
that a programme of eugenic engineering could hold out to man the possibility of 
exercising control over the evolution of animal species. The second is the suggestion 
once again that man and monkey are comparable in ways that go beyond their basic 
anatomical similarities. Some thirteen years before the publication of these remarks, 
Stendhal had entered in his notebook the following definition of 'la legerete': 'defaut 
produit par une curiosite ou desir de connaitre excite egalement par tous les objets.' To 
this he had added: 'La legerete extreme se voit chez les fous et chez les singes.'16 If the 
monkey can be raised to the level of man, it is clear that man can — and in some 
instances does — descend to the level of the monkey.
This mobility of individuals and of species, their potential to progress or to 
regress, to move upwards or downwards in the scale of being, though it is again clearly 
adumbrated in La Mettrie,17 anticipates the theories of biological evolution and 
transformism which would come into their own in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century.18 The image for Cabanis, and, through him, for Stendhal, was one of human 
and animal nature transported, in the words of Martin Staum, 'from the fixity of Being 
to the flow of Becoming.'19 The idea is given expression in an arresting paragraph 
which Stendhal would incorporate once more into VHistoire de la peinture en Italie. 
'Peut-etre, dans quelques siecles,' he muses,
Yhygi&ne considerera-t-elle l'espece humaine comme un individu dont l'education 
physique lui est confiee. Peut-etre qu'apres avoir pris tant de peine pour avoir des 
haras, d'excellents chevaux, et de bons chiens de chasse, nous chercherons un 
jour a creer des Fran?ais sains et heureux...20
It will be observed that this is a clear reiteration of Cabanis's assertion, cited above, that 
it behoved man to deploy his science in the correction of 'la nature humaine 
generale.'21 The statement, complete with examples, is drawn almost verbatim from the 
work published by the physiologist some fifteen years earlier. Quite apart from the 
moral import of Stendhal's remarks, which should not be overlooked, this 
consideration of the human species 'as an individual' raises questions which would be 
taken up by later nineteenth-century positivism,22 when Cabanis's vision of a 
'perfectionnement progressif de l'hygiene particuliere et generale' would be given new 
currency in the light of more advanced evolutionary theory.23
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The concern with the eugenics of the canine species and with the lessons for man 
that might be drawn therefrom is one to which Stendhal returns. 'Pour qui a des yeux,’ 
he declares in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, ’toute Thistoire naturelle est dans 
l'histoire des diverses races de chiens.'24 This remark, laconic almost to the point of 
obscurity, anticipates the much fuller development which would be given to the same 
idea in the Memoires d'un touriste. There, in considering the various 'races' of men 
indigenous to France, Stendhal would return to the canine model. Reflecting on the 
many types of dog that evolution has spawned, he is struck by how rare it is to find 'un 
chien de race pure. Les animaux degrades qui remplissent les rues proviennent du 
melange fortuit de toutes les races.'25 Stendhal's language here bespeaks awareness of 
a concept that is conspicuously absent from his early writings: that of race.26 What is of 
a piece, however, with remarks made some three to four decades earlier is the quite 
undistinguished place allotted to man in the continuum of Nature. Hence the 
unflattering conclusion which Stendhal draws from the dramatic evolution that the 
canine has undergone over the course of time:
Malgre le desagrement de la comparaison, ce que nous venons de dire de l'espece 
canine s'applique exactement aux races d'hommes, seulement comme un chien vit 
quinze ans et un homme soixante, depuis six mille ans que dure le monde, les 
chiens ont eu quatre fois plus de temps que nous pour modifier leurs races.27
While the tone in which these remarks are couched suggests something of 
Stendhal's characteristic delight in shaking the complacency of his reader, the idea itself 
is one to which he clearly gave mature reflection. In penning the Promenades dans 
Rome, he likewise has recourse to the analogy between man and dog. How does it 
come about that the Neapolitan and the Florentine are so vastly different in their 
manners, that Sienna is alive with gaiety, whilst Arezzo exudes passion?
D'abord, les races d'hommes sont differentes. Supposez deux lies de la mer du 
Sud que le hasard d’un naufrage a peuplees des chiens levriers et de barbets; une 
troisieme est remplie d'epagneuls; une quatrieme, de petits chiens anglais mopses. 
Les moeurs sont differentes. Grace au saugrenu de la comparaison, vous saisirez 
toute l'etendue de la difference que l'experience etablit entre le flegmatique 
Hollandais, le Bergamasque a demi fou tant ses passions sont vives, et le 
Napolitain a demi fou tant il suit avec impetuosite la sensation du moment28
Crude though the ethnology may be, the thrust of Stendhal's thinking here could not be 
clearer. Nor should we lose sight of just how novel such a theory would have been a 
few short years before Stendhal rehearses it a safagon. By the time he came to write the 
Promenades dans Rome and Memoires d'un touriste, the natural and human sciences 
were developing apace in France. Stendhal's acquaintance with a number of natural 
scientists29 allowed him to substantiate, however modestly, his knowledge in these 
domains. To the notion that man foimed part of a 'chain', proceeding by continuity and 
gradation from the lower to the more sophisticated forms of natural life, he needed,
295
however, no conversion. Already, in a letter written to Pauline. Beyle in April 1805, the 
idea is very clearly evoked. In advising his sister not to hope to inspire any natural 
sympathy among those whom he disparages as 'les secs\ he points out to her that, 
'pour avoir pitie, il faut se mettre a la place et il ne se reconnaissent pas dans nous.' He 
then goes on to illustrate the point in the following terms:
On voit tuer une mouche sans peine, on fremit de voir mater un bceuf; ce serait
bien pis si on voyait tuer un orang-outang.30
The implications latent in such a remark, as in the earlier suggestion that one might 
forge a man from a monkey, were far-reaching. The identification that is suggested here 
between man and the higher apes, in a scale descending through cattle to the lower 
orders of insects, strikes again at the heart of the Christian notion of a place apart for 
humanity within Creation. At a moment when biological evolutionism had not yet 
supplied the evidence necessary to sustain the thesis, Stendhal here echoes something 
of the eighteenth-century claim that Nature was but one material variously modified. As 
early as the mid-eighteenth century, the naturalist Buffon, whom Stendhal read at an 
early age,31 had attacked the whole basis of genera and species, contending that Nature 
was composed of 'individuals' alone, individuals linked from one end to the other of 
the natural scale by subtle gradations only.32 Buffon's comparison between man and 
the orang-outang in particular provided, as L.G. Crocker observes, a powerful means 
of assailing the view that man's difference from the animals lay in his physical 
organisation 33 This fact should not, of course, obscure Buffon's overriding intention, 
which was to defend the concept of the Homo duplex, separating animal man from 
moral and rational man, and demonstrating the latter's uniqueness in terms of his range 
of consciousness and essential spiritual dimension.34 In others, however, Buffon's 
basic thesis would find more uncompromising proponents. La Mettrie, with sharp 
polemic intent, held that Nature had used a single and same dough in which the yeast 
alone was varied.35 Mankind, La Mettrie claimed, was but a collection of more or less 
clever monkeys with Newton at their head.36
Though his position, like that of Buffon, requires qualification 37 Rousseau too, in 
the Discours sur Vorigine de Vinegalite — the work which would prompt Stendhal, in 
1803, to seek signs of the human passions in animal behaviour38 — had argued for the 
kinship between Homo sapiens and the higher apes, namely the orang-outang and 
chimpanzee.39 He was echoed in this by the naturalist Charles Bonnet, who, for all his 
religious scruple, went so far as to see in the much vaunted orang-outang not only 
physical but mental ressemblances to man. Here lay proof positive, argued Bonnet, of 
the Leibnizian axiom Natura non facit saltus, Nature makes no leaps 40
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All of this forms the essential back-drop to an image of Man and Nature that is 
recognisably Stendhal’s from the earliest. In his endeavour to penetrate the depths of 
the 'human heart', he hit at once upon the obstacle of a civilisation which, it became 
clear to him, did more to obfuscate than to elucidate human nature. The essence of man, 
Stendhal was to conclude (and it would remain a feature of his thinking thereafter), lay 
closer to the realm of Nature than advanced social mores conspired to suggest. 'Quelle 
societe me servira de base?' he writes among some of his earliest notes on dramatic 
characterisation.
La moins compliquee qui ait ete observee, les sauvages chasseurs d'Amerique. 
Chez les sauvages chasseurs d'Amerique, tous les liens naturels existent. On y 
trouve aussi les liens sociaux, on y trouve aussi toutes les passions, mais 
quelques-unes aussi legeres que possible.41
Liens naturels, liens sociaux, passions: here was a clearly graduated scheme of what 
Stendhal took to be the fundamental ingredients of social man. It was on the 
apprehension and depiction of these, he believed, that his success as a playwright 
would rest:
Tout le poete dramatique est dans la connaissance:
1° des liens naturels;
2° des sociaux;
3° des passions;
4° de la maniere de les opposer de fa?on a produire un effet de tel genre 42
Such was the theory. There remained, however, the considerable problem of 
» uncovering the 'natural' in social man. Stendhal's early notes provide a number of 
colourful suggestions for possible experiments upon man which find some echo in the 
then emergent science of anthropology.43 In particular, he is concerned by the question 
of whether man's desires, pleasures and passions, as they have evolved within civilised 
society, are akin to those experienced in an earlier state of nature. Part of the difficulty 
here for Stendhal lies, as we saw in Chapter V, in determining just what such a 'state of 
nature' might comprise. The problem, as L.G. Crocker observes, was not new. The 
same question of man's natural state had exercised the minds of eighteenth-century 
thinkers 'obsessed with the notion that by going back to the "origin" of things we can 
explain their "nature".' For it was firmly believed that there existed, as Crocker puts it,
a universal human nature which is prior — logically or historically — to society. 
This fund of basic universality remains indestructible in the social state. The 
question is, of what does it consist?44
Stendhal in turn poses the question; but, as the entry in his notebook for 27 August 
1804 attests, he is unable to provide any semblance of a response:
D[emande]: Qu'est-ce que I'etat de nature relativement a nos passions?
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R[eponse]: Ou trouver cet etat de nature? Je ne l'ai jamais vu. Qu'est-ce que 
c'est?45
Stendhal’s inability to hazard even the most approximate response to this question 
leads him, in the same notebook entry, to consider ways in which such a ’state of 
nature'might be simulated:
Si j'etais roi, je tacherais d’eloigner tous les hommes d'une certaine quantite d'iles 
toutes isolees. J’y ferais elever des enfants pris a la mamelle par des femmes et des 
hommes muets avec les ordres les plus severes de ne rien apprendre a ces enfants, 
de les empecher de mourir seulement. Des qu'ils pourraient se passer de secours, 
je retirerais mes muets. Je les abandonnerais dix ans. Ensuite j'irais les observer.46
This desire to apprehend humanity before society has exerted any factitious 
influence over it, to strip away the obstructive layers of acculturation in order to throw 
human nature into relief, would, of course, long haunt Stendhal. One finds here early 
intimations of a concern with society and the individual which would find expression 
across the range of his later published writings.47 What is also to be found in these 
early reflections on man, natural and social, is, as we have suggested above, an echo of 
the concerns that exercised anthropology in the first years of the nineteenth century. 
Louis Francis Jauffret, founder in 1799 of the first French anthropological 
association, the Societe des Observateurs de VHomme,48 envisaged indeed an 
experiment almost identical to that imagined by Stendhal. The experiment, as G.W. 
Stocking explains, was conceived to determine the characteristics of 'natural man' by 
observing infants 'placed from their birth in a single enclosure, remote from all social 
institutions, and abandoned for the development of ideas and language solely to the 
instinct of nature.'49
While Jauffret's proposed experiment was limited in its range, another prominent 
philosopher-anthropologist and member of the Societe took a broader and more 
ambitious view. Degerando's Considerations sur les diverses methodes a suivre dans 
Vobservation des peuples sauvages was an anthropologist's handbook which proposed 
to lay the ground for a return, through the study of primitive peoples, to 'le berceau de 
la societe humaine.'50 Since man in a more primitive state finds his nature subjected to 
fewer modifying influences, held Degerando, he presents a more transparent object of 
study than civilised man. What Stendhal describes as 'liens naturels’, Degerando writes 
of as 'varietes naturelles', which, he claims, are to be ascribed to climate, physical 
organisation and habit. 'Ici le developpement des passions et des facultes de l'esprit se 
trouvant beaucoup plus limite,' Degerando concludes, 'il nous deviendra bien plus 
facile d'en penetrer la nature, d'en assigner les lois essentielles.'51
In his early concern to rediscover 'natural man', Stendhal thus finds himself close
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to the cutting edge of a new science. If Degerando's memoir can, as Stocking contends, 
be taken as a 'capsule summation' of anthropology in his day,52 then Stendhal's early 
notebooks reveal just to what extent he was, as a layman, in tune. For several 
centuries, of course, the savage had occupied a place in the French and European 
cultural imagination, the focus, as Georges Gusdorf puts it, of 'mythes' and 
'nostalgies' alike.53 One need, of course, look no further than Rousseau for this 
perspective on the savage.54 Now, for the first time, however, was primitive man to be 
looked upon as an object of serious study. Though Rousseau himself had urged as 
much, his whole appreciation of the savage was, as Gusdorf notes, informed by a 
personal bias and a tendency to mythologise which militated against objective 
analysis.55 As Gusdorf neatly puts it: 'L'initiative de l'ecole ideologique marque le 
moment d'une demystification; le savoir concernant les sauvages accede enfin a la 
positivite.'56
If one subscribes to Gusdorf s analysis, then one is led to conclude that Stendhal's 
concern with the primitive is at once something more — empirically — and something 
less — romantically — than the 'opposition nature-societe de type rousseauiste' which 
Michel Crouzet discerns in his thought.57 For Stendhal's recourse to primitive man is 
conceived as part of his broader enterprise to know man; his concern to track human 
nature to its source is conceived less as a celebration than as a science: 'la seule bonne 
science', 'la plus belle science qui existe', '[la] seule science que j ’aie a apprendre.'58 
Nor did one have to flee society in order to recover something of the individual sub 
specie naturae. Even within the social order, Stendhal held, the observer can tend 
towards what is most 'primitive', perceiving within the same community gradations 
whereby the authenticity of human nature may be signally altered. 'C'est en effet chez 
les paysans qu'il faut commencer l'etude difficile des temperaments,' he would write in 
VHistoire de la peinture en Italie; 'l'homme riche echappe avec trop de facilite a 
l'influence des climats; c'est compliquer le probleme.'59 In distinguishing thus the 
degrees of 'human nature' that are exhibited within different social strata, Stendhal does 
not so much recall Rousseau as anticipate those later Realists and Naturalists who, as 
Maurice Larkin observes, would choose to focus their investigations on the manual 
classes:
Here, if anywhere, it was argued, Man's animal nature would be seen most 
clearly, uncomplicated and unadorned.
The middle and upper classes, by conu*ast, were seen as too thickly coated with the 
veneer of civilised behaviour for the animality within them to be so easily 
portrayed...60
If the manual classes proper never provided a canvas for Stendhal's art, they 
would remain nonetheless — and for the precise reason stated by Larkin — the object
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of an enduring philosophical interest. If Stendhal's letter to Merimee of 23 December 
1826 tells us much about the limitations of the novel as a forum for philosophising 
about human nature,61 his works of non-fiction left him at liberty to expatiate on those 
questions which had exercised his mind from the earliest. Thus in VHistoire de la 
peinture en Italie he explores a parallel between the remotest backwaters of 
contemporary humanity and the celebrated heroes of the ancient world. 'Ou trouver les 
anciens Grecs?' he asks:
Ce n'est pas dans le coin obscur d'une vaste bibliotheque, et courbe sur des 
pupitres mobiles charges d'une longue suite de manuscrits poudreux; mais un fusil 
a la main, dans les forets d'Amerique, chassant avec les sauvages de l'Ouabache. 
Le climat est moins heureux; mais voila ou sont aujourd'hui les Achilles et les 
Hercules.62
The value of such remote communities as repositories of human nature in the raw was 
clear to Stendhal, as it had been to Degerando. In De VAmour, he returns to the 
anthropologist's concern with authentic primitive society, echoing something of the 
ambitions of anthropology and ethnology in the 1820s to accede to full 'scientific' 
status:
On devrait etablir a Philadelphie une academie qui s’occuperait uniquement de 
recueillir des materiaux pour l'etude de l'homme dans l'etat sauvage, et ne pas 
attendre que ces peuplades curieuses soient aneanties.63
What could not be preserved could not be observed; and what could not be 
observed could at best be speculated upon. Yet the value of speculating upon what men 
might be in some other state was dubious indeed. Returning to his notes of 1804, we 
find Stendhal little advanced by his imaginary schemes. Having troubled over the 
numbers and sexual composition of his desert island castaways, he writes:
Chercher a deviner, d'apres ce que nous savons, ce que nous les trouverions 
faisant apres dix ans d'abandonnement.
Voila tout ce que je puis faire, avec les observations sur les animaux, pour avoir 
l’idee de l'etat de nature ou du commencement de la societe.
Les voyages, les recherches que Buffon, Montesquieu et J[ean]-J[acques] ont 
faites d’apres eux peuvent me servir.
Je ferai done la description du commencement de la societe parmi les hommes,64
This might indeed be as close as one could come to a knowledge of primitive man. 
Stendhal takes no account, however, of the extent to which he is in breach here of his 
own empirical principle, formulated in a letter to Pauline Beyle some weeks 
beforehand, in which he had enjoined his sister to 'voir l'homme dans l'homme et non 
plus dans les livres.'65 The proper study of mankind might, for Stendhal as for Pope, 
be Man;66 but he clearly remains captive to conflicting aspirations, rejecting the social 
man whom he could observe in favour of a remote 'natural' man for knowledge of
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whom he must rely on the accounts of others, or on his imagination pure and simple. 
Stendhal is acutely aware of the contradiction, and on a number of occasions exhorts 
himself to forsake his books and to study man at first hand. 'On est bien autrement 
convaincu de ce qu’on a vu,' he writes in a notebook entry dating from August 1803, 
'que de ce qu'on a lu.'67
Nothing, however, proves more elusive in all of this early period than the human 
nature which Stendhal is attempting to stalk. No sooner does he establish what he 
considers a bearing on his subject than the ground shifts from beneath him, leaving him 
as far as ever from his objective. 'Je connais mieux l'homme,' he declares on 29 
January 1803, 'surtout depuis vingt jours que je medite Helvetius.'68 Several days 
later, the judgment is reaffirmed in more enthusiastic tones still: 'Helvetius m’a ouvert 
la porte de l'homme a deux battants.'69 Being an 'anthropologist' in a rented room in 
Paris, however, was not to satisfy Stendhal for long. In a note penned some weeks 
after these words of praise for his newly discovered mentor, he rebels against the 
whole principle of observing man through the eyes of others:
J'ai vingt ans passes, si je ne me lance pas dans le monde et si je ne cherche pas a 
connaitre les hommes par experience je suis perdu. Je ne connais les hommes que 
par les livres, il y a des passions que je n'ai jamais vues ailleurs. Comment puis-je 
les peindre? mes tableaux ne seraient que des copies de copies.
Toute ma science, ou du moins une grande partie, est de prejuges. Si tous les 
auteurs que j'ai lus s'etaient accordes a supposer une passion qui n'existe pas, j'y 
croirais.
Encore un an ou deux et j'ai pris mon pii, il faut renoncer a etre un grand peintre de 
passions.70
Such an urgent analysis of his situation early in 1803 is worthy of attention. 
Lending an instructive insight into the young Stendhal's self-perception, these remarks 
go a long way towards explaining his relief when, in spring 1804, after a spell in his 
native Grenoble, he returns to Paris vaunting 'l'experience acquise a Gr[enoble], ou j'ai 
vu l'homme dans l'homme et non plus dans les livres.'71 Throughout the spring and 
summer of 1804, his journal carries the echo of this new-found satisfaction.72 Of 
Grenoble he writes again on 9 June 1804: 'c'est la que j'ai vu la nature, tout le reste est 
cru d'apres les livres...'73 The impression of progress in this domain was, however, to 
be short-lived. A matter of days after penning this thought, Stendhal confronts once 
more the prospect of being 'reduit a peindre en regardant mon modele par les yeux des 
autre s.’74 The only sound position in a sea of doubt, he concludes, is one of a 
self-imposed anthropological agnosticism:
Regarder tout ce que j'ai lu jusqu'a ce jour sur l'homme et sur les hom[mes] 
comme une prediction. Ne croire que ce que j'aurai vu moi-meme.75
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Much of this is, of course, quite academic. Stendhal's observation of man, 
whether in books or in the real world, is never the methodical, empirical affair that his 
remarks might at times suggest. The foregoing examples are worth citing precisely 
because they demonstrate the malaise which attends his endeavour to take a bearing on 
human nature. There is always another way, a better way which would produce the 
desired results, were it accessible to him. 'Si je n'etais pas trop vieux, a mon age, ou si 
j'etais plus riche, sous quelque pretexte j'irais me mettre dans une pension,' he writes 
to his sister in August 1804.
C'est la vraiment qu'on etudie les hommes. On est trop longtemps avec eux pour 
qu'ils aient (generalement) la force de se deguiser. Je me sens fou pour connaitre le 
caractere des hommes. Je ne sais pas ou cela me menera...76
Where it would lead was, all too often, back to square one. From the tribesmen of the 
Americas to the Balzacian world of the boarding-house, 'real' man contrives to elude 
Stendhal — or, more precisely, remains ever the inhabitant of his imagination. For he 
feels constrained to seek verification of human nature outside the orbit of his own 
observation and experience, in an elsewhere in which man escapes (or had once 
escaped, or would escape) the insidious distortions that are wrought upon the needs 
and passions of the civis. As Michel Crouzet astutely observes of Stendhal,
il se sert du meme concept fondamental de "nature" comme d'un point vers lequel 
remonter, ou descendre est necessaire pour se placer dans la verite pure de 
l'homme et de soi. La nature est saisie uniquement par la discordance entre la 
societe artificielle, et autre chose: le faux renvoie a quelque chose qui a ete vrai, ou 
devrait etre vrai, a une anteriorite ou une superiorite.77
The accessible is all too often synonymous with the factitious, whilst the 'natural' 
takes on a conditional, almost hypothetical character. In a notebook entry dated 29 July 
1804, Stendhal turns his mind to that peculiarly human trait, vanity. 'Un succes de 
vanite n'etait originairement qu'un assignat, une promesse de plaisir,' he reflects:
Voila quelle serait la vanite de trente jeunes filles et de trente jeunes gargons qu'on 
aurait transportes dans une lie au moment de leur naissance et qui auraient ete 
soignes par des muets de la fagon la plus egale possible jusqu'au moment ou ils 
auraient pu se nourrir par eux-memes.
Ils tireraient vanite par exemple de bien tirer le fusil a la cible parce que ce talent 
leur promettrait du gibier et la jouissance qu’on a a le manger. A un degre de 
civilisation de plus, les plaisirs contre lesquels on pourrait l'echanger.78
The almost unbroken flow of conditional tenses here is commentaiy in itself. Within the 
logic of Stendhal's remarks, the degre de civilisation de plus constitutes a key element. 
For it is by just such 'degrees' that are to be determined the differences between man in 
a 'state of nature’ and man within advanced civilised society. 'Vanity' Stendhal had 
defined some time before as 'la suite inevitable de toute civilisation perfectionnee.'79
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Now he goes a stage further, echoing Rousseau's contention80 that 'vanity' is the 
passion which most sharply defines human nature as it has evolved within civilised 
society, the very counterpoint of what is natural:
Quelle difference y a-t-il entre ces jouissances de vanite et les plaisirs naturels que 
nous pouvons observer surtout chez les animaux?81
The adverb surtout, with its suggestion once more of degree, conveys something here 
again of the continuity which Stendhal held to obtain between the human and animal 
realms. Vanity and animal pleasure are, in this sense, at separate ends of the same 
broad, but unbroken, spectrum. We have observed above how the reading of 
Rousseau's Discours sur Vorigine de Vinegalite prompted Stendhal to seek instances of 
passion in the animal world. 'Chercher dans les betes les passions des hommes et 
tacher d'y apercevoir leurs fondements naturels,' he writes in August 1803. 'Les 
taureaux, les cerfs se battent avec achamement par jalousie.'82 The value of the animal 
realm as a 'model' in the investigation of human nature lay for Stendhal in the fact that 
animals, though they had clearly evolved, could not be seen to have perfected  
themselves. The distinction was potentially crucial, allowing man, once his points of 
reference in the animal world were secured, to measure his present against his former 
— natural — 'self:
Les animaux peuvent nous etre d'une grande ressource pour ces recherches parce 
qu’il parait qu’ils ne se perfectionnent pas, ou du moins ce perfectionnement n’a 
point ete vu par nous.83
Though the view of animals as an authentically primitive analogue to man is one to 
which Stendhal would hold with conviction, this notion of perfectibility remains an 
important distinguishing feature of humanity.84 But why should mankind benefit from 
a capacity for self-improvement that is denied his animal kin? In seeking to answer this 
question, Stendhal puts his finger, as others had done before him,85 on language, the 
capacity to affix names to objects, as the key to man's progress beyond the purely 
animal state. Far, however, from rejoicing in the fact, he questions, paradoxically, the 
beneficial nature of human perfectibility. 'Par le moyen des noms,' he writes in his 
notebook for June 1804, 'les hommes surpassent infiniment les betes brutes en science 
et dans les avantages qui les accompagnent, et en erreurs, et dans les maux qu'elle 
cause [jfc].'86
Shades once more of Jean-Jacques. Not only does Stendhal diminish thus the 
triumph of human reason over brute nature; he goes so far elsewhere as to attribute a 
raw faculty of 'reason', an intellect of sorts, to animals themselves. Writing to his sister 
Pauline in February 1805, he waxes insistent, fresh from his reading of Tracy, upon 
the benefits of right reasoning:
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Tu vois que c'est la l'instrument general necessaire a tout et que tout le monde a 
une logique plus ou moins bonne [...].
Meme les chats, en prenant une souris, en ont une.87
Under the influence of Cabanis, Stendhal, as we have already noted, had extended 
to mankind the instinct evident in the behaviour of animals, promoting this indeed to the 
status of Tun des plus grands, motifs des actions de l'homme.'88 Here he reverses the 
process, ascribing plainly to the animal realm what had been defended throughout the 
ages as the appurtenance of man alone. In his reflections on the nature of human 
sentiment, or 'passion', Stendhal would be more prone still to insist upon the kinship 
between man and animal. Never is this more clearly the case than in De 1‘Amour, where 
his argument is sustained at times by allusions to the wider world of animal nature. 
Describing the physiological effects of love upon the human economy — 'un 
commencement de folie, une affluence du sang au cerveau, un desordre dans les nerfs 
et dans le centre cerebral' — he adds, by way of illustration: 'Voir le courage ephemere 
des cerfs...'89 In the subsequent chapter 'De la pudeur' (XXVI), he adduces in like 
fashion evidence to support his argument. 'Chez quelques animaux,' he observes, 'la 
femelle semble se refuser au moment ou elle se donne.' In this instance, however, 
Stendhal goes much further still, concluding: 'C'est a l'anatomie comparee que nous 
devons demander les plus importantes revelations sur nous-memes.'90
This consistent reduction of the distance between human and animal nature can be 
seen as a fundamental aspect of Stendhal's view of man, as it carries from his earliest 
private writings through to the latest of his published works. Not only apes and 
monkeys, but bulls and stags, dogs and horses, lions and tigers, wolves, goats and 
sheep, foxes and pigs, even worms and insects,91 have lessons to impart to man on his 
character, on his conduct, and on the Nature to which his being is inextricably bound. 
In a letter of 10 January 1838 to the botanist Adrien de Jussieu, Stendhal concludes 
with a remark which, for all its flippant humour, is consonant with his view of human 
nature at its most reflective:
On depense de l'argent pour avoir un kangouroo au Jardin des Plantes, pourquoi 
ne pas avoir a Paris cette autre rarete un Allemand homme d’esprit?92
Naturalism: A Problem of Definition
The foregoing pages, we suggest, are important for two principal reasons. In the first 
place, they confirm Stendhal's adherence to a naturalistic conception of man which
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gained ground through the work of Cabanis and other physicians-cum-natural scientists 
in the early years of the nineteenth century. Through his physiologie philosophique, 
Cabanis, as Emile Cailliet points out, 's'attache a mettre en relief le cote animal de 
l'homme.'93 To subscribe to Cabanis was to endorse an 'animalistic psychology of 
man' which eschewed the old hard and fast distinctions between the various orders of 
Nature and deprived humanity of any privileged station above and beyond the animal 
realm.94
The second and related sense in which these pages are important lies in the logical 
implication of the ideas advanced. Did not an animal basis of mind imply a 
physiological basis of morals?95 Cabanis and Tracy, in defining their science of 
Ideology as part of the wider science of zoology,96 were certainly at pains to argue as 
much. Theirs was an endeavour, as Emmet Kennedy points out, 'to convert the study 
of thought into a natural science with all the allure of certitude and uniformity which 
philosophy and politics clearly lacked.'97 To posit physical sensibility as the motor 
force of the human economy was to reduce moral responsibility to an idiom that had 
nothing in common with any innate conscience or 'revealed' appreciation of good and 
evil.98 Everywhere in Stendhal's thoughts on this question there is recourse to the same 
idea that 'moral' responsibility is a function not of some innate sense of right and 
wrong, but of a whole complex of psycho-physiological stimuli rooted in the laws of 
nature. Morality, taught the 'bible' of Cabanis, began with no immortal soul but in the 
nerves and diaphragm.99 The will with which Stendhal lends himself in turn to this 
rationale places him firmly in line with the new philosophical naturalism that issued 
from the clash of scientific reason and religious doctrine in the later eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. Donald King describes thus the process to which Stendhal bears 
witness:
Alors les sciences de la nature se creent pour resoudre les problemes laisses dans 
l'incertitude par la faillite de la foi. La physiologie naissante refuse a l'homme son 
ancien rang divin, "un peu inferieur aux anges" pour lui accorder une place dans le 
regne animal, soumis aux lois de la nature. L'esprit philosophique, qui avait etudie 
l'homme au point de vue moral, se transforme en esprit scientifique qui le 
considere comme un phenomene de l’histoire naturelle.100
Within a literary perspective, such a development would reach its apogee with Zola 
and the Naturalist movement of the later nineteenth century. When set alongside the 
case of Stendhal, however, this poses an inescapable problem. In Stendhal the 
ideologue we may, as a number of commentators (Zola included) have claimed, discern 
a bridge from eighteenth-century rationalism to the 'naturalism' of a later generation; 
but through Stendhal the novelist we negotiate no easy transition between the two. For 
it cannot reasonably be argued that Stendhal fits the mould of what we have come to 
understand by 'naturalism' in the literary sense of the term. His novels would suffice
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from the outset — as Zola promptly decreed101 — to demolish any such suggestion, 
just as would his lack of a rigorously defined method of presenting and developing his 
philosophical ideas across the range of his other works. And yet there are important 
senses, as Zola in part (though only in part) recognised, in which Stendhal does indeed 
prefigure the Naturalism of a later generation.102 The concern to puncture illusion and 
to pursue a truth that has its roots in observed reality alone; the vision of a humanity 
governed by heredity, environment and the pressures of the moment; the kinship 
between man, the animal kingdom and the wider realm of Nature; the contention that 
'moral' man was but 'physiological' man under another name, and should be 
'dissected' in like manner; the refusal to censure conduct that is determined by factors 
beyond the control of the individual; sobriety of perception reflected in a literary style 
eschewing affectation: all are aspects of the future 'Naturalism' which run deep in 
Stendhal.103 "'La science modeme, seule religion du XIXe siecle" — de qui est cette 
formule? Non pas de Zola, mais de Stendhal,' recalls with point F.W.J. Hemmings.104
Whatever Zola's well documented admiration for Stendhal, he was unsparing in 
his assertion that the latter had deployed 'une psychologie pure, degagee de toute 
physiologie et de toute science naturelle.'105 What grounds Zola had for such a claim 
we shall consider presently. For the moment, it may be noted that his assessment is far 
from commanding universal sympathy among Stendhal's critics, a number of whom 
have gone to the opposite extreme in proclaiming their author a Naturalist avant la lettre. 
Witness, for example, the judgments of Stendhal advanced by Albert Collignon and 
Adolphe Paupe respectively:
Ainsi, longtemps avant M. Taine et meme avant Sainte-Beuve, on le voit pratiquer 
en tous ses ouvrages, et sans la reduire en systeme, la theorie devenue celebre de la 
race, du milieu et du moment.106
La theorie de la race, du milieu et du moment, se trouve eparse dans l'ceuvre de 
Stendhal. L'auteur de Rouge et Noir n'en a pas fait un corps de doctrine a part et 
complet; il l'a plutot definie, en detail et a l'occasion, dans ses ouvrages de critique 
et d'histoire, et mise en action dans ses romans.107
Both of these assessments, while they may share the same kernel of truth, state the case 
in such crude terms that they raise more questions than they resolve. For while neither 
is prepared to relinquish Stendhal's claim (and it is a rightful one) to be a 'theorist', 
albeit sui generis, of race, milieu and moment, neither accounts in any adequate way for 
the integration of the said theory into his works. While Collignon's lack of 
discrimination may be construed as a sin of omission, Paupe's distinction between 
Stendhal's critical and fictional writings runs the risk of over-schematising, while it 
fails to provide any satisfactory account of what such a distinction implies. How do the 
ideas which Stendhal develops disparately across the range of his writings cohere into
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what can rightly be termed a theory? How, and to what degree, are these ideas 
translated by Stendhal from one genre to another, from historical and critical writings to 
the novel?
These are questions which must be addressed, and which lead us inescapably to 
consider the manner in which S tendhal himself viewed the integration of philosophical 
theory into the novel. The question is not an easy one, but it is called forth as much by 
Zola's remarks as by those of Collignon and Paupe. This much may be said at the 
outset: Stendhal, by the time he came to publish his earliest works, recognised — 
indeed was intensely committed to the principle — that hereditary and environmental 
factors, in all their variegated forms, exercised a crucial influence over human character 
and conduct. The fact is, however, that, where the novels at least are concerned, this 
remains a principle. For all Stendhal's declared fondness for 'le petit fa it vrai', he 
nowhere in his novels shows himself inclined to descend into the particularities of 
exactly which influences are at work and exactly how they bear upon his characters. 
Thus, while Matthew Josephson can hold Stendhal to be 'one of the most 
philosophical' of novelists, Martin Turned can state categorically that the same Stendhal 
'never used the novel to propound or to illustrate philosophical theories.'108
Prima facie, one might tend closer to Josephson's Scylla than to Tumell's 
Charybdis. Stendhal's novels rest upon, and are informed throughout by, his 
philosophical beliefs and concerns.109 What Tumell seems correct in suggesting, 
however, is that the explicit and laboured translation of philosophy into the novel is 
nowhere Stendhal's intent.110 The qualification is an important one. Among Stendhal's 
early critics notably, the charge was commonplace that he merely transposed 
philosophy into the novel. Thus for Elme Caro, Stendhal's novels 'ne sont guere que la 
mise en oeuvre de ses theories', whilst his dramatis personae remain 'des theories plutot 
que des personnages.'111 To argue as much, however, is wholly to misconstrue 
Stendhal's conception of the novel. For he never sets out, as he had done in his youth, 
to breathe life into a philosophical treatise. Nor indeed is it evident that he regards the 
novel, in Gita May’s terms, as 'a means of illustrating and testing, by way of narrative 
examples', his ideas and beliefs.112 Whatever Stendhal's views on the natural and 
social determinism at work upon man — and his views on the subject are both 
deep-rooted and enduring —, the Stendhalian hero is never just a theory made flesh, 
never, to adopt Zola's parlance, 'un simple resultat', 'un produit de l'air et du sol, 
comme la plante.'113
In one sense, of course, Stendhal's protagonists may all be considered, like Julien 
Sorel, so many 'bellesplantes';iu  but they are more, much more, besides. The interest
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of Stendhal's novels resides precisely in the fact that his characters are agents, to all 
appearances autonomous (though the opposite suggestion is frequently, if subtly, at 
work), situated within a given time and place, and issued with the challenge of 
asserting themselves, of mastering the circumstances — material, personal, familial, 
social, moral, economic, political — in which they find themselves. Though he pushes 
his contention much too far in claiming — astonishingly — that Stendhal 'was not 
materialistic enough to believe that individuals are conditioned by social factors,' D.F. 
Wakefield is, of course, stating the obvious when he asserts that Stendhal was no 
determinist in the mould of a Zola or a Taine.115 Though Julien Sorel's character is 
marked by his environment, it is not — in any explicit sense at least — explained by it. 
Julien is, as Wakefield puts it, 'propelled through life by an inner moral dynamism 
which has no obvious source outside himself.' The point is developed:
It is this element of the inexplicable and unpredictable (l'imprevu) which makes 
him, in Stendhal's words, "a superior being"; he is no mere puppet reacting to 
external circumstances. In fact, like Fabrice and all Stendhal's heroes, Julien has a 
certain weightlessness, a lack of consistency which enables him to act out of 
character and respond to each new situation in an unexpected manner.116
Though the expression 'out of character' begs questions for the environmental 
determinist which the critic does not address,117 these remarks take account of the fact 
that Stendhal's protagonists are never allowed to become laden with the ballast of 
philosophical theory, that they retain throughout a capacity to act in ways which do not 
appear to be governed by any pre-ordained determinist principle. E.B. Tenenbaum, one 
of the few critics to consider the problem of determinism in Stendhal's novels, notes 
quite rightly that 'social conditioning plays a considerably smaller role in the depiction 
of his protagonists than it does in his theoretical statements about personal identity.' 
Tenenbaum goes on to argue that what most clearly distinguishes Stendhal from other 
French 'realists' is precisely 'the capacity of the Stendhalian hero to transcend the 
influence of his environment.’118
The redundancy of ready labels such as 'Realist' or 'Naturalist' in Stendhal's case 
is all too clear. 'The peril of schematization,' as Victor Brombert puts it, 'is particularly 
great in dealing with a protean writer such as Stendhal.'119 Yet some broad working 
distinctions are required if we are to advance from the much too embracive assessments 
of Zola, Collignon and Paupe towards a more nuanced reading of Stendhal's novels. At 
the risk of replacing one schematic fallacy with another, one might argue that Stendhal 
the novelist is interested less in portraying the ways in which the hero is conditioned by 
circumstances, than the means whereby he responds to those circumstances, with all 
their inherent laws of cause and effect. 'II y a une maniere d'emouvoir qui est de 
montrer Its faits, les choses, sans en dire l'effet,' Stendhal had written in his diary as
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early as 1805, taking Mme de Stael to task for being burdensomely philosophical in 
Delphine.120 Certainly, the deliberate construction of settings in which might be played 
out the philosophical ideas explored in his other writings nowhere forms part of 
Stendhal's conception of the novel. A convinced believer in the power of the 
environment to shape human character Stendhal may be; but the environment which 
furnishes the theatre for his novels is a highly rarefied one, in which material detail 
appears often as a mere appendage to the protagonists’ self-conscience, where the 
world of concrete reality seems, as Georges Blin puts it, 'anecdotique, hors jeu, sans 
consequence.'121 Blin goes further on this point, concluding of Stendhal:
II ne donne, en effet, jamais le decor comme cause, ni le contexte comme texte, ni 
l'environnement comme milieu agissant. Et quand il condescend a attirer notre 
attention sur le theatre de l'aventure, ce n'est point qu'il espere determiner par Ik le 
heros, le resoudre — comme fait Zola — par l'exterieur [...]. [...] Le schema tait 
naturellement ces causalites d'ambiance dont un Zola devait se desoler que l'auteur 
du Rouge les eut laissees pour compte.122
Blin rests much of his case here upon an analysis of the scene, chosen by Zola to 
illustrate Stendhal's excessive abstraction, in which Julien seizes the hand of Mme de 
Renal in the garden at Vergy.123 Of this scene, Zola writes:
Or, le milieu n'apparait pas une seule fois. Nous pourrions etre n’importe ou, et 
dans n'importe quelles conditions, la scene resterait la meme, pourvu qu'il fit 
noir.124
Blin's intention, in returning to this episode, is to demonstrate that, contrary to Zola's 
charge, there is a very significant amount of concrete detail: 'les grandes chaleurs’; 'la 
nuit [...] fort obscure’; 'le ciel charge de gros nuages, promenes par un vent tres chaud' 
— which, Stendhal tells us — 'semblait annoncer une tempete’; 'les gemissements du 
vent dans l'epais feuillage du tilleul, et le bruit de quelques gouttes rares qui 
commengaient a tomber sur ses feuilles les plus basses.'125 Such is the clearly 
delineated arriere-plan against which the drama will unfold. Blin's purpose in recalling 
all of this, however, is not what it might seem. For, he argues, these descriptive 
elements denote no grand scheme of naturalistic determinism at work, but amount 
instead to so many 'donnees circonstancielles' which contribute at the level of action 
alone to an event 'dont la causalite reelle est a chercher ailleurs'126 — specifically, as 
Blin goes on to assert, 'dans le champ de lutte des deux volontes.'127 The physical 
conditions of the scene affect Julien's resolution to seize Mme de Renal's hand not at 
the level of intention (his decision was, it may be recalled, taken the previous evening), 
but at the level of execution only.
The net effect of Blin's analysis is at once to refute and to endorse Zola's criticism. 
To refute it by demonstrating that there is indeed significant recourse to material detail,
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where Zola claims there is none; to endorse it by contending that the same material 
detail is itself a function of plot, that it nowhere enters into the domain of intentionality, 
nowhere determines the characters or the action upon which it attends. In an author so 
apparently committed to the deterministic precepts of Helvetius, Tracy and Cabanis, 
this refusal to invest the material world with any clearly defined power to determine 
character and conduct poses a problem. 'Tous les maitres de Stendhal,' as Michel 
Crouzet affirms, 'lui leguent l'idee d'un determinisme absolu et general.'128 Yet where 
is the 'partisan d'Helvetius'129 in an author so unconcerned to relate the setting, 
characterisation and action of his novels to the extended material environment? Where is 
the 'philosophe de l'ecole de Cabanis'130 in a novelist who does not trouble to establish 
any clear rapports between the physical characteristics and the moral disposition in his 
protagonists?
Such questions have been the object of a surprising critical neglect, given the 
willingness of Stendhal's commentators to dub him a spokesman for Ideology and 
continuator of the deterministic materialism of the eighteenth-century philosophes. 
Where consideration has been given to the question of philosophy in Stendhal's novels, 
it has tended to concentrate upon the minutiae of specific influences to the exclusion of 
more general questions of approach and internal consistency.131 Where the broader 
questions have been addressed, the results have been far from satisfactory. 'Jamais on 
n'expliquera une page du Rouge et le Noir a l'aide de Cabanis ou de Destutt de Tracy,' 
concludes Rene Girard, dismissing out of hand any link between the 'theories de la 
jeunesse' and the 'romans de la maturite.'132 No less sweeping in his tone, Henri 
Martineau advances the quite opposite view, claiming that all of the characters in 
Stendhal's novels remain true to principles derived from Helvetius and Cabanis.133 
Beyond such bold generalities, however, neither critic ventures. Francine Marill 
Alberes makes a more sustained, though not altogether happy, attempt to discover the 
hand of Cabanis in Stendhal's novels. Among the more insightful judgments advanced 
in this regard is the assertion that the Stendhalian hero undergoes, 'a cote de 
l'experience externe, une experience interne, et a cote de l'action volontaire et 
raisonnee, un automatisme inconscient qui echappe au controle du moi.'134 This 
Alberes ascribes, plausibly enough, to 'le role de l'inconscient' which Stendhal had 
first encountered in Cabanis.135 Can one go so far, however, as to see Stendhal's 
novels as a dramatisation of Cabanis's philosophy? Alberes suggests as much when 
she writes:
Decantees par le temps, estompees par le souvenir, les idees du medecin Cabanis
ont pris figure humaine pour le romancier Stendhal, se sont incarnees en Julien
Sorel ou en Fabrice, d'abstractions elles sont devenues hommes.136
It is, of course, reasonable to propose that such a major and lasting influence upon
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Stendhal’s thought as that of Cabanis should provide an informing principle in his 
interpretation of the world. As the Vie de Henry Brulard attests, Stendhal’s allegiance 
to Cabanis's theories remains undiminished to the end.137 Yet, in taking account of 
what she perceives as Cabanis's influence on the novels, Alberes overlooks the 
obvious objection to her argument: the lack of any clear attempt by Stendhal to make the 
connection (inviolable for Cabanis) between the physical and moral characteristics of 
his protagonists. The painter, Stendhal had decreed in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, 
must bring out the moral character of man through a faithful representation of the 
physical,138 Was, it not incumbent upon the novelist to do likewise?
If one returns, with this in mind, to the physiological discussion of the 
temperaments as presented in chapters XCII-XCIX of VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, 
one is at a loss to discover anything that can be said with certainty to prefigure 
characterisation in the novels. How, it might be asked, does an author register the 
presence or absence in his heroes of capacious lungs, a voluminous heart or an excess 
of bile? The difficulty of such an undertaking is, of course, only too clear. There are, 
however, numerous indices of outward appearance — height, physical form, facial 
characteristics, complexion, eyes, hair, skin, muscular conformation — which, as 
Cabanis argues, provide the discerning observer with a guide to the temperament 
prevalent within the individual. The Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme 
furnish a veritable manual of physical characterisation, a storehouse of descriptions that 
could readily have been transposed into the novel.139
How, then, do we account for Stendhal's insouciance in this domain — an 
insouciance which goes to the point, as Georges Blin observes, of assigning to his 
protagonists the same bland, almost interchangeable features?140 Not only are the 
physical portraits of Stendhal's heroes and heroines unremarkable, they are, as Blin 
points out, liable to inconsistency.141 It would require much contrivance, and a 
distortingly high degree of selectivity, to bring these 'identikit' heroes, these 
'incorporeal figures', as C.P. Snow calls them,142 into line with Cabanis's contention 
that
a telles apparences exterieures, c’est-a-dire, a telle physionomie, taille, proportion 
des membres, couleur de la peau, habitude du corps, etat des vaisseaux sanguins, 
[correspondent] assez constamment telles dispositions de l'esprit, ou telles 
passions particulieres.143
All of this raises the central question of what Stendhal understood to be the 
function of the novelist. And here it must be remembered that, whatever his avowed 
view of the novel as a 'mirror', Stendhal never disengages himself from the belief that 
Art brings its own particular focus to Reality. As we read in the Vies de Haydn, de
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Mozart et de Metastase, 'tous les arts sont fondes sur un certain degre de faussete.'144 
The point is one which finds more forceful expression on other occasions. 'Tout 
ouvrage d'art est un beau mensonge,' declares Stendhal in an article on Walter Scott 
and La Princesse de Cleves,145 'Un ouvrage d'art,' he insists once more in the 
Promenades dans Rome, 'n'est qu'un beau mensonge.'146 Hence the near 
impossibility, as Stendhal argues in relation to the pictorial arts, that 'la nature presente 
une action telle qu'on n’ait qu'a la copier pour faire un tableau.'147
As of the painter, so of the novelist. Both must tailor, embellish, select their 
reality. 'En general,' writes Stendhal in his notes for Lucien Leuwen, 'idealiser comme 
Raphael idealise dans un portrait pour le rendre plus ressemblant.'148 This paradox 
takes us some way towards an appreciation of the truth, the 'nature', which Stendhal 
was seeking to convey through his novels — or, more accurately perhaps, towards 
some understanding of the truth which he was not attempting to convey. His impatience 
with the so-called 'naturalistes' who, in painting,149 fear to embellish their subject 
carries over into his preoccupations as a writer. 'Naturalism' represents for Stendhal a 
sort of 'zero degree' of the novelist's art. Hence the self-reproach which we find in a 
note consigned to the manuscript of Lucien Leuwen: 'For me: Tu n'es qu'un 
naturaliste: tu ne choisis pas les modeles, mais prends pour love toujours Metilde et 
Dominique.'150
One could not at the same time be a servant of Art and a slave to Reality. As F.C. 
Green asserts, Stendhal 'would neyer have admitted the possibility of that so-called 
identification of life and art which was the ideal of the later Naturalists.'151 His whole 
point of departure is different. 'II faut observer les passions dans l'homme qui existe,' 
Stendhal had written in 1804, 'pour pouvoir les mettre dans mes etres plus beaux que 
nature.'152 The novel, no less than the theatre, would be an excursion for Stendhal into 
that perennial object of his concern, the 'human heart.' No less than the theatre, too, it 
must avoid becoming a mere copy, however faithful, of observed reality. It is the 
novelist's task to reinterpret the world: neither to impose his own experience unduly 
upon his art, nor to withdraw to such a distance that he takes no part in shaping the 
'reality' that it is his to represent. The balance is a fine one. 'Je cherche a raconter,' 
Stendhal would write, in drafting his response to Balzac's review of La Chartreuse de 
Parm6: '1° avec une idee, 2° avec clarte ce qui se passe dans un cceur.'153
Here, in this brief statement of his objectives as a literary artist, we glimpse the real 
theatre of the Stendhalian novel. His instinct as a novelist is, as he intimates on 
undertaking Lamiel, to opt for the 'resume moral d'une action' at the expense of 
material realism.154 'L'habit et le collier de cuivre d'un serf du Moyen Age,' he
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declares in an article on Walter Scott and the Princesse de Clives, 'sont plus faciles a 
decrire que les mouvements du cceur humain.'155 Nor is such a judgment restricted to 
the novel as a specific literary form. Stendhal's defence of Rome, Naples et Florence as 
a study of Italy is that it describes not landscapes and stones, but 'l’etat des tetes et des 
cceurs en Italie, la force du ressort et le sens dans lequel il est dirige.'156
For all their self-righteous tone, such remarks are more than statements of 
principle. For, related to Stendhal's conception of what art should be, there is another, 
altogether more idiosyncratic, reason for his reticence over material detail. It is an 
aversion, pure and simple, to physical description. 'Occupe du moral,' he concedes in 
the Souvenirs d'egotisme, 'la description du physique m'ennuie.'157 Later in the same 
work, he describes the Salon de Tracy of which he was an habitue in the 1820s. 
Noting, however, that he has concentrated his attentions on the characters of various 
guests to the exclusion of the physical setting, he concedes: 'J'ai oublie de peindre ce 
salon. Sir Walter Scott et ses imitateurs eussent sagement commence par la, mais moi, 
j'abhorre la description materielle.' To which is added the still more telling remark: 
'L'ennui de la faire m'empeche de faire des romans.'158
Little wonder, then, that the novels to which Stendhal did turn his hand should so 
readily occasion the charge of lacking 'substance' in their characters and setting. 
Stendhal, argues C.P. Snow, could not 'immerse himself in an actual, living, realised 
world, either romantic or unromantic, the world of human beings of flesh and bone. He 
didn't breathe what a fellow-countryman of his later called "the odour of man.'"159 The 
fellow-countryman in question is, of course, Zola, whom Snow cites approximately 
here from the preface of L'Assommoir ('le premier roman sur le peuple, qui ne mente 
pas et qui ait l'odeur du peuple'). The judgment has some foundation. For if Stendhal 
— and, in his likeness, the Stendhalian hero — had a decided distaste for anything, it 
was for the odour of man such as later 'realist' writers would feel bound to evoke it.160 
If Zola can be accused of misunderstanding Stendhal, writes F.W.J. Hemmings, 'the 
imagination quails to conceive how Stendhal would have reacted to L'Assommoir.'161
Material reality, clearly, had to be incorporated into the novel as into any other 
form of art; but Stendhal's 'copy of nature', where it occurs, seems little more than a 
grudging capitulation to necessity. 'Eh! je le sais bien, morbleu! qu'il faut imiter la 
nature; mais jusqu'a quel point? voila toute la question.' The exasperation that is 
betrayed by this remark, which we find in the article on Walter Scott and La Princess de 
Clives,162 takes a more defiant form in the 'Projet d'article' which Stendhal penned for 
the prospective Italian readership of Le Rouge et le Noir in 1832, and where he raises a 
banner to the lack of material description in his novel. Here, he declares, the reader will 
not find 'deux pages a decrire la vue que l'on avait de la fenetre de la chambre ou etait le
313
heros; deux autres pages a decrire son habillement, et encore deux pages a representer 
la forme du fauteuil sur lequel il etait pose.'163
Against such an aversion, the most firmly established principles of determinism 
must yield. That Stendhal should have been able to see in Armance — of all novels — 
'Uetude de la nature1164 says much about the degree to which he had evolved his own 
highly rarefied conception of the 'nature' that should be distilled through the novel. 'On 
ne trouvera pas ici des paysages composes,1 boasts the author of the Chroniques 
italiennes, 'mais des vues prises d'apres nature...'165 In Lucien Leuwen likewise, 
Stendhal claims to have copied 'les personnages et les faits d'apres nature.'166 To write 
a successful novel, he contends, one must 'peindre des caracteres qui soient dans la 
nature.'167 Such protestations of 'naturalism' are, it is clear, meaningful on their own 
terms only. For Stendhal, as Robert Vigneron observes, 'la nature est la nature 
humaine plutot que la nature materielle, et c'est a la verite des caracteres, des passions 
et des mceurs qu'il s'attache avant tout.'168
It is important to recognise that, in this sense at least, Stendhal’s excursions into 
'fictional' literature over a forty-year period represent something of a continuum. For 
what is clearly to the fore in the novels and short stories is the same highly abstractive 
conception of man which had been such a feature of his early writings (and which, as 
we have argued, Stendhal had succeeded in correcting, from a philosophical point of 
view, through his reading of Cabanis and his increased awareness of the physiological 
dimension in human affairs). But Philosophy was no more Art for the later novelist 
than it had been for the aspiring dramatist. Thus Stendhal never successfully integrated 
— never, in truth, sought to integrate — his evolving vision of man, as a creature of 
flesh and blood, into his fictional writing, as he had done, for example, into VHistoire 
de la peinture en Italie, De VAmour or the portraits of Italy. Instead, his notions of 
characterisation and plot continue to draw upon the same principles as his earliest 
literary projects, principles whose durability requires to be recognised by the student of 
Stendhal's novels. For the notes and marginalia which afford an insight into the literary 
composition of the latter are replete with the vestiges of much earlier endeavour.
Part of the bridge between the notes and draft projects of the early 1800s and the 
writings of some three and four decades later is the fact that Stendhal held with such 
remarkable — if ill-advised — tenacity to his dramatic ambitions. Letellier, as F.W.J. 
Hemmings reminds us, remained on the stocks from 1803 until 1821, and perhaps 
beyond.169 When Stendhal determined finally to relinquish his ambition to become a 
playwright and turned to the novel instead, he did so largely within the terms of the 
enterprise which had occupied him, on and off, for some two decades. There is no 
doubt, of course, that Stendhal developed and greatly refined his sensitivity to the
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complexities of human nature; but, from playwright to novelist, he made no leap in the 
conception of his essential undertaking: to explore the workings of the human heart.170 
What makes for dramatic interest, in 1835 as in 1805,171 is the internal struggle 
between passions themselves, or the classic conflict of reason and passion. Thus, on 
the manuscript of Lucien Leuwen, Stendhal notes:
PLAN. — Je cherche une action probante, id est sacrifice de la seconde passion a 
la premiere.172
Hence, too, the dilemma in which the novelist places his hero vis-a-vis the object of his 
bourgeoning affections:
Son esprit se croyait fonde a mepriser madame de Chasteller, et son ame avait de 
nouvelles raisons chaque jour de l'adorer comme l'etre le plus pur, le plus celeste
Le combat de son ame et de son esprit le rendait presque fou a la lettre, et 
certainement un des hommes les plus malheureux.173
Here speaks not only the Stendhal who had coined the notion of 'crystallisation' some 
dozen years earlier, but — more particularly — the Stendhal who, as early as October 
1803, had deemed the height of dramatic interest to lie in pitting the dictates of the head 
against the impulses of the heart.174 The same Stendhal, as late as 1840, in his plans 
for Lamiel, would echo more clearly than ever the language and preoccupations of his 
youth. Having concluded in 1803 that the passions occupied their place in a range of 
conflicting elements within man — reason, habit, social obligation, familial and 
personal ties —, the ageing novelist would turn his mind to the same conflictual 
divisions within natural and social man.175 Passions, combats de passion, liens, 
habitudes: all are the stuff of Stendhal's earliest deliberations, which we find surfacing 
once more amid his notes of January 1840.176
Philosophy in the Novel: A Cannon-shot at a Concert
To resume, then, Stendhal never transcended in his novels a vision of man which has 
its roots deep in a much earlier period of his thought. Such enduring allegiance to his 
primary notions on the depiction of human nature could only conduce to a type of novel 
in which the physical environment would play a subordinate—or, in Robert Alter's 
terms, 'minimal but tactically efficient'—role.177 The thoughts and sentiments of 
Stendhal's characters hold centre stage throughout; everything else appears as a 
function of the latter only. 'Le decor a toujours une valeur relationnelle,' writes Hans
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Boll-Johansen, 'il constitue un support a l'analyse psychologique. Seuls les elements 
ayant la valeur de signes referentiels interessent Stendhal.'178
Therein lies one of the features which, as F.WJ. Hemmings observes, lend to 
Stendhal's writing its 'exquisitely archaic patina.'179 Another of those features is the 
chasteness with which the novelist conceives of his subject. For Stendhal obeys to the 
end an aesthetic imperative formulated in his youth.*180 The subject must retain nobility: 
base 'realism' was in Stendhal’s eyes as reprehensible as it was gratuitous.181 How 
can best be described the process of falling in love? The author of De VAmour y as we 
have seen, puts it thus:
D y a  une cause physique, un commencement de folie, une affluence du sang au 
cerveau, un desordre dans les nerfs et dans le centre cerebral.182
The author of Le Rouge et le Noir, however, puts it rather differently. In evoking Mme 
de Renal's nascent affections for Julien, Stendhal, in the 'Projet d'article', tells his 
potential reader:
Peu a peu, l'ame simple de Mme de Renal sympathise avec l'ame genereuse, fiere, 
orgueilleuse de Julien.183
The difference between these two descriptions of the same phenomenon is 
striking. It reveals something of the transformation, the chastening process, which 
Stendhal's language undergoes in passing from overtly 'philosophical' works such as 
L'Histoire de la peinture en Italie and De VAmour to the novels. The phenomenon of 
'crystallisation', contends the author of De IAmour, 'vient de la nature qui nous 
commande d'avoir du plaisir et qui nous envoie le sang au cerveau...'184 It is, 
however, in a quite different manner that the author of Le Rouge et le Noir will describe 
the same process as experienced by Mme de Renal towards Julien:
La generosite, la noblesse d'ame, l'humanite lui semblerent peu a peu n'exister que 
chez ce jeune abbe. Elle eut pour lui seul toute la sympathie et meme l'admiration 
que ces vertus excitent chez les ames bien nees.185
Between the exclusively cerebral experience described here and the physiological 
process evoked in De IAmour, there is indeed little in common. Jean Melia, in his early 
study of Stendhal's thought, quite fails to take account of this distinction when he 
writes:
Pour Stendhal, en effet, l'ame n'est pour rien dans les choses d'amour. Le corps 
seul regne en maitre. L’amour est une fievre et, comme la fievre, l’amour nait, 
s'aggrave, s'affaiblit ou s'eteint de par lui-meme. L'amour n'est qu'une impulsion 
physiologique dont les consequences influent sur le cerveau.1^ 6
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In principle, this is indeed so. To argue as much, however, is to appreciate only one 
aspect of love as Stendhal portrays it. For all Stendhal's -'philosophical' definitions of 
love as a maladie, a fit subject of study for the comparative anatomist and physiologist, 
he retains a whole lexicon of abstraction with which to convey the same phenomenon. 
If the former image is prevalent in his non-fictional writings, the latter comes into its 
own in his novels and short stories.
All of this, of course, merely serves to confirm an image of Stendhal which, in 
Georges Blin's words, 'decourage de le regarder comme un precurseur du 
naturalisme.'187 But we return here to the point made earlier, about Stendhal's refusal 
not only to employ, but even to perceive, the novel as a forum for philosophy. The 
paramount task of the novelist, he makes clear on a number of occasions, is to narrate, 
to entertain, to move — not, as Blin puts it of Zola, to produce a 'fichier 
documentaire', 'la legon de choses pour cours du soir.'188 The novel for Stendhal was, 
as Howard Clewes observes, 'partly a vehicle for his own views on human nature, 
politics and philosophy; but they must, he knew, conform to the art.'189 If politics in 
the novel is a pistol-shot at a concert, laboured philosophising would, one suspects, 
have had the effect for Stendhal of a thundering cannon.
It is instructive to recall, within this perspective, Stendhal's early criticism of Mme 
de Stael's Delphine, which, he had complained, 'fait trop sur l'ame (sur mon ame) 
l'effet d'un cours de philosophic.'190 Nor is this the only occasion where philosophy is 
evoked by Stendhal as an unwelcome intrusion in a work of literature. His judgment of 
Egisthe in Voltaire's Merope is revealing: 'Ce jeune homme parle en philosophe, ce qui 
detruit l'illusion.'191 The balance between the licence which the literary medium affords 
and the imperatives which it imposes is a question which clearly exercises Stendhal's 
mind. Nor would the criterion of his judgment in this regard vary between between his 
reading of Delphine in 1805 and his self-perception as a novelist in later years. On the 
manuscript of Lamiel, we find a telling reflection on the place of philosophy in the 
novel:
Si le recit est trop charge de philosophic, c'est la philosophie qui fait l'effet de la
nouveaute a l'esprit, et non le recit.'192
The novelist, it is clear, is confronted with a choice between philosophy and 
narrative, not with the possibility of incorporating both in equal measure, or of 
transmuting one into the other, as the later Naturalists would strive to do. In the margin 
of the same manuscript of Lamiel, Stendhal makes clear his view that philosophy in the 
novel could have a place only at the expense of narrative, not as any complement to it:
Maxime: Sur chaque incident se demanden faut-il raconter ceci philosophiquement
ou le raconter narrativement selon le systeme de l'Arioste?193
317
Henri Martineau surely betrays the letter and spirit both of this remark when, in his 
preface to the Romans et Nouvelles, he asserts of Stendhal: 'il exposait, et nous 
gardons fidelement ses propres expressions, que raconter narrativement ne saurait le 
satisfaire, mais qu'il a toujours cherche a raconter philosophiquement.'194 This is to 
distort beyond recognition the sense of the remark in question. Yet Martineau is not 
alone in thus misrepresenting Stendhal’s thought on this matter. Pierre Martino goes 
still further in a similar interpretation of the same remark:
C’est que le dessein essentiel du roman n’est pas pour Stendhal d'ordre litteraire; il 
est proprement philosophique; il ne s'agit point du tout de divertir l'imagination, 
ou de flatter agreablement la sensibilite amoureuse.195
Such assessments reveal a surprising insensitivity to Stendhal's thoughts on this 
question. For, as C.W. Thompson acknowledges, Stendhal became increasingly 
concerned as a novelist to 'eviter les reflexions philosophiques que multipliaient Balzac 
et George Sand, de ne raconter qu"'en action" et d'atteindre l'ideal d'une narration 
"narrative".'196 Amid his notes ioxLucien Leuwen, Stendhal defines his conception of 
the novel in unequivocal terms: 'Or, la premiere qualite d'un roman doit etre: raconter, 
amuser par des recits...'197 Philosophy, by contrast, is a trap into which the unwary 
novelist may fall.198 In the letter to Merimee which provides the famous 'key' to the 
reading of Armance, Stendhal hesitates over the quality of his novel. 'Ce roman est trop 
erudito, trop savant,' he fears.
A-t-il assez de chaleur pour faire veiller une jolie marquise fran5aise jusqu'a deux 
heures du matin? That is the question. [...] Si le roman n'est pas de nature a faire 
passer la nuit, a quoi bon le faire?199
With the last of his novels as with the first, Stendhal remains acutely aware of the 
limits to which didacticism may be pushed. The self-consciousness which is evident at 
times in his notes and marginalia suggests the perils more than the benefits of being a 
novelist schooled in Helvetius, Cabanis et al. In a marginal note consigned to a copy of 
the Promenades dans Rome and dating from the writing of Lamiel, we read once more: 
'Le roman est quelque chose qui fait passer la nuit.’200 In another note from the same 
period which relates to Lamiel specifically, Stendhal writes: 'On ouvre un tel livre pour 
avoir: 1° des recits; 2° des recits amusants.’201 Such remarks, lending as they do a 
valuable insight into Stendhal's conception of his craft, should put us on our guard 
against defining him too readily as a philosopher-novelist. Unsure of the success with 
which he portrays the thoughts and actions of his characters in Lucien Leuwen, 
Stendhal compares his approach to that of Fielding:
[...] Fielding decrit a lafois les sentiments et actions de plusieurs personnages, et 
Dominique d'un seul. Ou mene la maniere de Dominique? Je l'ignore. Est-ce un
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perfectionnement? Est-ce revenir a l'enfance de l'art, ou plutot tomber dans le 
genre froid du personnage philosophique?202
The verb tomber should no more go unnoticed here than the epithet froid. In such 
'philosophical characters' Stendhal's novels may appear, prima facie, to abound. Yet it 
is notable that, if his protagonists think themselves philosophical, Stendhal seizes every 
opportunity to lay bare their self-delusion, to debunk, with a sometimes savage irony, 
the very notion of 'philosophy' as a means of negotiating life's vicissitudes.203 Nor is 
the above the only occasion where the lapsing into philosophy by the novelist is thus 
condemned by Stendhal. In De 1‘Amour, we read that 'la reverie' — which is 'le vrai 
plaisir du roman' — 'est innotable.'
La noter, c'est la tuer pour le present, car l'on tombe dans l'analyse philosophique 
du plaisir.204
The choice — and it is presented clearly as such — is between 'la plus haute 
philosophic' and 'le laisser-aller des sensations tendres.'205 As a novelist, Stendhal 
believed that his sympathies should lie considerably closer to the latter than to the 
former. Nowhere is this more clearly spelt out, nowhere is the fundamental 
incompatibility between narrative art and philosophy evoked with more point, than in a 
note consigned by Stendhal to the manuscript of Lucien Leuwen:
[...] jamais de reflexion philosophique sur le fond des choses qui, reveillant 
l'esprit, le jugement, la mefiance froide et philosophique du lecteur, empeche net 
l'emotion. Or, qu'est-ce qu'un roman sans emotion?206
A case could readily be made for the same selective interpretation of philosophy in 
Stendhal's novels as Peter Jones makes, in Philosophy and the Novel, for, say, Anna 
Karenina,207 What we are primarily concerned with here, however, is Stendhal's own 
declared intentions; and for that reason it is important to take account of those occasions 
when he broaches the question in explicit terms. For the conclusion is inescapable that 
Stendhal considers philosophy to be inimical to the first principle of the novel.208 We 
are back here, it is clear, to that perennial conflict between the 'poet' and the 
'philosopher' which had so preoccupied him from the earliest and had never been 
successfully resolved. It is for this reason, we would submit, that Pierre Martino gives 
a highly misleading account of Stendhal's art when he writes:
[...] il ne serait pas mauvais de rayer le mot roman, toutes les fois qu'on parle de 
Rouge et Noir ou de la Chartreuse de Parme; on lui substituerait par exemple ce 
mot d'etude, dont quelques romanciers naturalistes essayerent de faire la 
fortune.209
We are at some remove here from what Stendhal himself would have accepted as a 
description either of his intention or of his achievement in the novels in question. We
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have already had occasion, moreover, to consider what Zola, as the standard-bearer of 
those same 'romanciers naturalistes', would have made of such an assertion. As Henri 
Delacroix rightly observes, Tartiste, le conteur' in Stendhal work not in tandem with, 
but in opposition to, Tanalyste.’210 Taime a la folie,' writes the author of Rome, 
Naples et Florence, 'les contes qui peignent les mouvements du cceur humain, bien en 
detail, et je suis tout oreille.'211 Had Zola required a single phrase from Stendhal to 
sum up his misgivings, he might have found it here.
So too, of course, Balzac. For it is interesting — if unsurprising — to note that, in 
his letter of 5 April 1839 to the author of La Chartreuse de Parme, the latter remarks, 
with some understatement: '[...] il manque le cote physique dans la peinture de 
quelques personnages.'212 What is surprising is how little store Balzac appears to set 
by this criticism. He clearly recognises — and respects — the distance that separates 
them both in their distinctive approaches to the novel. For he adds at once: 'mais c'est 
un rien, quelques touches. Vous avez explique l'ame de l'ltalie.'213
Such indulgence from the ’roi des romanciers'214 must have come as reassurance 
indeed. It is interesting nonetheless to note that, on re-reading Le Rouge et le Noir in 
February 1840, Stendhal would be moved to remark: 'II manque la description 
physique et pittoresque des personnages.'215 The judgment is revealing. For if there is 
some regret here at the dearth of physical description, it is significant that this is 
prompted by the notion that the work is less engaging, less colourful as a result, not by 
the fact that environmental determinism is inadequately portayed. A similar inference 
may be drawn from a remark which Stendhal makes in one of three drafts of the letter 
written in 1840 in response to Balzac's flattering appraisal of La Chartreuse de 
Parme:216
On me dit depuis un an qu'il faut quelquefois delasser le lecteur en decrivant le
pay sage, les habits. Ces choses m'ont tant ennuye chez les autres! J'essaierai.217
Determinism in the Stendhalian Novel
Returning now to the assessments of Collignon and Paupe, we are better placed to 
appreciate their deficiencies. For they fail to recognise anything of the circumspection 
and discrimination that are required in the discussion of Stendhal's 'naturalism'. Before 
defining Stendhal's novels as demonstrations of race, milieu and moment, one must 
first take account of his contempt, in theory as in practice, for what Georg Lukacs calls
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'mere naturalistic realism.'218 Stendhal, as we have said, is a firm believer in the 
principle of environmental and hereditary determinism, just as he believed in the power 
of historical moment to determine the destiny of men. Of these faces of determinism, it 
is the latter that is the most overtly present in his novels.219 'Du temps de l'Empereur,' 
he declares in a letter of 19 March 1831 to Alberthe de Rubempre, 'Julien eut ete un fort 
honnete homme.'220 In the novel itself, we are assured that the same Julien 'peut aller 
loin, si fata sinant.'221 An authorial comment which is echoed by Julien's retrospective 
estimation of himself: 'Moi seul, je sais ce que j'aurais pu faire... Pour les autres, je ne 
suis tout au plus qu'un PEUT-ETRE.'222 Condemned likewise to bear all the weight of 
an 'uncashed potentiality' (in the apt expression of Michael Wood),223 Lucien will be 
to the July Monarchy what Julien had been to the Restoration: 'un jeune homme qui 
peut-etre un jour sera quelque chose', 'un brillant peut-etre\ resolved to prove his 
mettle, 'd'etre un homme estimable et de servir la patrie, si l'occasion s'en 
presente.'224
Such remarks are pregnant with the suggested power of historical moment and 
circumstance to determine the destiny of the individual, leaving the reader ever in 
Stendhal's novels with the task of reconciling, in Victor Brombert's words, 'ce qui a 
ete avec ce qui aurait pu etre.'225 For there is in all of Stendhal's writings 'a certain 
speculative quality', a refusal to draw too firm a distinction between what is, has been, 
will be, and what might be 226 The point is admirably captured by Jean-Pierre Richard, 
when he writes of Stendhal: 'II suggere que nos actes sont bien au-dessous de ce que 
nous sommes, et que ce que nous sommes est bien au-dessous de ce que nous aurions 
pu etre, de ce qu'en realite nous etions.'227 Is this the self-indulgent illusion of.the 
Stendhalian hero, or the conviction of Stendhal himself? The answer, in relation to the 
protagonists of the novels at least, is never unambiguously provided. What is certain, 
however, is that Stendhal's whole appreciation of the era in which he lived is informed 
by such tensions between reality and possibility, by a keen awareness of the 'principles 
of instability, evanescence, and transformation' which, argues Brombert, were those of 
Stendhal's generation 228 The great energising force of the Revolution in particular is 
an aspect of his day to which he would remain to the end acutely sensitive.229 Here lies 
the gravitational pole towards which so much of the conditional tense in Stendhal's 
writing pulls. Thus, in the Memoires d'un touriste, we find him, in characteristic 
fashion, measuring a young Macon lawyer not by what he is now but by what he could 
have been then:
n  agit; il vaudrait mieux si les institutions etaient plus fortes, il serait Fox ou Pitt. 
Du temps de l'empereur, il eut ete conseiller d'Etat comme M. Chaban, et eut 
administre la province de Hambourg.
[...] Sous Napoleon il eut du moins ete force d'etre sous-lieutenant ou garde 
d'honneur.230
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This is but one occasion among many when Stendhal airs what had long become 
for him a stock theory on the ebb and flow of social opportunity. Personal qualities 
alone, he had early read in Helvetius, do not suffice to make the admirable man: ’il faut 
de plus se trouver, comme les Codrus & les Regulus, heureusement place dans des 
temps, des circonstances & des postes ou nos actions puissent beaucoup influer sur le 
bien public.'231 Historical moment, Stendhal comes in turn to reason, has power, as 
the final arbiter in human destiny, to determine not only personal fortunes but the very 
character of men and nations. In the Memoires sur Napoleon, we find one of the most 
emphatic statements of historical determinism in all of Stendhal's writings:
La France qui cherchait des hommes dans toutes les classes de la societe, trouva 
des genies dans des positions qui, d'ordinaire, ne foumissent que des avocats ou 
des officiers subaltemes. Si Louis XVI eut continue a regner, Danton et Moreau 
eussent ete des avocats; Pichegru, Massena et Augereau, des sous-officiers; 
Desaix, Kleber, des capitaines; Bonaparte, Carnot, des lieutenants-colonels ou 
colonels d'artillerie; Lannes et Murat, des marchands chapeliers ou des maitres de 
poste. Sieyes eut ete grand-vicaire et Mirabeau, tout au plus, un negociateur 
subalteme, un chevalier d'Eon.232
The tide of hypotheses with which Stendhal here sweeps away the reality of an era 
gives some measure of what he took to be the precarity of history, the 'unpattemed 
chaos of possibilities'233 awaiting to be unleashed at any point in the course of human 
affairs. 'La nature represente toujours le meme potentiel d'action,' as Michel Delon puts 
it, 'mais l'histoire est justement ce jeu de passage du virtuel a l'actuel, puis, 
inversement, du visible au latent.'234 The remark is made in relation to Mme de Stael, 
but is eminently apt to describe the conception of history which so often finds 
expression in the pages of Stendhal. The latter's protagonists, as Martin Tumell argues, 
'are the direct product of their age and are only comprehensible when seen in relation to 
it.'235 None, of course, is more alive to the power of moment and circumstance to 
determine the individual's fate than Julien Sorel. Yet, for all that, the prudent critic 
hesitates on this point. For so much in Stendhal's novels is conveyed through 
suggestion that it is difficult to be sure where determinism, whatever its guise, begins 
and ends. One recalls the letter to his sister Pauline, written in the full flush of his 
enthusiasm for the deterministic thinkers of preceding generations, in which he urges 
her to learn from a critical observation of others:
Cherche le chemin que tu aurais du tenir, si tu avais ete a leur place, pour eviter les 
habitudes de la tete et du coeur (ou le caractere) qu'ils se sont donnees 236
Coming away from a reading of Stendhal's novels, one might ask just such a 
question of his characters. Might they have done it another way? Might some other 
result have issued from the 'unpredictable, twisting affair, full of unseen alternative 
routes, other roads',237 that is the Stendhalian hero's lot? Fabrice at Waterloo may, to
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those with a fondness for allegory, say much about the plight of man in a baffling 
world, 'knocked about by events for which he isn't responsible';238 but where exactly 
lie the boundaries of Fabrice's responsibility for himself! 'Grand Dieu! Puis-je me 
repondre de rien sur moi-meme?' exclaims Lucien Leuwen.239 'Quelles que fussent les 
idees de Lucien,' we are elsewhere told, 'il n'etait pas maitre de ses actions.'240 As of 
the irresolute Leuwen, so of that repository of single-minded will-power, Julien Sorel. 
'La cruelle necessite, avec sa main de fer,' we read in Le Rouge et le Noir, 'plia la 
volonte de Julien.'241 The point is as pertinent to .Stendhal's autobiographical and 
critical writings as it is to his novels. For he early prefigures a feature of his fictional 
protagonists by projecting himself into other characters and other circumstances, and 
attempting to gauge what his conduct would have been 242 To what extent is man free 
to 'invent' himself before his destiny becomes a foregone conclusion? On which side 
are ranged the more powerful forces if 'character' for Stendhal is, as Michael Wood 
puts it, 'the ground where history and pschychology meet and do battle'?243
To the whole of Stendhal's world, both real and fictional, the question may be put. 
How is one to reconcile, in Brombert's words, the 'satisfied acceptance of 
circumstances with the tensions of a will bent on affirming itself in the very process of 
living?'244 In posing the question, we must bear in mind, however, that it is a question 
which Stendhal himself never came close to resolving. Certain circumstances, he held, 
call forth certain human beings. 'II est impossible,' he declares in a letter of 22 March 
1806, 'de s'imaginer un Richelieu dans une petite ville ou tout le monde travaille pour 
vivre huit heures par jour et sept jours de la semaine.'245 Yet this in no way appears to 
obviate the role which Stendhal continues to accord the will as an initiative and directive 
faculty. We have traced in his early writings the opposing tendencies of free will and 
determinism, between responsibility for  ('on peut se corriger de tout')246 and 
resignation to ('on ne peut se refaire et malheur a qui tache’)247 the self. Stendhal the 
novelist of the 1830s would be no nearer to resolving this question than had been 
Stendhal the apprentice playwright of 1803. If his novels yield no answer, it is because 
they have no answer to yield. 'Que sommes-nous? Ou allons-nous? Qui le sait?' Such 
is the philosophical agnosticism expounded by the author of the Promenades dans 
Rome 248 If the question of man's inscrutable destiny is despatched in that instance as a 
pretext for recourse to the ready pleasures of Mozart and Correggio, it returns in more 
pointed guise to the autobiographer reflecting upon his life in the Vie de Henry Brulard. 
Here, as C.W. Thompson recognises, Stendhal cannot escape 'une confrontation ehtre 
l'idee qu'il se faisait de son sort et sa conception de sa libertd.'249 From the very 
outset, the problem is posed:
Apres tout, me dis-je, je n'ai pas mal occupe ma vie. Occupe! Ah! C'est-a-dire que
le hasard ne m'a pas donne trop de malheurs, car, en verite, ai-je dirige le moins
du monde ma vie?250
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What Stendhal could not account for in life, he does not presume to account for in 
fiction. This is what makes it altogether so difficult to resolve the question of personal 
responsibility as it relates to the characters and conduct of his protagonists. Here, once 
more, we are in the presence of a Stendhal who refuses to pronounce definitively on the 
nature of human experience, who refuses to systematise reality. In the ’Projet d’article’ 
for Le Rouge et le Noir, Stendhal offers an account of Julien's character, or at least of 
what he considers those elements essential to an understanding of the novel’s broad 
outline. What he tells us by way of introduction to Julien is worthy of note:
Comme il est inferieur a ses freres et a son pere dans l’art de manier la hache [...], 
il en est meprise; Julien est battu par ses freres et par son pere, il les hait. [...] 
Comme, dans sa famille, il est l’objet, le but constant des coups de poing et des 
plaisanteries, cette ame profondement sensible et sans cesse outragee, devient 
mefiante, colere, envieuse meme pour tous les bonheurs dont elle se voit 
barbarement privee, fiere surtout, plus fiere que M. de Renal avec sa belle maison, 
ses richesses, son carrosse, sa noblesse et toutes les croix qui pendent a sa 
boutonniere.251
If this rapid sketch succeeds in setting up the poles around which Julien's early life in 
Verrieres will gravitate, it is inadequate to account in any but the most superficial way 
for Julien's character. For we are plunged at once in medias res, being offered no 
reason why Julien should be so different from his siblings. As we are further told, 'son 
ame est genereuse'; he has 'un grand caractere.'252 To suggest that these qualities are 
due, in their remotest origin, to an inability to wield an axe would clearly be nonsense, 
requiring the defense of an untenably narrow conception of determinism. Yet Stendhal 
is brought close to such a suggestion by the weight which is placed on the repeated — 
and overstretched — conjunction comme. What is irreducible in Julien when fathers 
and brothers are removed? What makes him such an unmitigated exception within his 
family? What of the wider environment in which he and they alike bathe?
The example is worth citing, for it demonstrates the negligent attitude which 
Stendhal appears to sanction vis-a-vis the determinants of character and conduct in his 
fictional creations. Is Julien beaten because he is different, oris he different because he 
is beaten? The conclusion which we, the reader, must draw is that Julien’s character 
both predates and is the result of his family upbringing, that he has a given basis of 
character upon which the few influences specified above have gone to work. We must 
conclude, too, that we are dealing here with a character who, by the time we meet him, 
is somehow ready to assume a substantial measure of personal responsibility. Where 
does the dividing line fall between being the victim of one's circumstances and the 
master of one's destiny? Where does necessity yield to gratuity? Stendhal sees no need, 
even by implication, to negotiate the problem. What of heredity? Stendhal had long 
recognised the gaping weakness in Helvetius’s theory that environment alone had the
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power to determine character. To broach the issue, as he would in the course of the 
novel, by entertaining doubts over his hero's paternity may heighten the intrigue,253 
but it is scarcely satisfying from any rigorously naturalistic point of view. One imagines 
what such a character profile would have become in the hands of a Zola. Stendhal, by 
contrast, seems prepared to depart at will from the logical implications of his avowed 
philosophy. Martin Tumell is one of the few commentators to recognise the importance 
of this point when he writes:
Stendhal's conception of character is an example of the way in which he discarded 
philosophical theories when they came into conflict with his artistic vision. The 
materialism implicit in the work of the philosophers whom he admired led logically 
to determinism, to the belief that character is nothing but the product of 
environment. It would be an understatement to say that Stendhal did not accept this 
view. Le Rouge et le Noir is based on the contrary view — on the view that genius 
is absolute and inexplicable.254
However valid this judgment, it would be wrong to conclude from it that Stendhal 
fails to provide any pointers towards the determinism which his protagonists undergo. 
Before we are invited quite to view Julien as the agent of his own destiny, we are given 
a very significant insight into his character. Whatever deal has been struck between M. 
de Renal and Sorel pere, we learn, Julien will not abase himself to eat with the former's 
servants. Stendhal explains:
Cette horreur pour manger avec les domestiques n'etait pas naturelle a Julien, il eut 
fait pour arriver a la fortune des choses bien autrement penibles. II puisait cette 
repugnance dans les Confessions de Rousseau.255
Here we have powerful inherent character traits — ambition and resolution — in 
conflict with an acquired character trait, an easily wounded dignity 256 Julien's 
revulsion at the prospect of dining with the household servants may not be 'natural', 
but it is powerful enough, we are told, to make him put his whole future at risk. If this 
is the price to be paid for social advancement, then he will flee, enlist in the army and 
renounce all hope of attaining the object of his already considerable ambitions.
Such is the glimpse which Stendhal gives us into Julien's mind at this early 
juncture. While a distinction between inherent and acquired characteristics is clearly 
made, it is implied that the same acquired characteristics have the capacity to determine 
the individual in even the most testing circumstances. If one sets the instance in 
question alongside a number of passages from the Vie de Henry Brulard, one may be 
more inclined still to stress the power, according to Stendhal, of acquired character. For 
Stendhal's autobiography is not just an account of the person he is and has been; it is an 
account, too, of the person — or persons — he might have become,257 Pervading his 
childhood reminiscences is the notion that the most apparently insignificant happenings 
can radically alter not only the course of one's life, but one's very being.258 Nor is this
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formative role reserved by Stendhal for the overbearing influences of family, education, 
and the wider environment; a single school lesson, a book, a conversation, even a 
chance remark, all have the power to exert a far-reaching influence on the individual.259 
Had his family appreciated this, they could have made of the young Henri Beyle what 
they wished, whilst he, ’comme une mouche dans les toiles d’araignee,'260 would have 
been powerless to resist:
Si mes parents avaient su.me mener, ils auraient fait de moi.un niais comme j'en 
vois tant en province. L’indignation que j'ai ressentie des mon enfance et au plus 
haut point, a cause de mes sentiments espagnols, m'a cree en depit d'eux le 
caractere que j 'a i261
Such a remark raises again the question of the boundary between self-determination and 
impotence in the face of one's destiny. Though Stendhal feels no need to account here 
for the source of the Spanish sentiment by which he defines himself in this instance 
(again we join in medias res), his reflection serves to underline what he clearly took to 
be the precarity of character in its formative phase. Thus, of his earliest instruction, he 
writes elsewhere in the Vie de Henry Brulard:
Sans mon gout pour la volupte, je serais peut-etre devenu, par une telle education 
dont ceux qui la donnaient ne se doutaient pas, un scelerat noir ou un coquin 
gracieux et insinuant, un vrai jesuite, et je serais sans doute fort riche. La lecture de 
laNouvelle Heloise et les scrupules de S[ain]t-Preux me formerent profondement 
honnete homme...262
In the light of the above, it is easier perhaps to accept Julien Sorel's character as 
the product of his self-administered 'education'. Yet one does not have to look far to 
find instances in Stendhal which destabalise any easy theory of acquired character. To 
remain within the context of the novel, let us consider very briefly an incident from La 
Chartreuse de Parme in which Fabrice, returning from Waterloo, lunges, dagger 
drawn, at a young Genevan by whose stare he feels insulted. 'En ce moment de 
passion,' we are told, 'Fabrice oubliait tout ce qu'il avait appris sur les regies de 
l'honneur, et revenait a l'instinct, ou, pour mieux dire, aux souvenirs de la premiere 
enfance.'263 Any acquired 'self is here shed in a flash, leaving only what is irreducible 
in Fabrice's character. There is no more elaboration by Stendhal in this case than in the 
earlier case of Julien; but, taken together, the two instances raise a number of questions 
about the nature and limits of what is determined in human behaviour. The more so, 
perhaps, if one bears in mind a judgment on Julien which appears relatively late in Le 
Rouge et le Noir, and in which his will-power is described by Stendhal as Tun des 
plus beaux traits de son caractere; un etre capable d'un tel effort sur lui-meme peut aller 
loin, si fata sinant.'264 Here we have, it seems, an already defined character in search 
of a road to self-fulfilment. Yet any such road, it is suggested by Stendhal, is crossed 
by so many other diversionary routes down which the 'self may be propelled at any
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moment. When Julien is stung by a rebuke from M. de Renal, Stendhal's simple 
authorial comment is: 'Ce sont sans doute de tels moments d'humiliation qui ont fait les 
Robespierre.'265
Innate disposition, acquired characteristics, instinct, Fate, and the merest accidents 
of chance: all are present, as vying influences, in the view of man which Stendhal 
articulates through the novel. Yet one emerges with no clear notion of the point at 
which the acquired self gives way to the intrinsic self, or of the circumstances in which 
neither is empowered to prevail over the much wider notion of an ineluctable 
Destiny 266 Instead, the overwhelming impression is of a Stendhal who leaves the 
freedom of his characters open-ended, providing the reader with no clearly or 
consistently defined reasons why they should be trammelled in the determination and 
execution of their will. As C.W. Thompson argues in relation to La Chartreuse de 
Parme, Stendhal — more through intuition, perhaps, than philosophical persuasion — 
articulates 'une attitude morale ou le sujet agit librement et a ses risques, tout en 
acceptant d'avance l'idee d'un ordre qu'il ne peut pas, et ne doit pas essayer 
d'eluder.'267 The frankly paradoxical terms in which scholars are thus obliged to take 
account of this aspect of Stendhal's fiction signal the difficulty of seeking not only in 
La Chartreuse de Parme but in any of the novels a definitive solution to the problem of 
free will and determinism. Georges Blin goes to the heart of this problem when he 
asserts of Stendhal:
Meme s'il admet par ailleurs, sur le plan theorique, avec ses tuteurs sensualistes et 
avec Montesquieu ou Cabanis, que le physique conditionne, et des lors explique le 
caractere moral, comme romancier il se fait le champion d'une sorte de parallelisme 
qui sauvegarde chez ses heros la liberte, voire la gratuite, tant de leurs decisions 
que de leur effective conduite. Ici, l'independance du personnage a l'egard de son 
heredite, de son passe et de son contexte materiel ou social represente assez bien 
l'autonomie que Stendhal romancier reconnait, en definitive, a la vie 
psychologique.268
The reconciliation of the 'will' with the principle of determinism is, as we have 
argued, one of the most difficult areas of Stendhal's thought. Implied across the range 
of his reflections on the will is a challenge to the Ideologues' conception of volition as 
nothing more than the 'consequence immediate et necessaire' of an irresistible 
impulsion towards pleasure and away from pain.269 Just as Hobbes had maintained 
before him, Destutt de Tracy argued that any notion of a 'free' faculty of will was 
untenable. We saw in Chapter IV Tracy's contention that it was 'un veritable non-sens 
de pretendre que la volonte est libre de naitre.'27^  Cabanis, for whom 'le moi reside 
exclusivement dans la volonte,'271 defines the will in rigorously physiological terms; 
no more here than in the case of Tracy does it take on the aspect of a self-generating 
faculty:
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Les impressions dont se tire le jugement sont transmises par les extremites 
sentantes ou re9ues dans le sein du systeme; le jugement se forme de leur 
comparaison, la volonte nait du jugement.272
Interpreting this central aspect of the Ideologues’ doctrine as a deficiency, Gilbert 
Chinard points out that it ’tends to reduce men to the condition of robots deprived of 
free will or of individuals with a personality entirely "conditioned” by physical and 
external circumstances.'273 To suggest that Stendhal’s novels are a Restatement of 
Ideology is to take no account whatever of the gulf which separates the image of man 
evoked by Chinard from the Stendhalian protagonist as described above by Blin.274
This divide in Stendhal between the theorist of Ideology and the novelist, if it does 
not resolve the problem under discussion, sums up very clearly the terms in which it 
must be posed. While the distinction which Blin etablishes between philosopher and 
novelist275 recalls something of Paupe, his argument is, of course, quite different. The 
strict material determinism that is evoked by Paupe276 has no place in this interpretation 
of a protagonist who remains free throughout — liberte, gratuite, independance, 
autonomie are the terms employed by Blin — to be purposeful, or even purpose/^, in 
his resolutions and actions.277 Yet one has the impression that Blin in turn pushes his 
contention a degree too far. For there is little that can be concluded ’en definitive’ in this 
regard. We have maintained that philosophy in its laboured particulars has no place in 
Stendhal's novel. Too much, however, is conveyed through suggestion and intimation 
for commentators to find security in categorical pronouncements on this question.
Let us return, by way of illustration, to the scene from Le Rouge et le Noir which 
is singled out for consideration by Zola and Blin alike. Why, asks the latter, do ’les 
facteurs d 'atmosphere' which have earlier been outlined pass unnoticed in Stendhal’s 
narrative? The answer which Blin proposes is seductively simple:
L’auteur du Rouge n’a pas besoin d’evoquer prealablement et par bilan suivi 
l’ambiance pour la raison determinante qu’il n’etablit point de continuite de celle-ci 
aux etres dont il surveille le comportement.278
The key term here is, of course, continuite; yet, in the garden scene which Blin once 
more uses to support his argument,279 the suggested discontinuity between atmosphere 
and characters is not, strictly speaking, borne out. For there is one detail upon which 
Blin, somewhat surprisingly, omits to comment. On the evening in question, we are 
told by Stendhal, Julien is struck by something odd in the behaviour of Mme de Renal 
and Mme Derville. Our first response is to put this down to Julien's own highly 
enervated state as he anticipates the battle of wills to come. Yet Stendhal, having by 
now evoked the meteorological setting, allows himself one final authorial comment 
before the protagonists sit down together and the drama proceeds to unfold. 'Elies
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jouissaient,' he tells us of the two young women in Julien's company, 'de ce temps, 
qui, pour certaines ames delicates, semble augmenter le plaisir d'aimer.'280
Though we should not wish to overstress the significance of this detail, it does 
serve to demonstrate the lightness of touch, the suggestiveness, and, above all, the 
ambiguity with which Stendhal addresses the question of environmental determinism in 
the novel. While it is the case, as Blin observes,281 that the episode in question is 
perceived almost entirely from the perspective of its instigator, Julien, it does depend 
for its whole significance upon Mme de Renal's capitulation to her would-be suitor's 
advances. The use of the verb 'sembler' makes the remark all the more tantalising; for it 
allows Stendhal to suggest his idea, then to withdraw without confirming or denying it. 
Nothing further is spelt out; but for the reader of De VAmour, VHistoire de la peinture 
en Italie or the Italian travelogues, there is food for thought in Stendhal's remark.
Much more so still for the reader of the 'Consultation pour Banti', that singular 
document in which Louis Crozet, at Stendhal's behest, drew up a strategy in April 
1811 for the latter's projected seduction of Alexandrine Daru, wife of his cousin and 
protector, Pierre Daru.282 For, in this most unlikely item of literature, we find not only 
some echo of the scene in the garden at Vergy, but a striking anticipation of and 
response, point for point, to the later accusation by Zola that Stendhal is oblivious to all 
of those factors — 'le paysage, le climat, l'heure de la joumee, le temps qu'il fait, la 
nature en un mot’283 — which conspire to make up the natural environment in its 
widest sense. 'Nous ne croyons pas qu'on puisse attendre qu'elle se donne,' reason the 
would-be seducer of Mme Daru and his accomplice:
elle sera emportee dans un moment de trouble, a la campagne, l'ete, a huit heures
du soir, deux heures apres un bon diner ou elle aura beaucoup parle.284
Nor is the parallel that may be drawn here restricted to the scene in question from 
Le Rouge et le Noir. In Lucien Leuwen, more than in any other novel, Stendhal evokes 
atmosphere in such a way as to raise questions about the determinism to which his 
protagonists are subject. In a number of instances, the author assigns an active role to 
Nature as a conspirator in the unfolding relationship between Lucien and Mme de 
Chasteller. On one notable occasion — whose drama does not match the Vergy scene 
from Le Rouge, but which will be dubbed 'cette fatale soiree' (for Mme de Chasteller), 
'cette soiree decisive' (for Lucien)285 — Mme de Chasteller is more forthright in her 
advances to Lucien than she will subsequently judge to have been prudent. A garden 
ball, a midnight supper, a beautiful moon and a calm landscape: such, we are told, is 
the setting for this encounter, to which Stendhal adds:
Cette nature ravissante etait d'accord avec les nouveaux sentiments qui cherchaient
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a s'emparer du coeur de madame de Chasteller, et contribuait puissamment a 
eloigner et a affaiblir les objections de la raison.286
The line is a fine one between a Nature which is merely in tune with the character's 
sentiments, and a Nature which is instrumental in inspiring them, which exercises, as 
Hans Boll-Johansen puts it, 'un role actif comme catalyseur des sentiments.'287 In the 
episode which ensues, it is worth noting that Mme de Chasteller will commit her 'fatal' 
indiscretion at a moment when she is 'tellement agitee, [...] et entrainee a son insu par 
le ton de gaiete que la conversation avait pris au souper...'288
The clear echo that is to be found here of the 'Consultation pour Banti' is present 
again in a subsequent episode that takes place at the woodland cafe-hauss, Le Chasseur 
vert. With the sun setting behind the trees and the Bohemian music contributing to a 
general atmosphere of gaiety, we are told: 'C'etait une de ces soirees enchanteresses, 
que l'on peut compter au nombre des plus grands ennemis de l'impassibilite du 
cceur.'289 It is, Stendhal suggests, 'peut-etre a cause de tout cela' that Lucien, 'comme 
entraine par un mouvement involontaire,' declares the sincerity of his attachment to 
Mme de Chasteller.290 Had they not been in full view of all, we are told, their 
conversation would have resulted in an embrace which neither would have had the 
power to resist. 'Tel,' declares Stendhal, 'est le danger de la sincerite, de la musique et 
des grands bois.'291
Tongue-in-cheek though it may be, this sort of aside to the reader, with the doubts 
that Stendhal leaves hanging over the motivation of his characters ('peut-etre a cause de 
tout cela... comme entraine par un mouvement involontaire'), is precisely what makes it 
so difficult to arrive at any definitive judgment on the degree to which they are to be 
considered self-determining. For there are moments in all of the novels when the 
protagonists, far from responding consciously to a set of clearly defined stimuli, appear 
to be driven by an 'automatic pilot' of sorts which robs them of responsibility for — 
even awareness o f—  their 'chosen' course of action. Octave, when he acts decisively 
on one notable occasion, does so 'par un mouvement que, malgre sa philosophic, il 
etait loin de s'expliquer.'292 At another significant moment in the unfolding drama, we 
read of the same Octave: 'II se sentait entraine, il ne raisonnait plus...'293 This apparent 
removal from Stendhal's protagonists of full and clear-eyed responsibility for their 
actions is never more evident than in an interchange between Clelia and Fabrice in La 
Chartreuse de Parme:
— O mon unique ami! lui dit-elle, je mourrai avec toi. Elle le serrait dans ses bras, 
comme par un mouvement convulsif.
Elle etait si belle, a demi vetue, et dans cet etat d'extreme passion, que Fabrice ne 
put resister a un mouvement presque involontaire. Aucune resistance ne fut 
opposee.294
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The suggestion that the characters are responding mechanically here to impulses 
that it is not in their power to resist, though it is strong, is not quite confirmed by 
Stendhal, who once more leaves open the question of moral responsibility through the 
insertion of comme and presque. The overriding impression, however, heightened by 
the- switch from active to passive mood in the final phrase, is of an obscure realm of 
motivation into which the characters themselves have no conscious insight. Thus, when 
M. de Renal asks his wife what she thinks of their newly appointed preceptor, we are 
told: 'Par un mouvement presque instinctif, et dont certainement elle ne se rendit pas 
compte, madame de Renal deguisa la verite a son mari.'295 In her relations with Julien, 
too, Mme de Renal is far from being at the helm of her own decision-making. The 
tactical advances and retreats that centre on the garden at Vergy illustrate well the 
manner in which Stendhal chips away at the self-determination of his protagonists. For 
throughout this crucial series of encounters we find stressed not Mme de Renal's moral 
responsibility, but rather her passivity: she is 'transportee du bonheur d'aimer', 'egaree 
par une passion qu'elle n'avait jamais eprouvee', 'enlevee par ce bonheur charmant', 
'entrainee au hasard par des images contradictoires et douloureuses', 'exaltee par les 
transports de la volupte morale la plus elevee.'296 Even when it is she who takes the 
active initiative and gives impetus to the evolving drama, she seems considerably less 
than the clear-sighted agent of her own destiny: 'Enfin, malgre ses resolutions, elle se 
determina a paraitre au jardin.'297 What value 'resolution', we may ask, when it is so 
easily overturned? Thus, of a Mme de Renal who has 'resolved' to respond to her 
suitor's advances with cool politeness, we read: 'Tremblante de le perdre a jamais, sa 
passion l'egara jusqu'au point de reprendre la main de Julien...'298
More interesting still, perhaps, is the case of Julien himself. At no point in the 
novel does he feel called upon to exercise greater self-mastery than in these decisive 
confrontations; yet, as events unfold, he finds himself as much the object as the 
instigator of his own actions:
Enfin, comme le demier coup de dix heures retentissait encore, il etendit la main et 
prit celle de madame de Renal, qui la retira aussitot. Julien, sans trop savoir ce 
qu'il faisait, la saisit de nouveau.
II fut trouble, sa pensee ne fut plus a lui, il approcha sa joue de ce joli bras, il osa y 
appliquer ses levres.299
Here we find no clear-eyed negotiation of a course of action, but rather a blind 
automaticity by which Julien is carried along. Such passages, while they convey well 
the mental 'short-circuit' that may occur in moments of intense anxiety, raise questions 
over the degree to which the protagonists are free to determine their course of action 
and to remain in control of its execution throughout. Nor is the passive mood reserved
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for Mme de Renal alone. 'Pour la premiere fois de sa vie,' we are told of Julien, 'il etait 
entraine par le pouvoir de la beaute.'300 This transition from active to passive, at the 
very moment when he is clasping Mme de Renal's hand in the presence of her 
unsuspecting husband, affords a passing glimpse into an aspect of Julien's character. It 
suggests too, however, that this self-styled Valmont is somewhat less in control of 
himself than he believes.
Nature at large, it is clear, is not the only influence to which Stendhal's characters 
are exposed. There is an inner nature at work, too, and one that can bring its own 
decisive impetus to events. Nowhere is this better illustrated than on the occasion when 
Lucien Leuwen, lost for words, responds to Mme de Chasteller's admonitions with the 
feeblest 'Eh bien?' Upon which we are told:
Le son de voix avec lequel il pronon9a ce mot: eh bien, eut manque peut-etre au
Don Juan le plus accompli; chez Leuwen il n'y avait aucun talent, c'etait
l'impulsion de la nature, le naturel. Ce simple mot de Leuwen changea tout.301
No less than Lucien, Stendhal's other protagonists have to contend with the reality of a 
'nature' which, it is suggested, runs deeper than their reason.302 As Gina puts it to 
Mosca in La Chartreuse de Parme; 'il n'est pas en votre pouvoir de changer votre 
nature'; whatever blame is to be ascribed to his conduct is, she concludes, 'la faute de 
l'instinct et non pas celle de la volonte.'303 If the most politically able cannot escape the 
empire of the natural, then we are not surprised to find it asserting itself fully in those 
less practised in the ways of artifice. Mme de Chasteller is a case in point. 'Tout 
l'etonnait,' we read, 'tout effrayait sa retenue de femme, sa...[sic] dans la passion dont 
elle etait victime.'304 Caught in the grip of confusion and self-recrimination when, for a 
fleeting instant, she falls prey to the temptation to clasp Lucien's hand to her lips, she 
reflects: 'Dieu! d'ou de telles horreurs peuvent-elles me venir?'305 A question to which 
Stendhal, in a wry marginal note, provides the illuminating reply: 'For me. De la 
matrice, ma petite.'306
If we permit ourselves to depart still further here from the text of the novel proper, 
it is instructive to note what Cabanis has to say on the matrix, or womb, as a seat of 
female sensibility. For it is the physiologist's contention that 'la sensibilite changeante 
de la matrice etablit toujours entre les deux sexes une distinction dont on aper^oit encore 
la trace, meme dans les cas qui semblent en offrir les signes le plus intimement 
confondues.'307 Mme de Chasteller's plight, as Stendhal clearly seems to conceive of 
it, is none other than this. The gulf that is suggested between reason on the one hand, 
and what is instinctive, primitive, natural on the other, provides one of the keys, 
according to Maurice Bardeche, for understanding the character of Mme de Chasteller:
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Cette alternance perpetuelle de l'instinct aux convenances, c'est toute la base 
psychologique de la conduite de Mme de Chasteller: c'est cette oscillation 
continuelle qui entretient le mouvement des incidents.308
Bardeche's point about Mme de Chasteller could, of course, be made equally well 
of Mme de Renal, Armance de Zohiloff or others among the women who inhabit 
Siendhal's fictional world. For they remain painfully on their mettle against an 
instinctual impulse which threatens to assert itself over their most elaborate 
resolutions.309 Mme Grandet in Lucien Leuwen provides a striking case in point. 
Adopting a strategy of feigned indifference towards Lucien, she resolves to leave 
ostentatiously unopened a note in his hand. This, however, proves beyond her, as she 
yields to her impulse to tear open the letter 'avec un mouvement de fureur, et sans s'etre 
pour ainsi dire permis cette action. La jeune femme l'emportait sur la capacite 
politique.'310 Such is what we read in the text itself. In the margin, however, Stendhal 
provides a 'translation' of this final remark:'Pilotis. Exactement la matrice l'emportait 
sur la tete.'311
The manuscript of Lucien Leuwen furnishes in this sense a rare insight into the 
way in which Stendhal, while recognising the importance of a physiological 
determinism which he applies in his conception of character and plot, seeks nonetheless 
to purge his novel of all explicit reference to this. For the first time in Mme Grandet's 
life, we are told, 'elle etait timide, parce que son ame si seche, si froide, deipuis 
quelques jours eprouvait des sentiments tendres.'312 Again it is to Stendhal's marginal 
notes that we look for a telling commentary on this rather bland description of Mme 
Grandet's condition:'For me. La matrice, excitee par un jeune homme bien, parlait.’313
The above provide a revealing reminder of how concerned Stendhal is to excise all 
explicit philosophising from his novels, to leave the reader's imagination unconstrained 
in this respect. In the introductory pages of Le Rouge et le Noir, the cure of Verrieres is 
presented as a 'vieillard de quatre-vingts ans, mais qui devait a l'air vif de ces 
montagnes une sante et un caractere de fer.'314 While this might prompt in the reader a 
fleeting reflection upon the link between climate and character, nothing more is done 
here*by Stendhal to substantiate the clear suggestion that such a link indeed exists. In 
Armance likewise we are told that the heroine possesses 'une volonte ferme, digne de 
l'apre climat ou elle avait passe son enfance.'315 No more here than in the 
characterisation of Chelan does Stendhal dwell upon the implications of his remark; but 
a brief marginal note consigned to a copy of Armance suggests that such allusions, for 
all their parenthetic character and brevity, were far from gratuitous. Of the harsh natural 
environment, 'l'apre climat', from which Armance issues, Stendhal notes quite simply: 
'Ce mot comprend le moral,'316
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It is by measuring thus Stendhal's 'off-the-record' reflections against the text of 
the novels proper that we arrive at some appreciation of his effort to observe a distance 
between literature and philosophy. It was not the novelist's role, he clearly felt, to iron 
out all of the doubts and the questions posed by his characters and their actions; he 
should be suggestive, not conclusive. Hence the tentative, interrogative tone which 
Stendhal chooses to strike at moments when he might have given rein to a much more 
affirmative treatment of his subject. Witness the manner in which he accounts for 
Julien's emotivity on his arrival at the seminary in Besangon: 'Un philosophe eut dit, 
peut-etre en se trompant: C'est la violente impression du laid sur une ame faite pour 
aimer ce qui est beau.'317 Later in Le Rouge et le Noir, the abbe Pirard, perplexed by 
Julien's character, wonders: 'Serait-ce la force du sang?'318 The question recalls a 
remark made in the characterisation of Armance, which demonstrates well Stendhal's 
concern to leave room for an element of ambiguity that is incompatible with any 
conception of the novel as a statement of philosophical 'truth':
Je ne sais si c'est au sang sarmate qui circulait dans ses veines, ou a ses malheurs 
si precoces qu'Armance devait la faculte d'apercevoir d'un coup d'oeil tout ce 
qu'un changement soudain dans la vie renfermait de consequences 319
The frequent failure of Stendhal's characters themselves to identify the precise 
source of what motivates them heightens this ambiguity. Like Mme de Chasteller and 
Mme Grandet, Mme de Renal quite fails to interpret her own responses for what they 
are. Electing to sit by Julien's side, we are told, 'Mme de Renal croit qu'elle agit ainsi 
par amour pour ses enfants.'320 It is only afterwards that she will, as Stendhal puts it, 
discover her love for Julien.321 No different in this respect is the case of Octave de 
Malivert, of whom we are told by a gently mocking author: 'Ce qui est admirable, c'est 
que notre philosophe n'eut pas la moindre idee qu'il aimait Armance d'amour.'322
Even when they succeed in identifying the underlying motivation for their 
resolutions and actions, a question mark remains over the freedom of Stendhal's 
protagonists to respond in any other way. Repulsed by Mme de Chasteller for having 
had the temerity to kiss her hand in an unguarded moment, Lucien determines that he 
will not pay his customary respects on the following day. True to his resolution, he 
repairs in the evening to a deserted rampart some distance from the Hotel de Pontleve. 
.'II etait plus incertain que jamais,' we are told, about the course to take next, when he 
hears the chime of a clock which normally accompanies his visit to Mme de Chasteller:
Le son de cette cloche decida Leuwen. Sans se rendre compte de rien, il eut le vif 
souvenir de l'etat de bonheur qu'il goutait tous les soirs en entendant ces quarts et 
ces demi-quarts [...]. [...] au son de la cloche, electrise par cette communaute de 
sentiments de deux ames grandes et genereuses, qui fait qu'elles s’entendent a 
demi-mot, il precipita ses pas vers l'hotel de Pontleve 323
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In the event, circumstances prevent Lucien from seeing Mme de Chasteller, who has 
gone out, and he retreats once more to the rampart. At no point does it occur to him that 
he has not been in full control of his behaviour throughout, as he castigates himself for 
his irresolution. Yet the language by which Stendhal recounts the episode,, with its 
insistence on Lucien's passivity — 'decida Lucien', 'Sans se rendre compte de rien', 
'electrise' — , leaves a lingering doubt in the reader's mind. What holds for Lucien, 
moreover, holds, as we have seen, for the other 'prime movers' in the action of the 
Stendhalian novel. 'Determined to be master of his fate,' writes E.B Tenenbaum of 
Julien Sorel, 'he achieves the goals he sets for himself by means of an extraordinary 
energy and strength of will.'324 If this is so, however, it is so, as Stendhal is at pains 
to suggest, only up to a point. 'Never was a young man so assured that he was shaping 
his own destiny, and so hugely mistaken,' concludes F.W.J. Hemmings of the same 
Julien Sorel.325 That both of these assessments should appear defensible in their 
respective contexts testifies to the difficulty of defining the limits of individual 
responsibility and determinism in Stendhal's novels, and suggests the work which 
might fruitfully be done on this important question.
Redefining M an's Place
What emerges clearly from the foregoing is a substantial corrective to the notion, 
advanced by Georges Blin, that Stendhal confers a thoroughgoing autonomy upon his 
characters in their resolutions and actions. At one level, his protagonists are cerebral 
gymnasts who go through the most elaborate routines, convinced at times that their fate 
hangs upon their every least gesture. At other moments, however, there is a suggestion 
that they themselves are merely part of a grander and much more inscrutable scheme of 
things, where the control they exert over their own destiny is exposed as an illusion. 
Julien Sorel's reflections in his prison cell, which Zola was to describe as 'un regal, 
une debauche de raisonnements,'326 provide in this regard one of the most 
self-consciously 'philosophical' passages in Stendhal's fiction. A hunter's boot strikes 
an ant-hill, reasons Julien, scattering ants and eggs alike:
Les plus philosophes parmi les fourmis ne pourront jamais comprendre ce corps 
noir, immense, effroyable: la botte du chasseur, qui tout a coup a penetre dans leur 
demeure avec une incroyable rapidite, et precedee d'un bruit epouvantable, 
accompagne de gerbes d'un feu rougeatre...
...Ainsi la mort, la vie, l'eternite, choses fort simples pour qui aurait les organes 
assez vastes pour les concevoir...327
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Here Stendhal allows himself free rein to indulge in a lofty philosophical 
commentary upon his hero's plight and the human condition of which it is 
symptomatic. As Maurice Larkin observes, these lines 'echo a vibrant strand of 
determinist thought that stretches from La Mettrie, through Cabanis, to Positivism.'328 
The sentiment that man is nothing more than an ant in the path of an indifferent Destiny, 
though it was as old as philosophy itself, had been given renewed impetus through the 
materialism of the philosophes and advances in the natural and physical sciences.329 By 
the nineteenth century, writes F.L. Baumer,
Europeans had eaten of the tree of science, and now saw more clearly than in any 
previous time the way things were: man, kindred to animals, lost on a grain of 
sand in an immense arid indifferent universe, his sense of his own identity and 
infinity suppressed, feeling, now that he had lost his innocence, "the tragic 
absurdity of living."330
While Baumer relates this state of mind to the later nineteenth century and in particular 
to what he terms 'the Fin-de-Siecle ambience', it has very clearly discernible roots in 
the philosophy of an earlier generation. The climate of eighteenth-century thought, as 
L.G. Crocker argues, in fostering the view of man as part of the general fold of nature 
and of the animal kingdom in particular, had posed the question of human destiny in 
new and more pointed terms:
Man becomes an accident of nature's productivity, unimportant, contingent, 
doomed to extinction. His actions are as much events in the natural world as an 
eclipse of the sun. He is not, in consequence, qualitatively differentiated from the 
rest of nature.331
Though it might seem to offer more ready solace to the moral nihilist than to the 
ethical humanist,332 such a view of man did, nonetheless, have a consoling aspect, and 
one to which Stendhal was to prove sensitive. For Man, if he is but an insignificant 
modification of Nature, could not lay claim to any special moral dignity or imperative. 
His driving principle must be the same as that which propelled all of natural creation — 
and for that the eighteenth century believed it had grasped the key: pleasure. Each is 
impelled to seek pleasure and to flee pain. There began and there ended the moral 
dictates of Nature. There lay the principle that united men and animals in an unrelenting 
and irresistible endeavour to secure the satisfaction of their own individual needs and 
desires.333
Where, one may ask, was the consolation in such an ostensibly bleak conception 
of humanity? In the fact, concludes Stendhal, that it provides a basis for viewing man 
and all man's deeds — and mwdeeds — with a much greater equanimity. For if men 
are motivated by an ineluctable urge to pursue what they perceive at any moment as 
their self-interest, then their behaviour can no longer be deemed laudable or
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reprehensible in any objective sense. Thus, on losing out to a rival suitor for Mina von 
Griesheim's attentions in June 1807, Stendhal is able to find solace in the unlikely 
Helvetius, who, as he recounts in a letter to his sister Pauline, 'm'a console pendant 
deux heures.'334 Much later, in the Vie de Henry Brulard, Stendhal provides what 
might be read as a gloss on this remark:
Ce qui marque ma difference avec les niais importants du journal et qui portent leur 
tete comme un saint-sacrement, c'est que je n'ai jamais cru que la societe me dut la 
moindre chose. Helvetius me sauva de cette enorme sottise. La societe paye les 
services qu'elle voit.335
Such a rationale, in which Leon Blum discerns the refusal to capitulate to a sterile, 
self-pitying mal du siicle,336 was to crystallise fully in Stendhal's mind in the 1820s 
and 1830s, under the particular influence, it seems, of naturalists such as Georges 
Cuvier and Adrien de Jussieu.337 From the earliest, as we have seen, Stendhal had had 
ample exposure to the notion that self-interest is the governing principle in all men at all 
times. Not until much later, however, would he attempt to find in this theoretical notion 
a palliative for all that'is least edifying in human nature as it is encountered, in practical 
terms, from day to day. The point is given its most reasoned exposition in the 
Memoires d'un touriste, where the methods deployed by the naturalist, Stendhal 
argues, provide a means of overcoming that implacable enemy to peace of mind, la 
haine impuissante:
J'ai entendu dire au celebre Cuvier [...]: "Voulez-vous vous guerir de cette horreur 
assez generale qu’inspirent les vers et les gros insectes, etudiez leurs amours; 
comprenez les actions auxquelles ils se livrent toute la journee sous vos yeux pour 
trouver leur subsistance."338
The therapeutic nature of such counsel is clear. One should strive against the animosity 
that men are so apt at inspiring, not through any semblance of altruism, b u t'par pitie 
pour soi-mime,'339 Treat man as an object of detached 'scientific' interest, as an insect, 
and he must become, in principle at least, a more tolerable neighbour.
Au lieu de hair le petit libraire du bourg voisin qui vend VAlmanack populaire, 
[...], appliquez-lui le remede indique par le celebre Cuvier: traitez-le comme un 
insecte. Cherchez quels sont ses moyens de subsistance; essayez de deviner ses 
manieres de faire l'amour.340
This idea, attributed here to Cuvier, was clearly one which made a significant 
impact upon Stendhal. Elsewhere he recounts, with some satisfaction, how the same 
reasoning helps him come to terms with the obstructive officialdom that it is the 
traveller's lot to encounter. 'J'ai eu de notables difficultes pour le passeport, mais ne 
me suis point impatiente,' he writes of a trip to Montmelian; 'j'observais les allures du 
commissaire de police; je l'ai traite comme un insecte.'341 Faced with the boors and
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bigots of Nancy society, it is to the same reasoning precisely that Lucien Leuwen will 
have recourse:
"Je devrais les etudier comme on etudie l'histoire naturelle. M. Cuvier nous disait, 
au Jardin des Plantes, qu'etudier avec methode, en notant avec soin les differences 
et les ressemblances, etait un moyen sur de se guerir du degout qu'inspirent les 
vers, les insectes, les crabes hideux de la mer"...342
The line of reasoning which Lucien seeks to apply in the salons of Nancy is 
explored by Stendhal, in a somewhat different context, in the Vie de Henry Brulard. 
Here Stendhal considers with regret how his enduring horror of fungus might have 
been dispelled had he only been informed that this was neither 'pourriture' nor 
'corruption', but a perfectly natural product:
Si mon grand-pere m'eut dit: "C'est une plante, le moisi meme qui gate le pain est 
une plante", mon horreur eut rapidement cesse. Je ne l'ai surmontee tout a fait 
qu'apres que M. Adrien de Jussieu, dans notre voyage a Naples (1832), (cet 
homme si naturel, si sage, si raisonnable, si digne d'etre aime), m'eut parle au 
long de ces petites plantes, toujours un peu signe de pourriture a mes yeux, 
quoique je susse vaguement que c'etaient des plantes.343
It is significant that it should once more be the naturalist here who offers Stendhal a 
means of coming to terms with what is least pleasant in the real world. 'Je devrais 
aujourd'hui,' Stendhal adds, 'etudier l'histoire naturelle des vers et scarabees qui me 
font toujours horreur.'344 By the time he came to write the Vie de Henry Brulard, 
Stendhal was in fact equating 'philosophy' — in its methods at least — with 
'naturalism'. Here, it seemed, was a new and fruitful means of establishing some grip 
on the material world around him:
A force d'employer des methodes philosophiques, par exemple a force de classer 
mes amis de jeunesse par genre, comme M. Adrien de Jussieu fait pour ses plantes 
(en botanique), je cherche a atteindre cette verite qui me fuit345
Stendhal nowhere has recourse to the broad canvas of naturalistic imagery that is 
the preserve of a Balzac or a Zola. The abbe Frilair may have something of the fox, 
Count Altamira of the lion, Du Poirier of the fox, hyena and boar all at once, Lamiel of 
the gazelle or doe, and Sansfin of the frog.346 But these amount to little more than 
stock similes that surprise more by their paucity than by their presence. L.F. 
Hoffmann, in considering this aspect of Stendhal, concludes that there is not a single 
animal metaphor to be found in the whole of Armance,347
Yet there is a deeper 'naturalism' which is sustained across Stendhal's 
philosophical, moral and social thought, and which is present as an informing principle 
throughout his writings. Once more the 'Projet d'article' for Le Rouge et le Noir 
provides a revealing insight. For Stendhal is explicit here in affirming man's place
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within a natural and 'moral' chain of being, where the same overriding law holds good 
for all:
L'auteur ne traite nullement Julien comme un heros de roman de femmes de 
chambre, il montre tous ses defauts, tous les mauvais mouvements de son ame, 
d'abord bien ego’fste parce qu'il est bien faible et que la premiere loi de tous les 
etres depuis l'insecte jusqu'au heros, est de se conserver,348
Stendhal's reasoning here harks back to a remark that is to be found in Racine et 
Shakespeare, where the same image of a universal struggle for survival is evoked: 'La 
premiere loi de tout individu, qu'il soit loup ou mouton, n'est-elle pas de se 
conserver?'349 This is what lends its full charge to Julien's much quoted denial of 
Natural Law, his insistence that there is no point — unless it be instituted by man 
himself — where the laws of Nature give way to the rights of man. In a letter written 
from Mantua to Adolphe de Mareste in March 1820, Stendhal dilates upon this idea:
"Nous ne pouvons pas etre plus libres que nous ne le sommes, me disait un 
homme d'esprit; mais tout est de facto et rien de jure. Demain Sa Saintete peut me 
jeter dans les cachots de San Leo et confisquer ma fortune; cela sera cruel, mais 
non pas injuste. H n'y a aucune loi qui le defende."350
These remarks provide an eloquent summation of the Benthamite philosophy which 
Julien articulates in his prison cell, a philosophy which, whatever its truth, we are told, 
'etait de nature a faire desirer la mort':
II n'y a de droit que lorsqu'il y a une loi pour defendre de faire telle chose, sous 
peine de punition. Avant la loi, il n'y a de naturel que la force du lion, ou le besoin 
de l'etre qui a faim, qui a froid, le besoin en un mot...351
It is this highly rationalistic 'naturalism' that was to give rise to such ambivalence 
in Zola. For the latter clearly recognised that, whatever Stendhal's technical 
shortcomings as an interpreter of the material world, he had a philosophical grasp of 
man which could not be denied its place at the fountain-head of Naturalism:
S'il est un de nos maitres, s'il est a la tete de 1'evolution naturaliste, ce n'est pas 
parce qu'il a ete uniquement un psychologue, c'est parce que le psychologue en lui 
a eu assez de puissance pour aniver a la realite, par-dessus ses theories, et sans le 
secours de la physiologie ni de nos sciences naturelles.352
In his endeavour to temper praise with reproach, we discern something of Zola's 
malaise in judging this maverick naturalist. 'Stendhal, pour moi, n'est pas un 
observateur qui part de l'observation pour arriver a la verite, grace a la logique; c'est un 
logicien qui part de la logique et qui arrive souvent a la verite, en passant par-dessus 
l'observation.'353 The method Zola could never sanction;354 but the philosophy of 
which it was a function, and the conclusions to which it led, he could not but endorse:
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Notre plus grand romancier, Stendhal, etudiait les hommes comme des insectes 
etranges, qui vivent et meurent, pousses par des forces fatales; son seul souci etait 
de determiner la nature, l'energie, la direction de ces forces; son humanite ne 
sympathisait pas avec celle de ses heros, il se contentait de faire son travail de 
dissection, exposant simplement les resultats de ce travail.355
Though it betrays a serious misappreciation of the relationship between Stendhal 
and the protagonists of his novels, this judgment reveals much about what underlay 
Zola's recognition of Stendhal as a forerunner of the Naturalist school. For it is here 
that Stendhal's naturalism most clearly resides, in his view of humanity as an intrinsic 
part of the natural order and in his conviction that man's moral being, no less than his 
physiological make-up, was susceptible of explanation through the methods of the 
natural sciences. Among the points which F.WJ. Hemmings finds contestable in 
Zola's remarks is the reference to those 'forces fatales' which, the latter claims, govern 
the affairs of men in Stendhal's world. 'Et a-t-on le droit de parler de "forces fatales",' 
writes Hemmings, 'chez un ecrivain qui opposait constamment a la fatalite l'energie 
personnelle?'356 What such a question fails to acknowledge, however, is the fact that 
'l'energie personnelle' itself is a type — and a most important type — of 'fatalite', that 
it forms an intrinsic part of the network of determining influences through which the 
individual's destiny is played out. As Michel Crouzet puts it, 'le message le plus certain 
que je regois de moi-meme sur moi-meme, c'est mon corps, mon temperament, qui me 
definit aussi fatalement et aussi confusement que le signe astral.'357 The influence of 
Cabanis and his theories of temperament and sensibility would, as we shall see in 
Chapter VIII, prove crucial in this respect, providing Stendhal with a physiologically 
ratified notion of personal energy as a 'given', a factor of character in situ from the 
earliest, and indissociable from the concepts of 'Nature' and 'Fate' alike. 'Donnee 
quasi organique,' as Crouzet recognises,
l'energie se confond avec la nature, ces forces premieres que l'ldeologie considere 
comme "notre seule propriete [...] notre richesse primitive", dont le libre exercice 
est pour elle la liberte, la possibilite d'etre tout ce qu'on peut etre; l'energie c'est la 
nature en liberte, laissee a la plenitude de son dynamisme et de ses appetits.358
While its insistence on a physiological basis of energy is to be valued, this 
assessment of Stendhal's celebrated concept must be interpreted with care. For 
Stendhal's moral ideal rests not, as Crouzet's conclusion ('D'ou ses liens avec la 
sauvagerie, sa ferocite')359 might suggest — and as has so often been suggested — on 
the vision of an unbridled human nature seeking its catharsis through some anarchic 
release of its energies into the social order.360 Energy was more subtly conceived by 
Stendhal than this. At its most complete, and its most idealistic, his philosophy is 
founded rather on a wish to see the forces of human nature harnessed within the social 
order itself, and producing whatever individual and collective happiness might be 
attainable 361 One of Stendhal's earliest critics, Rene Doumic, while remaining on the
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whole antipathetic, seized upon the importance of this distinction when he wrote of 
Stendhal:
On fait l'education de la volonte: cela consiste a endiguer, canaliser, diriger nos 
instincts, non pas a les supprimer. Le sage n'est pas celui qui n'a jamais senti les 
ardeurs du sang; mais c'est Socrate qui dirige vers le bien des instincts qui 
d'eux-memes tendaient vers le mal.362
Such an assessment does no violence to Stendhal's thought. The classical 
reference is, moreover, thoroughly apt. To appreciate Stendhal's ethic of energy in its 
most salutary light, one need do no more than return to the latter's conception of an 
Ancient world whose morality, 'ne demandant point a ses fideles de sacrifier leurs 
passions, mais bien de les diriger d'une fa$on utile a la patrie, n'avait nul besoin de les 
rassembler pendant de longues heures afin de graver dans leurs ames la peur de 
l'enfer.'363 The protest value of Stendhal's ethic of energy should be borne in mind 
when seeking to place it in the overall context of his thought. Remote and idealistic 
though the world evoked here by Stendhal undoubtedly is, it provides a pole towards 
which his imagination clearly pulls. The classical Roman ethic of virtus, combining as 
it does a fierce personal energy and a social utility both, occupies a high place in 
Stendhal's moral universe. Where the social dimension is absent or frustrated, the ethic 
degenerates into an individualistic virtil, which, though it may run counter to any 
commonly perceived standard of morality, derives from an energy that is no less 
admirable (and no more reprehensible) as a quality in itself. Everything comes down in 
the end to the direction which personal energy is permitted, or obliged, to assume 
within the prevailing social order.364
In this sense, it can be argued, Stendhal's moral ideal is that which I.F. Knight 
ascribes to the French philosophes generally: 'a naturalistic ethics which would take 
into account man's natural drives instead of denying their expression, as Christianity 
tends to do.'365 If he embraced the philosophes' ideal, however, Stendhal embraced 
too the tensions and contradictions implicit within it. 'The real dilemma facing the 
philosophes,' as D.C. Potts observes, 'was that of reconciling the social end they 
believed to be appropriate to man, with their equally convinced belief in the natural right 
of the individual to give free play to his instinctive energies.'366 As it passes to 
Stendhal, this dilemma is compounded, on the one hand, by his failure to define man 
within a consistently deterministic idiom, and, on the other hand, by advances in the 
physiological and natural sciences which appeared to militate against any overweening 
faith in the power of reason to direct human affairs. Stendhal's conception of 
Natural-man-tumed-Social-man remains an uneasy synthesis of opposites, portraying 
the individual now as part of a natural order — or b o rd e r  — within which his will is 
tightly circumscribed by the laws of Nature, now as a rational and moral being invested
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with the capacity to forge a private destiny in keeping with the public weal.
While he remains conscious, and wary, of the excesses to which unfettered energy 
may lead, Stendhal is conspicuous in shifting much of the burden of responsibility 
from the individual to the social whole. 'Quand je suis arrete par des voleurs ou qu'on 
me tire des coups de fusil,' he writes in 1818, 'je me sens une, grande colere contre le 
gouvernement *et le cure de l'endroit. Quant au voleur, il me plait, quand il est 
energique, car il m'amuse.'367 Later, in the Memoires d'un touriste, Stendhal takes up 
this same idea in terms more akin to the discourse of the utilitarian reformist 
philosophers:
L'homme qui vole est coupable; mais la societe qui a expose un de ses membres a 
la tentation prolongee de voler a une grande part dans la faute commise contre le 
bonheur general. Si l'individu a manque de force, la societe a manque de 
prevoyance.368
For all such protestations of collective culpability, however, Stendhal is a 
thoroughgoing apologist neither of the social reformism of Helvetius and Bentham, nor 
of Rousseau’s belief in the essential goodness of natural man. For he remains only too 
aware, as Gita May puts it, of those 'forces obscures, irrationnelles, violentes et 
egoi’stes qui risquent a tout moment de prendre possession de notre ame.' Far from 
being a faithful student of the Genevan philosopher, Stendhal, as May observes, 'a 
reproche a Rousseau de s'etre illusionne naivement sur le caractere fondamental de 
l'homme naturel.'369 This does not, however, mean — and it is here that we meet with 
some considerable difficulty in attempting to define the contours of his thought — that 
Stendhal was devoid of an idealism which recalls at times Rousseau's concern for the 
frank expression of man's innermost nature. Though his early visions of humanity 
would undergo considerable change, and though he would evince a deepening 
pessimism about the possibility that any such ideal might be realised, Stendhal 
remained nonetheless convinced that a morality which failed to take account of the 
exigencies of nature could conduce only to the institutionalisation of private and public 
unhappiness.37^  In the absence of a utopian solution, the tension in his thought is 
inescapable between a genuine concern for the social order and an equally genuine 
admiration for the individual of extraordinary energy who threatens to subvert i t 371 
For there remains a fundamental — and, one must conclude, irreconcilable — clash of 
interest in Stendhal between utilitarian principle, his enthusiastic approval of the 
'reward and punishment' rationale upheld by Helvetius and Bentham, and his 
sympathy for the exceptional individual who stands outside — not to say above — the 
commonalty in his interests and impulsions, his maniire d'aller d la chasse au bonheur, 
and who is not to be so readily induced by the rewards or deterred by the sanctions that 
are effective for the run of humanity. The question is one which we are unable to go
342
further into here, but which will be addressed in a number of its aspects in Chapters IX 
and X.
Climate, Character and the Invention of Stendhal’s Italy
Let us return, for our present purpose, to the question of Stendhal's 'naturalism' as it 
has been discussed above. For if this is muted in the novels, it comes into its own 
across the full range of Stendhal's other writings. It has been argued in an earlier 
chapter that the whole thrust of a work such as VHistoire de la peinture en Italie was to 
portray man as an integral part of Nature in its widest sense. This is never better 
underlined than in a passage where Stendhal, adopting Cabanis’s theories on the 
influence of climate and regimen, takes issue with Helvetius:
La nature de l'air dans lequel nous nageons constamment, la nature des plantes qui 
font notre nourriture, ou des animaux que nous devorons, et qui se nourrissent de 
ces plantes, varient avec le climat. Est-ce qu'on a jamais pretendu que les 
perdreaux de Champagne valussent ceux de Perigord? Quand Helvetius a nie 
l'influence des climats, il a done dit a peu pres la meilleure absurdite du siecle 372
This is, in essence, no more than the reaffirmation by Stendhal of his belief that 
Helvetius had been mistaken in his exclusive insistence on environment as the 
formative influence on man. It has important consequences, however, for the logic of 
the position which Stendhal now adopts. For the philosophy of Helvetius had posited a 
determinism that was indefinitely modifiable by man and which left the latter, in a very 
real sense, the architect of his own collective destiny. By denying, at least in part, the 
legitimacy of Helvetius's claim, Stendhal was in effect reopening the whole question of 
human responsibility. To what degree was it reasonable to propose that the natural 
environment exercised real influence over the course of human affairs? Stendhal's 
response, by the time he comes to write VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, is 
unequivocal:
Le peintre qui fera Brutus envoyant ses fils a la mort ne donnera pas au pere la 
beaute ideale du sanguin, tandis que ce temperament fera l'excuse des jeunes gens. 
S'il croit que le temps qu'il faisait a Rome le jour de l'assassinat de Cesar est une 
chose indifferente, il est en arriere de son siecle. A Londres, il y a les jours ou l'on 
se pend.373
The philosophical and moral implications of such a statement are far-reaching. To 
his remark about the days which conduce to suicide in London, Stendhal adds the bare 
footnote: 'Vent et brouillards au mois d'octobre.' Contrary to Paul Arbelet's
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suggestion, this amounts to more than the stock reiteration of an already worn theme 
about the frequency of suicides in England:374 it is a recognition of the pervasive 
influence which Stendhal would increasingly ascribe to Nature in the determination of 
human affairs. In 1829, the subject would have shifted from suicide to murder, and the 
theatre of Stendhal's considerations from London to Rome; but the essential point 
remains the same: 'La tramontana (c'est l'incommode vent du nord) porte sans doute a 
l'assassinat.'375 Nor are sexual mores any less subject to the vagaries of climate than 
suicide or murder. 'Je n'ai pas pu decouvrir la cause du sigisbeisme autre part que dans 
la nature,' declares the author of Rome, Naples et Florence en 1917, who concludes 
that the essential difference between Paris and Bologne in the matter of sexual morality 
'c'est qu'a Paris l'on peche par vanite, et a Bologne a cause du soleil.'376 Not that the 
love experienced in such different latitudes is comparable. As we read in VHistoire de la 
peinture en Italie, 'le climat de Naples fait autrement sentir les finesses de cette passion 
que les brouillards de Middelbourg.'377 In the north, love, if it exists, does so in spite 
of climate; in the south, '[le] climat fortune porte a l'amour.'378 Aesthetic sensibility, 
too, must bow to the exigencies of the natural environment. 'Qui peut aimer le Correge 
a Paris lorsqu'il fait un vent de nord-ouest?' asks Stendhal in the Promenades dans 
Rome: 'Ces jours-la, il faut lire Bentham et Ricardo.'379
With examples such as these, Stendhal’s writings abound. What is important for 
our purpose here is that no area of human activity is considered to be impervious to the 
influence of Nature. Even m-activity is explicable in climatological terms: 'On ne sait 
pourquoi, on ne sait comment, l'air de Rome donne sur les nerfs, inspire l'envie de se 
reposer, de ne pas travailler.'380 Though the traveller in France might make similar 
observations, the pervasive effects of Nature are registered most dramatically in 
Italy.381 'II est sur,' writes Stendhal in Rome, Naples et Florence (1826), 'que le 
climat seul de l'ltalie produit sur l'etranger qui arrive un effet nerveux et 
inexplicable.'382 Thus, in a note dated 5 June 1840, he writes: 'L'air de Rome me rend 
nerveux comme vous le voyez a mon ecriture.'383 Elsewhere he claims that there is in 
Naples an 'influence enervante du climat' to which the visitor succumbs despite 
himself.384 In a letter of March 1818 to Adolphe de Mareste, Stendhal would sum up 
his Milanese life-style in the following terms:
Enfin, l'ltalie me plait. Je passe, de sept heures a minuit chaque jour a entendre de 
la musique et a voir deux ballets. Le climat fait le reste.385
But if climate favours artistic sensibility in Milan, it suffices, as Stendhal will make 
clear in the Promenades dans Rome, to destroy it in Paris:
Figurez-vous Paris place par le hasard a Montpellier ou a La Voulte, pres de Lyon. 
Toute la partie tendre des arts est impossible, ou du moins stentata, sous un climat 
ou, trois fois par jour, les nerfs sont montes d'une fagon differente. Je compare les
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nerfs aux cordes d'une harpe. Que va dire Platon et son ecole?386
Crude though the analogy may be, we are at some remove here — as in all of the 
examples cited — from the 'dedain du corps,' the 'silence sur les elements 
physiologiques de l'homme et sur le role des milieux ambiants' which Zola would see 
in Stendhal as the function of 'une metaphysique qui etudie l'ame comme une 
abstraction, sans vouloir rechercher l'action que les rouages de la machine humaine et 
que la nature tout entiere exercent evidemment sur elle.'387 On a number of notable 
occasions, Stendhal, in keeping with the physiological theories of his age, isolates the 
nervous system specifically as the conduit between Nature at large and human 
sensibility.388 The power of earth tremors and storms to inspire terror in Italy is, he 
writes in the Promenades dans Rome, 'sans doute a cause de l'effet electrique qui agite 
nos nerfs.'389 As we read in that storehouse of insights into Stendhal’s method of 
composition that are his notes for Lucien Leuwen, the Tramontana wind has the 
capacity to disrupt creative endeavour:
Le 15 avril, la tramontane me faisait mal aux nerfs, je reprends le premier volume 
[...].
15 avril 1835, abime par la tramontane qui regne depuis huit jours.. 390
In the text of Lucien Leuwen itself we find some echo of this when we read of Lucien 
that 'une joumee de vent du nord avec des nuages sombres [...] suffisait pour en faire 
un autre homme.'391 Nor is there any possibility of escape: man is represented as a 
permeable organism absorbing Nature's influence, as the author of the Memoires d'un 
touriste suggests, through every pore:
Quand le mistral regne en Provence, on ne sait ou se refugier: a la verite, il fait un 
beau soleil, mais un vent froid et insupportable penetre dans les appartements les 
mieux fermes, et agace les nerfs de fa$on a donner de l'humeur sans cause au plus 
intrepide.392
In his useful article, 'Stendhal et la meteorologie', L. Dufour documents at some 
length the many references to weather which occur in Stendhal's writings.393 What 
does not emerge clearly from this meticulous study, however, is the relationship for 
Stendhal between weather and the 'moral' state of man. For there are a great many 
passages in which Stendhal goes beyond the mere recording of weather conditions, 
using the latter as a key to interpreting his own or another's state of mind at a given 
moment. Witness the diary entry of 28 May 1806. in which he notes quite simply: 
'L'etouffe du temps m'accable. La peine me rend machine.'394 Or the 'Joumee de 
gaiete' which he records on 3 February 1809, and which he ascribes to 'un temps de 
printemps qu'il fait depuis huit jours.'395 Examples such as these are plentiful in 
Stendhal's private writings from 1806 onwards. 'II manque une pluie chaude au 
bonheur des plantes et a celui de mes nerfs,' he notes in his diary of 3 May 1808.396
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Just as no fast distinction holds between plant and nerve, none holds between nerve 
'physical' and nerve 'moral'. Witness the laconic remark — 'froid du diable, au 
physique et au moral' — in Stendhal's diary of November 1809,397 or the more 
developed expression which he gives to the same idea in an entry dated 2 February 
1806: 'Apres avoir ete vente jusqu'aux os, ayant froid, mal a la tete, le cceur aride, et ne 
desirant rien [...], je suis alle prendre une demi-tasse de cafe.'398
Stendhal's travel diaries provide a ready forum for the expression of such ideas. 
The changeable climate of 29 April 1811, when he is journeying from Paris to Rouen, 
he finds 'froid et desagreable et contraire a mon imagination'; whilst in Nogent, some 
months earlier, he had relished 'ce beau temps de septembre si puissant sur moi et qui 
me convie a aimer.'399 Some thirty years on, this same power of weather to impinge 
upon the intellectual and affective'dispositions of man still features large in Stendhal's 
mind. Thus the author of the Memoires d'un touriste will evoke 'ce climat trop variable 
qui contribue a nous rendre imbeciles des soixante-cinq ans.'400 More striking still, and 
more explicitly reminiscent of the work which played a formative role in imprinting 
such ideas upon Stendhal's mind, is a diary entry of 1835 in which he records the 
effects of a bath taken to. counter-act a state of nervous agitation:
Sur ma machine. Gnoti Seauton. Le 16 fevrier, le bain ote l'irritation nerveuse.
Ecrit vingt pages en jouant, et plus d'impatience, d'irritation nerveuse.
Bain Saint-Gregoire avec humeur. Influence du physique sur le moral. I  wanted
water401
All of this, we would argue, is germane to the broader question of Stendhal's 
philosophical development. But how does one legislate for wind and water, sun and 
air? Is man but the passive victim of Nature's every whim, the blind object of forces 
that lie beyond his ken and control? The question is one which clearly troubles Stendhal 
and which comes to occupy a salient place in his considerations — moral, social, 
political and aesthetic—  from 1811 most notably.402 As he would write in the New 
Monthly Magazine of June 1825, 'l'importante question de l'influence du climat' had 
been addressed by Hippocrates and brought into vogue by Montesquieu. 'Plus tard, 
Volney et Cabanis jeterent de nouvelles lumieres sur cette theorie dont une connaissance 
exacte pourrait etre si utile au bonheur de l'humanite.'403
To acknowledge the importance of climate, however, was one thing; to resolve the 
philosophical difficulties posed thereby, quite another. For, while Stendhal recognises 
the inescapable logic of the determinism which he posits, he is loath to relinquish 
whatever measure of control men might exert over their own destiny. 'Montesquieu 
n’a-t-il pas dit qu'il faut corriger le climat par la loi?' he asks in Rome, Naples et 
Florence 404 The same question had already been broached in VHistoire de la peinture
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en Italie, where Stendhal argues the futility of disputing the relative merits of Racine 
and Shakespeare, Rubens and Raphael:
Si le savant a le genie de Montesquieu, il pourra dire: "Le climat tempere et la 
monarchic font naitre des admirateurs pour Racine. L'orageuse liberte et les climats 
extremes produisent des enthousiastes a Shakespeare."405
Though there is no indication here of the mechanisms whereby men might actually set 
about legislating for climate, the point is an important one. Nor should Stendhal's 
choice of verbs — 'font naitre', 'produisent' — go unremarked. For the clear 
suggestion here is that man is a product, a 'result' of combining factors, to be 
understood — as the chemist would understand a compound — by some process of 
retro-synthesis. Politics, Stendhal goes so far as to argue in 1818, 'est une science qui 
exige des experiences comme la chimie.'406 No less history, which should be written, 
he claims, 'avec la meme serenite philosophique qu'un traite de chimie':
L'inquisition, l'ultraisme, le despotisme etc., etc., devraient etre etudies 
exactement comme les poisons, et leurs antidotes signales avec le meme sang-froid 
que temoigne sir Humphry Davy lorsqu'il decrit le pouvoir mortel de l'arsenic et 
de l'acetate de morphine 407
In these examples, we find at work the same concern to evolve a theory of 
motivational psychology as had been evident in Stendhal's earliest writings. What has 
changed, and in far-reaching ways, is the conception of the human being whose 
chemistry is to be understood. In the redrafting of Rome, Naples et Florence in 1818, 
Stendhal coins one of the most roundly deterministic definitions of man that are 
anywhere to be found in his writings:
Un etre humain ne me parait jamais que le resultat de ce que les lois ont mis dans 
sa tete, et le climat dans son coeur 408
What is immediately striking in this statement is the clear re-affirmation, in 1818, of 
Stendhal's erstwhile division of man into tete and cceur. In truth, he had never 
relinquished this. Yet if the basic terms remain the same, their sense has significantly 
broadened. No more is it a question of a strictly metaphysical contest between 
abstracted notions of reason and passion: 'head' and 'heart' have come now to denote 
theatres wherein might be registered the whole gamut of influences which, firmly 
rooted in the real and concrete world, are at work upon the individual. Man has 
become, as Michel Crouzet puts it, a 'nature immergee dans la nature et la societe.'409 
Nowhere is this extension of Stendhal's earlier perception of human nature more in 
evidence than in a short passage from VHistoire de la peinture en Italie which can be 
said to contain the sum of his philosophy of man as it had evolved by 1817:
Le climat ou le temperament fait la force du ressort; l'education ou les mceurs, le
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sens dans lequel ce res sort est employe.410
The emphasis here is, significantly, Stendhal's own. The remark, in its brevity and 
far-reaching implications, provides a striking prefiguration of the later definition by 
Taine of race, milieu and moment as ie ressort du dedans, la pression du dehors et 
l'impulsion deja acquise.'411 This notion of an internal driving force — or ressort — 
which has its seat in the human organism and requires to be guided by some directive, 
educative process — sens — is a much modified version of the interaction of cceur and 
tete as Stendhal had earlier sought to define it. It is in this respect that the notions of 
temperament and innate characteristics, as they are gleaned from Cabanis, confound 
and complicate Stendhal's earlier, uni-dimensional view of human character as it.had 
been derived from Helvetius. For there is a growing awareness, evident from his 
earliest published work, that force of character, where it exists, will out. Thus, in 
VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, we read:
Dans la monarchie, le fils de Marius, ne pouvant avoir une compagnie, sera 
Cartouche. Je suppose que les parents donnent le temperament, le ressort; et 
l'education, le sens dans lequel il agit.412
Again the emphasis is Stendhal's, and again the 'ressort', or mainspring, of human 
character is seen as an indwelling quality which requires judicious direction. Piqued by 
the criticisms of Rome, Naples et Florence en 1817 which appeared in the Edinburgh 
Review of November 1817,413 Stendhal took up his pen to defend the aims and 
achievements of his work as he perceived them. In a letter addressed to the general 
editor of the Review, in which he disputes the charge of 'flippancy' levelled against his 
book, he makes his point in the following terms:
Or l'etat des tetes et des cceurs en Italie, la force du ressort et le sens dans lequel il 
est dirige ne sont-ils pas mieux indiques dans Stendhal que dans Millin?414
It is of no little significance that Stendhal should choose to highlight the above aspect as 
a strength of Rome, Naples et Florence. For the definition of man as the sum of his 
inner qualities plus the means whereby these find expression in a social context comes 
to inform his perception not only of individual character, but of national character too. 
In this, Stendhal believed, lay his chief originality as an observer of Italian mores in 
particular and of national temperament more generally. The comparison which is to be 
found in De VAmour between Corsica, Spain and Italy on the one hand, and France on 
the other, provides a clear application of the principle in question:
Dans ces climats, ou une chaleur brulante exalte la bile pendant trois mois de 
l'annee, ce n'est que la direction du ressort qui manque; a Paris, j'ai peur que ce 
soit le ressort lui-meme.415
We have discussed already the difficulty of assigning any rigorously deterministic
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value to Stendhal’s novels, and have remarked upon the highly rarefied portrait of 
human nature that is presented through his fictional characters. It is for these very 
reasons, however, important to bear in mind that, long before the publication of 
Armance, Stendhal had forged a much fuller definition of human character than he 
would ever allow himself to spell out in his novels. Nowhere, from the conformation 
of one's organs through to the air one breathed, could one escape the influence of the 
real and concrete world. The passage cited above from De VAmour, with its 
pseudo-physiological account of the effects of excessive heat upon the bilious 
temperament, demonstrates clearly Stendhal's appropriation of several notions from 
Cabanis and his application of these within a new context.416 In a note dating from 
April 1813, which would in due course be incorporated into the Vies de Haydn, de 
Mozart et de Metastase, the Italian character is defined by Stendhal in the following 
terms:
Le caractere italien est melancolique, c'est-a-dire que leurs idees sur le bonheur
sont produites par des corps bilieux, quelquefois avec des embarras dans le
bas-ventre.
Ce caractere melancolique est le terrain dans lequel les passions germent le plus
facilement. Ce caractere ne peut guere s'amuser que par les beaux-arts 417
The semantic fields through which this definition runs are highly significant. The moral 
and aesthetic disposition of the Italian, his conception of happiness and artistic 
sensibility, are seen as the product of an organic constitution that is evoked in 
physiological and botanical terms. 'Ideas' are not depicted here as some abstract 
concept; rather they are an indissociable part of the corps, the bas-ventre, in which they 
take root. The resonance between Stendhal's remarks here and the 'Deuxieme 
Memoire' of Cabanis, 'Histoire physiologique des sensations', is inescapable. For it is 
the latter's contention that 'certaines dispositions des organes internes, et notamment 
des visceres du bas-ventre,' may have an intellectually and emotionally uplifting effect 
upon the individual, lending 'plus d'elevation, d'energie, d'eclat' to the mind, together 
with a propensity to 'se nourrir d'affections plus touchantes, ou mieux dirigees.'418 In 
the Italian as Stendhal comes to define him, moreover, we find a celebration of that 
same predisposition towards the arts, of 'ces ames vives et ardentes, livrees sans 
reserve a tous les transports de leurs desirs,' which Cabanis expressly equates with the 
melancholic and passionate temperament as it thrives in the warmer climes of the 
south 419 Such language and reasoning alike could have come straight from VHistoire 
de la peinture en Italie or De VAmour. Nor would they seem misplaced in Stendhal's 
earliest musical biographies, which Francine Marill Alberes describes as 'la 
transposition de la methode de Cabanis appliquee a des cas concrets.'420 The 
correspondence between Stendhal's thought and that of Cabanis in this domain requires 
to be stressed. Worth stressing, too, is the fact that this perspective on the Italian quite 
specifically dates from a relatively advanced stage in Stendhal's reflections on man. The
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importance of the year 1811 — which, when it has not been altogether overlooked, has 
never been fully appreciated by Stendhal scholars — cannot be overstated in this 
respect. For it saw the coincidence of two of the most formative influences upon 
Stendhal’s thought: his first truly fruitful reading of Cabanis and his real 'discovery' of 
Italy.421
We have seen already how Stendhal's reading of the 'Sixieme Memoire' of the 
Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme in February 1811 gave rise, in his 
private notes and diaries, to a whole range of applications and examples. It was his stay 
in Italy, however, in the autumn of the same year, that was to provide Stendhal with a 
most propitious occasion for putting Cabanis's theories, as he understood them, to the 
test. From this point, a new and imposing figure was to emerge into the light of 
Stendhal's conscience and occupy thereafter centre-stage in his imagination: the 
bilious-melancholic Italian.
Francine Marill Alberes, in considering this question, contends that, having 
recognised in the Italian his 'type de predilection', Stendhal was 'heureux d'en trouver 
une explication dans Cabanis.'422 This, we submit, is a quite misleading assertion, 
from both a logical and a chronological point of view. For the Italian is, to a very 
considerable degree, a construct of Stendhal's imagination, a personage who is filtered 
through the reading of Cabanis and to whose 'invention' the latter contributes 
substantially.423 Though Stendhal early fell under the charm of Milanese life, his 
fulsome praise of the Italian character appears, in the form that would ultimately 
characterise it, only during and after the trip to Italy which he undertakes fresh from his 
reading of Cabanis in 1811. It is instructive in this regard to cite part of Stendhal's 
diary entry for 9 March of that same year, in which he anticipates his forthcoming trip 
to Italy:
Malheureusement, ce que je connais sur le caractire italien est bien faible. [...]
Nous allons en Italie pour etudier le caractere italien; connaitre les hommes de cette 
nation en particulier, et, par occasion, completer, etendre, verifier, etc., ce que 
nous croyons savoir de l'homme en general.424
Thanks in no small measure to his reading of Cabanis, Stendhal, by summer 1811, 
had the raw philosophic material of an ideal; he departed for Italy, it can be argued, in 
search of a reality against which to match it. In February 1811, prompted by a reading 
of Mme de Stael's Corinne, Stendhal had penned several pages of notes entitled: 
'Etudes du caractere italien', adding the significant qualification: 'A verifier sur les 
lieux.'425 It is during and in the wake of his trip of autumn 1811 that Stendhal's vision 
of the Italian as the embodiment of a particular temperament, of Italy as the home of the 
arts, of his own 'Italian' disposition, was to take its definitive shape 426 In the first of
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his published letters from this trip, dated 10 September 1811, Stendhal writes from 
Milan to his sister Pauline: 'Mais cet amour fou pour la gaite, la musique et les moeurs 
tres libres, l'art de jouir de la vie avec tranquillite, etc..., tout cela est le caractere du 
Milanais.'427 In a diary entry dated two days beforehand, Stendhal takes his reflection 
a stage further, concluding that this same Milanese character, with its 'arte di godere', 
is due to the joint influence of climate and government.428 His considerations on this 
question are not, however, disinterested. For it becomes clear that Stendhal is, all the 
while, forging an identification with the character which he is observing. Thus, in the 
letter of 10 September 1811 cited above, he declares to his sister Pauline: 'Je vois tous 
les jours que j'ai le cceur italien, aux assassinats pres, dont, au reste, on les accuse 
injustement.'429 Several days later, in a diary entry dated Milan 16 September 1811, he 
reflects ruefully:
Je n'ai que le cceur italien; si, en 1800, j'eusse ete mele dans la societe, comme je 
le suis actuellement et comme je le serais apres un mois de sejour a Milan, j'aurais 
pris les manieres italiennes 430
What is particularly noteworthy in all of this is that the 'naturalisation morale' (to 
borrow Michel Crouzet's expression)431 which Stendhal seeks in relation to Italy is 
accompanied — more than that, ratified — by a physiological 'naturalisation' to which 
his diary and letters from this period stand as testimony. No sooner, indeed, does 
Stendhal commence his trip than we find him reflecting in his diary upon the bilious 
nature of his temperament432 To the same diary, some weeks later, he consigns the 
thought that his character, his means of seeking happiness, bears a Latin stamp: 'Je suis 
d'un bonheur sombre et, ce me semble, italien, bien eloigne de la vie facile du 
sanguin.'433 As late, indeed, as the Vie de Henry Brulard, we will find expressed the 
same wish to substantiate his moral sympathy with a legitimate physiological claim to 
Italian ness: 'Par ma mere a laquelle je ressemble je suis peut-etre de sang italien.’434
It is clear that Stendhal's trip of 1811 plays a crucial role in sustaining this 
association between his definition of the Italian character and his sense of self. 'Au 
moment ou, ce matin, a 10 heures, nous avons apergu le dome de Milan,1 he notes in 
his diary on a subsequent visit to Italy in September 1813, 'je songeais que mes 
voyages en Italie me rendent plus original, plus moi-meme.'435 Such reflections, with 
all the sympathy they exhibit, are a far cry indeed from what Stendhal had written to his 
sister during his first spell in Italy over a decade earlier. Then he had been struck by 
quite another aspect of the Italian character— or, more precisely, he had interpreted the 
same aspects in a very different way. A glance at his letter to Pauline Beyle of 7 
December 1800 reveals a response to Italy which has tended to be eclipsed by the 
rhapsodic tones of later writings:
Je n'ai jamais vu et je ne m'etais pas forme l'idee d'hommes aussi abrutis que le
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bas peuple italien. Ils joignent a toute l'ignorance de nos paysans un cceur faux et
traitre, la plus sale lachete et le fanatisme le plus detestable.436
'Je t'assure que nous regrettons bien la France et la Suisse,' concludes the young 
second lieutenant; 'au moins la nous aurions affaire a des hommes.'437 Though the 
'brutes a figure humaine' who are evoked in this letter may not serve as a representative 
gauge to Stendhal's earliest perceptions of Italy,438 it is nonetheless true that, by 1811, 
he was in the process of reinventing his Italian. The Italy for which the adolescent 
Stendhal had recorded his enthusiasm was not the Italy of the people and of violent 
energy — this was to be an acquired taste — but the Italy of the Saint Bernard Pass, 
Cimarosa, La Scala, and an as yet unconquered Angela Pietragrua 439 Lacking still here 
were the crucial physiological and national-geographic references, the 'psychology of 
race', as George Brandes puts it,440 which were to become the hallmark of Stendhal's 
later writings on Italy. By 1811, however, Stendhal was in possession of the new tools 
with which to refashion his definition of the Italian. The latter is perceived now as the 
natural result of a particular climate, temperament; organic disposition. The faults 
which Stendhal had lamented in 1800 are not eclipsed; they are rather translated now 
into latent virtues. It is for this reason significant that, as late as March 1812, we find 
Stendhal consigning to his diary in tentative tones still an idea that was to become the 
very hallmark of his perception of Italy in relation to France: 'Bn etudiant les moeurs de 
l'ltalie au XVIe siecle, je crois voir que la science des convenances s'est perfectionnee, 
et c'est tant pis pour nous.'441 Writing from Milan on 29 October 1811, he had 
reflected upon the ready sociability of the Parisian and compared the latter, in a manner 
that would become compulsive in his later writings, to his Italian counterpart: 'Les 
peuples d'ltalie, au contraire, sont bilieux, point aimables du tout; la canaille italienne 
est meme la plus impatientante de l'univers...' But in those same Italians, Stendhal 
goes on to add, one finds 'un peuple ne pour les arts, c'est-a-dire excessivement 
sensible.'442
This summary portrait, revising as it does Stendhal's earlier and immeasurably 
harsher judgment of the common people of Italy, already contains much that will 
become central to his definitive perception of the Italian character. 'La canaille, qui n'est 
reprimee par rien, est plus mechante qu'ailleurs,' he declares in VHistoire de la peinture 
en Italie, 'ce qui ne prouve autre chose sinon que l'homme du Midi est superieur a 
l'homme du Nord.'443 The equation between the bilious temperament and .excessive 
sensibility of the Italian, which we find clearly expressed for the first time in 1811, 
foreshadows the passage from the Vies de Haydn, de Mozart et de Metastase in which 
Italy will be prized as 'la patrie des arts', and the Italian as the embodiment of 
melancholy passion and artistic fibre.444 It is for this reason, we suggest, that Geoffrey 
Strickland is inaccurate when he asserts that the closest Stendhal 'comes to finding
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reasons in nature for the Italians being as they are is to refer occasionally to their 
"beautiful climate".'445 Strickland interprets too literally here a term which, in the wake 
of Montesquieu and Cabanis in particular, becomes a short-hand notation for Stendhal, 
implying the whole range of natural — geographical, meteorological and physiological 
— influences to which human communities are subject.446 Though climate in its 
strictest sense comes into its own as a factor in determining national character, so too 
does temperament; and it is here that the real development in Stendhal's thinking 
occurs.
The revised stance which we find Stendhal adopting in 1811 vis-a-vis the Italian is 
accompanied, in this sense, by a powerful new idea: that the bas peuple, or canaille, of 
Italy is the repository of a sensibility physical in origin and conspicuous by its absence 
in France. As Stendhal puts it in his letter of 29 October 1811, Paris is a city where 
'tout est eunuque, jusqu'au maitre,' where '[les] choses sublimes sont mortes.'447 In 
comparing the French and Italian peasantry in Rome, Naples et Florence, Stendhal will 
have no hesitation in giving voice once more to the same idea. The French peasant, he 
concedes, 'a beaucoup plus de bonte, et de ce bon sens qui s'applique si bien aux 
circonstances ordinaires de la vie.' But, he counters,
je crois en verite que le paysan toscan a beaucoup plus d'esprit que le paysan
frangais, et qu'en general le paysan italien a re$u du ciel infiniment plus de
susceptibilite de sentir avec force et profondeur, autrement dit, infiniment plus
d'energie de passion.448
The significance of this remark lies not in the superiority which it posits — and which 
will be sustained throughout Stendhal's writings — between the Italian and the French 
in the matter of sensibility; it lies rather in the concept of energy which is intimately 
associated with this sensibility, and which is defined quite specifically here as an 
appurtenance of the Italian character. In the case of Stendhal, as in the case of his later 
apologist, Hippolyte Taine, observes J.-T. Nordmann, 'italianite et energie tendent a 
coincider.'449 It may seem otiose to reiterate here what is by now an established canon 
of Stendhal scholarship. Yet, if the coincidence for Stendhal between Italy and energy 
has become something of a truism, the roots of that coincidence have not received an 
exhaustive analysis by any means. What we propose in the following chapter is to 
unearth a number of these roots, and to examine what remains a neglected area of 
scholarly concern: the role of physiology in Stendhal's notion of 'energy' and in his 
understanding of natural impulse in general.
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CHAPTER VIII
ENERGY: THE PHYSIOLOGICAL FACTOR 
The Avatars of Energy
The portrait of the Italian peasant with which we closed the preceding chapter suggests 
that 'quality of soul' which we have come to associate with Stendhal's concept of 
energy, that 'principe superieur de toute vie' which Henri Delacroix, in his informed 
study, perceives as the essence of Stendhalian energy. While attempting to define what 
Stendhal understood by 'energy', however, Delacroix recognises the difficulty of 
assigning a definitive value to the term. 'L'idee d'Energie,' he writes, 'apparait ainsi 
comme une idee souple et elastique capable de bien des flexions, de bien des 
raffinements, de bien des transformations.' The term 'energy', as Stendhal employs it, 
Delacroix concludes, can be reduced to no single concept, but must be seen as the point 
where various domains of the author's thought — 'speculation, biologie, art, 
psychologie, histoire' — converge.1
Some seventy years on from the publication of Delacroix's study, the problem of 
interpreting Stendhal's concept of energy remains. In a recent article, Michel Crouzet 
has shown just how mercurial is the term 'energie' in Stendhal's hands. It is, Crouzet 
argues, a 'signifiant flottant’, at once 'approximatif and 'insituable'.2 The meanings 
that can be assigned to the term, as Crouzet observes, carry it well beyond the range not 
only of any single definition but of any given semantic field. Energy can be moral, 
aesthetic, passionate, rational, rhetorical, sexual, and more. In a paper delivered to the 
1987 Conference of the Society for French Studies, C.W. Thompson likewise explores 
a number of the avatars of Stendhalian energy and concludes that the author’s 
exploration of the notion is a great deal richer and more complex than has generally 
been appreciated. In signalling the work that remains to be done on this question, 
Thompson argues for no all-embracing definition of energy, but recognises instead 
Stendhal's tendency 'to stress the affinities between all sorts of energies and their 
convertibility one to another, whatever their origin or form, whether climatic, racial, 
social, emotional, physiological or artistic.'3
This shifting, elusive quality of 'energy' accounts in some measure perhaps for the 
divergence among critics who have sought to identify the point when Stendhal 
'discovered' his concept. Victor del Litto, J.-C. Alciatore and Francine Marill Alberes 
trace Stendhal's notion of energy to his early readings of Alfieri, Helvetius and Tracy
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respectively.4 The same notion of energy, according to Maurice Bardeche, dates from 
Stendhal's discovery of Renaissance Italy around 1811.5 For Paul Arbelet, by contrast, 
Stendhal's concept of energy takes root in his earliest admiration for the heroes of 
Ancient Rome; for W.H. Fineshriber, it is an ideal fashioned from the reading of 
Laclos's Les Liaisons dangereuses; for Alain Chantreau, it remains a product of 
imagination diffused through Stendhal's childhood memories as we find them recorded 
in’the Vie de Henry Brulard6
The exercise in which each of these critics in turn engages seems a futile one. 
There is no clearly documented point at which Stendhal can be said to have 
'discovered' energy; nor is there a particular moment after which the term is employed 
with any single and consistent meaning. What is clear is that the term and its cognates 
are used early by Stendhal in a rhetorical sense, to denote a particular literary style and 
vigour of expression.7 Energy as a quality of 'soul', an indefinable inner fibre, is also 
in evidence from the earliest. There exists an 'energie de la passion'8 which, Stendhal 
asserts in July 1803, is the 'qualite sine qua non genius'9 Prudence, on the other hand, 
is deemed a 'vertu des ames sans energie.'10 As an aspiring dramatist, Stendhal reflects 
that he must be able to 'presenter ses caracteres dans leurs maximum et minimum 
d'energie.'11 Nor does he pass up the opportunity to sound in himself the quality 
which he is seeking to portray in others. In his own character, as a diary entry of 14 
January 1805 reveals, the young Stendhal discerns an 'energie' which, with his 
frankness and his republican principles, as he puts it, 'me font croire un Machiavel par 
les ames faibles telles que mon oncle.'12
This contrast between the 'ame faible' and the resolute — energetic — spirit was, 
of course, to be a standard feature of Stendhal's repertoire. In his lexicon, energy 
becomes 'la force', 'la force d'ame', 'la force de Lame', 'Id. force du ressort', 'la force 
des passions', 'la force de volonte', 'la force de vouloir', 'la. force de caractire'13 For 
all his insistence on this notion, however, Stendhal recognised the ambiguities inherent 
in the term 'force'. In the revised edition of Rome, Naples et Florence, he attempts 
expressly to clarify his meaning: 'J'aime la force, et de la force que j'aime, une fourmi 
peut en montrer autant qu'un elephant.'14 This simple statement, whose significance 
has been overlooked in much of the discussion of energy in Stendhal,15 should be read 
in conjunction with a note drafted for inclusion in the same revised edition. 'Personne,' 
Stendhal affirms, 'ne s'avise de demander si Napoleon ou Frederic II surent bien 
appliquer un coup de sabre':
La force que nous admirons, c'est celle de Napoleon visitant l'hopital de Jaffa, ou
s'avangant avec simplicite vers le premier bataillon des troupes royales, sur les
bords du lac de Lafffey (mars 1815); c'est la force de lfame.16
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There is apparent in both of these examples a clear attempt by Stendhal to sanitise the 
notion of ’force', to disengage the term from its more brutish and reprehensible 
associations. The same is true of yet another note which one finds among Stendhal's 
revisions of Rome, Naples et Florence, and in which a revealing parallel is drawn 
between two ostensibly very different types of energy:
Dans le genre de V opera buff a comme dans le genre des batailles la seule qualite 
essentielle au grand homme, c'est la force. Au fond du genie de Cimarosa et de 
Napoleon on trouve une qualite commune, c'est la force. Dans un cas l'ame doit 
mettre sa force a sentir, dans l'autre a agir sur les environnants.17
This insistence on energy as a vital force, a sort of 'grace' bestowed upon an elect, 
while it is consonant with Stendhal's notion of the 'happy few', has much that is 
redolent, too, of the romantic cult of energy as it is to be found in Benjamin Constant or 
Mme de Stael. Of 'energy' in the romantic sense, and in the particular sense in which it 
is construed by the Coppet circle, Anne-Marie Jaton writes:
Madame de Stael la definit precisement comme \a. force morale que l'homme peut 
opposer a la force physique; l'energie apparait comme une qualite interieure de 
l'etre qui definit l'ame et caracterise le moi profond.18
Jaton's remarks resonate with those of Michel Delon, who, in his article 'La theorie de 
l'energie a Coppet', likewise defines energy as 'la force morale que l'homme peut 
opposer aux forces physiques.' The 'energy' of Stael and Constant is an ’"energie de 
l'ame"', an "'energie interieure'" free of all material connotation, residing in and 
emanating from a 'dynamisme fondamental de l'ame.' Of energy thus defined, Delon 
writes: 'Spiritualisme et moralisme se conjuguent pour en faire la force d'ame en 
combat permanent avec les contraintes physiques ou politiques.'19
As it may be related in turn to Stendhal, this clean division between the physical 
and moral worlds poses, a problem. It is a problem, moreover, which has never been 
addressed as such by Stendhal's critics. For if the apologists of energy a la Stael were 
selective in the energy which they extolled, if they cultivated admiration for one type of 
energy to the exclusion of others, Stendhal, for his part, embraces the concept in its 
unweildy totality. While the tendency of Stael and Constant was to view energy as a 
moral — indeed spiritual — force, the counterpoint to energy in any material or 
physical sense, the same energy for Stendhal had a decidedly physical dimension, 
taking its very source from the material'world which, as Jaton and Delon argue, the 
Romantics were at pains to eschew.20 The 'romantic' aspect of Stendhal's cult of 
energy is substantially tempered throughout by a philosophical principle which militates 
against just that division within energy — between force morale and force physique — 
which is evoked above.21 If 'energy' appears at the outset for Stendhal as an abstract
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concept,22 much like 'passion' or 'character' as he early defines them, it becomes clear, 
through the reading of Cabanis, that there can be no moral expression of an energy that 
is not first present in physical form.23 Energy need not expend itself in physical 
exploits; but, in its most elementary state, Stendhal would come to believe, it is the 
product of a given biochemical constitution and, as such, indissociable from the 
organism which serves as its seat24
i. Biological Energy
In his article 'Aux sources de l'energie stendhalienne', Victor del Litto makes two 
surprising assertions. Commenting upon the infrequency with which Stendhal employs 
the term energie before about 1816, he points to the presence of 'un seul exemple dans 
le journal de 1804.’25 The fact is, however, that Stendhal's diary for that year yields a 
number of examples which, in conjunction with his notes and letters from the same 
period, throw light upon the diversity of his early use of the term.26 The second of Del 
Litto's remarks is more curious still. 'Meme dans VHistoire de la peinture en Italie,' he 
affirms, 'le mot ne revient qu'a la derniere page du dernier chapitre: "La soif de 
1 'energie nous ramenera aux chefs-d'oeuvre de Michel-Ange...'"27 This, however, is 
far from accurate. VHistoire de la peinture en Italie provides, in truth, a whole range of 
instances in which the term energie, and its cognate energique, are used in the moral 
and aesthetic senses which we have so come to associate with Stendhal:
[...] l'on n'est pas plus vertueux qu'en 1500, mais moins energique pour le mal 
comme pour le bien.
Je vois bien que l'energie s'est refugiee dans la classe de la societe qui n'est pas 
polie.
A Rome, comme partout, l'energie s'est refugiee dans cette classe [ouvriere].
La poesie d'abord si energique prit un raffinement affecte; tout devint persiflage, et 
de nos jours l'energie eut souille ses doigts de rose.
On est revenu a ces caracteres qui animerent les poemes energiques des premiers et 
rudes inventeurs, ou on est alle chercher des hommes semblables parmi les 
sauvages et les barbares 28
For all their significance, the above give only a partial view of Stendhal's 
application of the concept of energy in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie. More notable 
still are those passages where, under the scarcely disguised aegis of Cabanis, he uses 
the term in a strictly physiological sense. Bile, we learn, is a highly active humour
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which serves 'comme un levain energique' within the human economy: 'c'est le 
temperament des hommes grands par les actions.'29 The phlegmatic temperament, by 
contrast, is attended by '[des] organes de la generation et un foie qui manquent 
d'energie...'30 In the case of the melancholic, we read: 'Les extremites nerveuses ont 
une sensibilite vive, les muscles sont tres vigoureux, la vie s’exerce avec une energie 
constante; mais elle s'exerce avec embarras, avec une sorte d'hesitation.'31 As for the 
nervous temperament, it evinces 'une grande energie' in 'les operations qui dependent 
directement du cerveau.'32
Physiological energy, whether by its presence or its absence, thus becomes one of 
the very touchstones of individual temperament and character. The significance of this 
fact has been greatly underestimated by Stendhal scholars. The tendency has been to 
dismiss Chapters XCII to C of VHistoire de la peinture 'en Italie as a more or less 
blatant plagiarism of Cabanis, and to conclude from this that they hold little interest 
other than by demonstrating Stendhal's often less than scrupulous method of exploiting 
his sources.33 Paul Arbelet, in his extensive study of what Stendhal owes to others in 
VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, writes of his debt to Cabanis:
Comme il importe assez peu que Beyle, dans cette incursion sur un domaine 
etranger, ait emprunte peu ou beaucoup, comme d'ailleurs nous ne saurions nous 
attendre a trouver en lui un physiologiste original ni un medecin competent, nous 
ne croyons pas devoir etudier ces emprunts avec la meme minutie que ceux faits 
par Beyle aux critiques d'art ou aux historiens. Quelques indications breves 
suffiront.34
Some brief indications are indeed all that Arbelet offers. Of the 500-plus pages which 
this study comprises, barely half a dozen are devoted to considering Stendhal's very 
substantial debt to Cabanis. Arbelet's rationale is worth citing, for it is representative of 
what we have seen to be the refusal by a considerable number of critics to accord any 
well defined place to Cabanis as a serious influence on Stendhal's thought. The 
evidence, however, is that, far from being incidental, the theories of Cabanis have a 
significance which is fundamental to Stendhal's philosophy as it is articulated in his 
earliest published writings. A glance at VHistoire de la peinture en Italie confirms the 
whole new dimension of meaning which the term energie had taken on for Stendhal, 
the essentially physiological character with which he had come by now to invest the 
notion.35 In neither the moral nor the aesthetic realm is energy to be divorced here from 
its physical source.36 We have seen already how the painter of Brutus must avoid the 
representation of a sanguinity that would belie his subject.37 The role of the artist, we 
recall, is to portray 'par les formes de son personnage le caractere que ses organes le 
forcent a avoir.'38 It is the logic of these remarks precisely that is embraced by Stendhal 
when he pursues the notion of 'energy' as a crucial factor in human nature and, ipso 
facto, a reality of which the artist must take cognisance:
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Les apotres du Guide, toujours sanguins et elegants, n'ont pas la profondeur et 
l'energie de pensee qui sont ici de coutume.
Les plus grands peintres sont pleins de ces fautes-la; Cervantes et Shakespeare 
sont les seuls grands artistes du seizieme siecle qui me paraissent avoir songe aux 
temperaments.39
It is by success or failure in thus depicting the outer signs of an inner energy that 
an artist's renown may hang. Guido Reni's predilection for the sanguin makes him 
ill-suited to satisfy the 'soif de l'energie' which characterises the nineteenth century and 
which can be quenched, Stendhal concludes, only through recourse to the bilious, 
energetic subjects of Michaelangelo.40 As of the painter, moreover, so of the historian. 
A true representation of human reality, in art or in life, must take account of the full 
range of relevant indices. By selecting cases from history, Stendhal suggests, one can 
locate those human 'sites' where temperament and energy converge, the one serving as 
a guide to the presence, type and degree of the other:
II est probable, par exemple, que Cesar n'etait pas flegmatique, que Frederic II 
n'etait pas melancolique, que Francis Ier etait sanguin, et qu'un grand general qui 
aurait fait tant de bien, et qui a fait tant de mal a la France, etait bilieux.41
The influence here of Stendhal's readings in physiology is beyond question. There 
is a suggestion, as early as January 1806, after Stendhal's second excursion into the 
Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme and his first reading of Pinel42 that he 
was already relating the notion of energy to a physical source. 'Trouver un emploi du 
temps utile pour les moments ou l'on se sent sans energie, degoute, ennuye par tout,' 
he counsels his sister Pauline, enjoining her, as we saw in an earlier chapter, to pay 
particular attention to her diet on such occasions 43 The remark might be less worthy of 
our attention were it not accompanied by a revealing diary entry dated the same day:
23 janvier, commencement d'energie; je retrouve mon ame ardente, sombre, 
aimant le profond comique, colerique, allant avec force, volonte, impetuosite, au 
fond des pensees. Effet determine par une tasse d'excellent cafe pris chez Mme 
Cossonnier 44
Here the whole moral disposition, the intellectual and artistic elan of the individual, is 
seen to hinge upon a single cup of coffee. For all the apparent extravagance of this idea, 
the association that is thus established between energy, diet and temperamental qualities 
recalls Cabanis's 'Huitieme Memoire' — 'De Vinfluence du regime sur les dispositions 
et les habitudes morales' — and prefigures the remarks on diet which Stendhal will 
incorporate into VHistoire de la peinture en Italie under the rubric 'Influence du 
regime'.45 In the wake of his further readings of Cabanis in 1811 and 1815,46 Stendhal 
will develop and give sustained expression to the notion of energy as a physical, almost 
palpable entity. Hence the array of organic and pseudo-physiological terms and
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concepts within which 'energy' comes to find its definition — and, ultimately, its 
legitimation — for Stendhal. 'Le feu', 'le phosphore', 'la bile', 'l'electricite', 'le 
magnetisme', 'le galvanisme', 'les nerfs', 'le fluide', 'le fluide nerveux', 'le fluide 
electrique':47 all become part of the same 'discours energetique' which, in the words of 
Michel Crouzet, 'physicalise l'ame, medicalise la morale, et etablit l'energie a 
l'intersection du fait biologique et du fait humain selon les modalites d'une economie 
quantitative.’48
Reflecting in Rome, Naples et Florence upon what distinguishes the spirited 
brigand from some lacklustre sub-prefect or mediocre army captain, Stendhal advances 
a provocative argument:
Mai.no, voleur d'Alexandrie, a ete l'un des hommes les plus remarquables de ce 
siecle, il ne lui manque que les quatre pages dans la Biographie, que le hasard
accorde au plus plat sous-p Mais qu'importe la vaine notation des hommes
aux faits existant dans la nature? Nos ancetres grossiers ne savaient pas voir 
l'electricite; en existait-elle moins pour cela? Un jour viendra qu'on admirera et 
historiera la grandeur de caractere, ou elle se trouve.49
Through the association that is established here between 'electricite' and 'grandeur de 
caractere’, Stendhal suggests that the one as much as the other is an incontrovertible 
fact o f nature. Biography, it is clear, must be approached with the same 'scientific' 
rigour, the same 'serenite philosophique', as politics or history.50 Artistic sensibility, 
too, is a domain in which the role of the scientist or physiologist would become ever 
clearer to Stendhal. 'La patrie de Voltaire, de Moliere et de Courier est depuis 
longtemps la ville de l'esprit,' he will write in the Promenades dans Rome;
mais le pays entre la Loire, la Meuse et la mer ne peut sentir les beaux-arts. 
Pourquoi? il aime le joli et hait Yenergie.
D'ou vient cette haine? Peut-etre de ce que les nerfs sont montes sur un ton 
different deux ou trois fois par jour par un climat trop inconstant.51
ii. Sexual Energy
Stendhal's insistence upon the term 'energie' in the latter instance, together with the 
clear correlation which he establishes between physiological predisposition and 
aesthetic sensibility, recall a passage penned a decade earlier, in March 1818, under the 
title 'Histoire de la poesie':
Pour des ames effeminees, pour des ames rouillees par l'etude du grec et 
rapetissees par la vie monotone du cabinet, et qui ne peuvent souffrir un vers 
energique si elles n'y reconnaissent a l'instant une imitation d'Homere; pour de
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telles ames, dis-je, la male poesie de Shakespeare, qui montre sans detours les 
malheurs de la vie, est physiquement insupportable.52
To suggest that any art, of whatever origin or type, may bz physically unbearable for an 
audience is to carry to its extreme the idea that artistic sensibility takes root in no 
ethereal realm but in the body organic itself. What is more striking still in this passage 
is the clear association which Stendhal endorses between energy and maleness on the 
one hand, debility and effeminacy on the other. It is an association to which he has 
recourse on a number of occasions. 'Je ne con?ois pas un homme,' he would declare in 
the Souvenirs d'egotisme, ’sans un peu de male energie, de Constance et de profondeur 
dans les idees, etc.'53 The equation is not sustained consistently throughout Stendhal's 
writings, in the sense that a number of the instances of energy which he cites feature 
females specifically.54 It is true, nonetheless, that much of that same energy which is 
located in individuals of the female species is distinctly virile in character. 'Le ciel 
devait a la gloire de ta race de te faire naitre homme,' declares Julien Sorel to Mathilde 
de la Mole.55 The remark is in keeping with a division of qualities that is clearly 
discernible in Stendhal's treatment of the sexes. One need only cite the ’esprit male et 
vigoureux’ which he wishes to inculcate in his sister Pauline, or the 'air dur, hautain et 
presque masculin' that will be exhibited by the same Mathilde de la Mole,56 to conclude 
that the energetic woman is, in Stendhal's world, something of an aberration within her 
kind.
We draw attention to this because it is wholly consistent with Cabanis's contention 
that energy is the appurtenance of the male organism, while sensibility is the 
endowment of the female:
[...] dans l'economie animale il ri'y a point d'impulsion energique toutes les fois 
que cette impulsion n'eprouve point de resistance: sa facilite meme l’enerve et 
l’aneantit. Si l’energie de reaction depend de celle d'action, a son tour faction 
s'entretient par la reaction qui lui succede, et qui devient pour elle un stimulant 
indispensable. Ainsi, tandis que chez l'homme la vigueur du systeme nerveux et 
celle du systeme musculaire s'accroissent l'une par l'autre, la femme sera plus 
sensible et plus mobile, parce que la contexture de tous ses organes est plus molle 
et plus faible, et que ces dispositions organiques primitives sont reproduites a 
chaque instant par la maniere dont s'exerce chez elle la sensibilite.57
This passage is noteworthy, for the energie and vigueur which are expressly attributed 
by Cabanis to the male — and which, as terms, are charged with a wholly positive 
value for Stendhal — are the very counterpoints of the mollesse and faiblesse which the 
latter so disdained as attributes of character, and which are here represented as the 
natural appanage of women. For Cabanis, la faiblesse, with its consequent lack of 
energie , was a defining feature of womanhood. By their nature, argued the 
physiologist, women are constrained to steer clear of matters which require 'une raison 
severe et forte,' where 'l'accent du caractere et de l'energie ajoute singulierement a la
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puissance de la raison.'58 Cabanis discourses upon the essential differences in the 
nature of men and women, drawing therefrom conclusions about the roles to which the 
respective sexes are suited. 'II faut que l'homme soit fort, audacieux, entreprenant; que 
la femme soit faible, timide, dissimulee. Telle est la loi de la nature.'59
No feminist charter this. While such views in the early years of the nineteenth 
century may not surprise us, their defence on serious physiological grounds is worthy 
of some note. As Anne-Marie Jaton points out, Cabanis found support for his 
contentions in the medical world of the day, most notably in the theories of the 
physician Julien-Joseph Virey, who went so far as to conclude that the male sperm 
itself was the repository of energy. 'Si la femme possede parfois courage et energie,' 
writes Jaton, completing the logic of Virey's argument, 'le merite en est done a 
l'impregnation, et l'etre feminin n'est alors que le reflet de l'homme.'60
Such, then, is the distinction between 'energy' and 'sensibility' (where the one is 
seen to exist as though in inverse proportion to the other) to which Cabanis and Virey 
lend the sanction of their physiology. When, in his diary of 1 April 1806, Stendhal 
remarks upon 'cette sensibilite mobile, qui me rend femme et qui est deguisee sous ma 
facilite a raisonner,'61 he is echoing closely the image of woman — 'plus sensible et 
plus mobile' — as we find it in the passage from Cabanis cited above. So too when he 
invokes 'la raison virile', or accuses the English upper classes of an effeminate 
sensibility, or criticises Newton for his lack of 'pensees males', for being 'trop grand 
ennemi des raisonnements temeraires, pour etre male dans ses discours.'62 That 
Stendhal saw all of this, ultimately, as a question susceptible of physiological 
explanation is clear from a passage in De VAmour, where he reflects upon the 
pronounced nature of female sensibility:
II a ete donne aux femmes de sentir, d'une maniere admirable, les nuances
d'affection, les variations les plus insensibles du cceur humain, les mouvements
les plus legers des amours-propres.
Elles ont a cet egard un organe qui nous manque: voyez-les soigner un blesse.63
Thus far, then, Stendhal appears to adhere faithfully to the theory advanced by 
Cabanis. As these same notions of energy and sensibility, with their respective 
connotations of maleness and effeminacy, are developed by Stendhal, however, they 
give rise to a much* richer and more ambiguous treatment than is endorsed by the 
near-caricatural distinctions of the physiologists. In recognising Stendhal's conception 
of 'la raison comme instrument de fermete, d'activitd, devant la passivite docile du 
sentir,' Michel Crouzet reduces the latter's thought on this question to its simplest 
terms: 'sentir est feminin, raisonner, masculin, sans doute.'64 Such a bald statement, 
however, takes no account of the manner in which Stendhal at times cuts across and
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subverts this same distinction. His females can evince 'classic' qualities of manhood, 
just as his males can be characterised at times by their apparent femininity.65 In such 
cases, moreover, it is not merely a question of turning the equation on its head, of 
showing what Albert Thibaudet describes as 'le defaut d'energie, qui feminise un 
homme, [...] ou l'exces d'energie, qui masculinise une femme.'66 For Stendhal is 
much less concerned with the rule than with the exceptions — and of these exceptions, 
there are two which hold to the fore in his imagination: the energetic — and therefore 
anomalous — female; the energetic and sensitive Italian, male and female alike.
It is to this question that we propose to devote part of our considerations in this 
chapter. It will be useful, therefore, to begin by discussing briefly Stendhal's 
conception of human sensibility. His thinking on this question owes much, it is clear, 
to an idea which we find recorded in his diary of 24 September 1813. This relates to a 
passage from Cabanis cited in the Moniteur of 16 September 1813, which Stendhal 
abridges thus:
"Remarquons que la sensibilite se comporte a la maniere d'un fluide dont la 
quantite totale est determinee, et qui, toutes les fois qu'il se jette en plus grande 
abondance dans un de ses canaux, diminue proportionnellement dans les autres."
(Rapports du physique, etc. Histoire des sensations. Cite au no. 259 du Moniteur 
de 1813.)67
This simple passage made a powerful impression on Stendhal. For it would find its 
way, in a relatively unaltered form, into much of his published work, providing him 
with a ready 'scientific' means of interpreting the different manifestations of human 
sensibility which he could observe in himself and in others.68 Thus the formula appears 
as a personal observation in a letter to Louis Crozet from December 1816, while it is 
given more general application in the Vies de Haydn, de Mozart et de Metastase and the 
later Vie de Rossini.69 The same notion is transferred from music to painting in 
VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, where Stendhal asserts that 'le fluide nerveux n'a, 
tous les jours, [...] qu'une certaine dose de sensibilite a depenser; si vous l'employez a 
jouir de trente beaux tableaux, vous ne l'emploierez pas a pleurer la mort d'une 
maitresse adoree.'70 Again in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, Stendhal returns to the 
same thought, incorporating it this time into his criticism of Poussin, whom, he 
declares, Shakespeare would have reproached in the following terms: ’"Ne te 
rappelles-tu pas que le fluide nerveux ne permet pas que le flambeau de l’attention 
eclaire a la fois et l'esprit et le coeur?'"71
The distinction between heart and head, as we have seen already, is never far from 
the surface in Stendhal. Here, as before, we are presented with a perceived opposition 
between reason and sentiment, an opposition that appears substantiated by the notion of
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a fluide nerveux which can dispense itself in limited quantities and in only one of these 
two theatres at any given time. This same idea is taken up and expanded in an important 
passage from De VAmour:
Pour moi, j'en reviens toujours aux lois physiques. Le fluide nerveux, chez les 
hommes, s'use par la cervelle, et chez les femmes par le coeur; c'est pour cela 
qu'elles sont plus sensibles. [...]
Appiani, qui ne croit a la vertu qu'a la demiere extremite, et avec lequel j ’allais ce 
soir a la chasse des idees, en lui exposant celles de ce chapitre, me repond:
"La force d'ame qu'Eponine employait avec un devouement heroique a faire vivre 
son man dans la caveme sous terre, et a l'empecher de tomber dans le desespoir, 
s’ils eussent vecu tranquillement a Rome, elie l'eut employee a lui cacher un amant; 
il faut un aliment aux ames fortes."72
The terms in which Stendhal couches his thinking here, the relationship that is 
suggested between 'lois physiques' and 'fluide nerveux’ on the one hand, and 'force 
d'ame' on the other, together with the introduction of a moral dimension to the question 
through the notion of 'vertu', conspire to give this passage a central place in his 
conception of energy. For one finds here a clear reaffirmation of that pregnant idea 
which Stendhal had expressed in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, when considering 
the nature of vital energy and the channels through which it may find expression:
Cela tient aux formes revues des parents, et au pouvoir de l'education. Dans la 
monarchic, le fils de Marius, ne pouvant avoir une compagnie, sera Cartouche. Je 
suppose que les parents donnent le temperament, le ressort; et l'education, le sens 
dans lequel il agit.73
This statement, together with Stendhal's remarks on the Gallic heroine, Eponine, give a 
whole new moral range to the questions raised by the actualisation of energy. In neither 
case does Stendhal expand upon the ethical implications of his assertions; but the 
recourse to overriding physical laws appears radically to curtail the possibility of any 
free moral agency. Hence the distinctly deterministic tones in which natural energy is 
alluded to as a function of the physiological and 'moral' make-up of the individual: 
'Cela tient aux formes regues des parents...'; 'les parents donnent le temperament, le 
ressort..'; 'il faut un aliment aux ames fortes.'
The ethical implications of such remarks will be considered in the final chapter of 
this study. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that the passage in question from De 
VAmour, with its reference to sensibility as a preserve of the female and reason of the 
male, recalls something of Cabanis's distinction between the sexes. Where Stendhal 
parts company with the physiologist, however, is in presenting the said Eponine as the 
embodiment not only of passionate sensibility, but of an energy that is precluded by the 
female constitution as Cabanis define's it. Nor is this the only instance in De VAmour 
where Stendhal cuts across the divide sanctioned by the physiologists. The same 'fluide
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nerveux' which is translated into active energy with Eponine is channelled into a 
frustrated sensibility in the case of 'un artiste romain' whom Stendhal imagines in Paris 
and to whom he ascribes the following thought:
"Je me deplais infiniment ici; je crois que c'est parce que je n'ai pas le loisir 
d'aimer a mon gre. Ici, la sensibilite se depense goutte a goutte a mesure qu'elle se 
forme, et de maniere, au moins pour moi, a fatiguer la source. A Rome, par le peu 
d'interet des evenements de. chaque jour, par le sommeil de la vie exterieure, la 
sensibilite s’amoncele au profit des passions."74
iii. Racial Energy
In the passage cited above, we find extended the scope of Stendhal's notion of 
sensibility. For introduced here are two new considerations which play no part in the 
preceding examples: geographical location and national character. Although the 
mouthpiece of Stendhal's thought is a single 'artiste romain', he may be seen to 
represent the archetypal Italian. We recall how, in a letter from Milan in October 1811, 
Stendhal defines the Italians as 'un peuple ne pour les arts, c'est-a-dire excessivement 
sensible.'75 Some fifteen years later, in his revised edition of Rome, Naples et 
Florence, he reiterates this notion with an implicit reference to Cabanis's theory of 
sensibility: 'Si l'on voyait les cceurs, l'on trouverait ici plus souvent le bonheur que le 
plaisir, l'on verrait que l'ltalien vit par son ame beaucoup plus que par son esprit.'76 It 
is in just such reflections on the Italian character that the clearest identification between 
sensibility and energy emerges in Stendhal. His belief in the Italian's predisposition 
towards feeling at the expense of reason is elsewhere in Rome, Naples et Florence 
subjected to rationalisation:
L'ltalien, pour qui la societe generale et les jouissances de salon sont impossibles, 
ne porte que plus de feu, et de devouement dans ses relations particulieres.
On the surface, this appears to be no more than the sort of stock remark that can be 
found in all of Stendhal's works relating to Italy. What makes this statement 
particularly significant, however, is the footnote which Stendhal appends by way of 
clarifying the sense here of the term 'feu':
Cabanis nous apprend que l'homme n'a chaque jour h depenser qu'une certaine 
quantite limitee de cette substance, jusqu'ici peu connue, nommee fluide nerveux. 
On ne peut pas depenser son bien de deux manieres; l'homme fort.aimable dans un 
salon le sera moins avec ses amis intimes.77
This short passage provides one of the keys to understanding Stendhal's
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conception of the Italian. For the terms 'feu' (so often in Stendhal's vocabulary a 
synonym for 'energy') and 'fluide nerveux' (which is closely associated with 
'sensibility') here come together and have their senses fused. The Italian's sensibility is 
energy — and energy, as we shall see, in its highest form. What is 'la premiere qualite 
d'un cceur italien?' By 1818, Stendhal has no hesitation in replying: 'l'energie.'78 The- 
neutrality of the term cceur is, moreover, apposite. For there is no obvious distinction 
to be made in the nature of energy as it is exhibited by the respective sexes in Italy. 
Discrimination, where it occurs in Stendhal's consideration of the Italian, is not sexual 
but racial. The point is framed in characteristic terms in the Promenades dans Rome, 
where the notions of nerve fluid and energy inform a pointed comparison between the 
Frenchman and the Roman:
Peut-etre il vous amusera par le brillant et l'imprevu de son esprit (je parle toujours 
du Fran?ais de 1780); mais, comme homme, c'est un etre moins energique, moins 
remarquable, plus vite lasse par les obstacles que le Romain. Amuse toute la 
joumee par quelque chose, le Fran£ais ne jouira pas du bonheur avec la meme 
energie que le Romain, qui, le soir, arrive chez sa maitresse avec une ame vierge 
d'emotions; done il ne fera pas de si grands sacrifices pour l'obtenir.79
The contribution of Cabanis everywhere underlies this notion of energy as a 
quantifiable resource, measurable in terms of its volume and expendability. 'La capacite 
energetique de l'individu n'est pas indefiniment extensible,' notes Philippe Berthier. 'II 
dispose d'un certain capital a depenser, et ce qu'il en utilise d'un cote n'est plus 
mobilisable de l'autre.'80 If we relate this to Stendhal's earliest notions of human 
nature, we can chart something of the development which his thinking has undergone. 
For reason and passion, while they may retain the aspect of competing 'faculties', are 
no longer seen to constitute the bedrock of human nature. Rather they become channels 
through which some vital, energetic property in man is expended. As early as June 
1804, Stendhal had suggested that Textreme de l'activite de l'ame' implied '[l'extreme] 
du repos de la tete.'81 This crude hypothesis is given a whole new physiological 
ratification in the idea that the head and the heart serve as conduits for something more 
essential and deep-rooted still within the human constitution.82
All of the foregoing introduces a dimension into the question of energy which is 
lacking when one approaches it within a purely 'moral' perspective.83 Yet if it is 
important to recognise the contribution of Cabanis, it is equally important to note where 
Stendhal departs from the physiologist and pursues the definition of energy on his own 
terms. For in the examples cited above, Stendhal quite abolishes the distinction upheld 
by Cabanis between male energy and female sensibility. The Italian becomes the 
repository not only of extreme sensibility but of manliness too. The English, with their 
predilection for riding, Stendhal writes in De iAmour, 'usent ainsi le fluide nerveux 
par les jambes et non par le cceur.'84 What they boast in athleticism they lose in
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sensibility. 'Rien de plus desoccupe au contraire que les jeunes Italiens; le mouvement 
qui leur oterait leur sensibilite leur est importun.’85 To this greater athleticism, the 
Englishman, as we read in the Promenades dans Rome, adds a more developed faculty 
of reason and a readier sociability: 'mais, comme homme, il sera fort inferieur au 
Romain.'86 And politically? Where does the Italian stand in relation to the more 
advanced regimes of Europe? 'Le Romain,' declares Stendhal, comparing the latter 
once more with his English counterpart, 'est beaucoup plus pres des moeurs de la 
republique, et, suivant moi, beaucoup plus homme.'87
Italy, it is clear, is the country of exception, the country where the rules that may 
hold good elsewhere cease to apply. No simple logic, physiological or other, here 
divides male and female. Just as the Italian man is the embodiment of sensibility, so his 
female counterpart is remarkable for her energy. 'L'energie qu'on trouve dans certains 
caracteres de femmes m'etonne toujours,' writes the observer of Italy in Rome, Naples 
et Florence,88 'Le peu d'energie qu'il y a a Rome,' we read in the earlier edition of the 
same work, 'est dans les femmes qui rappellent souvent la Sempronia de Salluste.'89 
Of a certain Bolonese belle, Stendhal can thus reflect in Rome, Naples et Florence: 'on 
pilerait toutes les femmes a sentiment de Paris ou de Londres, qu'on n'en tirerait pas un 
caractere de cette profondeur et de cette energie.'90
There is no rupture, then, in the italian character. Male and female, energy and 
sensibility, head and heart: all cohere within the same idealised image. Stendhal's 
Italian is, as Michel Crouzet puts it, 'le contraire de I'homo duplex, l'homme sans le 
schisme qui nous engage dans la vie morale et sociale, le vivant intact et coherent, 
jamais oppose a la vie, bref l'homme hors conflit.'91 This essential coherence of the 
Italian runs like a leitmotiv through Stendhal's travels in Italy. Nor is it restricted to the 
Italian qua individual. For all their lack of national identity, no people is more 
assertively treated as a generic whole by Stendhal than 'le peuple italien':
Comme peuple non civilise, mais chez lequel l'energie et la beaute des sentiments
et la finesse de l'esprit corrigent l'atrocite ou l'ineptie des lois civiles ou
religieuses, il est admirable 92
Distinctions of class and caste are effectively abolished in 'ce pays a sensations' where 
'tout le monde est peuple.' Here, all obey the same imperatives. The author of Rome, 
Naples et Florence explains: 'c'est qu'il y a des fortunes differentes, mais il n'y a pas 
de mceurs differentes,'93
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iv. 'Natural1 Energy
Though it is in a social context that the Italian is continually played off against his 
European counterparts, the explanation for his exceptional character is to be sought on a 
more elemental plane. For here, Stendhal does not tire of reminding us, we find the 
representative par excellence of Nature, Tetre le plus naturel de l'Europe'.94 Nowhere 
is the identification between Humanity and Nature more vividly sustained by Stendhal, 
nowhere is his 'naturalism' more alive, than in the pages that he devotes to considering 
the Italian character.95 Here the human, animal, organic and inorganic worlds are 
coalesced by Stendhal's language and imagery into one vast continuum. The Italian is at 
once plant, animal and mineral. 'La pianta uomo nasce piu robusta qui che altrove,' 
affirms the author of Rome, Naples et Florence: 'La plante homme nait plus vigoureuse 
en Italie que partout ailleurs.'96 The Italian character, we have noted, is 'le terrain dans 
lequel les passions germent le plus facilement.'97 Italy, we read in VHistoire de la 
peinture en Italie, is 'la terre ou les grands hommes sont encore le moins impossibles,' 
where the 'vegetation humaine' is at its richest.98 Thus it is that 'Canova a perce, par 
hasard, par la force de vegetation que l'ame de l'homme a sous ce beau climat.'99 
Thus, too, that the withering effects of transalpine civilisation upon the Italian's 
northern counterparts — 'faibles, blonds, etioles' — is gauged from the vantage point 
of Italy.100
Repeated botanical images such as the above are but one of the means whereby the 
Italian's proximity to nature is evoked. The Latin character is, Stendhal asserts, 
'comme les feux d'un volcan.'101 In the Promenades dans Rome, he writes: 'Le 
caractere du tigre peint assez bien la volupte romaine, si l'on veut y joindre des 
moments de folie absolue.'102 Italy is 'la nation des simiotigres\ the land of the 
'monkey-tiger'.103 The enforcement of the Austrian rule of law here is 'la legislation 
des anons et des oies appliquee a un peuple de singes malins et mechants.'104 At the 
fall of Napoleon's administration, Stendhal reflects in the Promenades dans Rome, the 
canaille of Rome could have wreaked havoc: 'Ce peuple, alleche par le sang comme le 
tigre, eut massacre probablement tous les riches marchands, et ensuite il se serait enivre 
et endormi au coin des rues.'105 As for the peasants of Piacenza in 1826,
ils sont encore l'animal mechant, fagonne par quatre cents ans du despotisme le 
plus lache; et le climat ayant donne du ressort a ces gens-ci, par le loisir, par les 
jouissances faciles, que la generosite de la nature verse a pleines mains, meme au 
plus pauvre, ces paysans ne sont pas simplement grossiers et mechants, comme les 
sujets de tel petit prince d'Allemagne, mais s'elevent jusqu'& la vengeance, a la 
ferocite et a la finesse.106
Climate from without, energy from within: such are the mainsprings of this Italian 
whom Stendhal depicts in vividly naturalistic terms. We have seen already how the
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energy of the Italian brigand Mai’no is likened to electricity, as a phenomenon 'existant 
dans la nature.'107 Likewise those Calabrian peasants who are imbued with Nature's 
force to such a degree that, 'Quand le temps mena$ait d'un orage, leur figure, comme 
agitee d'avance par le fluide electrique, avait un aspect bouleverse.'108 This attempt by 
Stendhal to find physical reference points, either in human physiology or in the wider 
world of natural phenomena, furnishes an important substratum to the portrait of the 
Italian's 'moral' character. It is on such grounds that we should wish to take issue with 
Michel Crouzet's assertion that the Italian represents for Stendhal 'une autre chair 
presque dematerialisee,' that 'le corps meridional puisqu'il est sentir avant tout, 
represente un allegement de la matiere, une promotion energetique, une desincamation 
spontanee.'109 Stendhal's Italian may indeed be the repository of a rarefied sensibility 
and artistic elan. But he is also — and very decidedly — corps, bas-ventre, poumons, 
nerfs, bile, fluide nerveux, fluide electrique...no
All of this goes beyond mere rhetorical contrivance. The overbearing presence of 
Nature, and the moral neutrality which Stendhal ascribes to it, are central to his 
philosophy of man as it is advanced through his reading of Cabanis and applied — 
however exaggeratedly — in his observations of Italian character and customs. In this 
sense, the discovery of Italy brings an important new dimension to Stendhal's 
'anthropology'. For the Italian becomes the new 'savage man', replacing the primitive 
as the means of shedding light on human nature.
Ne vaut-il pas mieux pour qui aime les curiosites morales, voyager en Italie qu'aux 
iles de la Cochinchine ou dans l'Etat de Cincinnati? L'homme sauvage ou peu 
raffine ne nous apprend sur le coeur humain que des verites generates qui, depuis 
longtemps, ne sont plus meconnues que par des sots ou des jesuites.111
In order to discover primitive man, one need go no further now than the Isle of Ischia, 
with its 'sauvages africains', or the Bay of Naples, where 'le paysan napolitain est un 
sauvage, heureux comme on l'etait a Otaiti avant l'arrivee des missionnaires 
methodistes.'112 Human nature, in its truest, least adulterated form is still pushed by 
Stendhal beyond the frontiers of the accessible. 'Pour avoir la nature,' as Michel 
Crouzet observes, ' ilfaut aller en Italie et a I’annee 7599.'113 What is important, 
however, is that the site where 'natural' man is to be run to ground has shifted from 
some ill-defined spatial and temporal au-dela to a very specific geographical and cultural 
location. If Stendhal cannot embrace the Latin of the Middle Ages, he can at least seek 
vestiges of the latter in what is real and observable in the nineteenth-century Italian.114 
'Le Midi,' as Michel Crouzet puts it, 'c'est l'homme premier et parfait, intact et 
createur: mais il a ete et demeure comme traces.'115
The inaccessibility of the Latin is temporal, then, not geographical. The Italian is
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not, like the other 'savage' peoples envisaged by Stendhal, awaiting a civilisation 
which threatens to descend upon and adulterate his nature: the Italian has been through 
a 'civilising' process of sorts and survived. Therein, for Stendhal, lies the uniqueness 
of this race. Caught in a curious limbo between what he has been and what he might 
become, the Italian is just cultivated enough to be identified with, just savage enough to 
escape the most deleterious effects of civilisation and retain something of human nature 
in the raw. He is at once closer and more resistant to civilisation than the primitive. 'Je 
crois fermement, d'apres deux cents anecdotes que je ne transcris pas, et pour cause,' 
declares Stendhal in Rome, Naples et Florence en 1817, 'qu'il y a moins a travailler 
pour faire un peuple civilise des sauvages du lac Erie que des habitants du Patrimoine 
de Saint-Pierre.'116
The indeterminate — and variable — place which the Italian occupies between civil 
society and savagery becomes a recurrent theme in Stendhal's writing. The Neapolitans 
are 'barbares', the Piacenzan is an 'animal mechant.'117 On the isle of Ischia, one finds 
'presque pas de trace de civilisation';118 Corsica and Piedmont are 'ces pays,a moitie 
sauvages';119 the Romagnols and Calabrians retain 'encore un peu de sauvagerie et de 
propension au sang.'120 In his diary of 2 March 1808, Stendhal notes: 'Je trouverais 
l'homme presque naturel en Calabre.'121 The presque was and would remain a 
significant qualification. 'La lecture des recits veridiques du capitaine Franklin que j'ai 
rencontre chez M. Cuvier,' Stendhal would write much later, in his preface to the 
Chroniques italiennes, 'peut m'amuser pendant un quart d'heure, mais bientot je pense 
a autre chose.' He explains:
Ces Riccaras sont trop differents des hommes qui ont ete mes amis ou mes rivaux. 
C'est pour une semblable raison que les heros d'Homere et de Racine, les Achille 
et les Agamemnon commencent a etre pour moi du genre baillatif. [...]
J'aime ce qui peint le coeur de l'homme, mais de l'homme que je connais, et non 
pas des Riccaras.122
Between Lombardy and Sicily, by contrast, are contained all of the lessons required by 
the student of human nature. While Milan and Florence lean towards the Parisian 
model, Rome and Naples are closer to Africa. 'Sans doute notre societe de Paris vaut 
mieux,' writes Stendhal ironically at the outset of the Promenades dans Rome,
mais nous voyageons pour voir des choses nouvelles, non pas des peuplades 
barbares comme le curieux intrepide qui penetre dans les montagnes du Tibet, ou 
qui va debarquer aux lies de la mer du Sud. Nous clierchons des nuances plus 
delicates; nous voulons voir des manieres d'agir plus rapprochees de notre 
civilisation perfectionnee.123
Closer to civilised society, perhaps; but not so close as to eclipse Nature. It is in 
the extent to which one adheres to what is natural that one affirms or falsifies one's
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humanity. Such is the conclusion which Stendhal draws from his observation of what 
Maurice Bardeche calls 'cette nouvelle espece humaine,' or, more properly, 'cette 
humanite d'avant la chute.'124 For in Italy Stendhal discovers a whole new 'state of 
nature', a whole new 'chain of being' within humanity itself: 'Comme les animaux des 
forets devant l'homme, les sujets ici ne forment qu'une societe fugitive devant les 
gouvemements.'125 Man, according to Cabanis, 'place par quelques circonstances de 
son organisation a la tete des animaux,'126 is no less subject than the lower forms of 
animal life to the constraints and impulsions of Nature. The general point is taken by 
Stendhal and given a much more precise geographical application. ’L'on ne contrarie 
pas impunement les lois de la nature,' we read in Rome, Naples et Florence, 'surtout en 
ce pays voisin de l'Afrique.'127
Nature Indulged and Nature Denied: Italy, De VAmour and the 
Seeds of Pessimism
With the foregoing in mind, we may appreciate more fully what makes Stendhal's 
Italian travelogues so fundamentally different from a work such as De VAmour. 
'L'homme n'est pas libre de ne pas faire ce qui lui fait plus de plaisir que toutes les 
autres actions possibles': such is the fundamental axiom of a 'Physiologie de VAmour' 
which rests on the premise that Nature — and by that must be understood also human 
nature — has laws which man subverts at his peril.128 Yet, from start to finish, De 
VAmour presents us with just such a subversion. What we have in this work is less a 
representation than a travesty of Nature. As in his considerations of Italy, Stendhal, to 
borrow the expression of Francine Marill Alberes, 'fait du naturel un absolu';129 but its 
value is everywhere evacuated, defined by its absence:
[...] la fermete d'une femme qui resiste a son amour est seulement la chose la plus 
admirable qui puisse exister sur la terre. Toutes les autres marques possibles de 
courage sont des bagatelles aupres d'une chose si fort contre nature et si penible.
La fidelite des femmes dans le mariage lorsqu'il n'y a pas d’amour, est 
probablement une chose contre nature.
II est contre sa nature, il est impossible que l'homme ne fasse pas toujours, et dans 
quelque instant que vous vouliez le prendre, ce qui dans le moment est possible et 
lui fait le plus de plaisir.
D'ou vient l'intolerance des stoi’ciens? De la meme source que celle des devots 
outres. Us ont de l'humeur parce qu'ils luttent contre la nature, qu'ils se privent et 
qu'ils souffrent.130
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The contrast with the Italy of the travelogues could not be more striking. In turning 
from De VAmour to Rome, Naples et Florence or the Promenades dans Rome, we 
move from a world in which Nature is repressed, denied, cut off at every source, to 
one in which it is given free rein and indulged to excess. As we read once more in De 
VAmour: Ton ne contredit jamais impunement la nature’; the remark, however, carries 
a very different charge in this context.131 In matters of the human heart, we are told, 'le 
naturel est de voler au plus grand plaisir.’132 Yet the definition of woman as it is 
framed in De VAmour is that of a creature 'en concurrence avec tous les penchants 
ordinaires de la nature humaine.'133 Nature has been banished to another place and 
another time. Thus the laws governing the rapports between the sexes in 
fourteenth-century Provence, 'prenant la nature humaine telle qu’elle est, devaient 
produire beaucoup de bonheur.’134 The sweeping logic of this assertion, with all its 
implicit criticism of contemporary institutions and conventions, provides one of the 
guiding principles of a work whose intention is everywhere to point up the contrast 
between natural impulse and unnatural self-denial. To recognise the rightful claim of the 
passions, argues Stendhal, is not to incite to licence; it is rather to follow the only route 
sanctioned by reason, and to take a step closer to framing laws and conventions which, 
’prenant les hommes tels qu'ils sont, peuvent leur procurer la plus grande masse de 
bonheur possible.' This concern to take men as they are as the first step in legislating 
for their conduct and welfare is voiced as early as 1803 in a letter to Edouard 
Mounier.135 The remark is made in relation to Montesquieu, whom Stendhal criticises 
for describing political regimes, rather than prescribing means whereby they might 
better legislate for the communities they serve. It is a criticism which would be levelled 
on more than one occasion by Stendhal against the author of De VEsprit des lois. Hence 
the rejoinder which, on a copy of the work, he scribbles alongside Montesquieu's title: 
'Ou esprit du droit conventionnel que les caprices des hommes ont etabli, et non des 
lois de la nature desquelles l'homme peut tirer le bonheur.'136
Read in such a light, De VAmour becomes as much an apologetic of Nature, a plea 
for what Peter Gay calls 'passionate naturalism', as Diderot's Supplement au Voyage 
de Bougainville some years before.137 The only release which Stendhal admits from 
the stifling tyranny of contemporary European mores is Italy, 'ou tout est naturel.'138 It 
is Italy alone, one might say, that provides the Tahiti to Stendhal's Bougainville. Here, 
he declares, in by now familiar tones, 'est le seul pays ou croisse en liberte la plante 
que je decris.'139 Ranged against Nature in De VAmour, by contrast, we find not the 
virtus of Ancient Rome or the virtu of Renaissance Italy, but a 'virtue' that is exposed 
as counterfeit in all but one of its guises. There is 'ce que le catechisme appelle la 
vertu', 'la vertu mercantile des religions', ia  vertu arrangee a l'usage des rois', 'ce 
qu'on appelle vertu', and, finally, ...'[la] vertu philosophique\ the latter alone being 
based upon a reasoned appreciation of man's natural penchants and, as such, offering
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no barrier to his potential happiness.140
What all of the above examples have in common is that Nature is in each case 
erected into an ill-defined but incontrovertible norm. Such repeated appeals to nature 
and the natural are given added point through the references to man's physiology and 
kinship with the animals. For love is no caprice of the will, no factitious invention of 
human society, but an animal reaction, a rush of blood and disorder in the nervous 
system, a type of physical derangement.141 Even that most elaborate of cerebral 
processes, 'crystallisation1, is, at source, a physiological imperative.142 It is clear that 
for Stendhal what is 'natural' in the affairs of the heart relates both to the laws of 
human physiology and to the broader context of Nature within which such laws 
operate. It is in the comparative anatomical study of man and animal — or, more 
precisely, of man as animal — that the most significant revelations about human nature 
should now, argues the author of De VAmour, be sought.143 Though there was 
nothing new in the suggestion that animals might have some light to shed on man, the 
point is worth stressing. For it demonstrates something of the distance which 
Stendhal's thinking had come since the days when he had suggested that, through the 
observation of behaviour alone, the philosopher might establish correlations between 
the animal and human realms.144 Now, in 1822, the emphasis is quite different. 'Tous 
les amours, toutes les imaginations,' affirms Stendhal, 'prennent dans les individus la 
couleur des six temperaments.' One must begin the study of the passions with 
physiology — and, in physiology, as Stendhal contends, 'l'homme ne sait presque rien 
sur lui-meme que par l'anatomie comparee.'145
By this logic, then, the study of that most delicate of human sentiments becomes 
an excursion, scalpel in hand, through the animal body. We are dealing here, clearly, 
not with Love as some airy manifestation of Mind or Heart, but with a love that may be 
laid bare upon a table and dissected. Love, like energy, is no abstraction: as Maurice 
Bardeche puts it, 'il depend des muscles, du climat, de la couleur de la peau, de la 
densite de la bile, de la rapidite du pouls et aussi de la forme du gouvemement.'146 The 
point is clearly made by Stendhal in the article, which he himself penned for De 
VAmour:
On fait depuis deux mille ans des madrigaux sur l'amour, c'est pour la premiere
fois qu'on s'est avise de l'examiner et de le decrire, comme Cabanis eut decrit et
examine laiievre ou toute autre maladie.147
What is significant here is not the degree to which the extravagant comparison with 
Cabanis holds up: it is the fact that Stendhal should conceive of his subject so expressly 
in these terms — with some measure of irony, perhaps, but with a goodly measure of 
sincerity too, one suspects. He is at least, as Michael Wood puts it, 'half-serious' in
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this journey, 'stethoscope and taxonomy in hand,' through the regions of the human 
heart.148 Physiologies were, of course, to prove something of a fashion between the 
1820s and 1840s;149 but Stendhal insists, and that already in 1822, not on a 
metaphorical but on a quite literal interpretation of the term. To understand the passion 
known as 'love', he argues in his preface, 'il faut en parler comme d'une maladie.'150 
This analogy between love and illness, though it has about it a contrived rhetorical ring, 
is sustained both within and beyond De VAmour. 'L'amour est comme la fievre,' 
insists the author, 'il nait et s'eteint sans que la volonte y ait la moindre part.'151 The 
notion that passion can override any supposed faculty of 'will' has its roots, as we 
know, deep in Stendhal's thought. As early as June 1804, he had, we recall, defined 
passion as 'une maladie involontaire de l'ame, comme la fievre est une maladie du 
corps.'152 The distinction between this assertion and the rationale underlying De 
VAmour, though it may appear a fine one, is fundamental. For the clear division of man 
into 'ame' and 'corps' has, by 1822, been replaced by the view of man as an integral 
w hole  susceptible of investigation through the sing le  method of the 
medecins-ideologues. Philosopher and doctor are no longer analogous; they have 
become one and the same for Stendhal in their recourse to what Henri Delacroix defines 
as the 'Ideological' method at work in De VAmour: "'description exacte et scientifique", 
classification, groupement de symptomes, evolution psychologique, etude des phases 
successives, appel aux faits biologiques et sociaux, consequences pratiques...'153
While Stendhal never applies this method in any but the most superficial and erratic 
fashion, 'Ideology' being all too often ousted by intuition, he seems to keep faith, in 
principle at least, with the declared intentions of the work. Though most of the private 
writings which refer to De VAmour date from the early 1820s and relate to the 
technicalities of composition and publication, two letters in particular shed light upon 
Stendhal's perception of the finished product. On 24 December 1824, he returns with 
comments to his friend, the natural scientist, Victor Jacquemont, a short essay by the 
latter on love. The note which accompanies this is revealing. 'Si j'avais cinquante 
chapitres comme celui-ci,' declares Stendhal, 'le merite de VAmour serait reel. Ce serait 
une vraie monographic.'154 Though elsewhere he refers to his work dismissively as 
'un bavardage’, ironically as ’ma docte dissertation’,155 he betrays the suggestion here 
that he might not have been averse to seeing his 'monograph' valued as a serious — 
'scientific' — dissertation. This appears to be confirmed by a letter to Sutton Sharpe 
dated 22 October 1833, in which Stendhal expresses his wish to have De VAmour 
reviewed by the Edinburgh Review or the Quarterly. 'Le difficile,' he declares, 'est de 
trouver un reviewer qui comprenne le livre.' To this he adds the brief but indicative 
assertion: 'Ce livre est une monographic de la maladie nommee Amour. C'est un traite 
de medecine morale.'156
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Whatever the objective merits or demerits of De VAmour, such remarks must be 
borne in mind when judging the significance of the work for Stendhal himself. No 
more, it is clear, did he believe that passion might be understood by being consigned to 
some special realm of human experience. Instead, he now held, the passions could be 
appreciated only as part of a complex interplay between the forces of nature and the 
structures of society. As early as December 1805, Stendhal had had recourse to the 
conception of love that is to be found in Cabanis.157 Now, almost two decades on, the 
lessons of the physiologist on this question are more clearly articulated than ever:
Par exemple, on pourrait dire:
J'ai trouve a Dresde, chez le comte Wolfstein, l'amour de vanite, le temperament 
melancolique, les habitudes monarchiques, l'age de trente ans, et... les 
particularites individuelles.158
Such is the complex mosaic — the 'modele de grille deterministe'159 — that it is the 
philosopher-scientist’s to piece together. Temperament, geographical location, national 
character, age, political regime, and personal circumstances (such as sex, state of 
health, occupation, daily routine, diet...): all essential elements in the web of 
determinist influences at work upon man. And yet, having established as a generally 
applicable principle this elaborate set of variables, Stendhal makes a passing remark 
whose full import it is easy to overlook. 'L'homme passionne,' he asserts, 'est comme 
lui et non comme un autre, source de tous les ridicules en France; et de plus il offense 
les autres, ce qui donne des ailes au ridicule.'160 Was it not the logical implication of 
this statement that the attempt to frame general principles was condemned from the 
outset to fall short of apprehending the nature and range of any given individual's 
experience? Was the only general principle not, in the final analysis, that there was no 
general principle? Stendhal does seem at least to be posing the question when, in the 
very first chapter of his work, he ventures the suggestion that there might be 'autant de 
fagons de sentir parmi les hommes que de fagons de voir.'161 With this brief remark, 
Stendhal raises a question to which he fails to provide any clear answer, but to which 
he will return, significantly, in the final paragraphs of his concluding chapter, when he 
considers the contrasting extremes of Werther and Don Juan:
II y a tel caractere fait pour ne trouver le plaisir que dans la variete. Mais un homme 
qui porte aux nues le vin de Champagne aux depens du Bordeaux, ne fait que dire 
. avec plus ou moins d'eloquence: J'aime mieux le Champagne.
He then goes on to make a much more telling point:
Chacun de ces vins a ses partisans et tous ont raison, s'ils se connaissent bien 
eux-memes, et s'ils courent apres le genre de bonheur qui est le mieux adapte a 
leurs organes et a leurs habitudes. [...]
Mais enfin chaque homme, s'il veut se donner la peine de s'etudier soi-meme, a 
son beau ideal, et il me semble qu'il y a toujours un peu de ridicule a vouloir
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convertir son voisin.162
Such is the note on which Book II of De VAmour ends. As the conclusion to an 
analysis of love that ranges over a variety of nations and epochs, these remarks are cast 
in some relief. Stendhal's studied refusal to pass any definitive judgment, his recourse 
to physiology as a means of accounting for the different perceptions of happiness that 
exist from one individual to another, appear to sanction an out-and-out relativism that 
requires to be reconciled with a number of the more generalising observations contained 
within the work. Yet the thought with which he concludes his treatise merely gives 
renewed and more pointed expression to a question which, as we saw in a previous 
chapter, had troubled Stendhal as early as 1805 and which had emerged again more 
insistently in 1810: the difficulty, the impossibility, of bringing any common standard 
to bear upon 'human nature' as it is manifest from one individual to the next.163
It is this question, implicit in much of what has been discussed in the foregoing 
pages, which we propose to examine in the final chapters of this study. For it 
constitutes the basis of what we consider to be an evolving pessimism in Stendhal's 
conception of man, a pessimism which Cabanis does much to foster and which* 
contrasts markedly with the more sanguine philosophy of Stendhal's earlier years. 
Helvetius and Cabanis are, arguably, the two greatest philosophical influences which 
Stendhal underwent. Both expounded philosophies which, though profoundly 
dispiriting in a number of their essential tenets, were to have provided the point of 
departure for a positive regeneration of mankind. Hence the irrepressible optimism 
which informs their writings. To recognise that men were invariably motivated to seek 
their own good, even at the expense of others, was to move a stage closer, Helvetius 
held, to forging the conditions within which the same men could be brought to pursue a 
common good which they would identify as their own.164 To conclude that human 
beings were determined not only by environment but by their very organs was, Cabanis 
in turn argued, to awaken the philosopher to the varied exigencies of human nature, and 
to prepare the conditions for a new ethic that would take account not only of man's 
conscious desires, but of his innate, instinctive, unconscious impulses too.165 For both 
Helvetius (who stressed the uniformity of human nature) and Cabanis (who stressed, 
perforce, its diversity), knowledge of man, the facing up to unpalatable truths, was a 
pre-requisite for the social and moral betterment of mankind. Knowledge of how man 
is must precede any programme for how he ought to be.
To this extent, Francine Marill Alberes is quite justified in arguing that Stendhal 
could look to such thinkers for 'une vision optimiste de l'homme, [...] un ideal humain 
qui soit applicable dans la societe et dans la vie.'166 What the critic does not recognise,
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however, is the severely limited and ephemeral nature of the 'ideal humain' for which 
Stendhal draws upon these thinkers. Where the theories of both Helvetius and Cabanis 
came together was in viewing man as the determined product of the forces at work 
upon him, 'le produit d'un schema naturel et d'un travail social.'167 Though Cabanis 
stressed the former and Helvetius the latter, these were the two essential domains, the 
natural and the social, within which the far-reaching reforms envisaged by the 
philosophes and Ideologues alike were to have been brought to bear168— domains 
which Stendhal, as we have seen, integrates into his own reasoning in the simplified 
formulae of ressort and sens. Though the philosophy is double-edged, as open to an 
optimistic as to a pessimistic interpretation, Helvetius and Cabanis alike were convinced 
that ways could be found of so directing human nature that it might become the means, 
not the obstacle, to the happiness of humankind. 'Bien qu'isole dans son egoisme 
irreductible,' writes Michel Crouzet,
l'homme d'Helvetius est sourdement finalise: il n'existe que comme fonction 
sociale. [...] La loi sociale fonde seule "la morale"; l'homme est qualifiable, il 
echappe a l’arbitraire anarchique de ses desirs pour entrer dans la vision du 
philosophe par son rapport a autrui, par le rapport entre son interet et celui 
d'autrui.169
This notion of an inseverable link between the one and the many forms the very core of 
Helvetius's social philosophy. Man's hopes for future progress must begin, he urged, 
with the recognition that 'l'interet de chaque citoyen est toujours, par quelque lien, 
attache a l'interet public.'170 Nor, as Crouzet rightly points out, is the philosophy of 
Cabanis any less edifying in its broadest perspective. Men may be powerless to 
overcome their natural instincts and impulses; but this need not be construed as a 
licence to undermine the common weal by making unfettered individualism the rule of 
law. On the contrary, it must be argued that
de la physiologie aux donnees legales telles que l'egalite et la liberte, il y a un 
enchainement si rigoureux qu'a la limite la morale n'est plus "que l'art de la sante", 
que les dereglements moraux et sociaux, crime et folie, sont de l'ordre de la 
maladie.171
No more from Cabanis than from Helvetius, however, do the above ideas pass 
intact to Stendhal. For what he proceeds to do, in the case of each of these philosophers 
in turn, is to truncate the arguments in question, to cut the bleak initial premises (what 
E.C. Ladd calls the "is") off from their more heartening conclusions (in Ladd's terms, 
the "ought"),172 and to conflate these premises — each individual is slave to his own 
self-interest, and each must seek his pleasure in accordance with the dictates of his 
particular organism — within a view of man which leaves considerably less room for 
optimism than either Helvetius or Cabanis, with their utilitarian ethic and their faith in 
the possibility of effective social reform, would have sanctioned.
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J'ai enfin lu un ouvrage qui me semble bien singulier, sublime en quelques parties, 
meprisable en d'autres, et bien decourageant en toutes: UEsprit d'Helvetius. Ce 
livre m'avait tellement entraine dans ses premieres parties, qu'il m'a fait douter 
quelques jours de l'amitie et de l'amour.173
Thus Stendhal to Edouard Mounier on 15 December 1803. The impression was a 
powerful one.. It was also to be lasting. The refinements and correctives which 
Stendhal's interpretation of Helvetius was to undergo over the years would never 
diminish the store which he set by the view of man inherited from this philosopher of 
egoism, a view of man in which the 'meprisable' would all too readily eclipse the 
'sublime'. For Helvetius is at once, as Michel Crouzet recognises,
le philosophe qui a tout eclairci, et rendu aise le progres de l'humanite vers le 
bonheur sous un bon gouvernement, et le philosophe qui en a trop montre, qui a 
transgresse les limites permises du savoir, et dont la terrible revelation engendre un 
pessimisme mortel.174
Such is the problem inherent in Helvetius’s vision, the 'double' nature of the 
philosophy to which he invites. 'Helvetius's notorious faith in the omnipotence of 
education,' writes Peter Gay, 'is a reflection not of optimism about human nature, but 
of stark pessimism about his starting point.'175 The remark is astute and sums up well 
the attitude of a Stendhal whose faith in Helvetius's utopian society proved less durable 
than his belief in the latter's depiction of men as so many self-seeking individuals. Nor 
would the physiology of Cabanis rescue Stendhal from the path down which he had 
embarked with the psychology of Helvetius. To the insidious pessimism that was to be 
a legacy of the latter, Cabanis would bring a philosophy — a 'triste raison'176 — 
which would swing the balance still further away from the optimistic confidence in man 
which Stendhal had exhibited in his youth. The process was to prove as disheartening 
as it was irreversible, consigning Stendhal to a moral outlook sharply at variance with 
his earliest philosophical predispositions and principles.
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CHAPTER IX
FROM THE ONE TO THE MANY: THE DISAGGREGATION OF
HUMANITY
Collective Ideals; Hum anitas and Virtus
L'egoi’ste ignore a jamais le vrai bonheur de la vie 
sociale: celui d'aimer les hommes et de les servir.
Homo sum, nil humani a me alienum puto.
Thus Stendhal in a letter of 9 March 1806 to his sister Pauline.1 Though the quotation 
from Terence is approximate, there is no mistaking the sentiment to which it gives 
expression.2 The remark denotes one of the most important informing principles in 
Stendhal's early conception of man and society. His notebooks, diaries and letters from 
this period are replete with evocations of a common humanity to which the destiny of 
the individual is inseverably bound. Fulfilment as a human being presupposed 
involvement in a society where unbridled egoism had no place. Each individual, 
Stendhal urges his sister, is equipped with a fund of 'sensibilite'* which should be 
turned outwards, not inwards: 'La societe tend a concentrer cette sensibilite en 
nous-memes, a nous rendre egoiste. Quand cette passion ne serait pas contre la vertu, 
elle est contraire au bonheur.'3
As a philosophical ideal, the notion of Humanity had nothing about it that was 
new. The eighteenth century had all but deified Man as a collective entity.4 Much of the 
philosophy to which Stendhal was exposed in his early years of study in Paris (and in 
the Ecole Centrale of Grenoble before that) served to reaffirm the notion that man's 
well-being could be secured only through his relations with the wider community of 
men.5 The ideas of Happiness, Virtue and Philosophy alike, as Paul Vemiere ably 
demonstrates, drew their meaning from the same source. By the later eighteenth 
century, writes Verniere, Thumanite est une "idee-force" qui n'est plus contestee.'6
Of the success with which this 'idee-force' consolidated its hold on the French 
philosophical conscience in the years immediately following the Revolution, Stendhal's 
early writings provide eloquent testimony.7 Much has been written about Stendhal's 
concept of individualism; much less about the civic ideals which early provided the 
driving force behind his moral and political convictions, and which would continue 
throughout his life to exercise his mind and pen. 'On nomme vertu l'habitude des 
actions utiles a tous les hommes,' he asserts in a letter of 1803; 'Vice, l'habitude des 
actions nuisibles a tous les hommes.'8 The remark, though crude in its formulation,
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provides the succinct statement of a utilitarian philosophy which held virtue and vice to 
be indissociable from positive action (self-mortification nowhere entered into the 
balance) and to take as their overriding criterion the service rendered to mankind. Thus, 
in a subsequent letter of May 1804, we find Stendhal enjoining his sister: 'ne prononce 
jamais le mot de vertu sans te dire tout ce qui est utile au plus grand nombre.'9 Such 
counsel was but a distilled version of ideas that are developed in Stendhal’s notebooks 
and in the draft projects through which were kept alive his early theatrical ambitions. 
'La vertu est ce qui est utile au public,' he writes in July 1804. 'Plus une chose lui est 
utile, plus elle est vertueuse.'J0 What was to be understood by the 'utility' in question? 
Stendhal provides an unequivocal answer: 'il giovare ai piu, produire la plus grande 
masse de bonheur possible.'11 To this end, the whole collective enterprise of man in 
society must tend. 'Le but de la legislation est de produire la plus grande masse de 
bonheur possible,’ declares Stendhal in a notebook entry of September 1803.12 The 
idea is reaffirmed among some early notes for the theatre, in which we find 'le but de la 
societe’ defined quite simply as 'le plus grand bonheur possible actuel.'13
These clear, sweeping appeals to the notion of a 'common good' provided a 
touchstone for the aspirations of the poete-philosophe. Montesquieu, we recall, should 
have deployed his talents to describe not the deficiencies of specific regimes, but, more 
usefully, the laws whereby such deficiencies might have been corrected.14 In keeping 
with this stricture, Stendhal's was from the first to have been a morally (and politically) 
edifying literary enterprise. 'Dans cette carriere,' he reflects in August 1803, 'les sujets 
a traiter sont tous des verites morales a developper, verites dont la connaissance est utile 
a tous.'15 The stage was a didactic instrument through which virtue might be fostered, 
vice extirpated, mores corrected. 'Toute comedie est un plaidoyer du poete contre 
quelque chose qui choque l'interet de tous,' writes Stendhal amid his notes of 26 
August 1804, invoking a conception of the playwright which is reaffirmed on a number 
of occasions.16 'Je rends service a la philosophie (recherche de la verite et pratique de 
la vertu),' he declares,17 relishing prematurely the fruits of an undertaking that is 
conceived with little short of messianic zeal. 'Le comique doit se regarder comme 
l’Hercule destine a nettoyer les etables d'Augias,' we read in a notebook entry of 20 
August 1804. 'Voir les vices qui nuisent le plus a la societe, qui s'eloignent le plus du 
modele ideal qu'on s'est fait, et les combattre.'18
Examples such as the foregoing in Stendhal's early writings are many. Many, too, 
are the occasions on which we are reminded that there is at work here no spirit of 
altruism, but rather a principle of enlightened egoism — of 'self-interest beguiled'19— 
according to which the happiness of the individual and the interests of the community 
.may be held to issue from the same source and to tend towards the same end. In her 
study of the background to Stendhal's novels, Margaret Tillett writes of the 'passage
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from the altruistic "vertu" of the anecdotes in the earlier works to the instinctive egoism 
of the main characters in the novels.'20 Though correct in acknowledging the distance 
which separates Stendhal's earlier and later conception of moral character, the remark is 
misleading. For all the semantic difficulties into which Stendhal’s reasoning on this 
question takes him, for all his residual attachment to a virtue innocent of crude 
self-interest, he never wavered in his contention that Altruism was, at bottom, an 
unmitigated fallacy. 'Tu dois t'appliquer a chercher quelles sont les choses qui peuvent 
faire ton bonheur,' he writes to his sister Pauline as early as January 1803; 'tu verras 
enfin que c'est la vertu et l'instruction.'21 Virtue thus conceived might be defined as *le 
desir de rendre les hommes aussi heureux qu'il vous est possible',22 but it implied no 
abnegation of the self. Quite the contrary. The virtuous man, Stendhal is at pains to 
stress, 'agit toujours comme le reste des hommes pour son plus grand bonheur, mais 
son plus grand bonheur est a procurer le plus grand possible aux autres.'23
This conception of 'virtue1, which is prevalent throughout Stendhal's early notes 
and letters, is part of a wider perception of society as a contract between self-interested 
individuals. 'L'usage, ou les moeurs, est un contrat social (c'est-a-dire fait avec ceux 
avec qui on entre en societe) par lequel on est convenu de se sacrifier a tel degre au 
bonheur des autres.'24 Nothing, it seemed to Stendhal, was more rationally defensible 
than this notion of a morality predicated upon the collective self-interest of human 
communities. 'Morale,' he writes, fresh from his reading of Helvetius in 1803, 'est la 
science des moyens inventes par les hommes pour vivre entre eux de la maniere la plus 
heureuse possible.'25 The problem occurred not in defining the principle, but rather in 
securing the means whereby theory might be translated into practice. For all of the 
foregoing statements, in tune as they are with the eminently political nature of 
Stendhal's early philosophical allegiance,26 depended for their validity upon a particular 
conception of man as a malleable being. In Some Thoughts Concerning Education, 
John Locke had written of the child's mind as 'white Paper, or Wax, to be moulded 
and fashioned as one pleases.'27 Dispensing with Locke's own tentative reservations, 
the eighteenth-century tradition of Condillac and Helvetius had made great play of this 
notion,28 which is passed to Stendhal via the author of De VEsprit most notably. The 
assumption was that human nature derived essentially from the world without, not from 
the man within. In order to acquire a great mind, wrote Stendhal to Pauline in January 
1803, she had only to observe and to compare in detail 'l'impression differente que font 
sur toi des objets quelconques.'29 As with the head, so with the heart. 'Les passions 
sont l'effet des objets exterieurs sur nous,' writes Stendhal in one of his earliest extant 
notes.30 The idea is amplified in a diary entry of 18 August 1804:
Chose a bien remarquer, l’ame n'a que des etats et jamais des qualites en magasin.
Ou est la joie d'un homme qui pleure? Nulle part. Ce fut un etat.31
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What it is important to stress here is the essential vacancy of human nature thus 
conceived. Character comes from without; man becomes wax in the hands of the 
educator-legislator. 'L'egoisme vient du gouvernement monarchique,' Stendhal 
confidently asserts in a letter of 20 June 1804.32 'La monarchic,' he notes likewise in 
his journal of August 1804, '[...] fait des ego’istes....'33 So anxious is Stendhal in 
these instances to identify an external culprit for what he deems a less than gratifying 
aspect of man that he goes far beyond what could be ratified by his philosophical 
mentors. While these remarks may appear on the surface to be in tune with Helvetius, 
Stendhal's language leads him once more here into a flagrant breach of the 
philosopher's egoistic principle. For 'egoism' in its most basic sense (the pursuit of 
one's own pleasure and avoidance of one's own pain) is the one — the only — factor 
in human nature that does not come from without; it may be directed from without, but 
comes, in every case, from the deepest recesses of the individual. The ego, as Michel 
Crouzet puts it, is the 'minimum vital' which Helvetius allows as the innate endowment 
of man.34
What is important here, however, is not the literal betrayal of Helvetius, but rather 
the will with which Stendhal looks beyond men in seeking the factors that account for 
their behaviour. The idea which is crudely expressed in both of the instances cited 
above is developed in more reflective terms in a commentary on Montesquieu's De 
VEsprit des lois. The latter, as Stendhal argues, should not have declared virtue, 
honour and fear to be the directing principles of the republican, monarchical and 
despotic forms of government respectively:
II devait dire: amour de soi; principe general, bien dirige dans les republiques ou il 
se confond avec l'amour de la chose publique, mal dans les monarchies ou la 
passion regnante est la crainte 35
Stendhal is much closer here to the letter of Helvetius. Writing to Pauline on 20 June 
1804, he pursues this idea: 'Sous la monarchic, les hommes ne s'interessent plus les 
uns aux autres comme dans les republiques; ils n'ont plus d'interets communs et en ont 
de contraires.'36 Here lay the challenge to the legislator, whose task it was to ensure the 
coincidence of interests between the individual and society. Stendhal dilates upon this 
idea in a note of 9 July 1804, where he considers the 'philanthropic eclairee' by which 
men may be brought to recognise their personal interest in the furtherance of the 
common good. 'Le grand art,' he concludes, 'est done de faire que les hommes se 
forment de belles idees qui les portent a sacrifier tout au bonheur du genre humain.'37
Education — the term has a near-totemic value for the young Stendhal — provided 
the key.38 We recall how he early fashioned his notion of heart and head as the
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governing agencies in man, and how he adopted the view that the mind must act as a 
guide to the passions:
D'apres cela, on voit que le meilleur coeur, quand il n'est pas joint a une bonne tete 
(pleine de beaucoup de verites completes sur les objets les plus importants a 
l'humanite [...]) ne peut faire que peu de bien.39
Truth, held the young Stendhal, in keeping with the Enlightenment spirit, was the route 
to happiness and virtue alike.40 'Je crois, et je te le demontrerai par la suite,' he writes 
to Pauline in May 1804, 'que tout malheur ne vient que d'erreur, et que tout bonheur 
nous est procure par la verite: faisons done tous nos efforts pour connaitre cette 
verite.'41 Nor was unhappiness all that was to be traced back to falsehood: evil itself 
sprang, Stendhal argued, from the same root. 'Tous les hommes agissent suivant ce qui 
leur parait etre et non suivant ce qui est,' he declares in a letter of 12 July 1804. 'Cette 
verite est consolante; elle nous montre que souvent ils veulent faire le bien, quoique, en 
effet, ils ne produisent que du mal.'42 His early dramatic endeavours were to have 
furnished ample demonstration of this principle. Thus, of his projected play Les Deux 
Hommes, we read:
Je montre que l'education philosophique a produit un homme vraiment honnete, 
tandis qu'au contraire l'education devote a produit un homme faible inclinant a la 
sceleratesse 43
Through the starkness of the deterministic language employed here, attention is 
drawn once more to the plasticity of the human nature in question. Men have the 
capacity to be heroes or villains, geniuses or dullards, depending solely upon the 
instruction which they receive. In upholding this principle, Stendhal keeps faith with 
the rationale of Locke, Condillac and Helvetius, a rationale which J.A. Passmore 
expresses thus: 'If men have a fixed, determinate nature, education is so far limited; if 
they have no nature, then its possibilities are boundless.'44 Stendhal's faith in the 
educability and perfectibility of humanity everywhere informs his early thoughts on the 
subject. The question was one which, for the purposes of the stage, he reduced to a 
simple conflict between two systems of education, two types of political regime. 'Dans 
les 2 men, je fais lutter le caractere republicain avec le caractere monarchique,' he writes 
in August 1804. His play will portray, as he puts it: 'Le caractere de tous les 
republicans qui ont existe, oppose a celui de tous les monarchistes.'45 Education and 
virtue go hand in hand with utility and happiness 46 Of the hero and villain respectively 
in Les Deux Hommes, Stendhal writes:
II faut que Charles [...] montre le caractere le plus propre possible a faire le 
bonheur des autres.
Et que Ch[amouc]y [...] montre le caractere le plus propre a faire le malheur des 
autres. [...]
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II faut qu'ils montrent leur caractere comme une suite de leur education.47
Nothing could be simpler than the conception of man upon which such 
characterisation was based. What is noteworthy is not only the malleability of the 
human nature that is evoked here, but the generic designations to which this gives rise. 
The republican character, the monarchist, the virtuous man: such are the terms in which 
Stendhal conceives of a Humanity that is considered en bloc. For it is clear that he 
subscribes at this stage to the Humean view that, everywhere and at all times, 'human 
nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations' — or, as L.G. Crocker 
puts it, that 'men, having an identical organism and, particularly, an identical reason, 
generate a common store of ideas and judgments through an essentially common 
experience.'48 Proper instruction will lead men in general to virtue and to happiness; a 
corrupt education will be no less far-reaching in its effects. In arguing thus, Stendhal 
holds closely to the rationale of Condillac and Helvetius, whose contention it was that 
sense-impressions, if properly interpreted, provided the first 'valid ingredients of 
knowledge, available to any man at any time.'49 Stendhal's early writings abound with 
reminders that his point of reference is an all-embracive one: 'tous les hommes'... 
'l'humanite'... 'l'interet de tous'... 'ce qui est utile au public'... 'tout ce qui est utile au 
.plus grand nombre'... 'la plus grande masse de bonheur possible'... 'l'amour de la 
chose publique'... 'la plus grande quantite d'utilite'... '[le] bonheur du genre 
humain'... 'le perfectionnement de l'espece humaine...'50
Here was the language of a post-Enlightenment, post-Revolutionary 
humanitarianism which perceived man, the measure of all, as a generic entity 
susceptible of universal and indefinite improvement. The extravagance of Stendhal's 
vision should be set in its context. For the discourse of the Revolution, as Pierre 
Trahard reminds us, drew heavily upon the same generic notion of Man:
partout les mots d'humanite, de justice, de fraternite retentissent; on parle 
d'"embrasser tout le genre humain dans ses affections", d'etre "un Alexandre en 
philanthropic", d'affranchir a la fois "tous les peuples et toutes les castes". Le 
programme est immense et vague, souvent plus pres de la chimere que de la 
realite.51
As the expression of a philosophical ethic predicated on utility, such sentiments 
mobilised in their service the same remote classical models which had been embodied in 
the civic ideal of the philosophes and which found renewed expression now in the 
discourse and art of the Revolution.52 For Stendhal in turn, the heroes and institutions 
of republican Antiquity, the Rome of Plutarch, Livy and Sallust, provided a 
store-house of moral lessons.53 'Sous la monarchic done, les hommes ne s'interessent 
plus les uns aux autres,' he declares in a letter of 20 June 1804, concluding: 'A Rome, 
on etait considerable par ses vertus et par ses talents; ici, on l'est par la maniere dont on
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est dans le monde.'54
Time and again Stendhal returns to this source as a means of sustaining his early 
conception of man and society. Curtius, Scaevola, L. Junius Brutus, Regulus, 
Gracchus, Horatius Codes: all feature in his notes and letters as paragons of civic 
virtue who attained the highest honour and the highest gratification through merging 
their self-interest with the greater interests of the community.55 Nor is the ethic which 
they embody — and this is the important point — seen by Stendhal to be beyond 
attainment. His recourse to the heroes of Antiquity is as much, at this stage, an 
aspiration as an exercise in nostalgia. A plan to write an 'Histoire Romaine en quatre 
vol[umes]' is conceived, in 1804, with a clear objective: 'le but de ce travail est de faire 
cherir le plus possible la vertu a ceux qui le liront. De les rendre le plus heureux qu'il 
dependra de moi.'56 Emulation, even betterment, was the order of the day. 'Regulus, 
avec le caractere d'Henri IV, serait la perfection jusqu'ici connue de l'homme, 
l'hom[me] donnant le plus de plaisir a ses concitoyens.'57 In a letter to Pauline Beyle 
dated 1 January 1805, Stendhal writes of Hannibal and Caesar as 'des hommes 
superieurs' who deployed a rigorous logic in their respective enterprises. With the 
principles of 'Ideology', he goes on, 'nous pouvons raisonner aussi juste que ces 
grands hommes et il ne nous manque plus que leur experience et leurs passions pour les 
egaler.'58
A tall order, certainly; but one which demonstrates well Stendhal's faith in a 
human potential that he believed to have remained undiminished over time. This 
common fund of potentiality required only to be tapped by means of judicious 
legislation and instruction. Universality was everywhere the prevalent notion. In 
August 1804, Stendhal transcribes into his notebook a remark from the Melanges 
extraits des manuscrits de Mme Necker: 'Les hommes n'auront jamais une conduite 
parfaitement bonne ou parfaitement mauvaise que quand ils seront diriges par un seul 
principe.'59 The statement captures something of the etat d1esprit in which Stendhal 
committed to paper his earliest reflections on man.60 With an optimism which was not 
to endure, he ruminated long on the principles that would bring to fruition the 
possibilities latent in human nature. Among his plans for an epic based on the battle of 
Pharsalus, we find a projected chapter entitled: 'Considerations sur l'etat moral futur du 
genre humain.'61 Later, having transferred his ambitions to the Filosofia.Nova, 
Stendhal will be no less preoccupied by this question: 'Je pense beaucoup de bien de 
notre siecle par suite du systeme de perfectibilite.'62
The apparent contradiction between a cult of Antiquity on the one hand, and a 
doctrine of human perfectibility on the other, was not, of course, peculiar to Stendhal. 
The same conflicting tendencies had, as R.A. Leigh observes, marked the thought of an
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eighteenth-century humanism which contrived to discover common principles between 
the classical world of Greece and Rome and the civic ideals of Revolutionary France.63 
The eighteenth century was nothing if not selective in the models of civic morality for 
which it was beholden to the Ancients. We come back always within this context, 
however, to the same crucial idea of a communion between the one and the many, to 
that 'identity of interests between governors and governed on which the stability of the 
state depends.'64 It was an idea to which, as we have seen, the young Stendhal proved 
responsive. Thus, of his friend Joseph Rey, he writes in his diary of 15 April 1804:
Rey, philosophe, se propose de publier un systeme ou il prouvera que le bonheur 
particulier est toujours lie au bonheur general. C'est ce que je lui souhaite.65
Stendhal was not, however, to be privy to any such easy verification of the 
principle underlying the utilitarianism of Helvetius, Tracy and Cabanis in turn. Instead, 
this principle was to pose much more of a problem for him than our discussion thus far 
has indicated. For, running parallel to his faith in the possibility of a communion of 
interests between men, was a deep scepticism about the extent to which human nature 
itself would admit of such. The dilemma was not new. The eighteenth century had, as 
Paul Vemiere argues, deployed ample casuistry in making of humanity the highest 
virtue:
Une telle vertu, fondee a la fois sur la nature de l'homme, l'instinct de sympathie, 
l'utilite sociale, reconciliait avec plus d'adresse que de vraisemblance l'amour de 
soi et l'amour d'autrui.66
For Stendhal in turn the difficulty was inescapable. If the axiom Salus populi suprema 
lex esto was a designation how men ought to.be, Virgil's Trahit sua quemque voluptas 
provided a statement of how they were.61 One could not conceive for long of 
'Humanity' without reducing this to the terms of individual men. Thus, in a notebook 
entry of July 1804, we find Stendhal clearly asserting that 'chaque homme est le seul 
juge competent de son bonheur.'68 We have observed already how, in his reading of 
Hobbes, he draws the moral implications — 'il y a autant de bontes ou de mauvaisetes 
qu'il y a d'hommes' — from such a relativistic view of man.69 Once more in his 
writings of July 1804, we find him giving expression to this idea in its ethical 
extension. 'Tout hom[me] a une idee dela vertu ou du vice. Ces idees sont souvent 
differentes.'70
The counter-argument to this was, in principle, a simple one: provide men with a 
common goal to which they may relate their self-interest, a common perception of right 
and wrong on which they may model their behaviour, and all will be for the best in the 
best of possible worlds. The gulf between theory and observed reality, however, 
remained enormous. 'Exactement parlant,' writes Stendhal in a letter of August 1804,
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'chaque ville a ses moeurs; dans chaque ville, chaque societe a les siennes, et enfin 
chaque hom[me] a les siennes.'71 How does one legislate for a 'common man' under 
such conditions? The problem is one which clearly troubles Stendhal. Having held that 
the results of one's actions alone should be deemed virtuous or vicious, he revises this 
judgment to take account of the sacrifices made by any individual in the pursuit of what 
he deems virtuous. 'II faut connaitre la quantite de bonheur ou de malheur qu'un 
homme attend de chaque chose pour connaitre la grandeur de son sacrifice au desir 
d'etre utile, et par consequent le degre de sa vertu.'72 But how does one measure this? 
How does one establish a system of praise and blame equally valid for all, if one 
departs from the notion of a virtue gauged purely by its consequences? Stendhal is 
unsure:
Par exemple, Paul fait une action qui a six degres d'utilite pour le public. Elle ne 
lui coute que deux degres d'effort sur lui-meme. (Voici ou est la difficulte qui 
m'arrete. C'est trouver la commune mesure de ces efforts des hommes. Est-ce en 
fonction de leur vie?)
Jean en fait une qui n'a que cinq degres d'utilite, mais qui lui coute quatre degres 
d'effort.
II est moins utile au public que Paul, mais bien plus aimable a ses yeux.73
This characteristic expression of a moral problem in mathematical terms demonstrates 
clearly the difficulty which Stendhal encounters in embracing the strict act utilitarianism 
of an Helvetius or a Bentham. To seek to differentiate between the effort expended and 
the end result achieved in any enterprise was to dilute the pragmatic eudaemonism of the 
utilitarians — whatever conduces to happiness is good, and the more it conduces to 
happiness, the better it is to be deemed — with something akin to the conventional 
notion of moral conscience. Some weeks after penning the above passage, Stendhal 
returns to the same problem and concludes: 'N'estimer done plus les gens sur leurs 
actions, mais sur les motifs qui les auront determines.'74
Caught thus between an objective, consequentialist definition of virtue, and 
another, much more subjective notion which takes account of intentionality, Stendhal 
shows himself alive, as he would again in D'un nouveau complot contre les industriels, 
to what Bernard Williams sees as a fundamental flaw in the utilitarian doctrine. For if 
the ethical status of any action arises from its consequences alone, then morality 
relinquishes its claim to take account of 'the relations between a man's projects and his 
actions.'75 Among the weaknesses of the consequentialist position, argues Williams, is 
the fact that it 'makes integrity as a value more or less unintelligible.'76 The problem, as 
Stendhal came to perceive it, was none other than this. For he could not accept as 
complete a system of morality which took account only of what men did, not of what 
they thought or felt while doing it. A man is more than the sum of his actions; he has 
purposes, hopes, fears, which inform his behaviour and colour his perception of it.
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Egoism i ts e l f like passion and virtue, is no absolute value transferable from one 
individual to the next, Stendhal would reason, but a variable factor within human 
nature. 'On peut done dire que plus un hom[me] est passionne,' he writes in July 1804, 
’plus il est profondement egoiste.'77
Here was something akin to the objection levelled by Diderot against the narrow, 
standardised conception of self-interest — 'permanent et inalterable' — that was to be 
found in Helvetius.78 To argue as much, however, was to threaten the utilitarian ethic 
at its very base. For it was to deny the existence of a stable common denominator upon 
which an equation between happiness and virtue could be founded for all men alike. 
Similar objections to the utilitarian rationale can be found at work elsewhere in 
Stendhal's early writings. Recognising some diminution of his republican zeal in June 
1804, he notes: 'Cette annee (XII) je suis beaucoup plus heureux et beaucoup moins 
vertueux que l'annee derniere.'79 Contained in this brief remark is the very negation of 
the idea that the private,and the public good were one. Nor was Stendhal always 
disposed even to regard himself as part of a wider community of fellow human beings. 
'Nous naissons tous originaux,' he declares in a letter to Pauline Beyle in 1804.80 
What, then, keeps men from indulging their individual penchants with a complete 
disregard for their fellows? Stendhal provides a cynical answer in his letter to Pauline 
of 6 February 1806:
tout hom[me], sans la potence, le qu'en-dira-t-on ou l'enfer, suivrait ses passions 
sans egard a la justice. (Nous, nous avons de plus la noble pitie et l'amour de la 
gloire, mais nous sommes un sur dix mille.)81
This impression of his own distinctiveness, together with the misanthropic tone 
that rings out periodically from his letters in particular,82 militated against the embracive 
humanitarianism to which the young Stendhal sought to give expression. The 
unintelligibility of some human beings for others seemed, despite all his faith in 
education, to open unbridgeable gaps within humanity. 'Les gens du peuple parlent-ils 
souvent du bonheur comme nous l'entendons?' we read in a note dated 13 April 
1803.83 The idea is taken up again in more affirmative tones in a subsequent notebook 
entry:
C'est que les hommes ne se comprennent qu’a mesure qu'ils sont animes des 
memes passions. Je dis une chose tres claire pour moi, mon interlocuteur la 
comprend suivant ses passions et souvent d'une maniere entierement opposee a ce 
que j'ai voulu lui dire.84
If one extends this logic to the individual of extraordinary qualities, then all hope of 
communion is lost. 'L'amour des grandes ames armees de bonne tete est inintelligible 
aux hom[mes] ordinaires,' writes Stendhal in a note dated 23 July 1804.85 In a letter
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penned some time later to his sister Pauline, we find the same idea given a much more 
personal application: 'Les jouissances des ames comme les notres ou ne sont pas 
comprises, ou sont detestees par les ariies basses qui peuplent la societe; souviens-toi 
de ce principe.'86
This lack of comprehension between 'souls' is a common enough theme in the 
correspondence with which Stendhal regales his younger sister.87 At no point in his 
early writings, however, does he contend that the gulf between individuals is due to 
differences residing in the human organism itself. Nor would it have occurred to him 
so to do. Helvetius had early provided an emphatic objection to any such notion:
II est done certain que l'inegalite d'esprit, apperque dans les hommes que j ’appelle 
communement bien organises ne depend nullement de l'excellence plus ou moins 
grande de leur organisation; mais de l'education differente qu'ils re9oivent, des 
circonstances diverses dans lesquelles ils se trouvent...88
To this reasoning, Stendhal's early writings remain uniformly true. Reflecting upon the 
meaning of the term 'organique' in June 1804, he suggests tentatively that the human 
anatomy might vary subject to regional factors.89 The thought is not pursued, however, 
and is indeed countered almost at once by the suggestion that sense-impressions are 
invariable not only from one individual to the next, but from one nation to another.90 It 
was to be through an increased appreciation of Cabanis and the role of physiology that 
Stendhal would come, finally, to recognise the inadequacy of this rationale. Only then 
would he discover a compelling new means of accounting for the differences that 
separated men and of rationalising his intuition on this crucial question.
Cabanis and the Legitimation of the Individual
In this respect, the concluding lines of De VAmour sum up an important current of 
Stendhal's thought as it was to develop under the influence of Cabanis. For, in seeking 
constant and universal principles to account for human character and conduct, Stendhal 
would be led to conclusions that were far removed indeed from the vision of humanity 
which he had sought to articulate as a young man of republican sympathies in 
post-Revolutionary Paris. In the medically-enshrined philosophy of Cabanis, he was to 
discover a legitimation of individualism, an objection to what Van Duzer calls the 
'universalistic uniformitarianism' of the Enlightenment tradition,91 such as he had 
nowhere encountered it in Destutt de Tracy or, indeed, in Helvetius, for all the latter's 
unrelenting insistence on self-interest as the motive force in human nature. There are, in
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Cabanis’s thought, two tendencies which are not always easily reconciled. On the one 
hand, this respected physician and philanthropist shared with his fellow Ideologues an 
overriding concern for the perfectibility of humanity and the desire to evolve a science 
of man and society which would conduce to greater social happiness. On the other 
hand, his researches brought him face to face with the diversity and uniqueness of men 
qua organisms of flesh and blood, and with the difficulty of establishing any easy 
common1 denominator by which they might be measured. The uniformity and the 
diversity of humanity sit in uneasy relation to one another throughout the Rapports du 
physique et du moral de l'homme, the science of man for which Cabanis endeavoured 
to lay the foundation remaining, as M.S. Staum puts it, 'poised on a delicate balance 
between the One and the Many,’ between the philosopher-scientist’s 'quest for 
uniformity, theory, and method' and the doctor's 'concern for individuality, 
eccentricity, and exceptional case history.'92
While embracing the humanitarian aspirations of his reformist compeers, therefore, 
Cabanis was careful to couch any egalitarian sentiment in measured terms. The 
introduction and conclusion of his 'Sixieme Memoire' on the temperaments are 
unequivocal in the store which they set by the natural differences between men:
Quand on compare l'homme avec l'homme, on voit que la nature a mis entre les 
individus des differences analogues et correspondantes, en quelque sorte, a celles 
qui se remarquent entre les especes. Les individus n'ont pas tous la meme taille, 
les memes formes exterieures; les fonctions de la vie ne s'executent pas chez tous 
avec le meme degre de force ou de promptitude; leurs penchants n'ont pas la meme 
intensite, ne prennent pas toujours la meme direction.93
Even, argues Cabanis, if one were to succeed in realising the desired regeneration of 
society, there would exist
encore des differences notables, soit par rapport au caractere et a la direction des 
forces physiques vivantes, soit par rapport aux facultes et aux habitudes de 
l'entendement et de la volonte. L'egalite ne serait reelle qu'en general: elle serait 
uniquement approximative dans les cas particuliers.94
Such a statement strikes at the very heart of the contention that men partake of a 
common fund of attributes and potential, and that differences between them are due to 
instruction and circumstance alone. This, as we saw above, had been the conviction of 
Helvetius; and Cabanis's criticism of the latter reveals much about the limits beyond 
which the physiologist believed no reformist stategy could prevail:
Enfin notre admiration pour l’esprit sage, etendu, profond d'Helvetius, pour la 
raison lumineuse et la methode parfaite de Condillac, ne nous empechera pas de 
reconnaitre qu'ils ont manque l'un et l'autre de connaissances physiologiques, 
dont leurs ouvrages auraient pu profiter utilement. S'ils eussent mieux connu 
l'economie animale, le premier aurait-il pu soutenir le systeme de l’egalite des
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esprits?95
It.comes as no surprise, in the light of such remarks, to note the qualification to which 
Cabanis has recourse when it falls to him to define the limits (or, as Helvetius would 
have it, the limitlessness) of man's educability. Indefinitely perfectible men might be; 
but Cabanis goes no further than to assert that the individual may become, through 
education physical and moral, 'en quelque sorte capable de tout.'96 The very 
unscientific 'en quelque sorte' betrays a reservation — and one which Stendhal would 
come to share97 — before the much more sweeping assertions of Helvetius.98
The centre-piece of Cabanis's philosophy was the theory of the temperaments. 
Here was a whole new emphasis for Stendhal on the differences which separated men 
rather than the factors that bound them in their common humanity. From the earliest, 
Stendhal had, of course, been no stranger to a relativistic conception of man. In Du 
Bos, Buffon, Montesquieu and Helvetius, he had found ample insistence on the 
significance of variables such as climate, political regime and education in determining 
human character. As early as February 1803, indeed, he had gone beyond Helvetius's 
unwavering faith in the omnipotence of education, with all its 'collaborateurs occultes' 
(in the sense not only of pedagogical instruction but of government, legislation and the 
whole range of institutional and cultural influences that bear upon men),99 to introduce 
another factor into the equation: 'Mceurs = lois + climat.'100 Some months later, 
Stendhal commits to paper his reason for recognising thus the importance of a factor 
whose influence Helvetius denied outright:
Je crois que le climat a beaucoup d'influence sur la nature des plantes, et par 
consequent sur celle des animaux dont l'homme se nourrit; il en a done sur le corps 
de l'homme. Or, il est evident que tous nos plaisirs passant par notre corps, le 
climat doit avoir une certaine influence sur nos desirs et par consequent sur nos 
actions.
Lois + x climat = moeurs.
• Buffon, IV, 238.101
The clear reference to Buffon here appears to account for Stendhal's insistence on the 
role of climate at this early stage.102 The latter identifies in fact three causes — climate, 
diet, and custom — 'qui toutes trois concourent a produire les varietes que nous 
remarquons dans les differents peuples de la terre.'103 It was with just this rationale, or 
with the first two factors at least to which it related, that Helvetius had taken issue. This 
he makes clear when, in De VHomme, he expressly disengages human character and 
conduct from physical constitution:
Je citerai les peuples du Nord en preuve de cette verite. Leur temperament pituiteux 
& phlegmatique est, dit-on, l'effet particulier de la nature de leur climat & de leur 
nourriture; cependant ils sont aussi susceptibles d'orgueil, d'envie, d'ambition, 
d'avarice, de superstition, que les peuples sanguins & bilieux du Midi. Ouvre-t-on
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l'histoire, on voit les Peuples tout-a-coup changer de caractere, sans qu'il soit
arrive de changement dans la nature de leurs climats ou de leur nourriture.104
Adopting a position quite opposed to that of Helvetius, therefore, Buffon, with all 
his distrust of fixed genera, had prepared the ground for Stendhal towards a recognition 
of some natural variation within the human species. In the wake of his reading of 
Cabanis, Stendhal would return time and again to this notion, seizing now upon 
temperament as an inescapable first principle in the definition of character. From the 
moment of asserting that human nature was, in part at least, the domain of the 
physician, he was extending considerably the scope of his philosophy. For he had 
previously held, it should be stressed, to the belief that a universal humanity could be 
envisaged behind the warping layers of environmental relativism, that the differences 
between men were to be explained by reference to factors that lay outside of man 
himself. This is evident from his early conception of history (in which he includes, 
significantly, memoirs and biographies) as a fund of moral lessons applicable to all men 
at all times, 'cette base de toute connaissance de l’homme', as he put it.105 In this, 
Stendhal echoed closely the celebrated contention of David Hume that the value of 
history lay in the discovery of 'the constant and universal principles of human nature' 
and 'the regular springs of human action and behaviour.' The same motives, Hume 
argued, always gave rise to the same actions; the same events followed always from the 
same causes.106 Stendhal argues no differently when, in a letter of November 1801, he 
urges his sister to study 'cette histoire philosophique qui montre dans tous les 
evenements la suite des passions des hommes', or when, in a notebook entry of 
January 1803, he declares quite simply: 'Les etres changent, les choses morales ne 
changent jamais.'107
This supposed constancy of human nature went hand in hand, the young Stendhal 
believed, with its universality. It is instructive to note that even a notion as 
fundamental, and as obvious to us today, as race could find no place within Stendhal's 
early view of man. 'Sont-ce leurs moeurs qui ont rendu les negres noirs?' he asks in a 
notebook entry of January 1803.108 Later, in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, 
Stendhal would suggest confidently that 'le Negre si noir et le Danois si blond sont les 
descendants du meme homme,' ascribing their respective evolution to wholly natural 
factors such as air, soil, climate and diet.109 In the Memoires d'un touriste, more 
notably, he will reflect at length upon the differences which define the various 'races' 
indigenous to France alone.110 In 1803, however, Stendhal was not yet equipped to 
advance any such line of thought. While he might speak in terms of peuples or nations, 
the latter were considered to be the result of historico-environmental processes only; the 
concept of race as a hereditary and ineradicable differential factor nowhere enters into 
Stendhal's initial considerations on man. In this, of course, he was far from
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exceptional. The sciences of anthropology and ethnology, still in their infancy, had not 
yet arrived to undermine the optimistic humanitarianism of the French Enlightenment, 
with its associated notions of human equality and perfectibility. G.W. Stocking 
identifies in the work of Degerando, with whom the young Stendhal has earlier been 
compared in this context, an exemplar of that Enlightened anthropology which lacked 
'any concept of "race", any notion of permanent hereditary differences between the 
groups of the human family':
Human nature was fundamentally the same in all times and places, and its 
development was governed by natural laws: man developed from his earliest state 
in a slow, unilinear evolutionary progress whose highest present manifestation 
was Western European society.111
If the nature and conformation of the human organism itself, however, varies in 
ways that can be held to affect the moral characteristics of the individual, then this 
introduces a whole new range of considerations, fundamentally altering the 
determinism to which man is seen to be subject. What had been thought to be the 
essential identity of the genus homo must now give way to a pluralistic and 
diversitarian vision of humanity.112 As G. W. Stocking argues, the early years of the 
nineteenth century witnessed a significant shift in focus and assumption, as advances in 
the science of physiology — and here the contribution of Cabanis in particular is cited 
— tended to replace the notion of a generic humanity with a new insistence on the 
natural differences which distinguished men both as peoples and as individuals.113
For a mind so preoccupied as Stendhal's with the notion of happiness, this 
effective disaggregation of the human community on physiological grounds led to an 
inescapable conclusion: the physical constitution of each individual must be held to 
bear, in one degree or another, upon 'ce premier penchant de l'homme: chercher le 
bonheur.'114 For one could not talk of the relation between the physical and the moral 
without taking account of what Stendhal perceived to be the very essence of 'moral' 
man: 'notre moi moral (notre desir du bonheur).'115 In VHistoire de la peinture en 
Italie, he would write tersely that 'le caractere d'un homme, c'est sa maniere habituelle 
de chercher le bonheur.'116 We have discussed already, in Chapter V, the restrictions 
incumbent upon happiness when it is removed from a notionally 'moral' realm and 
implanted firmly in the world of physiological reality.117 Whatever problems this of 
itself might entail are infinitely compounded if happiness, like temperament, or 
character, or passion, can be defined in terms of no standard constitution, but is 
reducible in each and every case to the physical disposition of the individual. 
Happiness, Stendhal could read in Cabanis, was but 'le bien-etre physique [...] 
considere sous un autre point de vue et dans d'autres rapports.'118
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Here once more the inadequacy of Helvetius was to be exposed. For it had been 
the latter's purpose to formulate, as Charles Frankel puts it, 'a calculus of morals based 
on the assumption that all pleasures are reducible to qualitatively identical units.'119 If 
this assumption was false, and the reader of Cabanis could not but conclude that it was, 
then the question posed for individual and society alike was enormous. How could one 
legislate for men's happiness when, as a result of their different constitutions, they find 
their happiness in different ways? Nor was it a question merely of identifying, through 
the temperaments, six definitive 'types' of man. There were, argued Cabanis, an 
infinite number of possible mixes and permutations among the temperaments 
themselves — even before the latter were complicated by any cultural or socio-political 
factors:
Ces six temperaments se melangent et se compliquent les uns avec les autres. Les 
proportions de ces melanges sont aussi diverses que les combinaisons et les 
complications elles-memes: et celles-ci peuvent etre aussi multipliees que les divers 
degres d'intensite et les nuances dont chaque temperament est susceptible, ou, 
pour ainsi dire, a l'infini.120
The point is not lost on Stendhal, who, in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, 
prefaces his discussion of this question with the clear statement: 'Les combinaisons de 
temperaments sont infinies.'121 Was not one obliged to conclude, in the final analysis, 
therefore, that there were potentially as many types of happiness as there were men? 
Stendhal sets off down the road towards such a conclusion when he writes: 'On voit 
combien il est ridicule de parler de la gaiete frangaise sous les brouillards de Picardie, 
ou au milieu des tristes craies de la Champagne.'122 The larger the community 
considered, the more approximate, shifting and ultimately unreliable are the labels by 
which it may be defined in its chasse au bonheur,123 Stendhal's suggestion in De 
IAmour that there might be 'autant de fagons de sentir parmi les hommes que de fagons 
de voir'124 is but one glimpse of a question which, from 1811 notably, was to have an 
increasing bearing on his philosophy of man and on the moral and social implications 
thereof.
Nosce te ipsum : Self-Knowledge and Resignation to the Self
Stendhal's private writings once more here provide an instructive insight into his 
thought. We have already noted how, citing Cabanis as his inspiration, he concludes in 
1811 that different temperaments 'prennent le meme plaisir et la meme peine d'une 
maniere differente.'125 On the strength of such reasoning, Stendhal comes to conceive 
of the passions as quasi-organic phenomena taking root in a particular anatomical 'soil':
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'II parait que certaines passions ne peuvent pas prendre et pousser dans certains 
temperaments; on se figurerait difficilement l'avarice passion dominante d'un 
sanguin.'126 In a note penned in April 1811, Stendhal develops this point by means of 
an imaginary incident which he relates as follows:
Supposons que dans une rue deserte et la nuit, un homme vous donne une calotte. 
Vous le reconnaissez. C'est un caractere feroce qui tire fort bien le pistolet et manie 
fort bien l'epee; il ne tient qu'a vous de ne pas parler de votre cas, il ne sera jamais 
connu, car le bretteur etait ivre et ignore son action. Mais si vous etes bilieux, 
l'idee de cet outrage empoisonnera tout le bonheur que vous pourriez avoir.127
Some twenty years later, in penning the portrait of the abbe Pirard in Le Rouge et 
le Noir, Stendhal is clearly mindful of this aspect of the bilious character. 'Mais le ciel, 
dans sa colere,' we read of the abbe, 'lui avait donne ce temperament bilieux, fait pour 
sentir profondement les injures et la haine.'128 If Pirard is defined by bilious qualities 
which he is powerless to suppress, Mme de Fervaques will, on the contrary, be defined 
by the absence of just such qualities: hers is 'la fa?on d'etre flegmatique et tranquille 
des Hollondais,' not 'la constitution bilieuse qui porte a la vengeance.'129 Such explicit 
references to what he had culled from Cabanis, though rare in Stendhal's novels, are 
nonetheless instructive. For they present temperament as a given, a pre-ordained 
definition of a whole character, attitude and mode of behaviour. Stendhal's reference to 
the bilious temperament is, of course, never gratuitous. As his diaries and letters 
reveal, he attributes a bilious quality to himself, laying claim to the essential elements of 
what he extracts from Cabanis as the 'caractere moral' of this temperament:
Tout cela donne a l’individu un sentiment presque habituel d'inquietude, le 
bien-etre facile du sanguin lui est entierement inconrtu. II n'a de repos que dans 
l'excessive activite.130
We have discussed how, on his trip to Italy in 1811, Stendhal applies just such 
qualities both to himself and to the Italian with whom he begins to proclaim his 
affinity.131 Reflecting, during the same trip, upon his lack of natural social grace, he 
observes: 'Je suis trop bilieux pour avoir jamais cette grace-la. J'ai un but ou je marche 
ferme.'132 What such a remark illustrates is that Stendhal was by now clearly mapping 
out his character, marking it off from other character 'types’ and determining those 
areas of human experience to which it was more or less suited. Though such a tendency 
is in evidence from his earliest reading of Cabanis, it receives renewed impetus in 
18l l . 133 Through his identification with the bilious Italian, Stendhal was encouraged 
to believe that his character, if it excluded him from facile pleasures and an easy 
sociability, made him singularly apt for arduous undertakings. In this sense, the 
Russian campaign would give him an opportunity to place more than his fellow soldiers 
under the glare of his philosophical scrutiny. 'Tout ce qui en vaut la peine, dans ce 
monde, est soi,' he would write to Adolphe de Mareste in 1818. 'Le bon cote de ce
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caractere est de prendre une retraite de Russie comme un verre de limonade.'134
We could not be further here from the 'Homo sum..' of Stendhal's letter to 
Pauline Beyle some dozen years before. Though Cabanis is not overtly implicated in 
the remark to Mareste, it is important to recognise that the physiologist had long since 
provided Stendhal with the grounds for such an assertion. In the theory of the 
temperaments notably, Stendhal had discovered at last what he considered to be a 
bearing on that shifting goal of his philosophical peregrinations: knowledge of man. 
Though, as Georges Blin has demonstrated,135 both the future novelist and his fictional 
protagonists will be ever haunted — or, in Victor Brombert's term, 'anguished'136 — 
by their failure to penetrate the depths of their being and bring back a sure measure of 
their character, Stendhal had little doubt, by 1811, that he had happened upon a means 
of responding to the Delphic injunction which had rung out from Hobbes, Tracy and 
Cabanis in turn: Gnothi seauton, Nosce te ipsum, Connais-toi toi-meme,137 We may 
cite briefly here the feverish diary entries of early 1806, in which the objective at least is 
clear, if the means are still to be defined:
[...] je me cherche. Ne pas m'arreter a ce que je crois etre.
Je crois que je ne me suis pas encore trouve, je ne sais pas encore quel sera mon
caractere.
Me chercher moi-meme...
Je ne sais pas ce que je serai definitivement.138
We recall, too, Stendhal's letter to his sister from the same period, in which he exhorts 
her to 'commencer la veritable etude,' that of her own character:
Lorsque tu connaitras ton instrument, tu pourras dire: Tel archet, jouant dessus,
produit malheur, tel autre, bonheur...139
The final remark cited here goes to the heart of Stendhal's early conviction that 
character could be defined as the response of the individual to external stimuli; that the 
individual had control not over the vagaries of human experience, but over his own 
reaction to these, 'que le bonheur est dans notre rapport avec les choses exterieures, et 
que, pouvant modifier notre individu, nous sommes maitres d'un des termes du 
rapport, et par consequent du rapport...'140 Mastery over one of the factors in the 
equation was mastery over the equation itself. 'N'importe la gravite reelle des 
evenements,' writes Stendhal to Pauline in February 1806; 'ce que l'hom[me], sur 
lequel ils agissent, en croit decide de leur influence sur lui.'141 In this context, it is 
useful to signal the young Stendhal's recommendation to his sister, in a letter of 1 
October 1805, that she espouse what he terms Texcellente philosophic de Scapin.'142
431
If one looks on the black side, if one always expects the worst, he reasons, one is 
better placed to appreciate what joys life has to offer when they do present themselves. 
Thus he urges Pauline once more in a letter of 24 March 1807: 'souviens-toi de la 
morale de Scapin: il faut s'attendre a moins que rien pour gouter le peu qu'on 
trouve.'143
All of this is essential to the appreciation of a note which Stendhal pens in 
November 1813, when, on re-reading Les Fourberies de Scapin, he comes across the 
line: 'Et ce qui a manque a m'arriver, j'en ai rendu graces a mon bon destin.' The 
response which these words elicit now from Stendhal is highly revealing:
Cette note est pour moi. Vers 1803, je pris reellement un peu l'habitude de cette 
philosophie de Scapin, et cela d'apres ce passage-ci, mais elle ne donnait que du 
malheur, cette philosophie. Pour moi, la partie des maux de bien loin la plus 
cruelle, c'est de prevoir. Les souffrir n'est presque rien. Mon esprit n'est pas 
occupe a les sentir, mais a en sortir. Pour un autre temperament, la surprise, la 
chute imprevue des maux, serait peut-etre ce qu'ils auraient de plus rigoureux. 
Pour ces caracteres la philosophie de Scapin est bonne.144
What is remarkable about this note lies not in Stendhal's revision of his earlier 
contention, nor in the fragment of self-analysis which it provides; it lies rather in the 
grounds upon which Stendhal rationalises and justifies his change of mind. For he 
clearly believes now that temperament plays a predominant role in dictating the personal 
philosophy to which an individual should hold. For another temperament, Scapin's 
philosophy may be fine; with his own, Stendhal now concludes, it is incompatible.
The above remarks can be viewed in the same light as another instructive example. 
In March 1811, Stendhal makes a brief introspective entry in his diary: 'Mes deux 
defauts provenant de misanthropie font qu'il est avantageux pour moi d'etre force 
imperieusement a voir et a pratiquer les hommes.'145 Some four years later, he returns 
to the same diary entry and appends a new and revealing comment: 'Cela m'est 
impossible, cela est trop contre mon caractere, cela me donne trop de malheur par 
ennui, et en me privant de tout bonheur par les arts. 1815.'146
What both of these examples clearly show is a capitulation by Stendhal to the 
exigencies, the essential singularity, of character. On both occasions, he gives evidence 
of a resignation that is strikingly at odds with the countless passages in v/hich he had 
formerly expressed his belief that one could amend or redefine one's character to new 
specifications.147 We are far here from the glibness of Stendhal's remark to Francis 
Perier-Lagrange in a letter from Brunswick in September 1807: 'Lorsque les passions 
qu'on a ne peuvent etre satisfaites, il faut s'en faire de nouvelles.'148 Such, he was to 
find, was easier said than done. The character which Stendhal had set out to 'cure' and
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'perfect' in 1805 was, he came to realise, not to be so readily righted.149 The 
imperative to 'know oneself was no less urgent; but the knowledge should be used, he 
would conclude, not in a futile bid to correct the incorrigible, but rather, as a means of 
better accepting one's character as it was. As though to confirm the thought, Stendhal 
commits to his diary in July 1814 the brief but telling reflection:
On se connait et on ne se change pas, mais il faut se connaitre.150
Of this remark, Jean Starobinski writes: 'C'est l'aveu d'une defaite, de la part d'un 
homme dont toute l'entreprise de connaissance avait pour mobile initial la 
transformation de soi.'151 Whether in 1814 Stendhal was quite ready to admit defeat in 
the matter of self-knowledge and self-determination is debatable. What is clear, 
however, is that the confidence with which he had broached this question in his earlier 
writings was by now very seriously eroded. Georges Blin offers some of the most 
perceptive remarks advanced by any critic on the shift from 'avancement' to 
'accommodation' in Stendhal's search for self-knowledge. As Blin puts it:
[...] consentant a ne devoir que s'accepter, mais ideologue encore dans le 
fatalisme, il se fait de Yetre soi non seulement une injonction, mais post-reflexive, 
doute que l'on sache "se prendre comme on est" si l'on ne sait comment on est.152
In a curious text dated 28 July 1822, Stendhal develops an elaborate analogy 
between human character and granite. Under the arresting title 'ESSAIS DE 
GEOLOGIE MORALE', character is described, with the aid of a sketch, as 'des 
rochers de granit' along whose contours the 'debris de la vegetation' have settled, 
filling in the gaps and fissures. 'II faut savoir faire la difference,' writes Stendhal, 'du 
granit au remplissage.' He explains:
Le granit, c’est le caractere naturel d’un homme, sa maniere habituelle de chercher 
le bonheur. Le caractere est comme les traits: on commence a le voir a deux ou 
trois ans; il est bien reconnaissable a seize ou dix-sept, on l'apergoit dans toute sa 
force a vingt-six ou trente.
Le remplissage [.„], c'est ce que la politesse, l'usage du monde, la prudence, fait 
sur un caractere.
Having thus defined the terms of his analogy, Stendhal goes on to make a more 
substantive point. The inexperienced eye, he claims, mistakes the smooth contours 
formed by the build-up of debris for the character itself:
II ne voit pas que des que l'homme devra faire quelque chose d'important a ses 
propres yeux, il suivra le contour du granit de son caractere.153
There is no need to insist upon the extent to which such a view of character is at 
variance with the philosophy of Helvetius, who would have admitted of no such 
distinction between the rock and its surface deposits. For it was the latter's contention
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that character was in its very essence acquired, that it was synonymous with what is 
here considered, as no more than an extraneous accretion. It followed, for Helvetius, 
that the tendencies of character were cultivable and infinitely modifiable.154 The 
implications of Stendhal's argument above, by contrast, are clear. Character is never, at 
bottom, altered; it is merely overlain with the influences to which one is exposed from 
day to day, influences which, in testing moments, are dispelled to reveal the true 
'granite' underneath. Any attempt to modify character, which is defined from the 
earliest age and which becomes clearly recognisable in adolescence, amounts, it is 
implied, to so much self-delusion.155
Increasingly, Stendhal’s private diaries and letters echo this note of resignation, of 
accommodation to one’s character with all its strengths and all its shortcomings. The 
boundary between control and capitulation, between assuming one's character and 
being condemned to it, is a fine — and a shifting — one.156 As much is acknowledged 
by Stendhal in a letter to Clementine Curial in 1824:
Je me compare a un consent qui arrive dans un regiment de dragons; on lui donne 
un cheval. S'il a un peu de bon sens, il connait bien vite les qualites de ce cheval. 
Le cheval, c'est le caractere; mais connaitre que le cheval qu'on monte est 
ombrageux n'ote pas du tout a ce cheval la qualite d'etre ombrageux. II en est ainsi 
de mon caractere; depuis deux ans surtout, je commence a le bien connaitre.157
It should not be assumed from this, of course, that character is always for Stendhal a 
burden to be bome. On a great many occasions, he retreats into his character as into a 
stronghold. The letters to Pauline in which he rehearses the view that they are of a 
privileged human stock cannot be dismissed out of hand as just so much posturing in 
the guise of a 'superior soul''— though they are certainly that too. The point to be made 
here is that whether Stendhal is exalting his character or cursing it — and he does both 
with equal vehemence — he is defining its difference.158
Of all the notions in Stendhal's real and fictional worlds, none would prove more 
imposing than this. As a quinquagenarian reflecting upon his childhood, he will 
articulate, or, more precisely perhaps, create,159 a personal mythology which is 
informed throughout by the consciousness of his difference from others. In the letters 
and journal entries which we have cited, one apprehends something of the tension in 
Stendhal between an appreciation of what marks him apart and a desire to take his 
Character in hand and mould it to his own specifications. It is in his fictional world, 
however, that Stendhal will bring the sharpest focus to bear upon this notion of 
'difference' — between the hero and the world, between the hero as he is and the hero 
as he would be — and that he will dramatise most effectively the tensions between the 
intellect and the 'fatal flaws' of character.160 Octave de Malivert, for all the exceptional 
nature of his case, speaks not for himself alone when he acknowledges: Tai par
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malheur un caractere singulier, je ne me suis pas cree ainsi; tout ce que j ’ai pu faire, 
c'est de me connaitre.'161
In considering the range of Stendhal's writings across which this question casts its 
shadow, there is a case for setting the Vie de Henry Brulard, and, to a lesser degree, 
the Souvenirs d'egotisme, somewhat apart. For there is present in both a calmness, an 
'apaisement intime',162 which is often lacking in the diaries and letters with which 
these introspective works may be compared. Jean Starobinski, in his searching 
analysis, puts it thus:
En vieillissant, Stendhal commencera a aimer la connaissance pour elle-meme, 
sans espoir d'en faire un instrument utile a quelque autre but. Cette tardive quete de 
soi n'est plus destinee a lui preparer son avenir (comme faisaient les Journaux 
intimes de 1806 a 1818) mais a lui restituer son passe.163
To describe this state of mind as a 'philosophical' acceptance of character would be no 
misnomer. For Stendhal discovers in the philosophy of Cabanis specifically a means of 
understanding and — much more importantly — of justifying, of making peace with, 
himself. Kurt Ringger's description of the Vie de Henry Brulard as a 'memoire 
justificatif is, in this sense, thoroughly apt.164 Stendhal's objective in these.pages is, 
as he describes it, to understand his 'machine.'165 But there is more to the Vie de 
Henry Brulard than this: there is something, too, of that same 'necessite interieure de se 
disculper et de faire son apologie' which Gita May recognises as a motivating factor in 
Rousseau's introspection.166 In Stendhal's case, the manner whereby this need is 
assuaged is particularly noteworthy. For it is to no romanticised notion of his own 
essential goodness or innocence that he has recourse, but rather to the hard edge of 
medical science as he perceives it. Thus his personal attributes and failings — his 
'symptomes du temperament melancolique', his 'temperament de feu', his 'timidite', 
his 'folie', his 'pudeur' and 'habitude d'une discretion parfaite'167 — all pass, by 
turns, under the lens of Cabanis's theories and find a psycho-physiological ratification 
against which it would be vain to remonstrate. Here, as Francine Marill Alberes 
perceptively notes, lies the ultimate value of Cabanis for Stendhal:
La theorie de Cabanis calme les angoisses de Stendhal dans la mesure meme ou ses 
angoisses rentrent dans un systeme, sont classees et homologuees, ressortissent a 
des problemes scientifiques, et non plus d'un conflit avec la societe, qui serait 
impossible a resoudre.168
What character traits he discerns in himself are clearly seen by Stendhal to be the 
function of his particular constitution, and, to that extent, to lie beyond the bounds of 
remedy or censure. Thus, in acknowledging what he deems at times to be a lack of 
hard-headed judgment and sense of proportion, he concludes: 'J'excuse ce defaut de 
mon esprit en l'appelant: effet necessaire et sine qua non d'une sensibilite extreme.'169
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In such remarks, we discern something of that 'unashamed cultivation of the 
human organism on its own terms' which, as W.D. Williams notes, Nietzsche was to 
find so laudable in Stendhal.170 Even the latter's early revulsion at the grubby 
specimens of republicanism whom he had witnessed during an illicit sortie to the 
Societe des Jacobins as a child is now rationalised and given a retrospective justification 
by recourse to Cabanis. 'En un mot,' concedes the autobiographer, 'je fus alors comme 
aujourd'hui: j’aime le peuple, je deteste ses oppresseurs; mais ce serait pour moi un 
supplice de tous les instants que de vivre avec le peuple.'171 He goes on:
J'emprunterai pour un instant la langue de Cabanis. j'ai la peau beaucoup trop 
fine, une peau de femme (plus tard j'avais toujours des ampoules apres avoir tenu 
mon sabre pendant une heure); je m'ecorche les doigts, que j'ai fort bien, pour un 
rien; en un mot, la superficie de mon corps est de femme. De la peut-etre une 
horreur insurmontable pour ce qui a l'air sale, ou humide, ou noiratre. Beaucoup 
de ces choses se trouvaient aux Jacobins de S[ain]t-Andre.172
The logic of Stendhal's thinking here could not be more transparent. His insistence on 
the delicacy of his skin, as Robert Alter observes, 'has the effect, by invoking 
Cabanis's notion of physiological determinants for moral qualities, of excusing the 
would-be republican's recoil from the common people, for it reduces his social 
fastidiousness to a reflex of his physical makeup.'173 What is particularly significant 
about the passage in question is that its application goes far beyond the single chidhood 
incident recalled by Stendhal. The suggestion that he has not changed one whit since — 
'je fus alors comme aujourd'hui’ — lends an enduring quality to the physical and moral 
characteristics described. By affirming thus the immutability of character in its essential 
traits, Stendhal strikes a firm note of determinism in which the legacy of Cabanis is 
again unmistakeable. For the physiologist, as he is filtered through Stendhal's 
perception, comes to sanction a deterministic view of human nature which is but a short 
step away from fatalism. Never is this more starkly in evidence than in the 
uncompromising passage which we find in Stendhal's journal of 28 July 1822:
Notre caractere, bon ou mauvais, c'est comme le corps que nous reconnaissons a 
seize ans, quand nous commengons a reflechir. Beau, laid ou mediocre', il faut le 
prendre tel qu'il est; seulement l'homme sage en tire parti.
Une fois que nous savons quel est notre caractere, nous pouvons nous attendre au 
bien et au mal, qui en sont predits dans les livres qui donnent la description du dit 
caractere. Par exemple: 
caractere violent, 
phlegmatique,
tendre et melancolique, comme J.-J. Rousseau.174
The emphasis on the term corps and the close association between character and 
temperament implicate Cabanis directly in this most pessimistic of statements. Such 
supine resignation to the inevitable, however, nowhere forms part of Cabanis's
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philosophy in its broadest reading. The whole thrust of the latter's work, as we have 
argued, is towards a moral and social regeneration of mankind that could only be 
achieved through thd understanding and judicious harnessing of the physiological 
factors which predispose the individual to particular modes of thought or action.175 
Temperament is but one element in the composition of character — and even then 
Cabanis leaves open the possibility of acquired temperament.176 What Stendhal does, 
therefore, is to push one aspect only of Cabanis’s thought through to its conclusion. 
The importance of the passage in question is that it establishes very clearly one of the 
poles around which Stendhal’s view of moral man had for some time gravitated — and 
would continue thereafter to gravitate. For he never satisfactorily reconciles 
determinism and moral responsibility within any coherent synthesis. His view of man 
as an object of inscrutable forces that lie beyond his bidding alternates with a belief in 
the power of the individual, through the exercise of reason, to exert some measure of 
control over the course of his life. Stendhal would hold to the principle that political 
regime, education and cultural environment had a role to play in defining human 
character; but, in the absence of any fundamental and long-term revision of society, we 
find him inclining increasingly to the view that there was little the individual could do to 
redress the excesses and shortcomings of a character that was, in the final analysis, not 
of his choosing.
Italian mores and the Fragmentation of Man
Such, in a sense, had been the problem — posed in the abstract terms of ’heart' and 
'head' — with which the young Stendhal had wrestled in the Filosofia Nova. His early 
writings, however, buoyed as they are by a confidence in man's power to mould his 
character and behaviour to desired ends, betray nothing of the fatalism that is exhaled 
by the passage cited above. With the reading of Cabanis and the annexation of a 
scientifically-orientated theory of human nature, the problem is given a new and keener 
edge. Where does the boundary lie between physiological determinism and rational 
control? The question is one which haunts Stendhal; and the answers which are to be 
found in his writing tend ever more in a direction that is at variance with his erstwhile 
faith in man's capacity to shape his own destiny.
Qu'est-ce que le moi? Je n'en sais rien. Je me suis un jour reveille sur cette terre; je 
me trouve lie a un corps, a un caractere, a une fortune. Irai-je m'amuser vainement 
a vouloir les changer, et cependant oublier de vivre? Duperie: je me soumets a leurs 
defauts. Je me soumets a mon penchant aristocratique, apres avoir declame dix 
ans, et de bonne foi, contre toute aristocratie. J'adore les nez romains, et pourtant, 
si je suis frangais, je me soumets a n'avoir regu du ciel qu'un nez champenois:
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qu'y faire?177
In this passage from Rome, Naples et Florence, we find a clear acknowledgment 
by Stendhal of that dichotomy 'between democratic principle and aristocratic 
propensity' which he would seek to rationalise by recourse to Cabanis in the Vie de 
Henry Brulard.178 Here, as there, moral characteristics are set on a par with physical 
attributes. One is stuck with one's character as one is stuck \Vith one's skin-type — or 
one's nose. The repetition (three times in succession) of the formula 'je me soumets' 
gives a strong deterministic ring to Stendhal's reasoning here, underlining the futility of 
striving — 'vainement' — to change one's lot. The passage has about it something of 
the self-conscious philosophising which characterises Stendhal's earlier letters to his 
sister Pauline. The fundamental difference, however, lies in a note of resignation, of 
submissiveness, that is seldom to be found in the earlier writings.
These few lines, with their alternately interrogative and assertive tone, go to the 
heart of what Georges Blin calls 'le probleme du moi*179 for Stendhal, posing not only 
the riddle of personality, but the whole question of the relationship between man and 
his destiny in its broadest sense. It is appropriate that the above passage should appear 
in Rome, Naples et Florence; for nowhere does Stendhal strike a more resolutely 
deterministic note than in his considerations of Italy and the Italian character. The 
capitulation to Nature's design which is evident in the Neapolitan lazzarone or the 
Roman peasant is unconscious and unconditional. As such, it is described by Stendhal 
in dispassionate tones, free of moral censure.180 The Italians, when compared to their 
French or English counterparts, are 'domines par les differences de climat et 
d'organisation';181 yet it is this very despotism of Nature, allied to their social and 
political institutions, which 'liberates' them in a sense, allowing each to 'chercher le 
bonheur comme il l'entend.'182 A foreigner in Rome, we read in De VAmour, may be 
surprised by the antics of some love-crossed individuals — but 'personne ne les blame, 
car ils font ce qui leur fait plaisir,'183
The presence of a foreign eye looking in on the Italian — and failing to 
comprehend what it sees — is a common device which Stendhal employs to highlight 
the unbridgeable gulf between the character of the Italians and that of their European 
neighbours. The Italians, we read in Rome, Naples et Florence en 1817, 'ont d'autres 
poumons que nous.'184 For all its brevity, this remark sums up the world of difference 
which separates the foreigner from the Italian — for a glance at Cabanis (and at 
VHistoire de la peinture en Italie) confirms the significance accorded by the physiologist 
to the lung as an index of physical and moral disposition.185 In Stendhal's 
considerations of Italy, the notion of a common humanity is conspicuous by its 
absence. Humanity is rent not only between North and South, France and Italy, but
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between regions, towns, villages — even streets. In Rome, 'la largeur d'une place 
change les mceurs.'186 Is it not clear, asks the author of La Duchesse de Palliano, 'que 
les passions varient toutes les fois qu'on s'avance de cent lieues vers le Nord?'187 Set 
La Chartreuse de Parme a few degrees further north, and 'il y a lieu a un nouveau 
paysage comme a un nouveau roman.'188
Nothing conveys more succinctly the relativity of human nature as Stendhal came 
to perceive it than these simple geographical references in which his writings abound. 
'Pour comprendre que dix degres de froid font a Stockholm un temps tres doux, il 
faudrait commencer par sentir la durete habituelle du climat,' we read in I'Histoire de la 
peinture en Italie.189 Compare two sixty-year old men, writes Stendhal with economy 
in the Promenades dans Rome, 'dont l'un a vecu a Paris et l'autre a Dijon ou 
Grenoble.’190 If humanity differs thus within the same geo-national space, little 
wonder that such irreparable rifts occur from one country to the next. 'Ce qui est 
aimable a Paris est indecent a Geneve,' we are told in Rome, Naples et Florence.191 
'Ce qui est divin en France,' declares the piqued correspondent for the New Monthly 
Magazine, 'n’est que flippant en Angleterre.'192
One of the clearest indications of Stendhal's shift away from the notion of a 
homogeneous humanity is the store which he would come to set by the concept of race. 
We have touched already upon the question of race as it is presented in the Memoires 
d'un touriste, where Stendhal, on the authority of W.-F. Edwards, divides the French 
'en Gaels, en Kymris, en Ibires et en Metis,'193 Edwards's letter to Stendhal in 
October 1837 reflects clearly the latter's concern with the evolving science of 
ethnology.194 Concern with this question is evident, too, in the Promenades dans 
Rome. 'Grace au climat et a la race des hommes (ce sont des Grecs),' predicts 
Stendhal, 'l'education fera en dix ans a Naples ce qu'elle ne peut operer qu'apres un 
demi-siecle en Boheme.'195 Elsewhere we find him comparing the relative merits of the 
Frenchman, the Englishman and the Roman, and affirming unequivocally 'la 
superiorite de la race romaine.'196
Stendhal's precise choice in these instances of the Roman and Neapolitan, rather 
than the 'Italian', is not without significance. For 'race' — as a sort of 'milieu naturel 
interne'197— comes to signify a means of differentiating not between peoples and 
nations alone, but between communities and localities within the same country.
On a plus de gaiete a Sienne, qui n'est qu'a six lieues de Florence: on trouve de la 
passion a Arezzo. Tout change en Italie toutes les dix lieues. D'abord, les races 
d’hommes sont differentes.198
Thus the superiority of the Roman is not reserved for comparisons with other nations
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alone. 'Le Romain,' declares Stendhal, 'me semble superieur, sous tous les rapports, 
aux autres peuples de l'ltalie.'199
In no work does Stendhal take greater pains — or greater pleasure, it seems — in 
underlining the differences that separate men than in Rome, Naples et Florence and the 
Promenades dans Rome. .'On peut etre bon et honnete a Cosenza ou a Pizzo,' we are 
told, 'tout en faisant assassiner son ennemi.'200 The reader familiar only with the moral 
code of his own country 'entend par les mots decence, vertu, duplicite, des choses 
materiellement differentes de celles que vous avez voulu designer.'201 Even a Church 
that pretends to catholicity is fragmented by the humanity which it serves:
Les sots qui ne savent que ce qui est imprime dans les livres vulgaires, croient que 
c'est le meme christianisme qui regne en France et en Italie.
En Europe, autant de religions que d'Etats. [...]. Gens impartiaux! jugez du genie 
du christianisme par Rome et Naples.202
No vestige here of that 'single principle' which Stendhal had envisaged in 1804 as a 
means of bringing all men to view the world within the same moral perspective.203 The 
hopeless lack of comprehension between human beings in even the simplest matters is a 
theme to which we find him returning time and again in his considerations of Italy. It is 
a central notion in a letter of 30 June 1819 to Matilde Dembowski, which, for all the 
intimacy of its message and the vested interest which it serves, presents a view of 
human nature quite consistent with the broader logic that informs Rome, Naples et 
Florence and the Promenades dans Rome:
II est evident que, comme etrangers, [...], comme etrangers, nous ne nous 
comprenons pas; nos demarches parlent une langue differente.
[...] Nous ne nous comprenons absolument pas.
[...] Combien de mes actions les plus simples de Milan ont du vous deplaire! Dieu 
sait ce qu'elles signifient en italien.204
As with morals and mores, so too with the arts. 'Quelle idee se formerait de nos 
arts un habitant d'Otaiti, pour qui tout ce qui tient chez nous a la galanterie serait 
invisible?'205 Not that one need go so far afield to uncover the discrepancies in human 
sensibility. Between the author of the Promenades dans Rome and his travelling 
companions the gulf in the matter of aesthetic appreciation seems no less wide: 'Telle 
est l'origine de tous nos differends: beaucoup de choses insignifiantes a mes yeux leur 
semblent jolies, et ce qui est la beaute sublime pour moi leur fait peur.'206 What 
Stendhal is above all anxious to do, here just as much as in Racine et Shakespeare or 
VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, is to defy canons of judgment which assume some 
universally applicable law of taste or 'rightness'. 'Me croyez-vous assez fou pour 
blamer un etre de ce qu'il sent ainsiT he asks, with mock outrage, in Rome, Naples et 
Florence. 'Je me borne a noter des faits.'207 Such is the relativistic reasoning which the 
question of artistic sensibility will everywhere come to elicit from Stendhal:
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Le voyageur doit se rappeler que, dans ce qui plait, nous ne pouvons aimer que ce 
qui nous plait. La nature humaine est faite ainsi, le meme homme ne peut pas 
adorer Raphael et Rubens.208
The Problem for Morality
In all of the foregoing, we are confronted squarely with the same 'disaggregation' of 
humanity, the same division of the human species into 'types', and of types into 
individuals, which had been evident in I'Histoire de la peinture en Italie and D e 
VAmour. The notion of difference, while it may be expressed in moral and aesthetic 
terms, takes root for Stendhal in a deeper imperative against which it is futile to protest. 
'La maniere de sentir de l'ltalie est absurde pour les habitants du Nord,' he declares in 
Rome, Naples et Florence:
Je ne congois meme pas, apres y avoir reve un quart d'heure, par quels caracteres, 
par quels mots on pourrait la leur faire entendre. — L'effort du bon sens des gens 
les plus distingues est de comprendre qu'ils ne peuvent pas comprendre. Cela se 
reduit a l’absurdite du tigre qui voudrait faire sentir au cerf les delices qu'il trouve a 
boire du sang.209
The image is arresting. It is not, however, unique. It echoes, in fact, a number of 
similar occasions when Stendhal has recourse to the animal realm in order to point up 
the differences that exist — naturally, necessarily — from one people to another, one 
individual to the next. 'Qui osera dire au tigre rapide: "Echange ton bonheur pour celui 
de la tendre colombe"?'210 Such is the question which rings out defiantly from the 
introduction of VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, and which is later pursued in an 
evocative analogy:
Quoi de plus different qu'une chevre et un loup? Cependant ces animaux sont a 
peu pres du meme poids. Quoi de plus different que l'anthropophage du Potose et 
le Hollondais tranquille, fumant sa pipe devant son canal d'eau dormante, et 
ecoutant attentivement le bmit des grenouilles qui s'y jettent?211
The contrast between the Bolivian cannibal and the phlegmatic Dutchman, underlain as 
it is with the comparison of wolf to goat, is stark. What is more, it is devoid of all 
explicit moral comment — or, to be more precise, the 'moral' comment must be seen to 
reside in the simple, repeated question 'Quoi de plus different?' For there is no attempt 
to judge both by a common standard: instead, the Dutchman and the Bolivian remain 
defined, irreducibly, by their difference one from the other.
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Recourse to 'beast-fables' as a means of illustrating the disparities and the limits of 
comprehension between human beings was, as Michael Wood observes, to become a 
standard feature of Stendhal's discourse.212 Merimee's testimony is once' more 
instructive in this particular: "’Vous etes un chat, je suis un rat", disait-il souventpour 
terminer les discussions...'213 Stendhal was far, of course, from being the patentee of 
this rationale; the beast analogy had a long established pedigree in French literature. 
'J'aurai beau dire aux moutons de faire les loups, ils seront toujours moutons, et aux 
loups d'etre doux comme des agneaux, ils resteront toujours loups.' Such had been 
Mme de Puisieux's preamble to the biting injunction: 'Quiconque est loup, agisse en 
loup.'214 The remark might have come from Sade, La Mettrie, or a host of other 
eighteenth-century writers who had deployed their philosophy in the defence of 'the 
natural' as an overriding arbiter of human character and conduct, 'une finalite 
transcendant la conscience.'215 In his refutation of De I'Homme, Diderot had given 
pointed expression to this reasoning, in response to Helvetius's conception of a 
standard, indefinitely modifiable human nature: 'On ne donne pas du nez a un levrier, 
on ne donne pas la vitesse du levrier a un chien-couchant; vous aurez beau faire, 
celui-ci gardera son nez, et celui-la gardera ses jambes.'216 While it would be otiose to 
seek in Stendhal the influence of any single author in this respect, it is clear, as Michel 
Crouzet points out, that he was to subscribe with vigour to the rationale in question:
Ne resume-t-il pas en effet et fort bien le 18eme siecle en lui empruntant toutes les 
allegories qui prouvent qu'il n'y a que des visions du monde relatives a des etres 
differemment organises et dont les valeurs ou points de vue ne sont jamais 
echangeables? Etre soi, c'est etre different...217
Nowhere here is there any suggestion of the malleability and open possibility 
which are so much a feature of Stendhal's earliest reflections on the human condition. 
The problem confronting Stendhal — as it confronted so many of the thinkers upon 
whom he drew for the raw materials of his philosophy — was that of reconciling two 
quite distinct, indeed opposing, conceptions of human nature. The eighteenth century, 
as Diderot's refutation of Helvetius well attests, had set out clearly the terms in which 
the issue was to be debated; but it had failed to resolve these into a coherent philosophy 
of man. Though it is difficult to state with precision when Stendhal recanted his early 
faith in man's capacity to attain to some ideal standard, it is clear that this was decidedly 
a thing of the past once he had redefined the principles of his philosophy in 1811. The 
examples cited above may be read in conjunction with a letter written by Stendhal to his 
sister Pauline in May of that year. The letter, it is important to note, belongs to a period 
in which Stendhal was reflecting upon his recent reading of Cabanis and endeavouring 
to apply the physiologist's principles to what he could observe in himself and in those 
around him.218 'Si nous avons la simplicite,' he declares, 'de courir apres le bonheur 
des petites ames, nous sommes tout etonnes, arrives a la jouissance, de les voir
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heureux et nous ennuyes.' He continues:
C'est tout simple: il faut des poules a un renard et des pommes de terre a un pore. 
•Nous ne sommes pas de la meme espece que ces animaux-la. La meme nourriture 
ne nous convient pas.219
The crudity of Stendhal's language here, his peremptory recognition of the differences 
that separate individuals in their impulsions and needs, together with the implication 
that there exists a higher order of humanity to whom the laws for the common mass do 
not apply, place this passage among those in his writings that are most redolent of his 
later admirer, Friedrich Nietzsche. The extract cited belongs clearly, as the rest of the 
letter in question attests, to one of Stendhal's more misanthropic moments.220 The lack 
of any measure in the language with which he vents his spleen — 'tous les hommes 
sont froids, mediocres et aiment a faire du mal aux gens qu'ils croient heureux'221 — is 
a warning against setting too much store by his remarks here as the expression of any 
definitive moral or philosophical stance. What is important once again, however, is the 
evocation, through recourse to animal imagery, of natural and ineradicable distinctions 
between human beings which, Stendhal suggests, precede any law, morality or 
aesthetic canon.222
Here was an idea whose power and durability may be gauged by the place which it 
would come to occupy across the range of Stendhal's writings. A letter addressed to 
Adolphe de Mareste on 3 March 1820, echoing both the sentiment and the imagery of 
the lines penned for Pauline Beyle almost a decade earlier, frames one of the most 
resounding statements of relativism to be found anywhere in Stendhal's hand. 'Je puis 
avoir tort,' he declares, 'mais ma sensation, pour moi, est vraie.'223 The paradoxical 
terms in which the remark is couched — sharpened by Stendhal's emphasis on the 
words 'pour moi' — suggests that there is a personal truth, ratified by the senses, that 
overrides all other standards of 'rightness'. Having made this essential point, Stendhal 
goes on, in the same vein, to explain to Mareste why he chooses to reside in Italy rather 
than in France:
J'aime mieux passer ma vie avec Monti et Rossini. Je ne me sens pas d'humeur de 
vous decrire Alexandre aux Indes. Cela est horriblement ardu, et, apres s'etre tue 
de peine, cela se reduit au discours du lion, qui veut faire gouter au cerf le plaisir 
de boire du sang. Vous etes l'homme de Paris, moi l'homme de Milan. Le foin 
intellectuel qui nourrit nos esprits depuis six ans est different. Une bouteille ne 
peut pas contenir a la fois du champagne et du bordeaux.224
Images which are used elsewhere by Stendhal to evoke the diversity of human 
sensibility and the determinism by which it is governed are heaped here one on top of 
the other.225 Such, of course, is the reasoning underlying the theory for which 
Stendhal would coin his term 'romanticisme'; but the amplification which he gives the
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notion here appears to take it beyond the boundaries of aesthetic sensibility alone. For 
the 'maniere de sentir de l'ltalie,' which he had declared in Rome, Naples et Florence to 
be beyond the comprehension of the outsider,226 is once more described here as the 
slaking of thirst with blood. The imagery is too contrived to be gratuitous. If Stendhal's 
'romanticisme' appeared to offer some solution to the problem of human diversity from 
a purely aesthetic point of view,227 was the implication not that there remained a 
problem for morality which might be much less easily resolved?228
Here we return to the difficulty which is latent in Cabanis and which is passed on 
unresolved to Stendhal. For while both express the hope, as we have seen, that some 
method may be found to administer Tespece humaine comme un individu,'229 both 
acknowledge, in their respective ways, that physiology itself constitutes a threshold 
beyond which any harmonisation of humanity must be deemed impracticable. With this 
notion, we come to the very heart of the moral dilemma upon which we touched in 
Chapter VII, the antinomy in Stendhal's thought between concern for a uniformly well 
regulated social order and admiration for the individual of extraordinary energy who 
threatens to disrupt it. As Margaret Tillett observes, Stendhal's interest is engaged by 
'the study of the pressures which turn l'homme into le citoyen, and those which from 
time to time compel him to assert that he is unique.'230 Once more, in this context, 
Cabanis's 'Sixieme Memoire' on the temperaments is inescapable:
II est possible que les circonstances particulieres qui president a la formation de 
chaque individu de la meme espece, determinent irrevocablement le degre d'energie 
et le caractere de sa sensibilite. Par exemple, il est possible qu'il y ait d'homme a 
homme des differences primordiales dans ce qu'on peut appeler le principe sensitif 
lui-meme: il est du moins tres-sur que ces differences ont lieu d'espece a 
espece.231
This notion of 'energy' as a quantifiable, a means of differentiating between not only 
peoples but individuals within the same community, is central to the lessons which 
Stendhal draws from Cabanis.232 If the 'sensitive principle', the 'degree of energy', 
may differ so radically from one man to the next, then the rule of human nature 
becomes nothing more than the sum of so many exceptions. While humanity is 
divisible into races and nations, the latter themselves are but aggregates of smaller 
communities which are reducible in turn to the individuals who people them.
With this in mind, we are better able to approach the character of the Italian as 
Stendhal presents it. For we encounter here, more than anywhere else, a legitimation of 
the individual, who, far from being part of that happy humanity of which Stendhal had 
dreamed in 1804, inhabits a world that begins and ends with the Self. 'Chacun 
s'occupe de soi, et si l’on .songe au voisin, c'est pour s'en mefier et le regarder presque 
comme un ennemi.'233 Stendhal's Italy represents in this sense the very antithesis of
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the society that is evoked in his early notes and letters. Music and love, he writes in 
Rome, Naples et Florence, may be indulged to satiety; but 'on y meurt empoisonne de 
melancolie, si l'on est citoyen'234 In a world of human islands, insists Stendhal, Tout 
ce qu'on peut esperer de mieux c’est que les interits s ’accordent,'235 And where they 
do not, the same ultima ratio — that 'fatalite de la nature humaine' which Stendhal will 
lament in a letter to Byron — may be invoked.236
It is through the workings of an all-pervading determinism that we are invited to 
perceive the Italian character, forged by temperament and by a legislation which, 
Stendhal asserts, ’fortifie la mauvaise tendance du climat.'237 The ferocity which is 
endemic among the-Italians, the penchant which they display for the sanguinary in their 
actions, is presented by Stendhal as a function of their energy and — the notion should 
not be understressed — as an index of their potential238 'Les vrais mechants-bilieux de 
l'ltalie sont les Piemontais,' we are told in Rome, Naples et Florence en 1817; yet in 
these same Piedmontese, one is more likely than elsewhere to find the stuff of which 
great men are made.239 This yoking of physiological and moral qualities diminishes 
substantially the choice which the Italian is seen to exercise in the question of his 
character and conduct. It resonates, moreover, with Cabanis’s definition of the 
biliewc-melancolique temperament as
le plus malheureux et le plus funeste de tous. C'est celui qui parait propre aux 
nations fanatiques, vindicatives et sanguinaires. C'est lui qui determine les 
sombres emportements des Tibere et des Sylla...240
'Est-ce leur faute s'ils sont feroces?' asks Stendhal in Rome, Naples et Florence en 
1817.241 In each of the works dedicated to Italy, Stendhal insists upon the irrelevance 
of such concepts as 'fault' and 'blame' as they might be applied to the individual 
Italian's thoughts or actions:
Les idees d'ordre et de justice qui, depuis le morcellement des biens nationaux, 
sont au fond du cceur du paysan champenois ou bourguignon, sembleraient le 
comble de l'absurdite au paysan de la Sabine. Voulez-vous ici etre opprime par 
tout le monde et detruit? soyez juste et humain.242
No question, then, of human solidarity here. Yet so much of the 'moral' 
dimension which appears to be sacrificed outright in Stendhal's Italy is rescued through 
the all-important notion of potential. For in this land, where a harsh law of nature holds 
sway, where 'une chaleur brulante exalte la bile,' the ressort is present in abundance: 
'ce n'est que la direction du ressort qui manque.'243 Stendhal is clear in signalling the 
rich potential which he recognises in those Italian brigands who, 'bien diriges, auraient 
ete capables de grandes choses.'244 In Italy, we are told, 'se trouve le ressort qui fait 
les grands hommes: mais il est dirige a contre-sens...'245 The Italian 'est musicien par
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instinct, poete par nature, victime et esclave par la seule faute de ceux qui le 
gouvement.'246 Under the continued weight of a corruptive regime, 'il deviendra un 
voleur ou un paresseux, un mendiant ou un joueur d'orgue.'247 Such is the lottery 
through which the Italian may seek the means of giving expression to his nature. 'La 
force,' as Michel Crouzet puts it, 'barree ici, se montre la, autre, masquee, 
transferee.'248
Contained within the foregoing paragraph, it may be argued, is Stendhal's most 
representative judgment of the Italian character. The apology of Italian energy which 
runs through his writings is as much an expression of what could be as a celebration of 
what is. Nowhere does Stendhal better.display what Eugene Goodheart describes as 
that 'extraordinary sensitivity to the uniqueness, the volatility, the instability of the 
energy that composes the self.'249 The Italian is a being, according to Stendhal's logic, 
'force aux grandes choses par son organisation physique' — and a people, in the 
borrowed terms of Alfieri, 'a qui rien ne manque, pour s'immortaliser, qu'un champ de 
bataille et le moyen d'agir.'250 The frustrated greatness of the Latin becomes a 
leitmotiv. Italy is, we read in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, 'la terre ou les grands 
hommes sont encore le moins impossibles.'251 The wording is as meaningful as it is 
contrived. 'Ce peuple,' we are likewise told in the Promenades dans Rome, 'est moins 
eloigne que nous des grandes actions.'252 Whoever does not understand this, declares 
Stendhal, will never understand Italy.253 'Donnez pendant vingt ans un Napoleon aux 
Romains,' he writes laconically in Rome, Naples et Florence, 'et vous verrez.254
The Problem for Society
The destinies to which men and nations are suited, and the degree to which 
circumstances permit them to realise their potential, are two sides of a question which 
preoccupies Stendhal profoundly. The problem for any society, as he saw it, lay in 
fitting its most able members to the most demanding roles. In this respect, his thought 
comes to mark a departure from the philosophical spirit of the Enlightenment and 
Revolution. 'The very atmosphere of the Revolution,' as M.S. Staum argues, 'directed 
public attention away from organic differences which might suggest the "humiliating 
. inequality of minds".' Instead, concern was focused, in keeping with the ideal of a 
universal man, upon 'those differences which governments could directly alter — 
political institutions and educational opportunity.'255 The egalitarian humanitarianism 
of the Enlightenment — as articulated by Helvetius among others — soon gave way in
446
Stendhal's mind, however, to the conviction that all individuals were not equal in 
potential, therefore could not be equal in achievement. The uniformitarian ideals of the 
Revolution are thus turned back upon themselves, by a Stendhal who, in the 
Promenades dans Rome, will lament the 'effet de l'idee nivelante du XIXe siecle' 
which, he contends, 'defend d'oser et de travailler a ce petit nombre d'hommes 
extraordinaires qu'elle ne peut empecher de naitre.'256
The source of Stendhal's thinking on the crucial question of matching men to 
social roles shifted definitively in this sense to Cabanis, who stood apart from the more 
utopian visionaries and held that it would be achievement enough if all men could be 
made fit to live as citizens, without entertaining the vain hope of making all equally fit 
to hold the same posts. If horses bred in the same stable continued to give evidence of 
different qualities and characteristics, then surely citizens of the same nation would 
continue to evince differences in vital energy, physical strength, intellectual ability:
L'homme, par l'etendue et la delicatesse singuliere de sa sensibilite, est soumis a 
l'action d'un nombre infini de causes: par consequent rien ne serait plus- 
chimerique que de vouloir ramener tous les individus de son espece a un type 
exactement uniforme et commun. Les hommes, tels que nous les supposons ici, 
seraient done egalement propres a la vie sociale; ils ne le seraient pas egalement a 
tous les emplois de la societe: leur plan de vie ne devrait pas etre absolument le 
meme; et le temperament, comme la disposition personnelle des esprits et des 
penchants, offrirait encore beaucoup de differences aux observateurs 257
Such is the conclusion of the Memoir on the temperaments by which Stendhal was 
to set such store. 'Nous savons tous,' he will argue in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, 
'qu'un espion espagnol traverse fort bien, en une nuit, vingt lieues de montagnes 
escarpees. Un Allemand meurt de fatigue a moitie chemin.'258 This simple comparison 
underlines the diversity of human capacity in its most basic, most crudely physiological 
terms. The only explanation offered in this instance by Stendhal is that 'une bile 
extremement acre donne plus de force aux grands muscles de la jambe.'259 Such a 
notion, however, is susceptible of much wider application, opening the way to a 
far-reaching relativism in the moral and social spheres. Thus we find Stendhal, who 
had once held the passions to be everywhere and at all times the same, correcting this 
very view when it is uttered by a fellow-traveller in the Promenades dans Rome:
"Le cceur humain est le meme partout", me disait-il. Rien de plus faux pour 
l'amour; a la bonne heure s'il s'agit d'ambition, de haine, d'hypocrisie, etc.260
The human leg is not always and everywhere the same; nor is the human heart. To 
argue as much was to endorse in its fullest implications the objection which Diderot had 
levelled against Helvetius in his refutation of De I’Homme.261 For it was but a short 
step from acknowledging the diversity of human nature to concluding that the same
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men could not aspire to the same achievement in every undertaking. There were, argued 
Diderot in advance of Cabanis, certain 'expressions de caractere, anterieures a toute 
education,' which predisposed the individual towards a given mode of being. 'L'art de 
convertir le plomb en or,' he writes scathingly of Helvetius's faith in the universality of 
human potential, 'est une alchimie moins ridicule que celle de faire un Regulus du 
premier venu.'262
By bringing his thinking into line with that of Diderot and Cabanis on this 
fundamental point, Stendhal resolves one question only to be confronted by another 
much more intractable. For the recognition of natural and unalterable disparities in the 
talents and potential of human beings poses an enormous problem when it comes to the 
attribution of posts within a given society.263 Where Regulus does exist, must he not 
be assured the means to deploy his talents and virtues? If all men are not fit to exercise 
all functions, those who are must either be allowed to accede to the roles for which they 
are apt, or find some alternative means of dispensing their energies. We have seen 
already in De VAmour that Eponine cannot be consigned to a life of tranquil 
domesticity.264 Had the circumstances not been present which allowed her to channel 
her energies into heroism, she would have channelled them — with no less resolve and 
no less aptitude — into vice. Those endowed with special energies or talents cannot but 
seek means to realise them. This logic brings resounding meaning to an enigmatic 
remark which Stendhal makes in his discussion of the temperaments in VHistoire de la 
peinture en Italie. The Ancient Greek hero, Philopcemen, we are quite simply told, 'ne 
peut pas etre condamne a scier du bois.'265
Force of character will out. There are those, such logic has it, who need to 
actualise their energies in a particular way. 'Vouloir, c'est avoir le courage de s’exposer 
a un inconvenient; s'exposer ainsi, c'est tenter le hasard, c'est jouer,' writes Stendhal 
in De VAmour. 'II y a des militaires qui ne peuvent vivre sans ce jeu; c'est ce qui les 
rend insupportables dans la vie de famille.'266 Some years earlier, in the planned 
revision of Rome, Naples et Florence en 1817, we find him giving more precise 
application to this notion:
Pour les soldats romains la guerre etait un etat de repos. Se trouver au milieu des 
perils, des conspirations, des vengeances et des grandes actions est le seul etat de 
repos que puissent jamais gouter quelques jeunes Corses et Piemontais de ma 
connaissance.267
If we place these remarks alongside the definition of the bilious temperament as it 
appears in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie, we see once more the close relationship 
between the physiology of Cabanis and the portrait of the Italian as they are filtered 
respectively through Stendhal's conscience:
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Le bien-etre facile du sanguin lui est a jamais inconnu; il ne peut gouter de repos 
que dans l'excessive activite. Ce n'est que dans les grands mouvements, lorsque le 
danger ou la difficulte reclament toutes ses forces, lorsqu'a chaque instant il en a la 
conscience pleine et entiere, que cet homme jouit de l'existence.268
The release of raw energy is, of course, a subject which Stendhal never tires of 
turning over in his mind and viewing from its many possible perspectives. In a letter 
written from Trieste to Adolphe de Mareste early in 1831, he provides in this sense a 
revealing gloss on Julien Sorel's character and fate. 'La guerre,1 he declares, 'appellera 
les plus dignes au timon et donnera des sous-lieutenances a une quantite de Juliens. Elle 
est, comme le mercure, la ressource assuree des sangs empestes.'269 In a further letter, 
penned later in the same year, we find Stendhal referring once more to war as a 
therapeutic 'catharsis' for certain individuals, an 'emetique salutaire', as he puts it.270 
These remarks are to be weighed. For implicit within them is a very considerable 
philosophical problem, with implications for morality, politics, and the whole notion of 
man within society. For how does one make a pillar of the establishment from such raw 
material? How turn this bellicose energy into virtue? Both of which beg a more 
fundamental question still: how can society legislate for the disparities within 
humankind, respecting the diversity of the Many whilst ensuring the sovereign 
well-being of the One?
. Though Stendhal provides no satisfactory answer to these questions, they lie at the 
heart of his philosophical and literary preoccupations, from Les Deux Hommes through 
to Lamiel. It is in his reflections on Italy once more, however, that such questions come 
most insistently to the fore. The analogy between the Roman soldier and the 
Piedmontese conspirator is but one example of an inverse equation which Stendhal 
establishes between 'virtue' and 'vice' in ancient and in modem Italy. 'Du temps des 
Romains,' we read of a ruthless bandit in Rome, Naples et Florence, 'ce brigand eut ete 
Marcellus.'271 Of the 'foule de genies bruts' who populate Italy, Stendhal likewise 
declares: 'Ils ne jouissent de leur energie que dans la force de volonte et au besoin 
beaucoup de ces Alfieri seraient des Brutus.'272 If such are the 'Romans' of today, the 
crucial difference is that the civic virtus of Brutus and Marcellus has been transformed 
by the socio-historical context — 'Temporum culpa, non hominum'273 — into a 
resolutely individualistic virtu. The ressort has lost its sens. Italy now is a country in 
which 'les Camilles’, where they do not take to crime, 'deviennent des saints 
Dominiques.'274
Simplistic such reasoning may be. But it furnishes an important organising 
principle around which Stendhal structures his view of Italy. As he writes in VHistoire 
de la peinture en Italie, 'la condition premiere de toutes les vertus est la force.'275 This 
notion, which carries through Stendhal's writings on Italy,276 provides a key to a
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moral world in which the 'voleur heroique' disputes the honours with the 'brigand 
honnete homme.'277 For both in turn display those 'vices indices de vertus' which 
Stendhal hails as the mark of a people whose crimes stand as testament to their potential 
virtues.278 La force is the raw material of virtue and vice alike, preceding both and 
lying, therefore, in its most elemental form, beyond the range of moral approbation or 
censure. In this sense, it resembles closely the passions as they are discussed in 
Chapter HI: it is what la force becomes when translated into action that defines its moral 
character.
L'abominable despotisme qui pese sur [le Romain] depuis le XVe siecle (voyez les
Memoires de Benvenuto Cellini), ne lui a laisse qu'une vertu: la force. Cette vertu
prend souvent la physionomie du crime...279
If there is romanticism in this, it is a romanticism which finds its endorsement in 
philosophy. For Stendhal's vision here, as so often elsewhere, is but an application to 
the Italian of the qualities which Cabanis, scalpel in hand, divines in the bilious 
character. 'Des talents rares, de grands travaux, de grandes erreurs, de grandes fautes, 
quelquefois de grands crimes: tel est l'apanage de ces etres ou sublimes ou 
dangereux.'280 Such is the definition that is to be found in the 'Premier Memoire' of 
the Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme, a definition which, echoing almost 
to the letter those 'enormi e sublimi delitti' celebrated by Alfieri, provides a perfect 
summation of Stendhal's Italian.281
Reserving a place in his portrait of the bilious Italian for each of the characteristics 
suggested by Cabanis, Stendhal makes of these, however, a statement that goes far 
beyond the intentions of the physiologist. His travels through Italy are not only a 
celebration; they are also an exercise in pessimism. For the conditional tense in which 
the virtues of the Italian are so tirelessly expressed has no prospect of becoming 
indicative. Nor indeed — and here lies the paradox of Stendhal's Italy — would 
Stendhal wish them to. The very condition of Stendhal's admiration for Italy's virtues 
is, we are led to conclude, that they remain potential. 'Le monde est dans une 
revolution,' we read in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie. 'II ne reviendra jamais ni a la 
republique antique, ni a la monarchic de Louis XIV. On verra naitre un beau 
constitutionnel,'282 The republic to which Italy might pretend is not the Republic of the 
Ancients,, which, as Stendhal insists, 'ne peut pas etre, et ne sera jamais un 
gouvernement modeme';283 it is rather 'quelque chose dans le genre-de New York,' 
where 'la plante homme [...] ferait de plus grandes choses, mais aurait besoin, pour 
vivre, de moins d'energie, et par consequent serait moins belle.'284
The shadow of the French Revolution and the spectre of American democracy 
hang alike over Stendhal's considerations of Italy. For such appear to be the two routes
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that lie open to a reformed Italian polity. In the former case, a republicanism which 
disintegrates into reaction and restoration; in the latter, a republic that succeeds to the 
point where the individual is sacrificed to the community, and culture to base utility. 'It 
is surely no accident that among the political movements of his day,' observes Irving 
Howe, Stendhal 'feels closest to the Carbonari who, because they are still fighting to 
unify their nation,' have not confronted the disintegration and distortions to which, it is 
so frequently suggested by Stendhal, liberal ideals are condemned when put into 
practice.285 To trade despotism for the modem republic as Stendhal portrays it is to 
exchange one tyranny for another. 'Les grands genies en Amerique tournent 
directement a Yutile,' he writes in 1819. 'Voila le caractere de la nation. Ils se font 
Washington ou Franklin et non pas Alfieri ou Canova.'286
Such is the impasse into which we are led via Stendhal's Italy. Any reform of 
society and reaffirmation of collective values, where it succeeds, must be on a model 
for which Stendhal's aversion is amply documented. As he puts it in Rome, Naples et 
Florence, 'j'estime un sage republicain des Etats-Unis, mais je l'oublie a tout jamais en 
quelques jours: ce n'est pas un homme pour moi, c'est une chose.'287 Any salvation of 
the human element, any retention of the vir in virtue, of that 'minimum humain' which, 
as Michel Crouzet argues, is the appurtenance of ante-social man for Stendhal,288 must 
reside in an ideal of individualism indifferent — where it is not recalcitrant — to the 
social order. 'C'est d'une huitre malade que l'on tire la perle,' insists the author of 
Rome, Naples et Florence, convinced that, where Italy at least is concerned, the worth 
of society and that of the individual are inversely proportional.289 Crouzet puts the 
problem succinctly in his study of Stendhal's Italy: 'La ou la societe ne vaut rien, 
l'individu est excellent.'290
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NOTES TO CHAPTER IX
1. Corf, I, 305. The quotation is an approximate rendering of Terence's 'Homo 
sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto' ('I am a man: I count nothing human 
indifferent to me'). Cf. the letter of 22 March 1806 to the same Pauline: 'Songe 
au vif bOnheur qu'on eprouve a voir un heureux, et un heureux que l'on a fait. 
C'est le secret du bonheur. Les plaisirs egoistes ne sont jamais enivrants, ce qui 
l'est, c'est de voir un etre qu'on aime aussi heureux qu'on peut le rendre. C'est 
ce qui a fait inventer la vertu' (Ibid., I, 314-315).
2. It was a sentiment much appealed to in the humanitarian philosophy of the 
period. See, for example, Cabanis's extolment of 'cette vive faculte de 
sympathie, en vertu de laquelle rien d'humain ne nous demeure etranger' 
(Rapports, p. 299). Cf. Diderot: 'Je suis homme et je n'ai d'autres droits 
naturels veritablement inalienables que ceux de l'humanite' (cited by Vemiere, 
p. 177).
3. Corr, I, 304-305. Despite the semantic problem of defining 'egoism' as a 
'passion', Stendhal articulates here an idea which finds many echoes in his 
early writings. Cf. ibid., I, 27-28: '[...] pour etre heureux, il faut avoir 
l’intention du bien et le faire'; ibid., I, 139: 'Nous aurons done le plaisir si doux 
d'etre vertueux...'; ibid., I, 209: 'Rendons nos amis heureux, en leur montrant 
la vraie vertu'; JL, II, 191: 'Done quand nous jugeons une action parfaitement 
vertueuse, il faut la faire a l'instant.'
4. 'La societe civile est pour ainsi dire la seule divinite,' wrote Dumarsais (cited by 
Vemiere, p. 175). On Tideal collectiviste de la Revolution', see Trahard, p. 
100: 'L'individu n'est rien en effet par lui-meme, et il n'a droit au bonheur que 
s'il s'incorpore a la collectivite, qui le protege.' See also on this important point 
Hazard, La Pensee europeenne au XVIII^me siicle, vol. I, pp. 224-233; 
Frankel, pp. 8-9.
5. Though Stendhal derived much on this question from thinkers such as 
Vauvenargues and Helvetius, he encountered everywhere variations on the 
same theme of Humanity. See, for example, the extract from Lavater, in which 
man is perceived as an integral part of a human network (JL, I, 292), or the 
remarks inspired by Brissot de Warville in July 1804: 'L’etat de bonhomie est le 
supreme bonheur pour moi. [...] les grandes meditations philosophiques me 
mettent dans cet etat delicieux' (Ibid., I, 475). On the Ecoles Centrales as 
schools of civic virtue, see Arbelet, La Jeunesse de Stendhal, vol. I, pp. 
237-252.
6. Op. cit., p. 177.
7. On the general aspects of this question, see Trahard, pp. 63-73 et passim.
8. Corr, I, 66. Cf. ibid., I, 282: 'D'abord ce qui est utile ou la vertu. Ce qui nuit
ou le vice'; ibid., I, 292: 'la vertu (la plus grande quantite d'utilite).'
9. Ibid., I, 93. Cf. ibid., I, 16-17: 'sois bonne et aimante et surtout jamais fausse, 
car c'est un crime que de feindre la vertu.’
10. JL, II, 17. Cf. ibid., I, 101, 244, 473-474; II, 35-36, 44.
11. Ibid., II, 18.
12. • Ibid., I, 247.
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13. I b i d . ,  II, 137.
14. Corr, I, 83-84. We find the point spelt out with more emphasis still some years 
later in a marginal note on Constant's Principes de politique: 'L'on perd 
toujours le temps pour discuter des anciennes erreurs. II faut se tenir sur la 
nouvelle route. Le principe d[irecteu]r de l'institution sociale est le bonheur des 
associes. Voila la pierre de touche avec laquelle l'on peut, l'on doit juger des 
operations et des lois politiques' {Ibid., Ill, 361). See also JL, III, 253.
15. JL, I, 216.
16. Ibid., II, 136. See also ibid., II, 52, 110, 133, 137-138.
17. Ibid., I, 468. We touch once more here upon the important practical and ethical 
dimension in Stendhal's conception of the philosopher and of the truth which it 
is his perceived mission to lay bare. See above, Chapters II and III. See also on 
this point J.-C. Alciatore, 'Stendhal et Brissot de Warville', pp. 126-128.
18. JL, II, 123. Cf. ibid., II, 42: 'chercher dans la societe [...] les erreurs qui 
restent encore a combattre. Les ordonner suivant le plus ou moins grand mal 
qu'elles peuvent produire'; ibid., II, 112: 'Voila le sens dans lequel moi, poete 
comique, je dois travailler pour etre utile a la nation, en detruisant la prise des 
tyrans sur elle, et la rapprochant par-dela de la divina liberta.'
19. J.L. Walker, The Philosophy of Egoism (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 
1972), p. 55.
20. Op. c/r.,* p. 17.
21. Corr, I, 48.
22. Ibid., I, 126. Cf. Stendhal's letter to Edouard Mounier in February 1804: 
'j'estime peu les hommes parce que j'en ai vu tres peu d'estimables; j'estime 
encore moins les femmes parce que je les ai vues presque toutes se mal 
conduire; mais je crois encore a la vertu chez les uns et chez les autres. Cette 
croyance fait mon plus doux bonheur...' {Ibid., I, 87).
23. JL, II, 93. 'Brutus meme en immolant ses fils agissait pour son plus grand 
plaisir' {Ibid., II, 11). Cf. ibid., I, 327: '[...] il n'y a que les sots qui croient 
que je puisse aller contre mes interets.' For the difficulty which Stendhal 
encounters in adhering to this principle, see the discussion of Helvetius in 
Chapter III.
24. JL, II, 49. See the judgment on human sociability which Stendhal paraphrases 
from Hobbes in June 1804 {Ibid., I, 391): 'Les hommes sont sociables a cause 
d'une jouissance qu'ils eprouvent a etre dans la compagnie de leurs 
semblables.' Cf. Hobbes, De la Nature humaine, pp. 100-101, § 16.
25. Ibid., I, 206. See Stendhal's exhortations to his sister that she sow in society 
what she wishes to reap: Corr, I, 103, 120, 122, 194, 283, 295-296. See also 
in this context ibid., I, 107-108, 128. For a general discussion of the 
'intelligent Egoism' which Stendhal invokes, see Walker, The Philosophy of 
Egoism (esp. pp. 17, 22-23, 53-55).
26. See on this point Van Duzer, pp. 72-83; Desne, pp. 252-254. Cf. 
Robespierre's summation of the Revolutionary ethic: 'la vertu est l'essence de la 
Republique' (cited by Trahard, p. 66).
27. Ed. cit., p. 261, § 202.
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28. While urging the immeasurable importance of education, Locke recognised 'a 
thousand other things' besides — 'the various Tempers, different Inclinations, 
and particular Defaults' — which could contribute to character. It would, he 
conceded, 'require a Volume' to list such factors. See op. cit., pp. 260-261, § 
202. On the1 eighteenth century's interpretation of Locke, see Passmore's 
excellent essay, 'The Malleability of Man in Eighteenth-Century Thought.'
29. Corr, I, 52-53. Cf. Helvetius, De VHomme, vol. I, sec. II, ch. 4, pp. 179-181.
30. JL, I, 29.
31. <97,1,114.
32. Corr, I, 109. Cf. ibid., I, 78: 'II est d'ailleurs evident que le Frangais actuel, 
n'ayant pas d'occupation au forum est force a l'adultere par la nature meme de 
son gouvem[emen]t.'
33. JL, II, 116.
34. 'D'Helvetius a Stendhal: les metamorphoses de Yutile', p. 473.
35. JL, I, 478. For what Stendhal is here reacting to in Montesquieu, see De 
TEsprit desLoix (Geneva: Barrillot & Fils, 1749), pp. 16-23.
36. Corr, I, 109. Cf. Stendhal's notebook entry of 10 May 1803: 'Aujourd'hui, je 
suis beaucoup plus citoyen que sujet, et je dois tendre a devenir sans cesse 
meilleur citoyen’ {JL, 1 ,170).
37. JL, II, 11-12. Cf. ibid., I, 188: 'Un orateur doit [...] parler dz vertus, justice 
etc., comme s'il y croyait et, a l'abri de ces mots imposants, montrer aux gens 
que leur interet est de faire ce qu'il leur conseille.'
38. On no question does the young Stendhal represent more clearly the spirit of the 
Enlightenment and Revolution. For the central place of education in the 
philosophical ethos of the period, see Palmer, The Improvement o f Humanity.
39. JL, II, 21. See Corr, I, 154: '[...] souvent on a le bon coeur de vouloir le 
bonheur des autres sans avoir la bonne tete necessaire pour en assurer les 
moyens.' The net conclusion to such reasoning is found in a notebook entry of 
August 1804: 'II ne faut done qu'avoir une bonne tete (ou bien raisonner) pour 
etre vertueux parmi nous' {JL, II, 92). Cf. Robespierre's definition of 
republican virtue as 'une ame elevee et un caractere ferme dirige par des 
lumieres suffisantes' (cited by Trahard, p. 66).
40. This idea was not, however, as we saw in Chapter II, without its ambiguities. 
The deficit side of 'truth' would present itself ever more insistently to 
Stendhal's mind as his early optimism evaporated and he grew increasingly 
pessimistic in his outlook. See below.
41. Corr, I, 93. Cf. ibid., I, 107-108: 'En general, tout mal vient d'ignorer la 
verite...' Stendhal keeps faith here with ;he spirit of the Ecoles Centrales. See 
Pearce Williams, p. 314.
42. Corr, I, 126.
43. Theatre, I, 243. Again the eminently political nature of Stendhal's early 
philosophy is in evidence. See JL, I, 480: 'II faut saper les tyrans par 
{'education, c'est la le moyen le plus sur.'
454
44. 'The Malleability of Man in Eighteenth-Century Thought’, p. 25.
45. JL, II, 89-90. The opposition of a philosophical republican and a corrupt 
monarchist was scarcely ’la plus grande idee qui ait jamais fonde une comedie 
{Ibid., n, 89). The philosopher had a well established place on the French stage 
by the time Stendhal came to conceive of his earliest plots. See I.O. Wade, The
Philosophe" in the French Drama of the Eighteenth Century (Princeton: 
Princeton UP; Paris: PUF, 1926).
46. See Picavet in relation to Condorcet ('la nature lie la verite, le bonheur et la 
vertu1 [p. 114]), Cabanis ('la raison n'est que la nature elle-meme, la vertu, que 
la raison mise en pratique, et l'art du bonheur, que celui de la vertu' [p. 191]), 
and Tracy ('"Le produit de la faculte de penser ou percevoir = connaissance = 
verite [...] = vertu = bonheur = sentiment d'aimer [...] = liberte = egalite = 
philanthropic’" [p. 303]). See also Lichtheim, pp. 167-168.
47. JL, II, 126-127.
48. An Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding, and an Enquiry concerning 
the Principles of Morals, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1894), p. 83, § 65; Crocker, An Age of Crisis, p. 184. Crocker's remark is 
made in relation to Voltaire; but it sums up well the view of human nature which 
Stendhal inherits from Helvetius most notably. On the 'essential identity of all 
men' as the latter conceived it, see ibid., p. 189.
49. Frankel, p. 47. See also p. 16.
50. See respectively JL, II, 21, 114; Corr, I, 66; JL, II, 136, 17; Corr, I, 93; JL, I,
247; II, 18; Corr, I, 83-84; JL, I, 478; Corr, I, 292; JL, II, 12, 157-158.
51. Op. cit., pp. 68-69.
52. See Parker, pp. 33-36, 62-63, 122-126; E. Rawson, The Spartan Tradition in
European Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 220-300; D. 
Leduc-Fayette, Jean-Jacques Rousseau et le mythe de Vantiquite (Paris: Vrin, 
1974); R.A. Leigh, 'Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Myth of Antiquity in the 
Eighteenth Century', Classical Influences on Western Thought, A.D. 
1650-1870, ed. R.R. Bolgar (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1979), pp. 155-168;
- J. Starobinski, 1789. Les emblemes de la raison (Paris: Flammarion, 1979), 
pp. 65-81. For an excellent study of the Latin moral tradition upon which the 
philosophes and Revolutionaries drew, see D. Earl, The Moral and Political 
Tradition of Rome (London: Thames and Hudson, 1967).
53. See Stendhal's repeated injunctions to Pauline that she read these authors: Corr, 
I, 2, 3, 44, 52, 54, 62, 74, 102, 131, 132, 135, 226, 272,- 282, 292. On 
Stendhal's perceptions of Ancient Rome, see J.G. Shields, 'Enricus Beyle, 
Romanus: le classicisme d'un romantique', Stendhal, Roma, LTtalia, ed. M. 
Colesanti et al (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1985), pp. 63-82.
54. Corr, I, 110. See also JL, I, 359. On this question in general, see Parker, pp. 
23-24.
55. See Corr, I, 47, 102, 109; JL, II, 11-12, 39, 101; OI, I, 148.
56. JL, II, 26. See also ibid., I, 237-238: 'II nous manque une histoire de la 
rjepublique] romaine ecrite avec l'enthousiasme de la liberte, enthousiasme 
modere de maniere a faire le plus grand effet et a reveiller les peuples dormant 
sous les chaines de la tyrannie.' Something of the sense of concepts such as
455
virtue and liberty as they feature in the rhetoric of the period, and as they are 
used in turn by Stendhal, may be gleaned from J. Hellegouarc'h, Le  
Vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la Republique (Paris: 
Les Belles Lettres, 1963). This study provides a useful accompaniment to 
Parker's The Cult of Antiquity and the French Revolutionaries. See also on this 
question J.G. Shields, 'Stendhal et les metamorphoses de la Republique', 
Stendhal Club, 27e annee, no. 107 (1985), pp. 214-226.
57. 0 7 ,1, 148.
58. Corr, I, 171-172.
59. JL, II, 87.
60. This raises an important question. For the view is expressed by many of 
Stendhal's commentators that he was from the earliest, in L. Blum's terms (p. 
216), 'impermeable, refractaire a toute influence, a toute persuasion.' The 
established image is one of an 'eternal dissenter' (Josephson, p. x) whose 
overriding ambition was, as P. Jourda argues, to 's'affranchir de toute 
influence scolaire' {Etat present des etudes stendhaliennes, p. 19). This is a 
view with which any who read Stendhal's early notes and letters in the light of 
his instruction in the Ecole Centrale cannot but take issue. For his writings, 
years after his formal education had ended, far from bearing out the suggestion 
that Stendhal ’resistait a tout ce qu'on lui avan9ait' (Blin, Personnalite, p. 418), 
are infused still with the values which had defined the Ecoles Centrales'. See on 
this question in general Palmer, The Improvement of Humanity, pp. 221-278; 
Vial, pp. 71-125; Van Duzer, pp. 111-114, 128-142; Kitchin, pp. 179-192. On 
Stendhal's alleged resistance to 'toute forme de contrainte et de dogme, comme 
parti pris negatif a l'egard de la societe et de la loi', see Crouzet, 'Litterature et 
politique chez Stendhal', p. 102; Merimee, 'Notes et souvenirs', in Jourda, 
Stendhal raconte par ceux qui Tont vu, p. 206; Arbelet, La Jeunesse de 
Stendhal, vol. I, p.. 252; Josephson, p. 25.
61. JL, I, 61. Though Stendhal's language here is suggestive of Condorcet, he 
makes surprisingly little mention of the latter in his writings — particularly if 
store is to be set by his claim that he read 'avec enthousiasme deux ou trois fois' 
(HB, II, 276) the Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progres de Vesprit 
humain. On Condorcet's theory of human perfectibility as Stendhal would have 
known it, see Picavet, pp. 101-116; Rude, pp. 30-37; J.G. Frazer, Condorcet 
on the Progress of the Human Mind (The Zaharoff Lecture, 1933) (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1933); F.E. Manuel, The Prophets o f Paris (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard UP, 1962), pp. 75-102; Cailliet, pp. 165-210 ('L'ceuvre a 
laquelle aboutit toute la pen see du XVIIIe siecle, c'est V Esquisse de Condorcet' 
[p. 166]). The concept of 'progress' as an outgrowth of Enlightenment thought 
is discussed by J.B. Bury in The Idea o f Progress (New York: Dover, 1960). 
See in particular pp. 159-216, 260-323. See also on this question Frankel, 
passim.
62. JL, I, 321. Though references to the perfectibility of humanity in Stendhal's 
early writings are legion, he hesitates on this question.'Qu'est-ce que la 
perfectibilite? Existe-elle?' {Ibid., I, 327). Cf. the notebook entry of July 1804 
in which he envisages 'la civilisation la plus parfaite possible ou si la 
perfectibilite est vraie nous arriverons le dernier jour du monde {Ibid., n, 62).
63. See 'Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Myth of Antiquity in the Eighteenth 
Century.' The association between classical antiquity and the doctrine of secular 
humanism in question arose more, of course, from myth than from historical 
fact. See N. Loraux and P. Vidal-Naquet, 'La Formation de l'Athenes 
bourgeoise: essai d'historiographie 1750-1850', in Bolgar, Classical Influences
456
on Western Thought, pp. 169-222. Stendhal, while celebrating in turn the 
virtues of the Ancients, is alive to the contradiction inherent in the 
Revolutionary cult of Antiquity. 'Les anciens ne connurent pas les droits de 
l'homme,' he writes in 1818. 'La liberte fut pour eux un heritage comme la 
fortune' (Italie, 199).
64. H.O. Pappe, 'The English Utilitarians and Athenian Democracy', in Bolgar, 
Classical Influences on Western Thought, p. 299.
65. 07,1,61.
66. Op. cit,, p. 175.
67. For Stendhal’s frequent recourse to these dicta, see JL, I, 174; II, 343; III, 181,
184, 335; Corr, I, 915; Vie de Nap, 38; De TAmour, II, 172 n. 1; Italie, 266; H 
deP, 11,8.
68. JL, I, 417. Cf. ibid., II, 18, 21: 'Tous les hommes agissent suivant ce qui leur 
parait et non suivant ce qui est.'
69. Ibid., I, 370.
70. Ibid., 1,452.
71. Corr, I, 140. As early as August 1803, we find Stendhal expressing doubt that
the society to which he is witness could be galvanised by a common interest 
into common endeavour. '[...] actuellement que [les hommes] trouvent des 
sensations delicieuses sans sortir de leurs maisons, peuvent-ils etre rappeles sur 
la place publique?' (JL, I, 227).
72. JL, n , 15. Stendhal is clearly uneasy on this point, for he appears to contradict 
himself by reverting almost at once to the argument that actions are to be 
deemed good or bad by virtue of their consequences alone: 'II ne faut done pas 
estimer notre role dans la vie commune par le merite qu'il nous semble avoir, 
mais par l'effet que nous lui voyons produire'. (ibid., II, 21). Cf. ibid., II, 
35-36: 'II faut ordonner [...] les vertus et leurs contraires les vices, sur la 
quantite de bonheur et de malheur qu'ils peuvent produire probablement'; ibid., 
II, 79: '[...] l'utilite [...] est toujours l'echelle du merite.'
73. Ibid., II, 17. Contained here already, in 1804, are the seeds of the pamphlet 
which Stendhal would in time direct against the narrow pragmatism of the 
Saint-Simonians. See on this question Strickland, Stendhal: The Education of a 
Novelist, pp. 48-51; 'Le bonheur du plus grand nombre', pp. 203-204.
74. JL, II, 100. 'Ce sont les motifs qui portent a une action et non pas l'action toute 
nue qui nous peignent un homme comme aimable ou haTssable. Un pere a fait 
perir son fils; execrable dans Philippe II, admirable dans J[unius] Brutus' 
(Ibid., II, 101).
75. 'A Critique of Utilitarianism’, in J.J.C. Smart and B. Williams, Utilitarianism 
For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1973), p. 100.
76. See ibid., pp. 79, 82-83, 99.
77. JL, II, 48. Cf. Corr, I, 109: Textreme egoiste est celui qui verrait avec plaisir 
tuer un homme pour s'epargner la peine de se faire les ongles.'
78. Op. cit., p. 385. 'Le seul point sur lequel je ne contesterai pas, c’est que chacun 
s'aime autant qu'il est possible a chacun de s'aimer. Mais deux hommes, oui,
457
deux seuls hommes reduits par la nature, l'experience ou l'institution a la meme 
dose d'amour de soi, seraient le plus etonnant de tous les prodiges.'
79. JL, I, 472.
80. Corr, I, 159.
81. Ibid., I, 280.
82. See, for example, ibid., I, 30, 36, 87, 150, 161-162, 218, 337, 338, 344-347,
353. See on this question Crouzet, 'Misanthropie et vertu: Stendhal et le
probleme republicain'; Blin, Personnalite, pp. 391-392.
83. JL, I, 142-143. Cf. ibid., Ill, 6.
84* Ibid., I, 343. Cf. ibid., I, 253: 'Le merveilleux, Yadmirable, Vetonnant d'un
homme ne sont point le merveilleux, Yadmirable, Yetonnant d’un autre
homme.'
85. Ibid., II, 37.
86. Corr, 1,344.
87. See also, for example, ibid., I, 335, 338.
88. De I'Esprit, vol. II, disc. Ill, ch. 26, pp. 157-158.
89. JL, I, 375-376.
90. Ibid., I, 390.
91. Op. cit., p. 78.
92. Such, according to Staum, are 'the evident polarities in Cabanis's viewpoint.'
See 'Cabanis and the Science of Man', p. 138; Cabanis: Enlightenment and 
Medical Philosophy in the French Revolution, p. 20.
93. Rapports, p. 262.
94. Ibid., p. 299.
95. Ibid., p. 11.
96. Ibid., p. 340.
97. See Corr, I, 920.
98. 'L'education peut tout' is the unqualified claim of Helvetius, whose contention
it is that 'Tous les hommes communement bien organises ont une egale aptitude
a l'esprit.' See De VHomme, vol. I, sec. II, ch. 1, p. 149; vol. II, sec. X, ch.
1, p. 611.
99. Education, for Helvetius, is ‘tout ce qui sert a notre instruction' (De VEsprit, 
vol. I, disc. Ill, ch. 1, pp. 343, 347). See on this point Cumming, p. 142; 
Smith, Helvetius: A Study in Persecution, pp. 195-197; Halevy, vol. II, pp. 
258-259.
100. JL, I, 126.
458
101. Ibid., I, 157.
102. See Vigneron, 'Beylisme, romanticisme, realisme’, p. 98.
103. See JL, I, 522 n. While Buffon makes no reference in the passage cited to 
legislation, Helvetius, for his part, goes so far as to deny outright the influence 
of climate. What Stendhal does, in effect, is to conjoin the arguments of both in 
a grossly over-simplified formula.
104. De I'Homme, vol. II, sect. V, ch. 2, pp. 13-14. This is a point which, as H. 
Delacroix (p. 9 n. 2) notes, Helvetius is at pains to stress.
105. Corr, I, 312. Cf. ibid., I, 27, 52; JL, I, 120, 135. It had, as L. Pearce Williams 
observes (pp. 317-318), been the objective of the Ecoles Centrales to present 
history as a means of charting the progress of the human mind and the 'constant 
relation' between man's reason and his well-being.
106. An Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding, p. 83, § 65. See on this 
point Crocker, An Age of Crisis, pp. 186-187; Gay, pp. 168-169, 380-385; 
Staum, 'Cabanis and the Science of Man', p. 136; Frankel, pp. 101-127 
passim.
107. Corr, I, 27; JL, I, 113. Cf. Corr, I, 142: 'Les moeurs changent, mais non les 
passions; les moyens de passions changent avec les mceurs.'
108. JL, I, 122.
109. H de P, n, 34-35.
110. M de T, I, 177-183; II, 29-35. See on this question Regaldo, 'Un touriste 
"ideologue": Stendhal a Bordeaux', pp. 43-46.
111. Op. cit., p. 140. To this notion of a 'generic human civilization' {Ibid., p. 148), 
Cabanis was to be among the foremost in bringing a serious physiological 
corrective.
112. The process by which this development took place in the French 
post-Enlightenment conscience is charted by Stocking.
113. Ibid., p. 148. See on this question in general Coleman, Biology in the 
Nineteenth Century, pp. 92-117.
114. JL, II, 403.
115. Corr, I, 311-312.
116. H de P, II, 84.
117. See the remarks relating to diet and health in Chapter V.
118. Rapports, p. 206.
119. Op. cit., p. 60.
120. Rapports, p. 295. See also ibid., p. 85: 'Dans la nature, les temperaments se 
combinent et se mitigent de cent manieres differentes. On n'en rencontre 
presque point qui soient exempts de melange.'
121. Hde P,  II, 38.
459
. 122. Ibid., II, 75.
123. See Bosselaers, Stendhal, pelerin du bonheur, pp. 27-28.
124. De VAmour, I, 16.
125. JL, II, 315.
126. Ibid., II, 354. See also ibid., II, 296-297; 0 1 ,1, 622-623.
127. JL, II, 334.
128. Romans, I, 406. See also ibid., I, 463.
129. Ibid., I, 596, 597.
130. JL, II, 327. To this Stendhal adds his ultimate appraisal of the bilious 
temperament: 'Le bilieux est done force aux grandes choses (Ex.: Milan).' [For 
'Milan', read Napoleon.] The passage cited may be read in conjunction with a 
remark which Stendhal makes to his sister Pauline in a letter from Vienna in 
September 1809: 'Le repos avec notre caractere est l'avant-garde de la mort'
0Corr, I, 540).
131. See 0 1 ,1, 766.
132. Ibid., I, 720. See the more extended reflection on this aspect of Stendhal's
character in his diary of 15 May 1806 {Ibid., I, 438).
133. See Chapters V and VII respectively; Corr, I, 261, 263, 272, 312, 616; OI, I,
720, 764, 766.
134. Corr, I, 893.
135. Personnalite, pp. 3-13. See also on this question Starobinski, 'Stendhal 
pseudonyme.'
136. Introduction, Stendhal: A Collection of Critical Essays, p. 5; Stendhal: Fiction ■ 
and the Themes of Freedom, p. 6. On the problem of self-knowledge in 
Stendhal and its relation to the creative enterprise of the novelist, see the same 
author's 'Stendhal: Creation and Self-Knowledge.'
137. See JL, I, 366; OI, I, 710; II, 231; Cabanis, Rapports, p. 142. See also on this 
question Alciatore, 'Stendhal, Destutt de Tracy et le precepte Nosce te ipsum.'
138. OI, I, 394; 397; 398; 428. Stendhal's diary serves often as a record of
self-discovery. See, for example, ibid., I, 668, 694, 697, 907.
139. Corr, I, 283. Cf. ibid., I, 291: 'Songe a te connaitre toi-meme.'
140. JL, II, 113.
141. Corr, I, 281-282. Such stoical reasoning is much in evidence in Stendhal's
early notes and letters. See, for instance, JL, I, 331; II, 8; OI, I, 378, 397; 
Corr, I, 106, 108, 119, 139, 163-165, 175, 193-194, 197, 198, 260-261, 271, 
348.
142. Corr, I, 229.
460
143. Ibid., I, 343.
144. /L, II, 420.
145. 07,1,668.
146. Loc. cit., n.
147. Among a plethora of examples, see Corr, I, 139, 163-165, 193-194, 214, 
291-292, 300; JL, I, 475; II, 8, 15, 182; OI, I, 397.
148. Corr, I, 364.
149. See OI, I, 315.
150. Ibid., I, 907. The problem of self-knowledge is from the earliest recognised by
Stendhal. See, for example, Corr, I, 101: '[...] il est tres difficile de se
connaitre soi-meme'; ibid., I, 282: 'Nous jie connaissons done guere nos 
caracteres...’ Cf. his conclusion as expressed in S d'E, 93: 'On peut connaitre 
tout, excepte soi-meme.' The problem will be transmitted in turn to Stendhal's 
fictional characters. See, for example, Lucien Leuwen's exasperated reflexion: 
'quelle opinion dois-je avoir de moi-meme?' (Romans, I, 1276).
151. 'Stendhal pseudonyme', p. 219.
152. Personnalite, p. 11 n. 4.
153. JL, III, 161-162. Cf. the naturalistic image which is again used to represent 
character in a diary entry of September 1811 (OI, 1,791).
154. See Cumming, pp. 151, 200-217; Smith, Helvetius: A Study in Persecution, 
pp. 196-201.
155. See Leuwen pere's pointed question to his son: 'Est-ce qu'on change de 
caractere?' (Romans, I, 1157).
156. See on this question Starobinski, 'Stendhal pseudonyme’, pp. 203-204, 
219-221, 242-244.
157. Corr, II, 33. This passage finds something of a pendant in the Vie de Henry 
Brulard. Tetais,' Stendhal recalls, 'comme un cheval ombrageux qui ne voit 
pas ce qui est mais des obstacles ou perils imaginaires; le bon, c'est que mon 
cceur se montait, et je marchais fierement aux plus grands perils. Je suis encore 
ainsi aujourd'hui' (HB, II, 277).
158. See on this point Brombert, Stendhal: Fiction and the Themes o f Freedom, p. 
24.
159. See Brombert's definition of the Vie de Henry Brulard as 'an enterprise of the 
imagination as much as of memory, [...] a work of creative retrospection' 
(Ibid., p. 25).
160. See Barrere, pp. 447-461.
161. Romans, I, 34. Cf. Julien Sorel: 'Grand Dieu! Pourquoi suis-je moi?' (Ibid., I, 
612), and Lucien Leuwen: 'Grand Dieu! Tous les hommes sont-ils ainsi? Ou 
suis-je plus fou qu'un autre? Qui me resoudra ce probleme?' (Ibid., I, 976). On- 
the singularity of the Stendhalian hero, see Blin, Personnalite, pp. 395-406, 
420-423; Barrere, pp. 457-459.
461
162. C.W. Thompson, Le Jeu de I'ordre et de la liberte dans 'La Chartreuse de 
Parme', p. 225.
163. 'Stendhal pseudonyme', p. 219.
164. L'Ame et la Page. Trois Essais sur Stendhal (Aran: Editions du Grand Chene, 
1982), p. 88.
165. HB, II, 279.
166. 'Preromantisme rousseauiste et egotisme stendhalien: convergence et 
divergences', p. 104.
167. See HB, I, 19; 33; 175.
168. Le Naturel chez Stendhal, p. 112.
169. HB , II, 129.
170. Op. cit., p. 178.
171. HB , I, 235.
172. Ibid., I, 236.
173. Op. cit., p. 22 n. 4.
174. JL, HI, 162. Here the contrast with Helvetius is starker than ever.
175. 'Ideology,' as M.S. Staum notes, 'did not imply a relentless fatalism any more 
than it implied a rigid materialism' ('Cabanis and the Science of Man', p. 140).
176. The twelfth and final memoir of Cabanis's work is devoted to the question of 
acquired temperament. This could be effected, it is argued, through the 
contraction of certain illnesses, or under the influence of a sustained change of 
climate or regimen. Stendhal, in turn, recognises the possibility of acquired 
temperament. See H de P, II, 75.
177. Italie, 508.
178. Alter, p. 21.
179. Personnalite, pp. 3 ff.
180. See, for example, Italie, 364-365.
181. Ibid., 147.
182. Ibid., 583.
183. De VAmour, I, 241.
184. Italie, 73.
185. 'Le volume du poumon parait aussi determiner communement celui du cceur, ou 
du moins l'energie des fibres de celui-ci se proportionne au volume de celui-la, 
et tous les deux determinent de concert les dispositions generates du systeme 
sanguin. [...] Ainsi done, un poumon plus volumineux produit, toutes choses
462
egales d'ailleurs, une sanguification plus active ou plus complete; il foumit une 
plus grande quantite de chaleur animale; il imprime un mouvement plus rapide 
au sang' CRapports, pp. 277-278). Cf. H de P, II, 40, 44-45; JL , II, 324-331.
186. Italie,! 55.
187. Romans, II, 711.
188. Ibid., H,.24.
189. Hd e P,  11,108.
190. Italie, 945. Of Louis David, Stendhal elsewhere writes: 'Ses tableaux ne font 
pas plaisir a l'ceil; ils seraient peut-etre bons sous la latitude de Stockholm' 
(Ibid., 333 n.).
191. Ibid., 39, 521.
192. CA, III, 22. The remark is a clear reference to the criticisms levelled against 
Rome, Naples et Florence en 1817 by the Edinburgh Review. See Italie, 
1440-1443.
193. See M de T, 1 ,177-182; II, 29-36.
194. Corr, HI, 542-544. Stendhal projects what he has culled from Cabanis onto the 
new material provided by Edwards. 'Chose singuliere! on ne rencontre guere 
d'homme de l'une ou de l'autre race au caractere physique pur ou a peu pres, 
qui n'en ait aussi le caractere moral' (M de T, I, 180). On this question, as on 
the earlier question of temperament, M. Tillett (p. 119) is unjustifiably 
dismissive. Failing to recognise Stendhal's debt to Edwards, she sums up this 
part of the Memoires d'un touriste as 'some pages of generalization on the 
"three races" of France — supplied by Crozet or borrowed from some even 
more pedestrian writer.'
195. Italie, 662-663. Stendhal adds the footnote: 'Voir la savante dissertation de M. 
le docteur Edwards, sur les races d'hommes et les rapports de la physiologie et 
de l'histoire. Paris, 1829.'
196. Ibid., 867.
197. Crouzet, Raison, p. 335.
198. Italie, 668. Extending the scope of the comparison, Stendhal goes on to evoke 
'toute l'etendue de la difference que l'experience etablit entre le flegmatique 
Hollondais, le Bergamasque a demi fou tant ses passions sont vives, et le 
Napolitain a demi fou tant il suit avec impetuosite la sensation du moment.'
199. Ibid., 586.
200. Ibid., 662.
201. Ibid., 37, 518.
202. Ibid., 62.
203. See JL, H, 87.
204. Corr, I, 974-975.
463
205. Italie, 65.
206. Ibid., 689.
207. Ibid., 410.
208. Ibid., 1182.
209. Ibid., 38, 519.
210. H d e P , l ,  50.
211. Ibid., n, 36.
212. Op. cit., p. 39.
213. 'H.B.', in Jourda, Stendhal raconte par cewc qui Vontvu, p. 191.
214. Cited by Mauzi, p. 147 n. 1. The homo homini lupus had a particular place, as 
B. Plongeron (p. 398) notes, in the post-Revolutionary philosophical 
conscience.
215. See Mauzi, pp. 145-147.
216. Op. cit., p. 277. The remark, of course, had a significance that extended far 
beyond the canine realm. Cf. ibid., p. 312: '[...] la race humaine rassemble les 
analogues de toutes les sortes d’animaux; et [...] il n'est non plus possible de
. tirer un homme de sa classe qu'un animal de la sienne, sans les denaturer l'un et 
l’autre, et sans se fatiguer beaucoup pour n'en faire que deux sottes betes.'
217. Raison, p. 299.
218. See, for example, OI, I, 660, 666, 720, 766; Corr, I, 621-622; JL, II, 334.
219. Corr, I, 609-610.
220. Cf. his vituperative denunciations of 'la canaille humaine' in the letters which he 
despatches from Prussia in 1807 (Ibid., I, 337, 338, 344, 346, 347, 348, 353, 
367, 377).
221. Ibid.,'I, 609
222. See on this point Crouzet, Nature et societe chez Stendhal, p. 35. 'Le vouloir 
prime le savoir,' as Crouzet elsewhere puts it, 'et le "caractere" la logique' 
(Raison, p. 153).
223.. Corr, I, 1002-1003.
224. Ibid., I, 1003.
225. See, for example, Vie de Nap, 354: 'Quand les hommes voudront-ils s’abaisser 
a comprendre qu'une bouteille ne peut pas etre pleine en meme temps de vin de 
Champagne et de Suresnes? II faut choisir.' Cf. Italie, 38, 519; De IAmour, II, 
136-137; JL, III, 186: 'une jeune femme ne peut etre blonde et brune.'
226. Italie, 38, 519.
227. Le beau ideal can be altered in time and space, multiplied or divided ad infinitum 
(H de P, II, 17-18). See on this question Talbot, Stendhal and Romantic
464
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
Esthetics, pp. 55-60. 'From the classical science of mathematical certitude and 
uniformity,’ writes E. Kennedy, 'ideologie, with Stendhal, became a method 
for analyzing romantic idiosyncrasy' (’Destutt de Tracy and the Unity of the 
Sciences’, p. 233).
It is, of course, a fine line (where the line exists at all) which separates the 
aesthetic from the moral in Stendhal’s world-view. ’[...] le sublime en bien est 
pres du sublime en mal,’ he writes as early as 1804 {Corr, I, 150).
See Cabanis, Rapports, p. 298; H de P, II, 79-80 n. 3.
Op. cit., p. 79.
Rapports, p. 266.
Witness ’le fatal triangle qui s’etend entre Bordeaux, Bayonne et Valence’ (HB, 
II, 25): ’Je pense qu’a cause du climat et de l’amour et de l’energie qu’il donne 
a la machine, ce triangle devrait produire les premiers hommes de France. La 
Corse me conduit a cette idee.’
Italie, 445. Cf. Stendhal’s letter to Clementine Curial in 1824 (Corr, n, 33). 
Italie, 292.
Ibid., 143.
Corr, II, 17. See, among a number of examples, Italie, 867-868, 1214, 1237; 
Rossini, I, 251.
Italie, 1660 n. Cf. H de P, II, 145: ’Quand son temperament profondement 
bilieux lui permettrait le bonheur facile du sanguin, ses gouvernements sont la 
pour le lui defendre.’
The association between energy, ferocity and potentiality is frequently in 
evidence. See, for example, Italie, 192-193, 334-335, 387-388. On the Italian 
as a quantum of potential, see Crouzet, Stendhal et Vitalianite, pp. 35-38, 
226-229.
Italie, 58.
Rapports, pp. 608-609.
Italie, 99. Cf. ibid., 165.
Ibid., 1038. See also ibid., 17, 239, 486, 867-868, 996-997.
De VAmour, I, 223-224.
Italie, 1236.
Hde P,  II, 145.
Italie, 1291.
Loc. cit. Stendhal writes of Italy's outlaws: 'combien d'entre eux ne 
demandaient qu'un champ a cultiver pour ne pas se faire brigands!' (Ibid., 
1237).
'Stendhal et l'energie: du Moi a la Poetique', p. 68. Again R. Doumic (pp.
465
134-135) seizes something of Stendhal's concept of energy which was lost on 
contemporaries such as E. Faguet. Of Stendhal's Italy, Doumic writes: '[...] 
dans de tels milieux, l'individu est sans cesse en presence d'un obstacle; il a 
l'occasion et il est dans la necessite de lutter; toutes ses facultes sont tendues, 
pretes au bien comme au mal; toutes les forces du genie sont developpees, 
pretes a faire leur poussee en n'importe quel sens, a eclater dans la guerre ou 
dans les beaux-arts...'
249. Op. cit., p. 59.
250. HdeP,II,A6;Italie,A26.
251. H de P, II, 145.
252. Italie, 656.
253. See ibid., 425-426, 219: '[...] tant le genie italien est fait pour les grandes 
choses...'
254. Ibid., 426 n. Stendhal later reiterates this remark, applying it specifically to the 
Roman: 'Donnez-lui un Napoleon pendant vingt ans, et les Romains seront 
evidemment le premier peuple de l'Europe' (Ibid., 586). Cf. the later reference 
to Naples (Ibid., 663): 'Un Frederic II, avec dix ans d'enseignement mutuel, 
placerait ce pays a la hauteur des Chambres.'
255. 'Cabanis and the Science of Man', p. 143.
256. Italie, 825.
257. Rapports, pp. 299-300.
258. Hd e P,  II, 31.
259. Loc. cit.
260. Italie, 1069. Cf. JL, II, 184; OI, I, 399-400; H de P, I, 264; Italie, 1182.
261. See op. cit., pp. 277, 312 et passim.
262. Ibid., p. 280. Each man, as Diderot argues (p. 312), 'est entrame par son
organisation, son caractere, son temperament, son aptitude naturelle a combiner
de preference telles et telles idees plutot que telles ou telles autres.' See in the 
same vein pp. 339-347.
263. The problem had been recognised by Diderot, who identifies in the arbitrary 
interplay of natural aptitudes and fortune 'la raison pour laquelle les talents sont 
deplaces et les etats de la societe remplis d'hommes malheureux ou de sujets 
mediocres, et que celui qui aurait ete un grand artiste, n'est qu'un pauvre 
sorbonniste ou un plat jurisconsulte' (p. 3.12). Such reasoning could have come 
straight from the pages of Stendhal.
264. De VAmour, 1 ,109. See above, Chapter VIII. The case of Eponine finds some 
echo in Mme de Renal, who, for all her adulterous deceptions, 'eut sacrifie sa 
vie sans hesiter pour sauver celle de son mari, si elle l'eut vu en peril' (Romans, 
I, 362).
265. H de P, n, 48. In a pointedly parodic way, Julien Sorel is offered a glimpse of 
just such a fate, the same 'moyen ignoble d'arriver a l'aisance', by Fouque the 
timber-merchant — and that at a moment when, dining with his friend 'comme
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CHAPTER X
PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS: APPLYING THE LESSONS OF
DISILLUSIONMENT
Philosophical Optimism Recanted
The foregoing chapter presents two quite distinct visions of human nature. By 
renouncing his early faith in man’s inherent sociability, Stendhal opened the way 
towards a rationale of the ego which we find developed across the range of his later 
writings. Italy — 'ou tout le monde est original et ne fait que ce qui lui fait plaisir, sans 
s'inquieter du voisiri — becomes the locus in quo of an individualism to which all 
roads, philosophical, aesthetic and political, lead.1 For the political aspect of Stendhal's 
thought cannot be separated from the broader philosophical context within which it 
evolves. The monarchical regime-— 'ou le sort de chaque homme est individuel'2 — is 
a far cry indeed from Stendhal's initial ideal; but, as the contributor to the London 
Magazine will declare baldly in 1825: 'Personne n'aime la Republique.'3 Whatever 
self-consciousness might be divined in such a remark, it sums up Stendhal’s perception 
of a France where, as he will put it in the Memoires d'un touriste,
il n'y a plus de societe; chaque famille vit isolee dans sa maison, comme Robinson
dans son ile. Une ville est une collection de menages anachoretes 4
Throughout Stendhal's writings, both private and published, one finds many such 
allusions to the disintegration of the republican ideal. Nor does Stendhal's experience 
as an active participant in the post-Revolutionary adventure appear to have bolstered his 
faltering faith in man. Quite the contrary, if store is to be set by the testimony of his 
diaries and letters. 'Les interieurs d'ames que j'ai vus dans la retraite de Moscou,’ he 
would reflect in his diary of 19 April 1813, 'm'ont a jamais degoute des observations 
que je puis faire sur les etres grossiers, sur ces manches a sabre qui composent une 
armee.'5 If Stendhal required proof that the virtus of old was no more, he seems to 
have found it in ample measure on the steppes of Russia. 'L'aspect sale sous lequel on 
decouvre l'humanite dans les positions difficiles, en un mot ce que j'ai vu en Russie, 
me degoute des voyages un peu dangereux,' we read again in his diary of 25 July 
1815.6
The terms in which Stendhal couches the recollections of his armed service, and of 
the Russian campaign most notably, are highly significant. For what he denounces 
most is the lack of any evident humanitarian sentiment. 'Le danger etait trop grand dans 
la retraite de Russie pour avoir pitie de personne,’ he would write in a footnote to
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I'Histoire de la peinture en Italie.1 Much later, as consul in Civitavecchia, we find him 
reflecting still upon the base egoism and venality which had been laid bare during the 
retreat from Moscow. 'Je quittai Moscou le 16 octobre 1812,' he recalls in a note 
consigned to Saint-Simon's Memoires\
Les generaux etaient des modeles d'egoisme sordide, prets a sacrifier leur vie pour 
de l'avancement, et bien autre chose que leur vie. Ces ames sales et sordides 
donnaient settlement signe de vie quand le peril etait extreme.8
It is not our purpose to argue the importance of this single episode as a 
turning-point in Stendhal's philosophical evolution. What we wish to highlight is quite 
simply the perspective within which he rationalised the experience in question, making 
it the focus for a sweeping — philosophical — disillusionment with mankind. 'This is 
the point,' writes Robert Alter, 'where Stendhal's doctrine of the Happy Few begins to 
take definitive shape, for after Russia he begins to fear that the mass of humanity is too 
horrendously unredeemable to work with or hope for.'9 Though Alter describes the 
Russian debacle as more of a clear watershed in Stendhal's philosophical conscience 
than we should care to, he appears founded in his contention that it 'was, most 
fundamentally, a sense of man's nature that was destroyed for Beyle in the wreckage of 
Napoleon's Russian adventure.' For Stendhal had, as Alter observes, and as we have 
seen in an earlier chapter, sought to conduct 'a rational quasi-mathematical analysis of 
man as a bundle of impulsions toward pleasure and away from pain obeying uniform 
laws of motivation.'10 Though he had long forsaken the more abstract and 
uniformitarian aspects of such a notion, the neatly turned aphorisms of the philosophes 
through which it had first been conveyed to him could not but seem singularly at odds 
with the brutalised vision of man to which he had been privy. Stendhal's diary entry of 
21 May 1813, written against the roar of the cannons at Bautzen, testifies to his 
impatience now with those observations on the 'human soul' by which he had once set 
such store, and which his Moscow experience — as he specifies — had cast in a new 
light:
Je ne bande plus pour ce genre d'observations. J'en suis soul, qu'on me passe 
l'expression; c'est un homme qui a trop pris de punch et qui a ete oblige de le 
rendre; il en est degoute pour la vie.11
Such remarks, for all their value, must be treated with some caution. Stendhal's 
interest in the 'human heart', if it waned in the aftermath of his Russian ordeal, was by 
no means eclipsed in 1812. What one may conclude is that he would cling more firmly 
hereafter to the impression, in which the retreat across the wastes of Russia seems to 
have confirmed him, of a humanity hopelessly fragmented. The Moscow campaign 
may be seen, in this sense, less as a clear turning-point than as an important stage in an 
on-going process of disenchantment for Stendhal.12 By the time he undertook to
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articulate his philosophy in I'Histoire de la peinture en Italie and De VAmour,,he would 
have come to some sort of intellectual terms with a view of man that is the very 
negation of that 'revered but impossible ideal'13 upon which he had drawn in his 
earliest writings. By then, too, Stendhal would have found a new avenue into which to 
channel his radically revised conception of man. 'Les plaisirs de chaque individu sont 
differents, et souvent opposes,’ we read in De VAmour: 'cela explique fort bien 
comment ce qui est beaute pour un individu est laideur pour un autre.'14
This, it became clear to Stendhal, was the inevitable conclusion not only of all 
aesthetic theorising, but of any attempt, moral and political alike, to legislate for a 
'common' man. The rank individualism for which his writing stands at times as a 
defiant apology may be seen as a capitulation to what he suggests is the overwhelming 
evidence of man's unregenerate ego. Yet Stendhal's protestations against the inveterate 
selfishness of his fellows must be seen within a broader context than his own 
philosophical evolution. It is important to stress that the role of the ego is paramount for 
even the most optimistic of the thinkers who furnished Stendhal with his earliest view 
of Humanity. Where he breaks faith with these thinkers is not in seeing men as so 
many self-interested animals; as Michel Crouzet points out: 'Tous les maitres de 
Stendhal l'ont dit, Helvetius, Cabanis, Volney, Tracy, la societe n'est qu'une collection 
d'individus, c'est-a-dire de bonheurs individuels...'15 It is rather on the crucial 
question of man's perfectibility — the belief that if men could not be made altruistic, 
egoism at least could be enlightened — that Stendhal was to defect from the rationale of 
the philosophers to whom he had subscribed.16 'Etudier bien cette idee de 
perfectibilite,' he had written in 1804, 'qui me menera, si je la trouve fondee, a un etat 
de l'ame bien doux, Yoptimisme,..'17 Stendhal was not, however, to embrace for long 
what had been a distinctive feature of eighteenth-century thought and had become in 
turn 'the guiding ideal of the Ideologic school'.18 The optimism which he makes 
contingent here upon faith in the betterment of mankind was not to come to fruition, but 
was to remain a feature of those earliest writings in which he extols the indefinite 
powers of education to transform the moral and social environment. Progress Stendhal 
would recognise aplenty in the scientific, technological and artistic advances of his age; 
but his faith in man's nature was not to keep abreast of his faith in man's intelligence. 
As early as 1804, we find the problem posed in terms which question the common 
notion (for the eighteenth-century optimists notably) of moral perfectibility through 
historical process:
Je pensais done que depuis les anciens l'esprit humain s'etait perfectionne, 
c'est-a-dire que nous savons beaucoup de verites qu'ils ignoraient.
Mais cela ne veut pas dire que le cceur humain se soit aussi perfectionne, 
c'est-a-dire que les passions de nos cceurs. soient plus vertueuses que celles des 
leurs; au contraire, a la premiere vue, il semble qu'elles le soient beaucoup moins. 
La monarchic elle-meme est une perfection de l'esprit humain, car quel art ne
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faut-il pas a un homme pour faire que tant de gens obeissent a ses ordres contre 
leur interet evident!
Mais peut-etre aussi avons-nous plus de plaisirs que les anciens republicans; 
sommes-nous plus heureux?19
The suggestion that men might be happier in the pursuit of their own gratifications 
than in the furtherance of the common weal had far-reaching implications. The tension 
between -the determinism of the philosophes and their moral idealism was, as D.C. 
Potts argues, one of the most compelling features of Enlightenment thought.20 As it 
passes to Stendhal, this tension is compounded by a loss of faith in man's civic 
propensities and in his capacity for moral self-regeneration. The increasing conviction 
that each individual was an end in himself could not be reconciled for long with the 
'revolutionary universalism' of Stendhal's youth.21 The terminus a quo and the 
terminus ad quern are, in the definition of man expounded by the philosophes, entirely 
different; for Stendhal they remain, ultimately, one and the same. 'Interet, besoin, 
passion , utile,' writes Michel Crouzet, 'ces mots du vocabulaire politique et 
psychologique indiquent un isolement premier de l'homme, une vocation ego-i’ste, une 
nature d'abord vouee a soi, qui fait un probleme de l'etat et de la generalite sociale.'22 
This 'nature d'abord vouee a soi' is but the starting-point for a reformist philosopher 
such as Helvetius; but it is to the starting-point itself that Stendhal will continually find 
himself returning. The idea — which comes into its own with the reading of Cabanis 
— that each human being possesses a unique 'nature' that no collective ethic could 
conjure away, while it found in Stendhal a responsive proponent, cut deep into his 
moral awareness. For it legitimised the transition from a science of Man to a science of 
the Individual that was at odds with the whole tradition from which he had derived his 
early philosophical and ethical inspiration. With its insistence on diversity and relativity 
in the spheres of human character and conduct, Stendhal's interpretation of Cabanis 
introduced a disunity and disorder where they had been felt to be most required. 
'L’optimiste naif,' to borrow the terms of Michel Crouzet, will emerge from his study 
of the 'human heart' 'un pessimiste cynique.'23
It is here that Stendhal's severance from the whole Enlightenment tradition is most 
irreparable, here that his modernity — to use an ambivalent and easily abused term — 
can be said in large part to lie. In his stimulating discussion of eighteenth-century 
French materialism, E.A. Gellner stresses that pessimism about the human condition 
was an attitude quite foreign to the secular ideals of the Enlightenment:
This vision of man formulated metaphysically by Schopenhauer, aphoristically by 
Nietzsche, and clinically by Freud is something which is alien to Enlightened 
thought and which constitutes a grave problem for it. The Enlightenment was not 
necessarily given to attributing a fundamentally good moral substrate to man, as 
Rousseau did, but it saw man as at least morally neutral and capable of rational and 
indeed virtuous behavior, once it could be freed from superstition; and even if 
motivated by self-interest, enlightened self-interest would lead to a rational
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harmony.24
Such was the rationale which informed the whole social, ethical and political 
world-view that we associate with the eighteenth-century philosophes and their later 
counterparts, the Ideologues. Faith in the redemptive power of reason, a perception of 
man and society as malleable entities, the alignment of collective morality and felicity 
upon a human nature which could not but proceed from truth to virtue: if these factors 
resume the spirit of optimism that sustained the Enlightenment, they also sum up, by 
implication, the problems inherited by the Ideologues as legatees of that optimism. For 
the latter are separated from their forebears not only by a social and political revolution 
that had given little cause to be sanguin about man's capacities for enlightened virtue, 
but by another revolution — slow, painstaking, but no less real for that — in the 
definition, of the very nature of man as an animal organism. The problem is brought 
sharply into relief by Cabanis. For how does one square belief in the boundless power 
of reason with the removal of even part of man's 'moral' self from his conscience to his 
abdomen? Did Cabanis not contend that 'l'organe cerebral, considere comme celui de la 
pensee, [...], n'est pas lie par des rapports moins etroits d'influence reciproque avec le 
foie, la rate, l'estomac ou les parties de la generation1?25 If such was the case, then 
each man potentially carried within himself the most powerful objection to the 
aspirations of Enlightened rationalism. Gellner puts the problem in general but 
elucidatory terms:
The idea that the enemy of rationality and happiness is within and deeply rooted, a 
kind of cosmic or biological or fundamental bloody-mindedness, is something 
which, if true, badly upsets the rationalistic and optimistic world-view of the 
Enlightenment. If true, it shows that enlightenment is not enough. The aims it 
offers humanity — rational, harmonized happiness — are in fact shown not to 
satisfy our real strivings; the means it offers — the removal of superstition and 
prejudice and tyranny — are shown to be inefficacious 26
This passage captures something of the evolution in Stendhal’s reasoning from Les 
Deux Hommes to Lamiel. For the 'human heart' — and this is the point that is lost if 
one dates his 'philosophy' from the age of eighteen or twenty — was far from being 
the same for Stendhal in 1840 as it had been in 1804. 'Between the ardent 
good-citizenship of Charles in "Les Deux Hommes" and the cynical egoism of Sansfin 
in Lamiel,’ writes Margaret Tillett, 'there is a gulf of disillusion as much with self as 
with events.'27 The 'gulf of disillusion', one might argue, lies, more deeply still, in 
Stendhal’s perception of human nature itself. As he would declare in a letter to Adolphe 
de Mareste dated 21 December 1819, 'nous avons tous deux raison, car il n'y a pas de 
moral, et nos physiques sont differents.'28 This peremptory recourse to the body as 
moral arbiter, with its outright denial of the faculties of 'head' and 'heart' as Stendhal 
had once conceived them, bears the unmistakeable stamp of Cabanis. Yet it betrays the
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whole spirit which informs the latter's philosophy. One need only glance at the 
Rapports du physique et du moral de I'homme to appreciate how crude and distortive is 
Stendhal's allusion here to its author. 'La nature produit I'homme avec des organes et 
des facultes determinees,' Cabanis certainly claims; but he adds at once:
mais l'art peut accroitre ces facultes, changer ou diriger leur emploi, creer en
quelque sorte de nouveaux organes. C'est la l'ouvrage de l'education, qui n'est, a
proprement parler, que l'art des impressions et des habitudes.29
While Cabanis's language reveals once more here some uncertainty about the limits 
to which reform might be pushed, there is no doubting his belief in man's power to 
exert a salutary influence upon the raw material of human nature. Nothing of this, 
however, appears in Stendhal's remark to Mareste, or in the journal entry from the 
same period in which, alluding once more to Cabanis, he presents character as a fait 
accompli which the best efforts of the reformer are powerless to modify.30 Such 
instances demonstrate well the selectivity and distortion which comes to characterise 
Stendhal’s representation of the philosophers to whom he professes allegiance. Writing 
to his friend Mareste on 22 April 1818, Stendhal defines the term 'vertueux' as 'utile au 
bonheur du peuple, fidele a la maxime: Salus populi suprema lex est.'31 The words 
could have been lifted as readily from Helvetius as from any of Stendhal's earliest notes 
or letters. If Stendhal's definition of virtue has not changed, however, since his initial 
reading of Helvetius, what has changed — and irrevocably — is his belief that such 
virtue could be implemented with any realistic prospect of success. 'II faut etre bien 
borne, he concludes cynically, 'pour se figurer que l'interet du berger et celui des 
moutons soit le meme (c'est-a-dire que le berger le croie).'32
So much for the enlightened legislator. Stendhal puts his finger here on a central 
weakness in Helvetius’s argument. For he clearly recognises the problem latent in the 
fact that the legislator-educator himself must issue from the same Humanity, and be 
subject to conditioning by the same environment, that it is his task to reform. As D.W. 
Smith puts it in his study of Helvetius, 'no legislator, on the author's own admission, 
could be sufficiently disinterested to create a legislative system suited to the needs of the 
public rather than of himself.'33 Helvetius would have required therefore, as John 
Lough points out, some deus ex machina to set his system in motion, if not indeed to 
sustain it.34 Was it not naif in the extreme to hope that any monarch 'would suddenly 
through enlightenment become the instrument of the will of the people, the guarantor of 
its happiness'?35 And what of the longer term? How does one prevent society, once 
reformed, from degenerating? How does one ensure, in Stendhal's terms, that the 
interests of shepherd and flock, once in harmony, remain in harmony? Having 
witnessed the political upheavals of Revolution, Empire and Restoratipn, Stendhal 
could, in 1818, ask the question with some ppint. But the answer is nowhere to be
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found in Helvetius. An advocate of enlightened despotism, he held that political 
progress should take place from the top down, that it should be the achievement of an 
enlightened few from among the ruling elite.36 To argue as much, however, was, as 
E.C. Ladd points out, to cherish little more than the pious hope that a head of state 
would take it upon himself to 'work fpr the greatest happiness of all members of 
society.'37
While it raises a powerful objection against the whole foundation upon which the 
social reformism of Helvetius rested, Stendhal's scepticism to Mareste about the 
possibility of any real community of interests among men takes issue also with 
Cabanis. For the latter echoes Helvetius in contending that, 'Par une heureuse 
necessite, l'interet de chaque individu ne saurait jamais etre veritablement separe de 
l'interet des autres hommes.'38 Cabanis bases his rationale on a quasi-Christian notion 
of virtue — minus the spiritual dimension — whereby acts against the common interest 
'retombent inevitablement, tot ou tard, sur leur auteur.' He explains:
Sans doute, I'homme vertueux peut etre malheureux: mais il serait alors bien plus 
malheureux encore sans le secours de la vertu; elle seule adoucit tous les maux, et 
fait gouter tous les biens de la destinee humaine.39
The argument was a common one among the philosophes and Ideologues.40 'Le 
veritable bonheur,' Cabanis concludes, 'est necessairement le partage exclusif de la 
veritable vertu.’41 What Stendhal was to call into question, however, was not just the 
practicability of virtue thus conceived, but its very desirability. For he had long ceased 
to subscribe to the simple equation between virtue and happiness which had found 
expression in some of his earliest letters to his sister Pauline 42 A diary entry of 20 
February 1815 provides a most illuminating glimpse of Stendhal's revised stance on 
this question:
Je ne sais si l'habitude des vertus est aussi utile au bonheur que le pretend 
Cabanis. Ceci est peut-etre une ffaude pieuse [...]. Mais je crois que l'habitude de 
l'egoisme a la du Deffand nuit au bonheur, en faisant qu'on ne prend plus interet a 
rien.43
These juxtaposed references to Cabanis and Mme du Deffand evoke two antithetical 
worlds, one of expansive social virtue, the other of insular egoism, neither of which is 
recognised here by Stendhal as a route to personal happiness. The terms in which the 
reference to Cabanis is couched recall distinctly the 'Lettre sur la perfectibilite' which is 
ascribed to the latter and which had appeared in La Decade of 20 April 1799.44 For 
there a time is' envisaged when 'la vertu, dont les hommes irreflechis se font une image 
severe, sera prise enfin pour ce qu'elle est, pour le moyen d'etre heureux.' To this is 
added the confident prediction that
un jour viendra ou les avantages attaches pour I'homme aux habitudes de la vertu,
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seront si bien demontres, qu'on se moquera du mechant comme d'un sot, toutes 
les fois qu'on ne jugera pas necessaire de l'enchainer comme un furieux.45
For all the esteem in which Stendhal had come to hold Cabanis by 1815, he clearly 
refuses to accompany the latter in these sanguin conclusions about man's moral 
potentiality. What gives more point to the confrontation which we find in Stendhal's 
diary between the would-be social reformer and the celebrated socialite is a remark 
which appears in VHistoire de la peinture en Italie and which, taken in conjunction with 
the diary entry in question, appears to bear out Stendhal's repudiation of the notion of 
human perfectibility as it is upheld by Cabanis:
Tant qu'on ne fera pas de tous les hommes des anges, ou des gens passionnes 
pour le meme objet, [...], ce qu'ils auront de mieux a faire pour se plaire sera 
d'etre Frangais comme on l'etait dans le salon de madame du Deffand.
It is important to stress that the pessimistic resignation which is implicit in such a 
remark, while it issues a challenge to the social philosophy of Cabanis, is wholly — if 
paradoxically — consistent with the latter's contribution to Stendhal. For, taken in 
isolation from any programme of social regeneration, Cabanis's theories of 
physiological determinism appeared to lend themselves much more readily to an 
individualistic than to a socialistic philosophy of man. Such at least was the way in 
which Stendhal chose to interpret the Rapports du physique et du moral de I'homme. 
'L'idee dominante que je rapporte de Paris,' he would write to Mareste on 2 November 
1819, 'c'est que chacun a raison dans son trou, et qu'il est absurde de vouloir etre a la 
fois dans deux trous.'47
Such is the rationale which Stendhal invokes in order to account for his decision to 
reside in Milan rather than in Paris. The difference that distinguishes him in this sense 
from his friend is a theme which runs through the letters to Mareste. Writing again on 7 
May 1821, Stendhal makes what is by now a familiar commentary on their respective 
life-styles:
La chute della Pietra di Paragone vous demontre ce que j'avance depuis cinq ans: 
qu'un Parisien comme vous et un Italien tel que moi avons un gout different. De 
plus, chacun a le bon gout, s'il parle sincerement.48
Contemporaneous with De VAmour, these letters echo and elucidate the concluding 
remarks of that work. For it was Stendhal's contention there, as we recall, that 'tous 
ont raison, s’ils se connaissent bien eux-memes, et s'ils courent apres le genre de 
bonheur qui est le mieux adapte a leurs organes et a leurs habitudes.'49 Each must be 
the arbiter and censor of his own happiness, according to criteria which, Stendhal 
suggests, begin and end with an understanding of one's own nature. 'La Morale est 
comme la Physique; que de sottises ont dit les anciens!' he would scribble on a volume
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of Montaigne’s Essais in 1834.50 An individual should never be ridiculed for his 
passion, he had reflected some two decades before, 'car c'est une maniere de chercher 
le bonheur et je suis seul juge competent de ce qui me rend heureux ou malheureux.'51 
The remark is made, significantly, in a commentary on Moliere's Les Femmes savantes 
— a play which, as we recall, Stendhal considers to be founded on the soundest 
physiological principles.52 Such a view of man, it is clear, could not be reconciled for 
long with any utopian ideal of common interest based on the greatest good of the 
greatest number. 'Un amoureux parle du bonheur a son pere avare,' writes Stendhal 
amid some notes in which he attempts to codify his thoughts on the theatre:
Bonheur signifie pour le fils possession de I'objet aime; pour le pere possession
d'un million. Ils parlent des moyens d’atteindre le bonheur. Peut-on s'etonner si
leurs moyens different.53
Penned in 1813, these remarks articulate a logic that can be found at work across 
the whole range of Stendhal's later writings. All is relative, he would insist, in human 
relations, art, politics, moral convention.54 No standard of taste or behaviour is 
immutable; and none remains impervious to the changes wrought upon it from one 
community to the next, one individual to the next. 'Tout cela,' declares Stendhal in his 
letter to Mareste of 21 December 1819, 'se reduit a ce que le Correge aurait fait ses 
madones noires s'il eut peint au Senegal.'55 Though such a remark has, on the surface, 
much in common with Ideology's denial of absolute standards in human affairs, the 
emphasis which Stendhal lends his reasoning on this whole question sets him quite 
apart from his declared mentors. While Destutt de Tracy, as Michel Crouzet notes, 'se 
fondait sur une "organisation" universelle des hommes’, Stendhal, by contrast, 'tend 
invinciblement a majorer les elements carrement subjectivistes de la doctrine, et a la 
lancer dans un relativisme complet.'56 Tracy's philosophy, argues Emmet Kennedy, 
'suffers from the fallacy of composition, that what is good for one is necessarily good 
for all.'57 It was by confronting the bankruptcy of such a notion that Stendhal would 
move progressively further from the 'unitary tendencies' of the Enlightenment and 
Revolution.58 Hence the frank and expeditious terms in which the author of De 
1‘Amour will deem the American incapable of 'crystallisation', wedded as he is to the 
arid pursuit of reason. 'J'admire ce bonheur et ne l'envie pas; c'est comme le bonheur 
d'etres d'une espece differente et inferieure.'59
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Video meliora, proboque... : The Moral Plight of the Stendhalian Hero
Such is the problem which will receive its most vexing and at times most subtle 
examination in the novels. All of Stendhal's protagonists in turn will be forced to 
conduct their chasse au bonheur in a world where relativism goes hand in hand with 
individualism, and individualism with isolation. Octave, for all his attachment in 
principle to the utilitarian philosophy of Helvetius and Bentham, will confront 
nonetheless 'cette sensation: je suis ici dans un desert d'hommes.'60 Julien, though 
visited — in his 'vertu romaine’ — by illusions of utilitarian virtue, will capitulate to 
the imperative: 'chacun pour soi dans ce desert d'egoisme qu'on appelle la vie.'61 
Lucien, separated by a 'chasme' from his father and mentor, will strive in vain to 
reconcile 'ce sot amour du bien' with the less edifying aspects of his character and 
career.62
All three will rationalise their relationship to the world in terms of their singularity, 
a singularity which is at once a refuge and a burden, and which is evoked at times in a 
deterministic language redolent of Cabanis. 'Un etre tout-puissant et bon pourrait-il me 
punir d'ajouter foi au rapport des organes que lui-meme il m'a donnes?' reasons 
Octave.63 'Puisque l'effet physique est si fort,' exclaims Lucien, 'je ne suis done pas 
blamable moralement!'64 The same Lucien will seek to rationalise his aversion to the 
republican model of government by placing the claims of his organism above those of 
his reason. 'J'ai de l'estime pour leur opinion, leur ambition est honnete,' he writes of 
the republican cenacle in the Nancy garrison; but, he concludes, 'la democratic est trop 
apre pour ma fagon de sentir.'65 Julien Sorel likewise, we are told, has 'une 
organisation delicate'; his ambition, it is suggested, stems not from any 'decision' as 
such, but from the fact that 'la delicatesse de son cceur lui fait un besoin de 
quelques-unes des jouissances que donne l'argent.'66 The gulf between the civic ideal 
which each in turn esteems and their own exiguous contribution to the common weal is 
cruelly accentuated by Stendhal. 'Mais comment sortir de la boue ou je suis plonge au 
moral comme ah physique?' exclaims the mud-bespattered Lucien on the road from 
Blois, adding feebly in his own defence: 'j'ai fait ce que j'ai pu pour etre utile et 
estimable'67 Like Julien, he is, Stendhal delights in reminding us, a 'jeune Romain' 
tom between principle and practice,68 whilst it is Octave's lamely to reflect: 'Brutus 
sacrifia ses enfants, e'etait la difficulte qui se presentait a lui, moi, je vivrai.'69
Caught squarely between his perception of an ideal good and a countervailing 
reality — 'entre ce qu'il estime et ce qu'il prevoit de sa vie future'70 — Stendhal's 
protagonist struggles to take what comfort may be had from a deterministic rationale, 
from the thought that things are as they must be. 'Est-ce la faute d'un homme s'il a les
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cheveux noirs?' asks Octave.71 'II n'y a qu’un sot, se dit-il, qui soit en colere contre les 
autres,' we read of Julien: 'une pierre tombe parce qu'elle est pesante.'72 Such 
reasoning, however, is fitful and inadequate to afford any genuine comfort. It is clear 
from Stendhal's notes on Armance that he perceived the tensions between conscience 
and conduct as fundamental to dramatic characterisation in the novel:
Ou est le jeune homme qui, sans devenir fou, pourra supporter la contradiction 
entre ce qu'il estime et ce qu'il prevoit de sa vie future? — [...] Le contraste entre 
les actions qu'il regarde comme estimables et les actions a travers lesquelles il 
prevoit que doit le conduire sa vie future.73
'A quoi done sommes-nous bons?' Such is the question, voiced by Lucien 
Leuwen, which sums up the anguish of a Stendhalian hero in whom the ressort can 
find no meaningful sens.74 For it can be argued of Stendhal’s novels that they 
dramatise in each case the conflict between the essential character of the individual and 
the channels through which this must seek expression. 'Du temps de l'Empereur,' we 
recall, 'Julien eut ete un fort honnete homme.'75 For Octave, Julien and Lucien alike, 
the attachment to utilitarianism in principle is matched by a painful awareness of their 
own uselessness in practical terms. The parody of ancient civic virtue which breaks 
through at times in the novels serves to heighten the gulf between lofty ideal and a 
paltry reality. If Julien draws inspiration from Caesar's troops at Pharsalus, it is to calm 
his anxieties before the nocturnal assault on Mathilde's balcony; if Lucien compares 
himself with the legendary Brutus, it is as the acolyte of a mundane and less than 
principled July Monarchy 76 A quotation from Ovid, which Stendhal cites in VHistoire 
de la peinture en Italie, expresses appositely the plight of these frustrated heroes as both 
they and the reader are invited to perceive it: 'Video meliora, proboque; deteriora 
sequor' — 'I see the better course and approve of it; but I follow the worse.'77
In La Chartreuse de Panne alone do we find that easy capitulation to Nature — and 
to human nature — which takes men and things as they are, and which is summed up 
in Gina's remark to Mosca: 'il n'est pas en votre pouvoir de changer votre nature.'78 It 
is here too that the utilitarian ideal which exercises Octave, Julien and Lucien alike is 
broached in the most dismissive tones. For Fabrice, 'le culte du bonheur du plus grand 
nombre ' is but 'une heresie qui passera comme les autres, mais apres avoir tue 
beaucoup d'ames, comme la peste tandis qu'elle regne dans une contree tue beaucoup 
de corps.'79 More candid still in this respect is the character-portrait of Mosca:
Le comte n'avait pas de vertu; l’on peut meme ajouter que ce que les liberaux 
entendent par vertu (chercher le bonheur du plus grand nombre) lui semblait une 
duperie; il se croyait oblige a chercher avant tout le bonheur du comte Mosca della 
Rovere...80
For this reason, Mosca is most emphatically not, as Pierre Martino claims, 'le
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produit parfait de la culture ideologique.'81 He represents a conscious and sustained 
deviation from all that Ideology tends towards from the outset. Manuel Brussaly, in 
subscribing to Martino's analysis, upholds a contradiction in terms when he declares 
Mosca 'amoral in the ideological sense, a disciple of the doctrines of Tracy and of 
Helvetius.'82 Ideology, as such interpretations fail to recognise, is shot through with 
moral purpose. It is no manual for individualistic self-mastery, as Martino suggests,83 
but an ambitiously comprehensive programme for the regeneration of social man. 
Mosca's 'redemption' lies not in being an ideo logue , with all the ethical 
humanitarianism and expansive social conscience which this implies; it lies — in 
keeping with the much narrower and more aesthetic considerations which had informed 
D'un nouveau comp lot contre les industriels — in an inherent generosity of spirit, the 
possession of 'une de ces ames rares qui se font un remords eternel d'une action 
genereuse qu'elles pouvaient faire et qu'elles n'ont pas faite.'84 Skulduggery, turpitude 
and infamy are, as Howard Clewes observes, the tools of this so-called ideologue's 
trade; but he retains Stendhal's sympathy through his disabused awareness that the 
game is there to be played according to rules which have little in common with any 
morally fastidious definition of good and evil, right and wrong.85 If we extend our 
considerations to Lamiel, the difficulty of attempting to impose a reading on Stendhal's 
novels which squares with his reputation as an exponent of Ideology is at its most 
acute. For in Sansfin we find an altogether more hard-edged and gratuitous cynicism 
than in either Leuwen pire or Mosca, a cynicism which, as Stendhal's last word on the 
problem of man in society, presents as unedifying a portrait of human nature as is 
anywhere evident in his writings. The question with which Stendhal approaches the 
characterisation of Sansfin in his notes of 6 March 1841 gives evidence of a conscious 
effort to push his portrayal of the darker side of human nature into new and uncharted 
territory: 'Dominique aura-t-il assez d'esprit pour avilir comme il faut Sansfin?'86
Egoism, Utilitarianism and the Bankruptcy of the Republic
It would be a distortion of the complexity of Stendhal's thought to suggest that he 
progressed in a linear fashion from the embracive humanitarianism of his youth to the 
militant individualism which is at times so pointedly articulated in his works. There is 
present even in his earliest notes and letters a concern for the individual as a unique 
exponent of human nature, just as there persists in his later writings a deep respect for 
the civic ideals on which he modelled his conception of man at the outset.87 The 
problem, as Gita May rightly recognises, was one of forging a difficult compromise 
between 'l'ideal egalitaire et collectiviste' to which Stendhal early subscribes, and 'la
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conception romantique et individualiste de l'etre d'exception dans un etat de perpetuelle 
et intolerable alienation vis-a-vis des autres.'88 Therein lies the essence of a 
philosophical conflict which was to find no easy resolution in Stendhal. For in his 
thought at its most mature, there remains a tension between the claims of the individual 
and the claims of the social group which, if it seems to resolve in favour of the former, 
issues in considerably less triumphalism than Stendhal's critics, and indeed his own 
pronouncements, might at times lead us to suspect. The destiny of the outsider — 'la 
malheureuse position de I'homme soi-disant superieur, ou, pour mieux dire, different' 
— is, as Stendhal suggests in a letter to Felix Faure in 1813, bought at a price to 
society and individual alike.89
Many are the occasions when we encounter the same suggestion by Stendhal that 
the extraordinary individual is to be pitied as much as celebrated, that the most basic 
self-interest demands the identification of the 'self with the social whole.90 'II faut 
considerer que ce sont les hommes avec qui vous etes destine a vivre qui vous rendront 
heureux et malheureux,' Stendhal had written sententiously to his sister Pauline in April 
1805.91 Reflecting on life in Italy in his diary of 8 September 1811, he writes: 'on a 
besoin d'heureux pour etre heureux jusque dans les plus petites choses, mais je crois 
qu'on peut l'etre dans ce pays.'92 Such remarks invite some re-evaluation of the 
doctrine of bullish individualism which has so often been taken to be the very essence 
of Stendhal's philosophy. 'Le bonheur est contagieux,' we read in a note dated Milan, 
14 May 1818: 'Si vous voulez etre heureux, vivez au milieu de gens heureux.'93 The 
disparity between such words and the clarion call for defiant self-sufficiency which so 
often rings out from Stendhal's writings is clear. Harry Levin shows a rare appreciation 
of the complexity of this question when he writes:
Though later generations of supermen and nihilists and deracines and immoralistes 
pay their respects to Julien, and claim Stendhal as the founder of their culte du 
moU no writer has more cogently insisted that egoism is self-destroying, and that 
the few cannot be happy when the many are unhappy 94
Implicit here is the problem up against which Stendhal's philanthropic and 
utilitarian sympathies were forever destined to run. In order to contribute to and share 
in the happiness of others, one must be like others. While Stendhal stops short of 
holding that the end indeed justifies the means, he is acutely conscious of the isolation 
to which the individual who cannot lose himself amid the run of humanity is 
condemned. 'Malheur a qui se distingue!' warns the author of Le Rouge et le Noir.95 
Much of the dramatic tension of Stendhal's novels resides, as we have noted, in the 
essential singularity of the hero, his failure to be at one with the world in which he 
lives. While there is evident in Stendhal's private writings the same 'singularity 
agressive et militante'96 that is displayed at times by his protagonists, he remains alive
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to the deficit side of such distinctiveness from the common herd. It is in no exultant 
tones certainly that, writing from Civitavecchia in October 1839, and having had ample 
occasion to revise the collectivist ideals of his youth, Stendhal would declare himself 'le 
seul animal de mon espece.'97
Such remarks require to be interpreted within the wider perspective of Stendhal’s 
social thought. For the distinction has not been clearly enough made by critics between 
’utilitarianism' as a social philosophy and 'utilitarianism' as a narrow personal code, 
or, put another way, between a universalistic and a purely egoistic interpretation of the 
utilitarian ethic.98 Thus can W.H. Fineshriber insist upon the 'wholly utilitarian and 
egoistic morality' preached by Stendhal, whilst Geoffrey Strickland discerns in the 
same Stendhal 'a very conscious Utilitarianism', fashioned after the socialistic precepts 
of Jeremy Bentham." Neither interpretation is necessarily to be faulted; nor, indeed, 
are they mutually exclusive: but there are important qualifications to be made in either 
case. For it is precisely Stendhal's failure to reconcile these postures, to resolve the 
tensions that they create in his view of man and society, which explains his evident 
discomfiture in relation to the Benthamite principle of 'the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number.' Renee Winegarten oversimplifies the question when she asserts: 
'Without difficulty, Beyle moved from the utilitarianism of Helvetius to the 
philosophical radicalism of Bentham.'100 No writer, in truth, has met with greater 
difficulty in reconciling the demands of the one with the sovereign well-being of the 
many. As Pierre Martino recognises, Stendhal 'ne s'explique pas bien sur l'opposition 
possible de l'interet general et de l'interet individuel;'101 but it was a question which 
never ceased to exercise his mind.102
All of the foregoing must be borne in mind when considering Stendhal's place 
within the philosophical tradition to which his name has been annexed. If Helvetius and 
Cabanis, in their initial premises at least, provided what seemed a legitimation of 
individualism, they failed in turn for Stendhal to reconcile this with the wider 
humanitarian ethic that it was their concern to promulgate. They merely posed the 
problem, without offering any ultimately practicable solution. To this extent, both 
imparted to Stendhal the seeds of an irresolvable dilemma. Of those called upon to enact 
the Revolution, Tocqueville writes:
Ils ne doutaient pas de la perfectibilite, de la puissance de I'homme; [...], ils
avaient foi dans sa vertu. [...]; ils ne doutaient point qu'ils ne fussent applies |
transformer la societe et a regenerer notre espece. 03
As it fell to the succeeeding generation to draw up the balance-sheet of a century of 
philosophical radicalism culminating in the ravages of revolution and war, the fallacy in 
such millennial ambitions was brutally exposed. In Stendhal, and in Le Rouge et le
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Noir notably, writes Paul Bourget, we discover Taube tragique du pessimisme.'104 It 
was in this 'dawn of pessimism' precisely that a later age was to discover Stendhal's 
'modernity'. Writing for La Revue Bleue in 1884, Paul Deschanel deems Stendhal 'le 
lien entre la philosophic sensualiste du XVIIIe. siecle et la philosophic fataliste de nos 
jours.'105 The idea is taken up and amplified by another of Stendhal's early 
commentators, Emile Faguet:
Stendhal, c'est le XVIIIe siecle, c'est Duclos, Helvetius, Destutt de Tracy et 
Cabanis [...]. Mais c'est le XVIIIe siecle, dirai-je perverti, je dirai plutot un peu 
endurci et rendu plus brutal par la Revolution et l'Empire. [...] En un mot c'est un 
homme du XVIIIe siecle, moins l’optimisme. C'est le XVine siecle qui a traverse 
une terrible epoque de brutalite et de violence, qui en a ete endurci et assombri, et 
qui a garde toutes ses idees sans garder son reve. De la ce qu'il y a de sec et de dur 
et de noir dans toute l'ceuvre de ce d'Holbach retardataire.
Faguet goes on to conclude with point:
L'etablissement du bonheur, voila le reve du XVHIe siecle, la chasse au bonheur, 
qui devient vite la lutte pour le bonheur, voila l'idee de Stendhal. La transformation 
deToptimisme epicurien en epicurisme pessimiste, voila ce que Stendhal, [...], fait 
toucher du doigt.106
The happiness of the greatest number was a concept which disintegrated at the 
touch. Having sought in vain a common measure of egoism, of passion, of virtue, of 
all that might serve as a constant gauge to human nature and as the basis for a moral 
code by which to regulate men and their affairs, Stendhal would come to inveigh 
against any suggestion that such a measure might indeed exist. Etienne Delecluze 
records in his journal the portrait of a Stendhal intent on repudiating 'tout ce qui peut 
etablir un consentement unanime,' unshakeable in his contention that 'les uns voient 
jaune, les autres bleu, les autres vert.'107 Delecluze leaves a similar testimony in his 
Souvenirs de soixante annees and his Impressions romaines, ascribing to Stendhal the 
most firmly rooted belief that men are condemned to perceive the world from 
standpoints so particular as to preclude any community of experience:
Nous ne pouvons pas nous ressembler; nous ne pouvons pas recevoir des 
impressions semblables des memes objets.108
While it echoes Cabanis's thesis that 'les hommes ne se ressemblent point par la 
maniere de sentir,'109 such reasoning would come to represent for Stendhal the most 
insurmountable obstacle to a utilitarian ethic. In its ex post facto interpretation of human 
affairs, utilitarianism, as Bernard Williams argues, makes 'only the most superficial 
sense of human desire and action at all; and hence only very poor sense of what was 
supposed to be its own speciality, happiness.'110 It is on this crucial point that 
Stendhal's faith in the utilitarian ideal would founder. For one could not legislate for 
personal happiness; one could not gainsay the multiplicity of ends in which men pursue
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their own felicity. Once the definition of happiness is thus consigned to each individual, 
once it is tied to a particular neuro-biological organism and made subject to factors that 
are perceived to lie beyond man’s immediate control, the way is open to a resolutely 
individualistic ethic.
Stendhal’s ambivalence with regard to the utilitarian ideal would require a detailed 
study.111 What is clear, however, is that the 'totalitarian democracy' which had fired 
his imagination as a young reader of Helvetius112 could not be easily reconciled with 
the vision of man which emerged from Cabanis. Extraordinary individuals were not 
made: they were bom. Any attempt to redefine man on a collective model, Stendhal 
would come to reason, could only be achieved through the subjugation of men as men. 
America, as the only viable republic, gives the lie to Stendhal's republicanism. For 
there men are counted, not weighed; there, as we read in Lucien Leuwen, 'la charrette 
gouvemative est tombee dans l'omiere opposee a la notre. Le suffrage universel regne 
en tyran, et en tyran aux mains sales.'113 This remark carries a clear suggestion of the 
juste-milieu politics which are generally held to have been Stendhal's 'position', in so 
far as it can be defined as such, under the July Monarchy.114 What it demonstrates 
emphatically is Stendhal's refusal to endorse the translation of res publica into what it 
must inevitably become, res populi. 'En ce cas,' he would declare in the Memoires 
d'un touriste, 'je deviens bien vite aristocrate. Je ne veux faire la cour a personne, mais 
moins encore au peuple qu'au ministre.'115
In interpreting such remarks, critics have tended to concentrate upon Stendhal's 
personality, his difficulty in reconciling what Robert Alter describes as 'passionate 
republican principles and a thoroughly aristocratic sensibility.'116 This interpretation, 
in the light of the aesthetic considerations that bulk so large in Stendhal's political 
thinking,117 may have something to commend it. But there were philosophical reasons, 
too, which accounted for Stendhal's political predicament. After Cabanis, the most 
utopian system would have to recognise that, in terms of intelligence, talent, potential, 
and the whole range of character-traits and qualities to which each individual organism 
plays host, men could not be counted but must be weighed. To this extent, it can be 
argued, Cabanis's premises militate against his conclusions, his physiological 
determinism constituting an insuperable bar, for the reader who so chooses to interpret 
him, to his humanistic and socialistic aspirations.118 For it was the latter's objective, as 
it was the objective of the Ideologues in general, to 'lay bare the common ground of 
human needs and aspirations, thus providing the lawgiver with the means of furthering 
the common good.' Such, as George Lichtheim argues, was the guiding principle of 
Destutt de Tracy and his fellow Ideologues:
What is "natural" is also "social". Once human nature is properly understood,
society will at last be able to arrange itself in a harmonious fashion. Reason is the
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guarantor of order and liberty. As with Condorcet, Destutt's aim is pedagogical: it 
is to lay bare the guiding principles of republican citizenship.119
It was this very notion, however, this sanguin faith in the possibility of reforming 
man and society, which came to smack of the illusory for Stendhal. What he finds 
reprehensible in the republican posture is precisely the desire to regenerate humanity, to 
cast it in a mould which it simply will not fit.120 The events of 1789-1815 and beyond 
bore witness enough to the fallacy in the pretensions of militant republicanism. As the 
author of the Memoires d'un touriste will avow,
il me semble qu'en 1837 du moins, le gouvemement royal est preferable a la 
meilleure des republiques. Nous tomberions sous le plus mauvais des rois, sous 
un Ferdinand VII d'Espagne par exemple, que je l'aimerais mieux que les 
republicans au pouvoir. Ils y arriveraient, je le crois, avec des intentions 
raisonnables; mais bientot ils se mettraient en colere, et voudraient regenerer}11
The biting emphasis on the final verb here conveys what had become the very 
gravamen of Stendhal’s charge against the apologists of the Republic. Defining a 
democratic system which would accommodate the divergent exigencies of human 
nature, which would resolve (as Michel Crouzet so aptly puts it) Tobjection qu'est 
Uhomme a tout systeme',122 was, however, another matter; and Stendhal has none to 
offer. But his eroded republicanism and capitulation to the compromises of the July 
Monarchy are the measure of a philosophical conviction as much as they are the 
expression of any personal sensibility. For he could not sustain intellectually a 
republican sentiment that is nurtured under the Consulate, called into question under the 
Empire, and forced to come to terms with its own bankruptcy under the Restoration and 
July Monarchy. The stripling republican who had 'rinsed his mouth out' with Alfieri on 
the day of Napoleon’s coronation is at some remove from the pragmatist who would 
conclude, as Manuel Brussaly puts it, that 'he preferred a king to a president.'123 
Insofar as it constitutes an early expression of opposition to the prevailing regime, 
Stendhal's political ideal remains consistent with itself and with the humanitarian 
philosophy of which it is, at the outset, a function. It is in this sense indeed that his 
'republicanism' is always best defined, as a stance of opposition, affording a means, 
even in the 1820s, of assailing the regime and its philosophical base of support.124 
Confronted with the prospect of translating his republic into what realpolitik will bear, 
however, Stendhal demurs.
For the modem republic, with its enslavement to the utilitarian principle, becomes 
indissociable for Stendhal from a mediocrity and a philistinism that work to outlaw the 
individual. 'Ces theoriciens du moi inventent une societe sans le moi,' writes Michel 
Crouzet, summing up well the depersonalised, abstracted, highly theoretical republic 
conceived by the philosophes and Ideologues.125 The moment one makes utility the
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rule of law, the moment one hands sovereignty to ’la majorite, laquelle est formee en 
grande partie par la canaille,'126 one abolishes the conditions in which the arts and 
much of what is most to be valued in human endeavour may flourish.127 In this sense, 
it can be argued, Cabanis, by aiding and abetting Stendhal in the revision of his earliest 
conception of humanity, provides a means of keeping faith, philosophically, with his 
evolving social and political conscience. It is not without significance, certainly, that the 
author of the Rapports du physique et du moral de I'homme is invoked or alluded to on 
so many occasions to justify the cult of self which Stendhal makes his own. No less 
than Lucien Leuwen will Stendhal come to associate democracy with the suppression of 
the richness and diversity that is human nature, with the idea that 'where every man is a 
voter, no man is free.'128 No less than his vexed but resigned hero will Stendhal 
adjudge the republic to be beyond him, both physically and morally.129 As Michel 
Crouzet acutely observes, 'l'image de la vie republic'aine chez Stendhal demeure, 
malgre l'adhesion au principe de l'interet, inseparable du renoncement.'130
Hedonism and Pessimism: 'Beylism* Reconsidered
It is within this context that Stendhal's so-called 'Beylism', though it is not primarily a 
political posture, attains its fullest significance. For that philosophy of 'desultory 
egoism '131 which he invokes in a number of letters between 1811 and 1813 
constitutes, as Geoffrey Strickland observes, the formulation by Stendhal of 'un 
hedonisme a sa propre mesure.'132 Utilitarianism (as a social philosophy) and Beylism 
(as a personal code) depart from the same point; but they proceed in different, indeed 
opposing, directions. What is utility? Stendhal provides the answer in a marginal note 
dating from 1819: 'Grand principe de Helvetius' tres bien applique aux lois par J. 
Bentham .'133 What is Beylism? It is the same Helvetian principle, the same 
fundamental concern to forge a practical means of attaining personal happiness, allied to 
the relativistic determinism of Cabanis and bereft of all collective overtones. Writing to 
Felix Faure from Moscow at the height of the Russian campaign on 2 October 1812, 
Stendhal enjoins his friend to cultivate what he terms '[les] principes du pur beylisme.' 
The letter defines with clarity the limits of what has become the most overworked -  
and, one may justifiably say, the most abused134 — term in Stendhal xholarship:
Je lisais les Confessions de Rousseau il y a huit jours. C'est uniquement faute de 
deux ou trois principes de beylisme qu'il a eu tant de malheurs. Cette manie de voir 
des devoirs et des vertus partout a mis de la pedanterie dans son style et du 
malheur dans sa vie. II se lie avec un homme pendant trois semaines: crac, les 
devoirs de l'amitie, etc. Cet homme ne songe plus a lui apres deux ans; il cherche a 
cela une explication noire. Le beylisme lui eut dit: "Deux corps se rapprochent; il
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nait de la chaleur et une fermentation, mais tout etat de cette nature est passager. 
C'est une fleur dont il faut jouir avec volupte, etc." Saisis-tu mon idee?13*
The ring of Cabanis which this passage has about it is unmistakeable. 'Depuis 
l'attraction materielle jusqu'a la sympathie morale dans I'homme sociable,' writes J.E.
! Schlanger, 'Cabanis trace une genese unitive de l'organisation.'136 Thus, in the 
Rapports du physique et du moral de I'homme, we find an insistence on the animal 
attraction and elective affinities that obtain between living beings as masses of 
organised matter, on the physical basis of 'la sympathie morale', the process whereby 
'On voit les individus s'attirer, ou se repousser.'137 Nothing in Nature is excluded by 
Cabanis from the 'analogie entre la sensibilite animale, l'instinct des plantes, les 
affinites electives et la simple attraction gravitante, qui s'exerce en tout temps entre 
toutes les parties de la matiere.'138
The extract from Stendhal's letter to Faure, however, is important for more than 
the imprint which it bears of such reasoning. The passage, which is central to an 
understanding of what Stendhal meant by beylisme, can be read in conjunction with an 
extract from another letter written earlier in the same year to his sister Pauline. In this, 
we find a clear adumbration of the cultured egoism which Stendhal would later contrast 
with the burdensome aspirations of the social reformers.139 'Mme du Deffand,' he 
writes, 'me fait sentir encore mieux tout le bon de mon systeme: de ne rendre son 
bonheur dependant de personne...’140 The wilfully solipsistic attitude that is suggested 
here as a means of ploughing one’s own private furrow towards happiness finds an 
echo in other letters and diary entries of the period. As Stendhal writes in a letter to 
Felix Faure in November 1812, 'plus tu seras heureux, moins tu trouveras etrange mon 
systeme de belisme [sic], plus tu m'aimeras.'141 In like fashion, he had sought, as his 
diary of March 1811 informs us, to 'rendre un peu beyliste' his love-crossed friend, 
Louis Crozet.142 In each case, Stendhal is referring to a manner of viewing the world 
which makes personal — that is individual — happiness the supreme goal. Beylism is, 
as Michel Crouzet quaintly puts it, 'une "self-philosophie"'.143 Tailor one's 
expectations to match reality and avail oneself of the routes to happiness that lie open 
without lamenting those that are barred: such is the essence of a doctrine which 
Stendhal alludes to as 'Epicurean'.144 Alfieri, had he shown a little less bilious virtue 
and a little more beylisme, would have learnt to see life not as a relentless struggle 
against an established order which he could not hope to overturn, but rather as 'un bal 
masque ou le prince ne s'offense pas d'etre croise par le perruquier en domino.'145
Exegetes have travelled far indeed from the strict sense of what is conveyed by 
such remarks. For there is in all of this more that is redolent of the classical sage than of 
the anarchic self-assertion, the manual for waging war On society, the 'philosophie de
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la revolte', which successive generations of critics have come to associate with the term 
'Beylism'.146 What emerges from those several passages in which Stendhal sets forth 
his beylisme is a philosophy not of revolt, but rather of accommodation — to oneself, 
to one's circumstances, to the world in which one must live. The beyliste, in setting his 
sights on happiness, - should eschew excess and temper extravagant desire; a 
contentment that can be attained — and sustained — is worth more than a state of 
sublime happiness which, Stendhal argues, must prove at best ephemeral, at worst 
chimerical.147 Beylism is not only a quest for happiness: it is a recognition of the limits 
to happiness that are set by the human condition itself. It is best defined perhaps as an 
injunction to enjoy the pleasures of life as and when they present themselves, to cut 
with the grain, as it were, rather than striving against the natural course of things. 
F.W.J. Hemmings sums it up, with commendable sobriety, as 'a hedonistic doctrine of 
which the first rule is: Do not kick against the pricks.'148
Whatever the appeal for Stendhal of the rationale on which it rests, this homespun 
hedonism could provide only a partial solution at best to the problem of man in society. 
The self remained for Stendhal too much a part of the social fabric for him to feel that 
he had found in his beylisme anything but an enforced and far from satisfactory 
compromise with happiness as it elsewhere conceived by him. For there clearly persists 
in Stendhal's mind the conviction that 'il y a une certaine chose nommee vertu dont il 
faut aussi se souvenir quelquefois quand on pretend etre heureux.'149 His writings to 
the end carry numerous evocations of 'virtue' such as it had been defined in his earliest 
notes and letters:
[...] vertueux dans le vrai sens du mot (c'est-a-dire contribuant au bonheur du
genre humain)... [Histoire de lapeinture en Italie]
[...] vertu (utilite du plus grand nombre). [Rome, Naples et Florence]
[...] cette morale simple qui n'appelle vertu que ce qui est utile aux hommes. [Les
Cenci]
[...] la vertu la plus pure, 1 'utilite de tous... [Memoires d'un touriste]150
What is it to be virtuous? It is to set the well-being of the many above the well-being of 
the few and to act in consequence. In a letter of 26 March 1820 to Adolphe de Mareste, 
Stendhal draws upon this rationale, condemning outright the politics of 'the happy 
few': '[trouver] reellement du plaisir a faire le mal du plus grand nombre, pour le plaisir 
du petit, id est ultra.'151 In De VAmour, a chapter is devoted to the question. 'Moi, 
j'honore du nom de vertu l'habitude de faire des actions penibles et utiles aux 
autres.'152 Even as late as March 1841, in Stendhal's notes for Lamiel, we find 
reaffirmed this conception of 'la vertu (etre utile a son propre peril).'153 Yet the 
attachment to such a notion, however durable, was accompanied in Stendhal by a sharp
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awareness of its inherent idealism and ultimate impossibility. As early as 3 May 1804, 
Stendhal had confided in his diary that the time for such virtue was no more: 'Je sens 
que le temps est passe d'etre republicain.'154 To cling to an ideal while despairing of it 
would be the lot of a Stendhal who, in 1813, defines his 'Republic' still as 'le 
gouvemement qui existait a Rome durant les guerres puniques, ou le premier interet de 
tout le monde est la chose publique.'155 Here, in a remote, beleaguered, 
semi-legendary Rome, Stendhal identifies that 'single principle' — the metus hostilis 
— around which a genuinely communal interest could crystallise, 'cette cite des cceurs 
ou le prive s'absorbe dans le public, et l'individu disparait dans l'etat...’156
That Stendhal should choose Rome at the height of the Punic Wars as his model 
republic is significant. For the suggestion is frequently present in his writing that the 
apotheosis of the Republic is to be achieved only in a state of war. The beleaguered city 
state, under threat for its very existence, is the society which best gives expression to 
Stendhal's republican ideal. Here the man of extraordinary talent and energy could 
dispense these to the full in the service of a community whose interests lay in according 
the highest office to the most able. France, for a brief moment at least, had experienced 
something of the seige mentality to which Ancient Rome, in Stendhal's mythology, 
owed her virtues. 'Quand Bonaparte fit parler de lui,' reflects Julien Sorel, 'la France 
avait peur d'etre envahie; le merite militaire etait necessaire et a la mode'157
The argument that republican virtues are best fostered in adversity was a common 
one among Latin moral historians, who looked back to the struggle against Carthage 
notably as the moral apex of Republican Rome. The notion made a strong impression 
on Stendhal.158 For, as F.W.J. Hemmings recognises, there is a Cato, a 'stern 
republican Roman’, who co-exists in Stendhal with the 'dilettante-dandy'.159 Yet 
Stendhal's admiration for the Ancients, though genuine, lasting and highly idealised, is 
not uncritical. What the Republic of the Ancients — no less than that of the modems — 
gains in moral terms, it loses in aesthetic appeal.160 For nothing, by Stendhal's lights, 
was more inimical to artistic creation and the finer sensibilities than an excessive 
concern for the public good and the tyranny of the many over the few. On such 
grounds alone, Stendhal would have found objections aplenty to the best organised 
republic, even if — especially if — men were capable of observing its every 
stricture.161
While the Cato in Stendhal regretted Hannibal at the gates, the beyliste was 
prepared to take his pleasures where they were to be found, in the opera houses of Italy 
(where the ego reigns supreme and 'il n'y a point de societe')162 and the salons d la du 
Deffand (where 'on ne prend .plus interet a rien’).163 In this denial of the social 
dimension, concludes Michel Crouzet, 'il ne reste plus qu'une indifference civique
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souveraine, un ego-i‘sme enfin vainqueur, comme si la politique et l'idealisme 
humanitaire n'etaient qu'une agression contre le moi.'164 Where the demands of society 
and of the self cannot be balanced, they must be seen as mutually hostile.165 The gulf 
between theory and reality is never more acutely felt by Stendhal than on this question. 
For,-as Irving Howe argues so well, there coexist in Stendhal's political vision two 
quite distinct forms of liberalism, 'a pure liberalism, a liberalism not yet tarnished by 
history, a liberalism of concept to set off against the liberalism of practice, which he 
rightly finds both timid and absurd.'166 In La Chartreuse de Parme, it falls to Ferrante 
Palla to articulate in an Italian context what had long been Stendhal's judgment of 
post-Revolutionary France:
Je me suis dit, elle n'aime pas la republique, elle qui m'est superieure par l'esprit 
autant que par les graces et la beaute. D'ailleurs, comment faire une republique 
sans republicans?167
The answer is the more resounding for being left unvoiced.
Increasingly antipathetic to any form of philosophical or political radicalism which 
might seek to 'regenerate' man, Stendhal was to make of necessity a virtue in 
relinquishing the notion that 'The Republic' could provide a viable order for France.168 
Though Fernand Rude argues the case for Stendhal's sympathy with Fourierism in the 
Memoires d'un touriste, such sympathy as can be divined does not go without a very 
substantial measure of cynicism. However well Fourier may have conceived of his 
Associations, he remains a 'reveur sublime' who has not taken account of the first 
principles of human nature. His fault, Stendhal suggests, is the fault of all those pious 
reformers who, though they may be admirable in their sincerity, remain consigned to 
self-delusion and failure:
Fourier, vivant dans la solitude, ou, ce qui est la meme chose, avec des disciples 
n'osant faire une objection (d'ailleurs il ne repondait jamais aux objections), n'a 
pas vu que dans chaque village un fripon actif et beau parleur (un Robert Macaire) 
se mettra a la tete de l'association, et pervertira toutes ses belles consequences.169
So much for Stendhal's faith in collective human enterprise by the late 1830s.170 
We come back always in this context to his rejection of the possibility that men could be 
invited, cajoled, or even compelled to sink their differences in some common pool of 
human experience. The eighteenth century to which Stendhal holds allegiance presents 
two images of man that are primafacie opposed. As I.F. Knight argues in her study of 
Condillac, the thinkers of the Enlightenment sought not to account for men, ideas, or 
institutions in terms of their uniqueness, but rather to 'find the common ground which 
constituted [their] universality.'171 A.O. Lovejoy stresses likewise that the 
Enlightenment was, in its dominant tendency, an age devoted to seeking 'a standard 
conceived as universal, uncomplicated, immutable, uniform for every rational
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being.'172 Yet underlying — and indeed sustaining — this search for common 
principles of thought and behaviour, was the recognition, brought home by 
Montesquieu, Buffon, Du Bos and others, of the actual and observable 1differentness 
of men and their opinions and valuations and institutions.'173 For the way had long 
been opened up towards the conclusion not that men were indissociable in nature, but 
that, as Francine Marill Alberes puts it, 'il n'y a que pluralite et multiplicite d'individus; 
la seule constante d’un monde changeant prend la forme proteenne de la diversite et de 
la variete.'174
The challenge to the eighteenth century lay at the junction of these two views of 
man, at the point where the superficial diversity of men might be resolved within the 
wider conception of a human nature that was held to be 'fundamentally the same under 
all the accidental accretions of time and place.'175 If there lay the challenge, there too, 
according to Stendhal's witness, lay the failure. By the time it reaches Cabanis, man's 
individualism is beyond redemption. With the sanction of physiology at his beck, the 
human being could more and more dig himself in behind the ramparts of his own 
singularity, behind what Lovejoy calls 'the sanctity of one’s idiosyncrasy.'176 Men 
might aspire to be equally happy, and it was Stendhal's sincere wish that they should: 
but they could never be happily equal.177 Increasingly Stendhal would come to hold the 
view that the principal objection to 'the regenerative power of education as an 
instrument of social enlightenment and progress' (which, as Van Duzer observes, was 
fundamental to the ideologue ideal)178 lay not in the regimes by which men were 
governed, but within man, each man, himself. Morality no less than Art becomes, in 
the words of C.W. Thompson, 'un dialogue fragile entre des subjectivites radicalement 
isolees.'179 We are so many prisoners of our own sensations, of our own singular — 
egoistic — experience of the world. The sharp expression given to this rationale in the 
1853 edition of the Promenades dans Rome urges the conclusion that, 'tant que nous 
sommes, etres vulgaires ou grands hommes, nous sommes emprisonnes dans nos 
propres sensations, et encore plus emprisonnes dans les jugements que nous en 
tirons.'180 Thus the individual may counter every moral and aesthetic precept with the 
objection that, whilst the latter must assume any situation to be the same for others as it 
is for him, 'the situation never is the same for others because he himself is a unique 
factor in any situation.'181 It requires no more than this simple reasoning to give every 
man the means of replacing what J.A. Brunton calls 'the "Valid for one, valid for all" 
principle' with the central — irredeemably individualistic — axiom of Egoism, i-fche "I 
am I" principle.'182
Nor would it require a radically different rationale to find in the history to which 
Stendhal’s writings stand as testament little cause for celebrating the unity of mankind. 
Whatever the Revolutionaries' opposition to scholastic generalisation, theirs was no
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less an ambition, as Henri Peyre reminds us, 'to proclaim universal truths and 
formulate principles for all men.'183 If the vicissitudes of 1789 to 1815 bore out 
anything for Stendhal, however, it was that the uniformitarian vision of man was but an 
illusion — a 'pious fraud' — masking the reality, of a Humanity rent by ineradicable 
divisions. The self, it was clear, could no more be defined in quite the same way as 
indissociable from the commonwealth'of men. Of the French post-Revolutionary 
conscience, George H. Mead writes:
First of all, the discouraged self that had undertaken to rebuild the world on the 
basis of rights, the self that had followed out the gospel of Rousseau in attempting 
to reconstruct society on the basis of what was universal in the individual, on the 
basis not only of that which he found in himself but which he recognized in others, 
found that the undertaking had failed. It was not possible to build up a new 
community on the abstract rights of men.184
The American Revolution might, as Mead recognises, argue against such a bleak 
conclusion; but for those emerging from the Revolutionary years in France, there was 
urgent need for some revision of principle. Such a revision, in Bernard Plongeron's 
judgment, was to spring from 'un pessimisme foncier a propos de la nature humaine 
"ondoyante et diverse”, que partagent generalement les rescapes de l'aventure 
revoliitionnaire.'185 It is as tempting as it is perilous, through the lens of historical 
hindsight, to descry thus the mood of a whole people and period. In the pages of 
Stendhal, however, the attitude in question finds a resounding echo. Hence the 
sweepingly 'philosophical' allusion to himself, in I'Histoire de la peinture en Italie, as 
'celui qui, ballotte par les revolutions, est devenu a ses depens juste appreciateur du 
merite de l'homme.’186 Those austere republicans who people Stendhal's writings, and 
for whom he reserves admiration and derision in equal measure, merely persist, as 
Rene Girard puts it, in 'les illusions du XVIIIe siecle sur l'excellence de la nature 
humaine.' They fail, in the face of all evidence, to recognise that 'les plus beaux fruits 
de la reflexion ideologique seront toujours gates par le ver de l'irrationnel.'187 
Stendhal, for his part, makes what he deems the necessary aggiornamento in his 
thinking, as two notable passages penned in 1814 attest:
J'entends par mes republicains [...] les hommes dont le moral s'est forme sous 
l'influence de la Revolution et qui, sous l'empire des leQons terribles et diverses 
qu'elle a donnees au monde, sont devenus des royalistes constitutionnels.
L'experience de la Revolution et le despotisme de Buonaparte avaient apaise 
l'effervescence de leurs tetes; ce n'etaient plus ces hommes sans ffein qui croyaient 
qu'un peuple etait libre lorsqu'il avait le droit de se gouverner lui-meme; nous 
n'avions plus de Brutus, et nous l'avons bien prouve...188
So much for the revival of Republican Rome. In an age when, as he would declare 
in I’Histoire de la peinture en Italie, 'la mode est pour les vertus negatives,'189 the
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high-minded ideals of Stendhal's youth- could not but be radically undermined. In a 
note consigned circa 1818 to the margins of Mme de S tael's Considerations sur les 
principaux evenements de la Revolution frangaise, we find an appreciably shrunken 
representation of the Virtue which the young Stendhal had so vigorously lauded as the 
height of civic engagement. 'Pompeuse betise,' he retorts to Mme de Stael's defence of 
a virtue divorced from self-interest: 'etre vertueux c'est ne nuire aux interets de 
personne.'190 The shift from an essentially positive, socially orientated ethic to mere 
abstinence from harm is telling.
Stendhal, as Irving Howe observes, 'is a writer of the moment when a great 
historical experience has reached its point of exhaustion':
Such a writer can no longer believe in the unity of society, neither the unity
claimed by those in power, which is patently a fraud, nor the unity envisaged by
. those in opposition, which now seems distant and chimerical.191
Stendhal comes at the end not only of a great historical experience but of great 
philosophical enterprise too. The Enlightenment, with its ideals and aspirations for the 
betterment of mankind, is ever-present as the backcloth to his thought. Bom early 
enough to partake of the optimism which had inspired a previous generation, he was to 
outgrow his faith in all that eighteenth-century philosophy had seemed to promise. 
Taken as a whole, Stendhal's writings provide a theatre in which the Age of Reason, 
with its abstract vision of man as a quantum of passionate impulse and rational intellect, 
seeks to come to terms with a new age of science and medicine in which it was 
becoming mandatory to treat human nature as a psycho-physiological and not a 
metaphysical object of inquiry.192 The change both in premise and conclusion to which 
this gave rise called into question much that had been postulated about man's nature and 
his capacity for the moral and social regeneration that was the ambition of the 
philosophes and Ideologues alike. From a concept of man based on supposed 
universals to a concept of the self as a unique 'pathological' case, the transition is 
starkly portrayed in Stendhal's literary output from 1800 to 1842.193
At every stage in its development, Stendhal's thought can be defined either by its 
kinship with or its departure from the philosophy that is expressed in his early 
notebooks, diaries and letters. Irving Howe makes an important point — and one 
which has not always been recognised — when he argues that Stendhal's cult of energy 
'follows logically from his gradual loss of belief in the unity of society or the 
redemptive power of the people.’ It is amid the ruins of an intensely civic ideal that 
Stendhal constructs his defence of energetic individualism, with all its admiration for 
'the exceptional man, the hero who surmounts history rather than the people who bear 
it.'194 From virtus to virtu, from a collective ethic to one of resolute individualism,
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from a belief in the indefinite perfectibility of man and society to a cynical and 
quasi-fatalistic view of the human condition, Stendhal's thought is an exercise in 
disenchantment.195 Philosophy, which had begun by commending itself as a panacea 
for the ills of man and society, ends as a study in disillusion laying bare the severe 
limitations to the improvements that could be wrought upon mankind.196 Between the 
"’ami des hommes", soucieux du "bonheur commun'” whom Fernand Rude discovers 
in the young Henri Beyle,197 and the Stendhal who, as Georges Blin puts it, 'ne veut 
pas d'autre source de la valeur que le Moi, ni d'autre motif dans le Moi que le 
"plaisir",'198 there is much to sustain Emile Faguet's fine summation:
En un mot c'est un homme du XVIIIe siecle, moins l'optimisme.199
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CONCLUSION
We began this study by acknowledging the many-sided and complex nature of 
Stendhal's thought. So, too, must we end it. It has become something of a fashion 
among Stendhal scholars at once to lament and to extol a mercurial quality which 
militates against the unequivocal Conclusion.1 'No one who ventures to speak or write 
about Stendhal,' avers F.W.J. Hemmings, 'can fail to be painfully aware at almost 
every turn of how much he is forced to disregard, of the many reservations and 
attenuations that have to be suppressed.'2 The remark articulates admirably our 
sentiment on concluding this study. For we are conscious, despite all that has been 
said, of all that remains to be said; conscious of the fact that we have presented here but 
one reader's interpretation of a mind that has been defined with justice as 'mobile, 
versatile, contradictoire’.3
What we have sought above all to demonstrate in the foregoing pages is that, 
whatever definitions one assigns to Stendhal's thought, whatever philosophical 
categories one endeavours to make him fit, whatever debts one traces to specific 
thinkers or movements, his philosophy remains a highly personal one, both more and 
less than the sum of its parts. It is a philosophy in the popular sense of a set of 
reflections and opinions, expressed through philosophical concepts but addressed from 
the perspective of complex commitments; not philosophy properly speaking, namely 
engagement in detached, sustained argument. In Stendhal's 'philosophy', the most 
incompatible elements coexist. Stendhal is a determinist who sets a premium on the 
will, a materialist who is not above invoking the 'soul', a utilitarian who scorns base 
utility, a philosophical egoist who clings to an ideal of disinterested virtue, an idolater 
of demonstrable fact who yet avows a cult of the ineffable. Terms such as 
'materialism', 'sensationalism' or 'naturalism' are no more susceptible of easy 
classification in Stendhal's case than is his shifting utilitarian ethic or his ambivalent 
pronouncements on man's capacity for self-determination. Stendhal keeps faith with no 
single philosopher or philosophical school, but develops his own very particular view 
of the world and of man's place within it. If by the term 'disciple' we understand the 
faithful exponent of a detailed body of philosophical precepts, then Stendhal is no 
disciple. He remains as resolute in resisting the 'ism' as his commentators have been in 
thrusting it upon him. His thought, often more orthodox in its tenets than he suspects, 
presents an uneasy synthesis of two widely divergent traditions, the radical philosophy 
of the eighteenth-century materialists and what might be termed conventional ethical 
psychology. The predispositions and assumptions which Stendhal carries with him into 
his reading of philosophy, if they undergo a marked evolution, prove nonetheless an 
enduring obstacle to his assimilation into the school of thought for which his name has 
become a byword. The construction which he places upon such age-old concepts as
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'reason' and 'will', 'self-interest' and 'virtue', sets him at some considerable remove 
from the mechanistic materialism of Hobbes, the environmental determinism of 
Helvetius, or the sensationalist ethic of the Ideologues. Arthur Chuquet, in considering 
the aptitude of the term 'Romantic' to define Stendhal's art, concludes by throwing 
away the mould and declaring Stendhal 'un independant, un irregulier qui n'appartient a 
aucune ecole, a aucun cenacle, et ne suit la banniere de personne.'4 There is a truth in 
such a remark which is as readily applicable to Stendhal the 'thinker' as it is to Stendhal 
the literary artist
Acutely — rather, perhaps, than deeply — concerned by the philosophical 
questions of his day, Stendhal never made it his pretension to forge a systematic 
world-view. His was an ostentatious effort, on the contrary, to eschew all suggestion 
of the esprit de systime. If he is to be defined as a 'philosopher', it is as a philosopher 
sui generis — and one who, from beginning to end, remains curiously at odds with his 
medium. While there is evidence aplenty in Stendhal's writings of a strong and abiding 
reverence for philosophy and science, there is also a keen awareness of the atrophying 
effects of seeking only the 'knowable'. The practitioners of philosophy whom he exalts 
as masters of their science in turn feel the biting edge of his criticism, the contention 
that they are cold, unfeeling technicians dedicated to the reification of life in its every 
particular, the unmasking of all illusion. The dehumanising reductionism upon which 
their philosophy trades constitutes the gravamen of charges levelled against Condillac, 
Helvetius and the whole sensationalist tradition to which Stendhal is commonly held to 
have been an unquestioning adherent.
Such reservations notwithstanding, it is clear that the philosophy by which 
Stendhal was influenced occupies an indispensable place in his writings. We have 
endeavoured to take account of what we consider foremost among the ideas which 
inform his writings, and to reflect the partisan element in Stendhal's philosophical 
proclivities. We have become accustomed in our age to regarding philosophy as a 
remote, esoteric discipline. In Stendhal's day, there was no domain of human interest 
which could not be brought within the purview of the philosopher. The mind-body 
problem, God and the soul, the place of Man in Nature, the uniformity and diversity of 
species, the influence of the physical and cultural environments, free will and 
determinism, self-interest and the utilitarian ethic: all were issues which, against the 
backdrop of a rapidly developing world of the sciences, presented themselves to 
Stendhal not as arcane points of academic dispute but as real and immediate concerns.
Stendhal's enduring preoccupation with such issues, his later claim that he had 
brought his intellect to bear upon the same essential corpus of ideas throughout, should 
not mislead us into concluding that his thought failed to develop, or that he did not
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question, revise, renounce on occasion his convictions. Beneath the apparent constancy 
of Stendhal's philosophical disposition can be discerned tensions, contradictions, and a 
very considerable evolution. One best appreciates the later Stendhal, it is often argued, 
through knowledge of the earlier. Such appreciation, we contend, is to be sought as 
much in the distance which separates the two as in the ideas which unite them. Stendhal 
himself, it must be recognised, lays claim to none of those labels which, beloved of 
scholars, would freeze his thought in a particular frame. It is a curious irony that the 
one unequivocal definition which, in 1829, Stendhal did elect to apply to himself— 'je 
suis un philosophe de l'ecole de Cabanis'5 — should have received such short shrift at 
the hands of his critics. We have attempted to draw out the implications of this remark, 
and to accord Cabanis something of the place which we find him so frequently denied 
by Stendhal scholars.
To this end, we have sought to trace Stendhal's progression from a highly 
abstractive, somewhat mechanistic notion of Man to a much more naturalistic 
conception of the living individual. From the narrow constraints and ultimate sterility of 
his earlier reasoning, Stendhal advanced, under the aegis of Cabanis, to much richer 
philosophical pasture. Here metaphysical man was to be forsworn in favour of natural 
man. By embracing the integrity and specificity of the living organism, Stendhal defies 
the notion that the human being is no more than an ingenious machine awaiting 
stimulation from the external world. The corrective which Cabanis brings to Stendhal's 
other maitres d penser on this question is crucial. It is to the physician Cabanis, 
certainly, and not to the metaphysician Hobbes, that we should look when seeking to 
define the nature of Stendhal's much evoked materialism. Though Stendhal early 
recognises the proximity between the human and animal realms, Cabanis opens up a 
whole new perspective on man as a higher form of animal. Stendhal's theory of energy 
and perceptions of Italy, we have argued, owe much to the evolution of his thought in 
this respect.
All of this amounts, we hope, to a study which sheds light upon some areas of 
Stendhal's thought that have become obscured by a tendency to accept on trust his 
adherence to a particular set of philosophical values. To define Stendhal as a thinker in 
the sensationalist-materialist tradition of Hobbes, Helvetius or d'Holbach is to re-cast 
him in a mould which he simply refuses to fit. To make of him an ideologue after the 
fashion of Tracy is to overlook a number of fundamental aspects of his thought which 
confound any such designation. We have sought throughout to contain Stendhal within 
no single definition, but to confront with equal scruple what we perceive to be the 
consistencies and contradictions alike in his thought. We leave it to others to contend 
the place which Stendhal should occupy in any history of ideas. What is certain, 
however, is that his writings provide a rich vein of commentary upon the philosophical
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questions confronting his age. From his earliest journals and letters through to the latest 
of his published works, Stendhal’s writings commend themselves to the student of the 
history of ideas, not for the manner in which he resolves the problems addressed 
therein, but for the very difficulties which he encounters in seeking to resolve these. 
The complexity of Stendhal's response to the range of philosophical issues with which 
we have dealt in the foregoing pages has long discouraged the present author from 
aspiring to draw this study to any neat and all-embracing conclusion. If the net result of 
our endeavour is merely to suggest how much may yet be done to amplify and elucidate 
our understanding of Stendhal's thought in all its many ramifications, then we should 
consider it conclusion enough.
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NOTES TO CONCLUSION
1. See in this vein Clewes, p. 42; Adams, p. xviii; Wood, p. 166; Felix-Faure, p. 
13; Richard, p. 116; Crouzet, 'L'Apolitisme stendhalien, pp. 221, 222.
2. Stendhal: A Study of His Novels, p. 95.
3. Blum, p. 10.
4. Op. cit., p. 286. M. Crouzet, in discussing Stendhal's politics, signals 'ce desir
de n'adherer a une doctrine qu'a la condition de pouvoir en sortir, et d'en faire
un repoussoir, et non une partialite' ('L'Apolitisme stendhalien, p. 221).
5. JL, III, 181.
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